Appendices: Police Investigating Police - Final Public Report

1. Kingsclear Youth Training Centre Final Report

In October 2007, the CPC released the Final Report of the public interest investigation into complaints received with regard to RCMP investigations of alleged sexual abuse at the Kingsclear Youth Training Centre in New Brunswick.

The investigation examined allegations of an improper RCMP investigation of alleged criminal conduct by Staff Sergeant Clifford McCann, Kingsclear staff and residents, as well as allegations that RCMP officers engaged in activities designed to cover up the alleged criminal conduct. The final report found that the RCMP's criminal investigations were inadequate to such an extent that they created a perception of a cover-up.

Among the many recommendations, the CPC advised that:

• "any sensitive or large-scale investigation into allegations which impact on the community's trust in the RCMP should be tasked to another police service or, at the very least, to a team of RCMP officers from another region or province who would have the appropriate experience and who would be unfamiliar with the member under investigation. This would assist in limiting the perception of bias and ensure that public trust in the RCMP is maintained."
• In reply to the abovementioned recommendation, the RCMP Commissioner agreed, stating: "appropriate policies and practices need to be in place to provide for independent investigations" and that a development of policies addressing the matter of such investigations is "under way."^{Footnote 1}. A new External Investigations or Review Policy (outlined in greater detail in the next chapter) was developed and is anticipated to be published shortly.

2. Chair-Initiated Complaint into the Shooting Death of Ian Bush

In October 2005, Ian Bush, a 22-year-old mill worker, was shot to death by an RCMP Constable in Houston, British Columbia. In September 2006, a CPC review was launched into the circumstances surrounding Ian Bush's death as well as the integrity of the subsequent criminal investigation.

In the Final Report issued on November 28, 2007, the following findings, among others, were presented:

• The RCMP Major Crime Unit members who investigated Mr. Bush's death did so in a manner free from any conflict of interest, bias or partiality.
• The North District Major Crime Unit conducted a highly professional investigation into Mr. Bush's death and exemplified a best practice for major crime investigations.
• The CPC cleared the RCMP officer involved of any wrongdoing.

Key recommendations included:

• The RCMP develop policy that provides direction to on-scene RCMP members in major cases involving investigation of police conduct, i.e. situations where the police investigate the police, including the need to ensure real and perceived impartiality.

The CPC's findings were met with disappointment on the part of the Bush family, who decided to proceed with a civil lawsuit against the RCMP, the B.C. Solicitor General and the B.C. Attorney General.

There are two other salient cases that are subject to a CPC review but currently remain underway with a Final Report and recommendations pending. Below is a summary of the two cases, for information purposes.

3. Chair-Initiated Complaint into the Shooting Death of Kevin St. Arnaud

On December 19, 2004, Kevin St. Arnaud, a robbery suspect, was fatally shot by Constable Ryan Shermetta, a member of the Vanderhoof RCMP Detachment in British Columbia. The shooting was investigated by the "E" Division North District Major Crime Unit based in Prince George.

In January 2005, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association filed a public complaint against the RCMP alleging that Mr. St. Arnaud was shot without justification. Because there were three investigative processes relating to the case already in place, the RCMP Commissioner decided against a public complaint investigation.

In February 2006, the regional Crown counsel stated that no criminal charges would be laid against the involved RCMP officer. As a result, in March 2006, the CPC initiated a complaint into the events surrounding the death of Kevin St. Arnaud. In January 2007, the coroner's inquest brought the adequacy of the original criminal investigation into question and the CPC added to the complaint the allegation of inadequate investigation conducted by the RCMP.

The investigation conducted by the RCMP public complaints investigator and the CPC file analyst revealed facts that led to the suspension of the RCMP officer involved in the incident, as well as a referral of the investigation to Crown counsel for possible perjury charges.

4. Chair-Initiated Complaint into the In-Custody Death of Robert Dziekanski

On October 14, 2007, in an attempt to subdue a man at the Vancouver International Airport, four RCMP officers deployed a conducted energy weapon. The man, a Polish immigrant who did not speak either of Canada's official languages, died at the scene. The event was videotaped by a bystander and broadcast around the world, causing public outrage about the use of conducted energy weapons and the RCMP officers' handling of the incident.

In November 2007 the CPC launched a complaint into the conduct of the RCMP members present at the Vancouver International Airport on October 14, 2007, and the adequacy of the subsequent criminal investigation. In May 2008, an inquiry was launched headed by retired Court of Appeal Judge Thomas Braidwood. In a December 12, 2008 announcement, B.C. Crown prosecutors declared that none of the RCMP officers involved would be criminally charged for their actions.

The CPC review and the Braidwood inquiry both remain ongoing. The CPC report is anticipated to be released in the near future.

Alberta: Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT)

Mandate

• ASIRT's mandate is to investigate incidents of complaints involving serious injury or death of any person, and matters that are serious or sensitive in nature, that resulted or may have resulted from the actions of a police officer.

Background

• The establishment of ASIRT was part of Alberta's Premier Ed Stelmach's plan to provide safe and secure communities. In the spring of 2007, the Department of the Solicitor General and Public Security created ASIRT in order to "ensure excellence and independence in the investigation of matters referred by the Director of Law Enforcement."
• The model became another option for the Director to use with a view to independent investigations of serious and potentially criminal conduct of police. The agency became operational in January 2008.

Jurisdiction

• ASIRT has jurisdiction over all sworn police officers and police services in Alberta. Pursuant to section 45 of the Police Act, "police service" includes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and a regional, provincial or municipal police service established under an enactment of another province or territory.
• It is made up of two operational units. One is based in Edmonton to cover northern Alberta; the other is in Calgary to investigate incidents in the southern part of the province.
• ASIRT is not a review mechanism. As its Director Clifton G. Purvis points out, "our business is not to review policy." Police policies and procedures may be assessed only in conjunction with a police investigation.

Legislative basis

• ASIRT was established by Section 46.1 of the Police Act. This section also provides for other options, such as requesting that an officer from an outside police agency to assist in the investigation (Section 46.1 (2) a), requesting that an outside police agency conduct the investigation (Section 46.1 (2) b), or establishing a civilian panel to observe, monitor or review the investigation (Section 46.1 (2) c).

Handling of complaint process

• Once an investigation has been completed, the ASIRT director reviews the results of investigations to ensure completeness and fairness. A report is then forwarded to the office of the Crown prosecutor requesting an opinion on charges. After the director receives the opinion, he decides what charges if any will result from the investigation.
• According to section 45 of the Act, "If, after causing the complaint to be investigated, the chief of police is of the opinion that the actions of a police officer may constitute an offence under an Act of the Parliament of Canada or the Legislature of Alberta, the chief shall refer the matter to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General." If the chief determines that the actions constitute a contravention of the regulations governing the discipline or the performance of duty of police officers, the chief shall conduct a hearing into the matter.
• Section 46.1(4) of the Act dictates that "if the chief of police or police officer in charge of the police service conducting an investigation under subsection (2) (b) or (d) is of the opinion that the actions of the police officer are the subject of the investigation constitute a) and offence under an Act of Parliament of Canada or the legislature of Alberta, the chief or police officer shall i) refer the matter to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, and ii) advise the commission and the chief of police of the police service under investigation of the chief's or police officer's findings, unless the Minister of Justice and Attorney General otherwise directs."
• Any contravention of regulations on police performance or service policies will be referred to the chief of the police service under investigation or the commission.

Statistical analysis

• In 2008, 21 files were opened and four concluded.
• In November 2008, ASIRT has officially completed its first investigation.
• On January 6, 2009, ASIRT has laid criminal charges for the first time. An RCMP officer was charged with sexual assault. The ASIRT investigator was not an RCMP member.

Structure

• ASIRT is led by a civilian director, Clifton G. Purvis, a seconded Crown prosecutor from Alberta Justice. Reporting to him are: a civilian assistant director, two civilian criminal intelligence analysts, four civilian investigators, ten sworn police officers (from the Calgary Police Service, Edmonton Police Service, and the RCMP).
• The director may also engage public overseers from the community to ensure independence in the investigative process.

Budget/financing

• In the most recent fiscal year, ASIRT's one-time start up costs totalled $3,930,560.
• Its annual operating costs are $2,973,280.

Investigator credentials/training

• ASIRT is a body composed of police officers and civilians which "requires expertise valuable to the spirit and intent of the unit." It is headed by a civilian director that is legally trained with significant experience in the area of criminal prosecutions. This director oversees an elite team of civilian and sworn professionals.

Policies and procedures

• ASIRT is currently developing a policy and procedure manual.

Additional observations

• In the words of Clifton G. Purvis,
  • It's really important to strike a balance between investigative expertise and independence. A truly integrative unit reporting to a civilian ensures independence. It's unrealistic for our community to assure the cost and timeliness of investigations [that a separate, independent agency composed entirely of civilians would entail].
• The advantage of a body like ASIRT is that its integrated approach gives it "immense strength." It can utilize existing RCMP resources and immediately engage expertise and timely arrival of investigators.

British Columbia: Independent Observer Program (IOP)

Mandate

• The mandate of the Independent Observer Program (commonly referred to as IOP) is to provide "competent, professional and timely observations" regarding the impartiality of RCMP investigations of their own members in cases involving serious injury or death, as well as other cases that are "high profile and sensitive in nature."

Background

• Increasing public concern regarding the accountability and impartiality of police members investigating other police members. A demand for a transparent and credible investigative process in cases involving serious injury or death led to the proposal that the RCMP combine with the capabilities of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC).
• As a result, the Independent Observer Pilot Project (IOPP) became operational in British Columbia on April 1, 2007, an initiative that would assess the impartiality of RCMP investigations when the actions of one of its members resulted in serious injury or death, and in other cases that are "high profile or sensitive in nature."
• Today a fully established program, as of January 2009, the Independent Observer Program (IOP) has been deployed 10 times.

Jurisdiction

• The RCMP's "E" Division in British Columbia is under the jurisdiction of the IOP. This includes approx. 5,900 regular and 1,700 civilian members and public service employees.
• In addition, pursuant to the 2005 Public Safety Cooperation Protocol signed between the RCMP and the Assembly of First Nations, the IOP commits the Aboriginal population.
• The IOP was established in conjunction with the RCMP's Office of Investigative Standards and Practices (OISP).

Legislative basis

• Section 37 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act outlines standards against which the conduct of the members of RCMP is examined. These include:
  • Line management
  • Appropriate level of response
  • Timeliness of the response
  • Conduct (discipline standard set by section 37 of the Act)

Handling of incident

• The investigation of the incident is initiated by the RCMP Major Crime Unit.
• The RCMP member in charge of the OISP is responsible for notifying the CPC Independent Observer. Together, they attend briefings offered by the Major Crimes Unit's Team Leader within the first 24 hours, and thereafter as needed.
• The OISP member oversees the competency of the RCMP investigation. The Independent Observer can make recommendations to the OISP member and observe and assess the impartiality of the investigation. The Observer, however, does not participate directly in any phase of the investigation process.
• The Independent Observer assesses the impartiality of the investigation against the agreed upon criteria, which include the following:
  • Line management
    • Were there any perceived conflicts of interest between the investigators and those subject to the investigation?
  • Appropriate level of response
    • Was the response of the investigators proportionate to the gravity of the incident?
    • Were the investigators appropriately qualified?
  • Timeliness of the response
    • Was the response of the investigative team done in a timely fashion to the incident?
  • Conduct
    • Was the conduct of the investigators in pursuance of section 37 of the Act? Section 37 sets out discipline standards of RCMP employees, which include such provisions as respect (section 37 a), integrity of the law (section 37 b), incorruptibility (section 37 f), and courtesy (section 37 g of the Act).
• The Independent Observer provides the findings and the Chair of the Commission reports those to the RCMP.

Statistical analysis

• In its first year of operation, the Independent Observer was involved in six investigations. In all of them, the Observer had no concerns regarding their impartiality.
• There were 15 internal "E" Division investigations that did not involve the Observer.
• In December 2008, the Observer was deployed outside British Columbia for the first time at the request of Yukon's "M" Division to investigate an in-custody death of an individual in Whitehorse.
• As of January 2009, the Observer was deployed 10 times and found no concerns with the RCMP impartiality.

Structure

• The Deputy Commissioner of "E" Division and the Chair of the CPC are in charge of a continuous review of the IOP, and shall meet on an as-needed basis.
• The Senior Director, Operations and the RCMP person in charge of the OISP manage the daily operations of the IOP.

Budget/financing

• No data is available as to the financing and budget of the IOP.

Investigator credentials/training

• According to the CPC, the background of a CPC Independent Observer should include:
  • Legal training, or
  • University degree in criminology or policing in addition to experience in policing practices, and
  • Significant experience in the area of public complaints relating to the police,
  • Experience in the RCMP or other police investigative courses, such as Major Case Management, is an asset.

Policies and procedures

• The Observer reports directly to the Senior Director, Operations.
• The CPC Chair, Vice-Chair, the Executive Director and the Communications Manager also see the report. The latter keeps the media updated as appropriate.

Additional observations

• In June 2008, a review of the IOP following one year of its operation was completed.
• It determined that the IOP is effectively fulfilling its mandate and advised the CPC to explore the possibility of establishing the IOP in other RCMP divisions "on a pilot project basis."

British Columbia: Police Complaint Commissioner (PCC)

Mandate

• The Police Complaint Commissioner is an independent officer of the legislature, assigned to provide civilian oversight of the police complaint process that pertains to members of municipal police force in British Columbia.

Background

• PCC was established in 1998 pursuant to the Police Act, following the recommendations of the Oppal Report (Closing the Gap: Policing the Community).
• In 1992, the Attorney General ordered the creation of a Commission of Inquiry Into Policing in British Columbia, led by Mr. Justice Wallace T. Oppal.
• Oppal's Report was issued in 1994. Justice Oppal noted, among other things, widespread concerns on the part of both the public and the police in regard to the complaint procedure and police discipline system.
• According to Oppal's report, the public in British Columbia demanded police accountability whereas the police perceived the complaint system of the time as "unfair."
• Justice Oppal recommended the establishment of a police complaint commissioner "operating at the level of an ombuds person," accountable to the legislature, who would oversee all police investigations and whose office would be completely independent of the police force, the government, and private interests.
• Between 1994 and 1998, the Oppal Report's recommendations were subject to a facilitated process, conducted by Dr. John Hogarth, with the aim of attempting to achieve consensus among stakeholders on a new Police Act.
• The consensus document passed effective July 1, 1998 enacted many of Oppal's recommendations, but omitted several important recommendations. For example, the new Police Complaint Commissioner was not given the power to conduct his own independent investigations and had no power to overrule flawed or inadequate decisions by a discipline authority. Oppal's recommendation that police officers be under an express duty to cooperate with an investigation was also left out of the new statute.
• In July 1998, amendments to the Police Act established the Police Complaint Commissioner as an independent officer of the legislature.
• In July 2005, the British Columbia Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General John Les ordered a review of the police complaints process in the province. B.C Appeal Court Judge Josiah Wood was appointed as the Director of the review.
• Judge Wood's final report, entitled Report on the Review of the Police Complaints Process in British Columbia, was released on February 7, 2007.
• The report contained 91 recommendations to improve the complaints system in B.C.
• Following the release of the report, the B.C. government announced changes to the province's Police Act to implement the report's recommendations.
• On March 4, 2009 the provincial government introduced amendments to the Police Act:
  • Bill 6 – 2009 Police (Misconduct, Complaints, Investigations, Discipline and Proceedings) Amendment Act, 2009 and
  • Bill 7 – 2009 Police (Police Complaint Commissioner) Amendment Act, 2009.
• B.C. Solicitor General John van Dongen stated that the proposed legislative changes address "virtually all" of Wood's recommendations.
• NDP public safety critic Mike Farnworth emphasized that the changes are insufficient because the RCMP, which constitutes the majority of patrol outside greater Vancouver and southern Vancouver Island, remains excluded from the Act's jurisdiction.
• There has been some criticism that the amendments fail to provide adequate civilian oversight since investigations into police misconduct remain largely in the hands of police officers. To that B.C. Solicitor General van Dongen replied that the creation of an entirely civilian investigator team is not practicable and implied that police investigators are sufficiently experienced for the task. The B.C. Solicitor General is confident that the province can strike a good balance of public and police involvement in the police complaints process.

Jurisdiction

• PCC has jurisdiction over municipal police officers within the province of British Columbia, with the exclusion of the RCMP.
• The flowing departments are within OPCC's jurisdiction:
  • Abbotsford Police Department
  • Central Saanich Police Service
  • BC Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit
  • Delta Police Department
  • South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority Police Service
  • Nelson City Police Department
  • New Westminster Police Service
  • Oak bay Police Service
  • Port Moody Police Department
  • Saanich Police Department
  • Stl'atl'imx Tribal Police Service
  • Vancouver Police Department
  • Victoria Police Department
  • West Vancouver Police Department
• The new legislation applies to municipal police officers, including those who are no longer part of the police force. Thus, all throughout the Act, reference is consistently made to "chief constable or former chief constable" and "member or former member." 'Former member' is defined as "a person who, at the time of the conduct of concern, was a member of a municipal police department but who after that time has retired or resigned and is no longer a member of any municipal police department" (76 (1)).
• Section 82 (4) specifically stipulates that complaints against former members or those that have retired or resigned, are still admissible.
• This was done mainly to remedy cases in the past when police officers retired or resigned to avoid suspension or other disciplinary actions

Legislative basis

• The powers and obligations of the Commissioner are outlined throughout Part 9 of the Police Act.
• Section 50 of the Act requires the Commissioner to prepare reports of complaint dispositions.
• Pursuant to section 55(3) of the Act, the Commissioner can order an investigation to be initiated.
• A key feature of the new legislation is section 89: "Mandatory external investigation of death and serious harm," which mandates that the PCC must be 'immediately' notified by a chief constable when a person "suffers serious harm" or dies while in police custody or as a result of police actions (89 (1)a), as well as when the serious injury or death of a person could be seen as the result of the conduct of a municipal police department or police operations (89 (1)b). This feature seemingly addresses the issue of public perception regarding police officer conduct-the very appearance of causality between a person's death and police operation dictates the involvement of the PCC.
• In such cases, the PCC must refer the investigation to a constable from an external police agency (89 (2)a) who: 1) has "no connection" with the matter (89 (4)a i) and 2) has a rank of equivalent or higher than the rank of the subject officer (89 (4)a ii).
• The PCC may also delegate a special provincial constable,^{Footnote 7} appointed by the Minister, to handle the investigation (89 (2)b).
• In addition, the PCC is obligated to direct an external investigation if a complaint against the chief constable or former chief constable is not resolved informally (91 (1)), if the PCC believes such investigation is in the public interest (92 (1)), or, regardless of whether a complaint was filed, "at any time information comes to the attention of the PCC concerning the conduct [of a police officer, which] would, if substantiated, constitute misconduct" (93 (1)).
• Should it consider necessary in the public interest, the PCC may observe the investigation (96 (a)) or designate an employee to observe it (96 (b)), "at any time before an investigation is initiated... or during the investigation."
• As part of this monitoring duty, the PCC may require from the investigating officer to be informed of the progress of the investigation (in addition to the investigator's duty to file reports with the PCC within 30 business days following the beginning of the investigation), require copy of "any information or record related to the investigation (Section 97 (1) a and b), provide advice to the investigative officer or the discipline authority regarding further investigative steps (97 (1)c)and, upon consultation with the investigator and the discipline authority concerned, direct that further investigation be taken (97 (1)d).
• Pursuant to section 97 (3), the investigative officer must comply with the requirements under subsection 1 (a) and (b) (be informed of progress and copies of any information/record).

Handling of complaint process

• The Police Act recognizes that investigations can arise in one of two ways: Form 1 complaint Investigations and Ordered Investigations.
  • Complaint Investigations arise when a member of the public lodges with a police department or the PCC a "Form 1" complaint alleging police misconduct. Any person may file a Form 1 complaint, whether or not they are personally affected by the conduct alleged. When a Form 1 is filed, the Police Act requires the allegation to be investigated by the police unless it is summarily dismissed, informally resolved or withdrawn.
  • Ordered Investigations are investigations initiated by Commissioner's Order for Investigation. Pursuant to section 55(3) of the Police Act, the Commissioner has the authority, whether or not a record of complaint has been lodged, to order an investigation into the conduct of a municipal constable, chief constable or deputy chief constable. An ordered investigation may arise from information received from a police department, or information received from a member of the public, even if that person has not formally lodged a complaint.
• In addition to the statutory routes to formal investigation mentioned above, the PCC has also developed administrative practices pertaining to what are known as "monitor files" and "non-lodged complaints". The "monitor file" process is an administrative understanding with police departments whereby the PCC is promptly notified in the event of a serious police-involved incident which has the potential for a Police Act investigation and public interest.
• The Police Act recognizes three types of complaints: Service or Policy Complaints, Internal Discipline Complaints and Public Trust Complaints.
  • Service or Policy Complaints involve the police department's policies, procedures and services.
  • Public Trust Complaints are complaints about individual police misconduct which would constitute a breach of the Code of Professional Conduct and which satisfy any of the following: (a) causes or has the potential to cause physical or emotional harm or financial loss to any person; (b) violates any person's dignity, privacy or other rights recognized by law; (c) is likely to undermine public confidence in the police. In 2007, approx. 90% of all allegations were characterized as Public Trust Complaints.
  • Internal Discipline Complaints are complaints about individual police misconduct which do not satisfy the definition of public trust complaint.
• Public trust complaints are processed pursuant to a detailed statutory code set out in Part 9, Division 4 of the Police Act. Internal discipline complaints are addressed in Part 9, Division 6 of the Police Act. Service or policy complaints are addressed in Part 9, Division 5. The Police Complaint Commissioner has differing oversight mandates respecting each Division.
• A public trust complaint may be resolved informally with the help of a professional mediator or with the assistance of the Investigator. When the complainant and the respondent sign a letter of agreement, the complaint is considered successfully resolved.
• A public trust complaint may also be summarily dismissed by a discipline authority if it is frivolous or vexatious, if there is no reasonable likelihood that further investigation would produce evidence of a public trust default, or if the alleged incident took place more than 12 months prior to filing a complaint. The PCC must review all summary dismissal decisions, and may order a complaint investigated despite summary dismissal.
• If it is not informally resolved or summarily dismissed, the complaint is investigated. The investigation must be completed within six months from the receipt of the complaint.
• The complaint procedure begins when a complainant must complete and lodge a "Form 1" Record of Complaint.
• If it is received by the PCC, a copy of the complaint is forwarded to the Chief Constable of the affected department; if the complaint is received by the police department, a copy of the complaint is sent to the PCC.
• The complaint is assigned to the police department's Professional Standards Section for investigation.
• The investigator must periodically update the complainant, the respondent and the PCC regarding the progress of the investigation.
• In exceptional cases, the PCC or the Discipline Authority (the Chief Constable of the respondent's department) may delegate the complaint to be investigated by an external agency, including the RCMP in its capacity as the provincial police force.
• A Public Hearing may be arranged in the following circumstances:
  • Upon a request from a complainant dissatisfied with the outcome of the investigation;
  • Upon a request of the respondent police officer who, as a result of the investigation, has received a disciplinary measure more severe than verbal reprimand;
  • If the PCC believes that a hearing is necessary in the public interest.
• When a public hearing is called, an Adjudicator is appointed to preside over the hearing, and Commission Counsel are appointed to lead evidence and present the case relative to the default. The complainant's role at a public hearing is limited to making argument after all the evidence has been called.
• An adjudicator's decision is subject to appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal on a question of law.
• Section 178 of the new proposed legislation further ensures that police officers shall cooperate with the PCC in the latter's exercise of powers or performance of duties. In addition, Section 101 (4) dictates that the member must comply with any request made by the investigating officer within five days of its receipt.
• Police officers' suspension without pay has been increased to 30 days without pay (126 (c)).
• The police officer subject to a public hearing or review on the record is not compellable to testify as a witness. However, "an adverse inference" may be drawn from the officer's failure to testify (151 (1)).
• To ensure that the PCC is able to monitor investigations in real time as opposed to ex post facto, the new legislation introduces "contemporaneous file monitoring system" which would allow the PCC to securely access and electronically monitor records of investigations and proceedings (182 (1)). The board of a municipal police department is ordered to ensure that this software is implemented, used and upgraded (182 (3)) and the PCC and the Minister are tasked with adoption of a set of standards regarding the rules of information exchange and maintenance of data integrity among all users (182 (4)).

Statistical analysis

• In 2007 the OPCC opened 476 individual complaint files.
• 493 individual complaint files were closed.
• 70 files were initiated by the Commissioner's Order for Investigation. 68 of those were made following the request of the originating police department.
• Among all opened files, 26 were Monitor Files and 28 Non-Lodged Files.
• 11 Police Act files were investigated by an external agency.

Structure

• The office is composed of eleven full-time employees. Until February 2009, it was led by the Police Complaint Commissioner, Dirk Ryneveld, Q.C. Mr. Ryneveld was replaced by Mr. Stan Lowe.
• PCC is assisted in his duties by the Deputy Commissioner, Commission Counsel, Senior Executive Assistant and Coordinator, Intake Services.
• There are also six Investigative Analysts.
• The length of the PCC's tenure was amended in the new proposed legislation. In contrast to the previous Police Act which dictated that the PCC holds office for 6 years and is not eligible for reappointment (Section 47), according to Bill 7, the PCC shall hold office for a period of five years and may be reappointed for another term of up to five years (47 (3)).

Budget/financing

• In the fiscal year ending March 31, 2008, the OPCC's budget was $1,557,000 with eight full-time or equivalent employees.
• The total operating budget consisted of $1,532,000 and the capital budget was $25,000.

Investigative analyst credentials/training

• To review police complaint investigations by municipal police departments and designated tribal police services, to review internal and external police complaint investigations, and to assist with Public Hearings. The position also provides educational seminars on complaint investigations and the application of Part 9 of the Police Act.
• University degree or diploma in a relevant discipline is required and several years of practical experience or an equivalent combination of education/training/experience in a related field (for example conflict resolution or mediation).
• In addition, knowledge of legal cases relating to police complaints and civilian oversight of law enforcement is required.
• Finally, important is a thorough and detailed knowledge of the principles/techniques of investigation.

Policies and procedures

• The PCC's website includes a link that takes the reader to the "guidelines, practice directives and policies." The "Guidelines" are entitled "Extension of Investigation" (process where a party applies to extend an investigation), "Procedural Fairness" (full disclosure at discipline hearings and public hearings) and "Suspension of Proceedings" (procedure where Police Act proceedings are suspended). The sole "Policy" is entitled "Exercising of Discretion of the Police Complaint Commissioner." This Policy deals with the discretion whether to order a public hearing.
• "Practice Directives" were prepared in the following areas: (i) discipline hearings; (ii) informal resolution; (iii) Internal discipline; (iv) Service and Policy Complaints; (v) Service of Notices; (vi) Summary Dismissals; (vii) Withdrawn Complaints; (viii) Procedural Fairness; (ix) Statements by Police Officers; (x) Off-duty conduct; (xi) Mediation.
• The PCC has also issued several policy documents to municipal police departments addressing aspects of the complaint process pertaining to (i) suspensions of Police Act proceedings during criminal investigations; (ii) the standard of proof in Police Act proceedings; (iii) Pre-hearing conferences; and (iv) the imposition of discipline.
• The OPCC has a detailed policy and procedure manual dealing with all aspects of their duties and responsibilities.

Additional observations

• Former PCC, Mr. Dirk Ryneveld, stated that in order to be truly effective, a police oversight agency needs to combine "the best of both worlds: totally civilian body with former police officers [which would] bring police experience to [ensure] informed decision-making."
• Mr. Ryneveld has been requesting legislative changes for several years, in annual reports as well as in several publications such as the 2005 White Paper.
• In an interview conducted with the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of the PCC, Mr. Bruce Brown, on November 21, 2008, Mr. Ryneveld summed up his recommendations into four major issues:
  • Contemporary oversight ability instead of ex post facto;
  • Public review ability;
  • Compellability of police officers (with respect to disciplinary proceedings);
  • Wider range of penalties or disciplinary measures.
• It appears that the proposed legislation does address most of these concerns.

Chicago: Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA)

Mandate

• The mandate of Chicago's Independent Police Review Authority (commonly referred to as IPRA), is to investigate complaints against members of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) concerning domestic violence, excessive force, coercion and verbal abuse based on bias.
• IPRA must undertake investigations into all cases where a firearm or a taser was discharged in a manner that could potentially injure an individual, as well as all Extraordinary Occurrences (any death or injury to a person while in police custody, any suicide or attempted suicide), regardless of whether there is alleged misconduct.
• IPRA has the responsibility to intake all allegations of police misconduct.

Background

• In 1974, the Chicago Police Department created a new unit, the Office of Professional Standards.
• In 2007, the Office of Professional Standards became separated from the CPD.
• In response to concerns about how allegations of police misconduct were being investigated by the CPD, Mayor Richard M. Daley created IPRA by City Ordinance in the summer of 2007. IPRA replaced the Office of Professional Standards.
• On September 5, 2007, IPRA became operational as an independent department of the City of Chicago.

Jurisdiction

• IPRA has jurisdiction over all CPD officers.
• It is an independent department reporting directly to the Mayor.
• IPRA has the responsibility to intake all allegations of police misconduct.
• IPRA must investigate all discharges of a firearm or uses of a taser regardless of whether there is any alleged misconduct.
• Complaints that do not involve excessive or deadly force, domestic violence, verbal abuse based on bias, or coercion by a CPD member, fall outside IPRA's jurisdiction. These can include allegations of drug use, theft and procedural violations. They are forwarded to the Internal Affairs Division of the Chicago Police Department for resolution.

Legislative basis

• IPRA was established by City Ordinance Chapter 2-57.

Handling of complaint process

• If the complainant signed an affidavit or is a member of CPD, IPRA classifies the Log Number as a Complaint Register Number for the remainder of the investigation.
• If the complaint is external and the complainant has not signed an affidavit, IPRA initiates a pre-affidavit Investigation.
• Any complainant making an allegation against a CPD member must sign a sworn affidavit certifying that the allegation is true, or certifying that the complainant believes the allegation to be true.
• IPRA acknowledges the complaint within five to seven working days.
• Following the notification of an event involving the discharge of a firearm or taser, as well as in the case of Extraordinary Occurrences, IPRA issues a Log Number. In the absence of the allegation of misconduct, IPRA undertakes the investigation and classifies it as a Complaint Register Number only if the investigation reveals alleged misconduct.
• A lawsuit against the city alleging misconduct by a CPD member is treated like any other allegation of misconduct. If there is an affidavit, a Log Number is issued and the case is classified as a Complaint Register Number.
• The pre-affidavit investigation can contain all investigative tasks except the accused officer, who cannot be interviewed until IPRA receives a complaint or gets an exception to the affidavit requirement, which can come from the state law or the union contract.
• IPRA's final report makes one of the following findings:
  • the allegation is sustained: there is sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action;
  • the allegation is not sustained because there is not enough evidence to either prove or disprove the allegation;
  • the allegation is unfounded (it is false or not factual);
  • the officer is exonerated: the actions of the accused were lawful and proper; or
  • there is no affidavit-no witness provided a sworn statement and no exception to the affidavit requirement was applicable.
• For any sustained case, IPRA may recommend discipline of violation noted or written reprimand, suspensions of 1 to 365 days, or termination.

Statistical analysis

• In the year 2007-2008, IPRA received 9,578 allegations and notifications regarding members of the CPD.
• IPRA closed 2,158 investigations. 46 cases were declared "sustained."
• From April 2008 to June 2008, IPRA retained 640 matters for investigation and closed 672 pending investigations.
• 16 cases were closed as "sustained". IPRA recommended that 203 investigations were "not sustained".

Structure

• IPRA is led by a chief administrator, appointed for a term of four years by the mayor subject to approval by the city council.
• The chief administrator must issue an official report to the mayor's office on a quarterly basis regarding the activities and accomplishments of IPRA for the period in question.
• All members of IPRA are civilians.

Budget/financing

• For the fiscal year 2008, the budget recommendation for IPRA totaled US$5,758,479.
• US$5,060,407 were relegated to investigations.

Investigator credentials/training

• IPRA investigators receive a curriculum of training on an annual basis.
  • The investigators receive training from the Chicago Police Department on CPD policies and procedures.
  • They also receive training from the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center, which includes fingerprint analysis, DNA analysis, toxicology, firearms testing and other areas of forensic testing on an as-needed basis.
  • IPRA is currently in the process of designing additional investigative skills training.

Policies and procedures

• IPRA has a Standard Operating Procedure manual which has not been updated for several years. It contains, among others, policies on how to conduct investigations and procedures for shooting investigations.
• There is also a manual for the Major Incident Response Team.
• In addition, IPRA's Chief Administrator addresses each class of new police officer recruits during their recruit training, explaining the role and functions of IPRA. The Chief Administrator also addresses classes of promoted detectives, sergeants and lieutenants.
• IPRA assesses officer conduct against CPD policies (indicated in the list below), led by the CPD General Order 02-08 on the use of force. Added in August 2003 to its Force Options policy, Section III B 2.d (2) stipulates that when dealing with an 'active resister', deploying a taser is one of the response options; however, "only [CPD] issued tasers may be used and only after the member has received Department-authorized training in their safe handling and deployment."
• The following policies apply within the department's use of force:
  • Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report. Such incidents include an assault against a CPD officer.
  • Canines as a Force Option which dictates that CPD-trained dogs can be used as a force response to an active resister.
  • Deadly Force, which includes the firing of a firearm in direction of a person or vehicle.
  • Force Options identifies possible levels of response options when dealing with different types of detainees.
  • Use of Force Guidelines, and
  • Use of Force Model, a graphic representation for the appropriate use of force in relation to the actions of a subject.
• In its investigations, IPRA assesses officer conduct against CPD policies, led by the broad policy on the Use of Force. The following policies apply within the department's use of force:
  • Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report
  • Canines as a Force Option
  • Deadly Force
  • Force Options
  • Use of Force Guidelines
  • Use of Force Model

Manitoba: Law Enforcement Review Agency (LERA)

Mandate

• The mandate of the Law Enforcement Review Agency (commonly referred to as LERA) is to investigate public complaints about the on duty conduct of local or municipal police.
• LERA's mission is "to deliver a judicious, timely, impartial, client-oriented service to the public and to the police services and police officers within its jurisdiction."
• LERA does not handle criminal investigations or complaints regarding police services.

Background

• A 1976 incident that involved an alleged beating of a rape suspect by the Winnipeg police officers (Frampton case) prompted an investigation on the part of the Manitoba Police Commission (MPC).
• Following the investigation, the MPC recommended that changes need to be incorporated into the citizen complaint procedure.
• Legislation was proposed in 1981 and the new legislation was proclaimed in December 1984. LERA became operational in 1985 pursuant to The Law Enforcement Review Act.
• The new legislation required that all citizens' complaints regarding the actions of on duty police officers be referred to the Commissioner who shall then determine whether a disciplinary default has been identified and an investigation warranted.
• In 1992 the Law Enforcement Review Board and the MPC were dissolved. Hearings are referred to the Chief Provincial Judge to ensure independence and objectivity from an expert source.

Jurisdiction

• Any peace officer employed by the provincial or local police service, including police chief, fall under LERA's scope of jurisdiction.
• The Act also applies to the conduct of officers from other provinces appointed as police officers in Manitoba, as well as Manitoba police officers appointed in other provinces.
• LERA's jurisdiction extends to 13 police services involving approximately 1,480 police officers.
• Members of the RCMP are excluded from LERA's jurisdiction.
• The Commissioner files an annual report with the Minister of Justice.

Legislative basis

• The Law Enforcement Review Act outlines LERA's powers and obligations.
• Section 12(5) of the Act allows the LERA Commissioner to conduct a search and seizure if necessary.
• The Commissioner has all powers of a commissioner as set out in Part V of The Manitoba Evidence Act.

Handling of complaint process

• LERA investigates allegations that municipal police officers have committed any of the following:
  • abuse of authority, such as:
    • making an arrest without reasonable or probable grounds,
    • using unnecessary violence or excessive force,
    • using oppressive or abusive conduct or language,
    • being discourteous or uncivil,
    • seeking improper monetary or personal advantage,
    • serving or executing documents in civil proceedings without authorizations,
    • differential treatment without reasonable cause on the basis of any characteristics described in The Human Rights Code (Subsection 9(2)).
  • making a false statement, or destroying, concealing or altering any official document or record;
  • improperly disclosing any information acquired as a member of the police service;
  • failing to exercise discretion or restraint in the use and care of firearms;
  • damaging property or failing to report the damage;
  • failing to help where there is a clear danger to the safety of a person or property;
  • violating the privacy of any person under The Privacy Act;
  • breaching any part of The Law Enforcement Review Act that does not already specify a penalty for the violation;
  • helping, counseling or causing any police officer to commit officer misconduct.
• Pursuant to Section 6(3) of the Act, a complaint must be made within 30 days of the alleged disciplinary incident.
• Any person who feels wronged by the conduct of a municipal police officer can file a complaint. The complaint may also be filed by another person providing there is a written consent from the alleged victim.
• All complaints must be made in writing, dated and signed.
• Complaints may be sent directly to LERA or made to the police who shall then send it to LERA.
• LERA's investigators interview witnesses, take statements and review reports such as medical and police records. They are authorized to make any inquiry necessary to obtain the required evidence.
• Following the investigation, the Commissioner screens the complaint. He may decide to take no action under the following circumstances:
  • the complaint is frivolous or vexatious;
  • the complaint has been abandoned by the complainant;
  • the alleged conduct falls outside of LERA's jurisdiction;
  • there is not enough evidence to send the complaints to the provincial judge for a public hearing.
• The complainant is notified in writing and then has 30 days to request a review from a provincial judge.
• LERA Commissioner has a duty to attempt to resolve a complaint by way of informal resolution.
• If it cannot be so resolved and the officer in question fails to make admission of guilt, the Commissioner shall refer the case to the provincial judge for a public hearing.
• Penalties that a provincial judge may impose vary among the following:
  • dismissal;
  • permission to resign or summary dismissal if resignation not received within seven days;
  • reduction in rank;
  • suspension without pay for up to 30 days;
  • loss of pay for up to 10 days;
  • loss of leave of days off for up to 10 days;
  • written or verbal reprimand;
  • admonition or warning.
• Where the incident reported involves a possible criminal offence, the commissioner or the provincial judge shall report it to the attorney general.

Statistical analysis

• Winnipeg Police Service typically accounts for 86% of all complaints. Brandon Police Service represents 7%.
• In 2007, 308 files were opened. The five-year average is 367 complaints.
• The year 2007 marked a decrease in the number of allegations of disciplinary default in the following categories: abuse of authority, arrest without reasonable or probable grounds, using unnecessary or excessive force, and being discourteous or uncivil.
• 49% of all complaints involved allegations of injuries from the use of force.

Structure

• LERA is headed by a Commissioner, Mr. George V. Wright, who is appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.
• In addition, LERA is composed of a Registrar of Complaints, a clerk and four full-time professional investigators who have extensive law enforcement experience.
• For the fiscal year ending March 2008, LERA staffed seven employees.

Budget/financing

• Ending March 2008, the budget totaled $654,800.

Investigative analyst credentials/training

• The investigators working currently at LERA are former police officers. Because LERA does not have the jurisdiction over the RCMP, its investigators have no authority to handle cases involving their former unit.

Policies and procedures

• LERA's procedures in dealing with public complaints are described in the section on the handling of complaint.
• The Commissioner carries out the investigations in compliance with The Law Enforcement Review Act and has all the powers of a commissioner under Part V of The Manitoba Evidence Act.

Additional observations

• LERA can be described as "an administrative law agency."

New Zealand: Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA)

Mandate

• New Zealand's Independent Police Conduct Authority (in this report referred to as IPCA), previously known as the Police Complaints Authority, was established in 1989. Its chief functions are:
  • to investigate complaints alleging misconduct or neglect of duty by the police or concerning any practice, policy or procedure of the police affecting the complainant in a personal capacity;
  • to investigate incidents involving death or serious bodily harm arising as a result of police actions; and
  • to investigate matters referred to the IPCA by the Commissioner of Police, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding entered into with the IPCA, of serious misconduct or neglect of duty and which are treated by the IPCA as if they were complaints.

Background

• IPCA was created in 1989following the enactment of the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988. It is an independent Crown Entity subject to the Crown Entities Act 2004. It is independently governed and operated, and funded through Vote: Justice under Non-Departmental Output Class Agreements.
• In November 2007, the Police Complaints Authority became the Independent Police Conduct Authority, a body with wider powers which include the ability to investigate historic complaints and to refer less serious complaints to the police. Since November 2007, the number of investigators has also increased from five to nine.

Jurisdiction

• There are 13 Police Districts in addition to Police National Headquarters from which the Authority can receive and accept complaints for investigation.
• The Authority has the ability to oversee a police investigation and to give directions to the police in that respect. It cannot remove the investigation from police's control, but it can carry out its own separate investigation of the complaint in question. Only the police have the resources to handle major investigations in their early stages, and, in addition, the evidence collected by the police in the course of investigation can be used for the purposes of further proceedings whereas the evidence collected by the Authority cannot. ICPA investigators LARGELY use the work done by the police as the foundation upon which to develop their own further investigation.
• In 2005, the Authority and the Commissioner of Police entered a Protocol for Cooperation to ensure collaboration between the two entities' investigators.
• There is also a Memorandum of Understanding between the IPCA and the Police which provides that matters of serious misconduct or neglect of duty internally reported within the Police are to be notified to, and be dealt with by, the IPCA.
• The Minister of Justice and the IPCA have a Memorandum of Understanding, agreed upon prior to each financial year. IPCA points out that its activities are reported against the ultimate Justice sector outcome of "A Safe and Just Society."

Legislative basis

• IPCA derives its powers from the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988, which is "an Act to make better provision for the investigation and resolution of complaints against the Police by establishing an Independent Police Conduct Authority."
• Under Section 12 of the Act, the role of the IPCA is to receive complaints of alleged misconduct or neglect of duty by the police or concerning practices or procedures of the police. Under Section 13, incidents involving death or serious bodily harm in the execution of police duty, such as shootings and fatal vehicle pursuits, must be notified to the IPCA.
• IPCA is currently experiencing a restructuring process and an Amendment Bill is set to be introduced to New Zealand's parliament. In a 2007 Cabinet paper Review of the Independent Police Conduct Authority, the effectiveness and independence of the IPCA were examined and several proposals were recommended in order to respond to two main challenges encountered by the IPCA:
  • the lack of independent investigative capacity;
  • the constraints posed by the secrecy and privilege provisions in the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act which prevent information obtained by the IPCA being used in other proceedings.
• As a result, six proposals were recommended to meet these issues. These were, among others, that amendments need to be made to Section 17 of the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act in order to clarify the responsibilities of the IPCA to undertake its own investigations, and the application of the Official Information Act to the IPCA.

Handling of complaint process

• Complaints are classified in 35 categories and IPCA reports on each category by each of the 14 districts. A complaint is received when an individual lodges a complaint, either directly to the IPCA or to the police who refer it to the IPCA. A complaint must affect the person, or body of persons making it, in a personal capacity.
• The police have a duty to investigate all serious matters and incidents. Since 2003, IPCA has had its own investigators to investigate complaints of a serious nature or in respect of death or serious bodily harm. However, because the evidence collected by the police can be used in a criminal prosecution or disciplinary proceedings and the evidence collected by the Authority's investigators cannot be so used, the approach to investigations is almost always a parallel approach, guided by a protocol of cooperation between the two organizations.
• Upon the receipt of a complaint, the Authority has several options:
  • it can investigate the complaint (section 17 (1) (a) of the Act);
  • it can refer it to the police for investigation (section 17 (1) (ab);
  • it can defer action pending a police investigation undertaken on the behalf of the Authority (section 17 (1) (b);
  • it can defer action pending a criminal or disciplinary investigation undertaken by the police (section 17 (1) (ca);
  • it can oversee a police investigation (section 17 (1) (c);
  • or it can decide to take no action (section 18 of the Act).

Statistical analysis

• In the year ending June 30, 2008, a total of 2,073 new complaints were accepted for investigation. This was an increase over 2,016 in 2006-2007 and 1,741 in 2005-2006.
• The majority of complaints in 2007-2008 were in the categories of Neglect of Duty (for example, failure to investigate), Practice and Procedure (including breach of complainant's rights), Attitude/Language, and Use of Force.
• Under Section 13 of the Act, police are required to notify the IPCA of incidents of death and serious bodily harm associated with police actions. During 2007-2008, IPCA was notified of 11 deaths (one suicide and 10 others) and 48 incidents of serious bodily harm.
• During 2007-2008 IPCA made considerable progress in reducing a 'backlog' of complaints that had been outstanding for 12 months or more. The 'backlog' was reduced from 1,611 files at 30 June 2007 to 211 files at 30 June 2008.
• The IPCA investigators conducted 351 independent investigations during 2007-2008. Of those, 251 had been opened during previous years, and 100 were new investigations. The investigators closed 203 investigations during the year, leaving 148 open at 30 June 2008.
• In its Statement of Intent 2008/09, IPCA sets targets for the timeliness of: scene examination, liaison with police investigators and contact with the next of kin for major incidents involving death or serious bodily harm; completion of investigations; response to enquiries; and assignment of complaints for investigation. IPCA also sets targets for further reduction of the 'backlog' of complaints outstanding for 12 months or more.

Structure

• IPCA is chaired by a High Court judge, appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of Representatives. The current Chair is the Hon Justice Lowell Goddard.
• IPCA also has a board of up to five (including the Chair). Currently two full-time board members have been appointed, both of whom also have operational responsibilities, for investigations and services respectively.
• Since 2003, IPCA has increased its investigative team to a manager and eight investigators, and is in the process of establishing a Service Centre which will take initial action on complaints, whilst retaining a team of Reviewing Officers who assess the adequacy of police investigation before a final report is produced.

Budget/financing

• The Authority is funded by Vote: Justice and administered by the Ministry of Justice in accordance with the Crown Entities Act 2004.
• In 2008-2009, IPCA's total expenditure was forecast at NZ$3,900,468 (audited expenditure for the year will be available in its Annual Report 2008/09 to be published in November 2008).
• In 2006-2007, actual expenditure totalled NZ$1,981,964.

Investigator credentials/training

• All of the Authority's investigators are former senior police officers with many years of experience in criminal investigations. Five investigators are former members of the New Zealand Police and two from overseas police services.

Policies and procedures

• IPCA is currently working on developing a working definition of "serious injury." For now, it relies on a broad understanding of "injuries that result from police force."
• There is a Protocol for Cooperation between the IPCA and the Commissioner of Police to ensure collaboration between the two entities' investigators.
• In addition, there exists a Memorandum of Understanding between the IPCA and the police service which provides that matters of serious misconduct or neglect of duty internally reported within the police are to be notified to, and dealt with, by the IPCA.
• The IPCA and the Minister of Justice have a Memorandum of Understanding, agreed upon prior to each financial year. IPCA activities are reported against the ultimate Justice sector outcome of "A Safe and Just Society."

Northern Ireland: Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland

Mandate

• The Ombudsman's mission is to "provide an independent, impartial police complaints system for the people and police under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 and 2000; to ensure maximum awareness of the Police Ombudsman complaints service and that it is fully accessible and responsive to the community; to provide a robust and effective investigation process leading to evidence based recommendations; and to analyse and research the outcomes of complaints so as to inform and improve the policy and practice of policing."

Background

• Since the Belfast Agreement of 1998, a number of developments in the area of policing occurred in Northern Ireland. An Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, better known as the Patten Commission, was created in order to address the public distrust and discontent with the widely unpopular Royal Ulster Constabulary. The Commission made several recommendations for change related to the country's police service. These included a suggestion to rename it the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in addition to several measures that would improve police accountability at the local level.
• In 2000, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland was established under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998.
• It is accountable to the Parliament through the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and is required to have regard to any guidance given by the Secretary of State.

Jurisdiction

• The police under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 falls under the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. In addition, the Belfast Harbour Police, the Larne Harbour Police, the Belfast International Airport Police and Ministry of Defence Police in Northern Ireland, as well as the Serious Organised Crime Agency, can be investigated by the Ombudsman when their staff operates in this jurisdiction.
• Police Ombudsman's jurisdiction is set to be extended shortly to the UK Borders Agency.
• The Office is constituted and operated independently of the Northern Ireland Office, the Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Legislative basis

• The Ombudsman's Office was established by virtue of Statutory Rule 2000 No. 399, Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 (Commencement) Order (Northern Ireland) 2000.
• The relevant operating authority is found in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, and the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003.

Handling of complaint process

• All complaints about police misconduct are handled by the Police Ombudsman's Office. The complaints must be made within one year of the incident (although in special circumstances and when the Ombudsman considers the complaint grave and exceptional, complaints surrounding events that happened more than a year later may be accepted).
• Upon the receipt of the complaint, the Police Ombudsman decides how to deal with the complaint and assigns a person responsible for dealing with the complaint. The Ombudsman aims to reply to the complainant within four working days.
• Should the matter be suitable for Informal Resolution, the complainant shall be consulted and the matter is referred to the police. Otherwise, it is referred to the Ombudsman's investigators (or to the police for investigation).
• Mediation is being added at the beginning of the process to supplement informal resolution, and is currently being tested in a pilot process.
• Upon the completion of the investigation, the Ombudsman may decide to adopt the following actions: it may recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions that the police officer should be prosecuted; it may recommend that the Chief Constable should bring disciplinary proceedings against the officer (or, in the case of a complaint against the Chief Constable or his assistant or deputy, recommend disciplinary proceedings to the Policing Board); it may recommend compensation; or it can reject the complaint and offer explanations for this decision.
• The Police Ombudsman's decision is final unless new information is brought to light which the complainant was unaware of at the time of the complaint.
• At the conclusion of any investigation of a non-complaint matter (investigated under section 55 of the 1998 Act), the Ombudsman is required to send a copy of the investigation report to the Chief Constable, the Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
• Anyone who is not satisfied with any aspect of the Ombudsman's service or actions can make a complaint verbally or in writing. Complaints are registered and acknowledged within three days and a response given in 20 days.

Statistical analysis

• During the year 2007/08, the Ombudsman's Office registered 2,970 complaints and non-complaint matters. Non-complaint matters included referrals from the Chief Constable, referrals from the Director of Public Prosecutions and four were matters which the Police Ombudsman decided to investigate in the public interest.
• Of all 2,970 complaints and matters, 1,332 (45%) were referred for formal investigation. 851 investigations were completed and closed during the year.
• In 2007/08, 27 non-complaint matters were registered by the Office and 20 reports were issued to the Chief Constable, the Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
• The Ombudsman made recommendations to the Chief Constable in 158 cases involving 200 officers, over half of which (54%) suggested advice and guidance.
• A total of 241 cases were referred to the Public Prosecution Service (PPS). PPS recommended that 11 of these be prosecuted (these involved 12 police officers and 19 charges).

Structure

• The Office is a Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) which is headed by the Police Ombudsman as a Corporation Sole who is appointed by Royal Warrant for a period of seven years. The Ombudsman, Mr. Al Hutchinson, is supported by the Chief Executive, Mr. Samuel Pollock, and a Senior Management Team composed of six Directors.
• In the year 2007/08, the office was composed of 143 employees, with approx. 100 involved in complaints, investigations and historical enquiry investigations into complaints of police wrongdoing.
• None of the staff of the police Ombudsman's Office are members of the police force of Northern Ireland. The staff also comprises several police officers seconded from police services other than the service of Northern Ireland.

Budget/financing

• The Ombudsman is funded by a Grant in Aid from the Northern Ireland Office. For the year 2007/08, it incurred a net operating cost of £8,533,972.

Investigator credentials/training

• There are three categories of Investigative Officers (IOs): directly recruited, seconded police investigators, and investigators on temporary contracts.
• Direct entrants for Police Ombudsman investigators are selected through open, advertised competition. They need to pass a competency-based interview.
• Candidates would have demonstrated an investigative background from the private or public sector, and some would have been police officers.
• Selected candidates who are offered a position enter a two-year probationary period and need to complete accredited training through Portsmouth University, UK, coupled with on-the-job mentored training.
• Training for Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) is delivered through the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) accredited training.
• Numerous leadership and specialty investigator courses are contracted externally.

Policies and procedures

• The Police Ombudsman is directed by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003 to investigate current practice or policy of the police if:
  • it comes to his attention, or
  • he believes it is in the public interest to do so.
• Studies have been done in areas such as: police use of handcuffs, police searches of residences, policing of minority communities, and the use of CS spray.

Additional observations

• The Police Ombudsman, Mr. Al Hutchinson, admits that the Northern Ireland model cannot be simply exported anywhere and operate just as effectively; factors such as the size of the territory and population under jurisdiction, as well as the history of people's dealings with the police (possible history of distrust), need to be taken into consideration.
• There are advantages and disadvantages to Northern Ireland's model.
• The key advantage, Mr. Hutchinson points out, is that in cases of complaints, an independent civilian body "takes the heat out of the situation" and the public can trust that the findings are impartial and unbiased.
• There are some disadvantages, however:
  • The Police Ombudsman model is not "importable everywhere." There is a cost to such an agency and for a country the size of Canada, such a model may be too costly.
  • Leaving the judgment to an outside agency might translate into police officers' reluctance to do their duty because they fear they might become subject to a complaint.
• In addition, "totally civilian" body might be impractical. It takes a great degree of sophistication and time to properly train investigators. That is why introducing seconded police officers may be preferable.
• Retired police officers might possess all the necessary experience, but their skills might become dated.
• According to Mr. Hutchinson,
  • To investigate properly, we have to be just as good if not better [than police officers in question].
  • If you build a mix of seconded and retired police officers as well as civilians, you will build a body that is competent, professional, fair and accountable.

Mandate

• The Ombudsman's mission is to "provide an independent, impartial police complaints system for the people and police under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 and 2000; to ensure maximum awareness of the Police Ombudsman complaints service and that it is fully accessible and responsive to the community; to provide a robust and effective investigation process leading to evidence based recommendations; and to analyse and research the outcomes of complaints so as to inform and improve the policy and practice of policing."

Background

• Since the Belfast Agreement of 1998, a number of developments in the area of policing occurred in Northern Ireland. An Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, better known as the Patten Commission, was created in order to address the public distrust and discontent with the widely unpopular Royal Ulster Constabulary. The Commission made several recommendations for change related to the country's police service. These included a suggestion to rename it the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in addition to several measures that would improve police accountability at the local level.
• In 2000, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland was established under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998.
• It is accountable to the Parliament through the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and is required to have regard to any guidance given by the Secretary of State.

Jurisdiction

• The police under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 falls under the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. In addition, the Belfast Harbour Police, the Larne Harbour Police, the Belfast International Airport Police and Ministry of Defence Police in Northern Ireland, as well as the Serious Organised Crime Agency, can be investigated by the Ombudsman when their staff operates in this jurisdiction.
• Police Ombudsman's jurisdiction is set to be extended shortly to the UK Borders Agency.
• The Office is constituted and operated independently of the Northern Ireland Office, the Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Legislative basis

• The Ombudsman's Office was established by virtue of Statutory Rule 2000 No. 399, Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 (Commencement) Order (Northern Ireland) 2000.
• The relevant operating authority is found in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, and the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003.

Handling of complaint process

• All complaints about police misconduct are handled by the Police Ombudsman's Office. The complaints must be made within one year of the incident (although in special circumstances and when the Ombudsman considers the complaint grave and exceptional, complaints surrounding events that happened more than a year later may be accepted).
• Upon the receipt of the complaint, the Police Ombudsman decides how to deal with the complaint and assigns a person responsible for dealing with the complaint. The Ombudsman aims to reply to the complainant within four working days.
• Should the matter be suitable for Informal Resolution, the complainant shall be consulted and the matter is referred to the police. Otherwise, it is referred to the Ombudsman's investigators (or to the police for investigation).
• Mediation is being added at the beginning of the process to supplement informal resolution, and is currently being tested in a pilot process.
• Upon the completion of the investigation, the Ombudsman may decide to adopt the following actions: it may recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions that the police officer should be prosecuted; it may recommend that the Chief Constable should bring disciplinary proceedings against the officer (or, in the case of a complaint against the Chief Constable or his assistant or deputy, recommend disciplinary proceedings to the Policing Board); it may recommend compensation; or it can reject the complaint and offer explanations for this decision.
• The Police Ombudsman's decision is final unless new information is brought to light which the complainant was unaware of at the time of the complaint.
• At the conclusion of any investigation of a non-complaint matter (investigated under section 55 of the 1998 Act), the Ombudsman is required to send a copy of the investigation report to the Chief Constable, the Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
• Anyone who is not satisfied with any aspect of the Ombudsman's service or actions can make a complaint verbally or in writing. Complaints are registered and acknowledged within three days and a response given in 20 days.

Statistical analysis

• During the year 2007/08, the Ombudsman's Office registered 2,970 complaints and non-complaint matters. Non-complaint matters included referrals from the Chief Constable, referrals from the Director of Public Prosecutions and four were matters which the Police Ombudsman decided to investigate in the public interest.
• Of all 2,970 complaints and matters, 1,332 (45%) were referred for formal investigation. 851 investigations were completed and closed during the year.
• In 2007/08, 27 non-complaint matters were registered by the Office and 20 reports were issued to the Chief Constable, the Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
• The Ombudsman made recommendations to the Chief Constable in 158 cases involving 200 officers, over half of which (54%) suggested advice and guidance.
• A total of 241 cases were referred to the Public Prosecution Service (PPS). PPS recommended that 11 of these be prosecuted (these involved 12 police officers and 19 charges).

Structure

• The Office is a Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) which is headed by the Police Ombudsman as a Corporation Sole who is appointed by Royal Warrant for a period of seven years. The Ombudsman, Mr. Al Hutchinson, is supported by the Chief Executive, Mr. Samuel Pollock, and a Senior Management Team composed of six Directors.
• In the year 2007/08, the office was composed of 143 employees, with approx. 100 involved in complaints, investigations and historical enquiry investigations into complaints of police wrongdoing.
• None of the staff of the police Ombudsman's Office are members of the police force of Northern Ireland. The staff also comprises several police officers seconded from police services other than the service of Northern Ireland.

Budget/financing

• The Ombudsman is funded by a Grant in Aid from the Northern Ireland Office. For the year 2007/08, it incurred a net operating cost of £8,533,972.

Investigator credentials/training

• There are three categories of Investigative Officers (IOs): directly recruited, seconded police investigators, and investigators on temporary contracts.
• Direct entrants for Police Ombudsman investigators are selected through open, advertised competition. They need to pass a competency-based interview.
• Candidates would have demonstrated an investigative background from the private or public sector, and some would have been police officers.
• Selected candidates who are offered a position enter a two-year probationary period and need to complete accredited training through Portsmouth University, UK, coupled with on-the-job mentored training.
• Training for Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) is delivered through the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) accredited training.
• Numerous leadership and specialty investigator courses are contracted externally.

Policies and procedures

• The Police Ombudsman is directed by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003 to investigate current practice or policy of the police if:
  • it comes to his attention, or
  • he believes it is in the public interest to do so.
• Studies have been done in areas such as: police use of handcuffs, police searches of residences, policing of minority communities, and the use of CS spray.

Additional observations

• The Police Ombudsman, Mr. Al Hutchinson, admits that the Northern Ireland model cannot be simply exported anywhere and operate just as effectively; factors such as the size of the territory and population under jurisdiction, as well as the history of people's dealings with the police (possible history of distrust), need to be taken into consideration.
• There are advantages and disadvantages to Northern Ireland's model.
• The key advantage, Mr. Hutchinson points out, is that in cases of complaints, an independent civilian body "takes the heat out of the situation" and the public can trust that the findings are impartial and unbiased.
• There are some disadvantages, however:
  • The Police Ombudsman model is not "importable everywhere." There is a cost to such an agency and for a country the size of Canada, such a model may be too costly.
  • Leaving the judgment to an outside agency might translate into police officers' reluctance to do their duty because they fear they might become subject to a complaint.
• In addition, "totally civilian" body might be impractical. It takes a great degree of sophistication and time to properly train investigators. That is why introducing seconded police officers may be preferable.
• Retired police officers might possess all the necessary experience, but their skills might become dated.
• According to Mr. Hutchinson,
  • To investigate properly, we have to be just as good if not better [than police officers in question].
  • If you build a mix of seconded and retired police officers as well as civilians, you will build a body that is competent, professional, fair and accountable.

Ontario: Office of the Independent Police Review Director (IPRD)

Mandate

• The office of the Independent Police Review Director (commonly referred to as IPRD) is a brand new oversight body created in May 2007 by Bill 103: the Independent Police Review Act.
• It is an independent civilian body which shall administer the public complaints process in Ontario.
• IPRD is required to review every complaint made to him by a member of the public and to ensure that every complaint is referred, retained or dealt with.
• IPRD is responsible for the initial screening of public complaints.
• In addition, IPRD may establish "procedural rules and guidelines for the handling by chiefs of police and boards" of complaints made by the public (Section 56 (b)).

Background

• The creation of the IPRD was brought about by the recommendation made by Justice Patrick LeSage, whose 2005 report called for a new independent civilian body to administer the police review system.

Jurisdiction

• IPRD is required to review every complaint made to him by a member of the public and to ensure that every complaint is referred, retained or dealt with.
• IPRD acquired the interlocutory powers of review previously held by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS).

Legislative basis

• IPRD was established pursuant to the Bill 103 – the Independent Police Review Act, which received Royal Assent on May 17, 2007.
• Its powers are outlined in Part V of the Act.
• The establishment of the IPRD is also referred to in Ontario's Police Services Act Part II.1 Section 26.1 and Section 56.

Handling of Complaint Process

• Each complaint needs to be filed within six months of the incident in question. The IPRD can allow complaints made outside of that limitation under exceptional circumstances (such as when the complainant is suffering from a disability).
• IPRD may decide not to handle a complaint if:
  • the complaint falls outside of the limit period;
  • the complaint if frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
  • the complaint should be dealt with under another legislation;
  • it is not in the public interest to deal with the complaint;
  • in the case of a complaint involving a policy or service, if the policy or service in question did not directly affect the complainant.
• IPRD must refer complaints about policies or services to the municipal chief of police.
• The chief of police must submit a report to the IPRD regarding the disposition of the complaints.
• The complainant may request that the police board review the complaint. The board, in turn, may order a public meeting.
• IPRD has the power to determine whether to retain a complaint for internal investigation by the IPRD, to refer a complaint about conduct for investigation to another police service or to refer a complaint about conduct for investigation to the chief of police in the service where the complaint originated. At any time following the referral (but before the hearing), the IPRD has the authority to decide upon the manner in which the complaint is handled. IPRD may also take over the investigation or refer it to another police force.
• Where the IPRD retains the investigation of the complaint, once the investigation is completed, the IPRD refers the matter to the chief of police with a written report stating either that the complaint is not substantiated, is substantiated or is substantiated but constitutes misconduct that is not serious. The Chief of Police may decide to refer the matter to a disciplinary hearing or where the misconduct is less serious may resolve the complaint informally.
• Where the complaint has been referred to the Chief of Police for investigation and the Chief of Police decides either that the complaint is unsubstantiated or that the complaint is substantiated but that the conduct is not of a serious nature, the complainant may ask the IPRD to review the decision made by the police chief within 30 days.
• If the complaint is substantiated, the chief of police must order a disciplinary hearing unless the complaint is referred for informal resolution (for less serious matters only).
• A copy of decisions made at the hearing is made available to the IPRD and the general public.
• The officer involved and the complainant can appeal the decision to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.
• IPRD has standing at any hearing of the Ontario Civilian Police Commission to present argument and make submissions.

Structure

• The team of the IPRD is in the process of construction. The first Independent Police Review Director, Gerry McNeilly, was named in May 2008.

Ontario: Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS)

Mandate

• The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (commonly referred to as OCCPS) is an independent, civilian, quasi-judicial agency reporting to the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services.
• The mandate of the OCCPS is to ensure that policing services in Ontario are effective and adequate.
• OCCPS seeks to fulfill the following roles:
  • Hearing appeals of police disciplinary decisions;
  • Adjudicating disputes between municipal councils and police services boards involving budget matters;
  • Considering requests for the reduction, abolition, creation or amalgamation of police services;
  • Conducting investigations and inquiries into the conduct of chiefs or police, police officers and members of police services boards;
  • Determining the status of police service members;
  • Hearing disputes relating to the accommodation of disabled police service members;
  • Conducting reviews of local decisions relating to public complaints at the request of complainants; and
  • General enforcement relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of policing services.

Background

• Pursuant to the 1997 amendment of the Police Services Act, the mandate of the OCCPS was broadened to include oversight of the streamlined system for the handling of public complaints about the policies, services or conduct of police officers. The system allows complainants to request a review by the OCCPS of local decisions about police conduct. Changes to the current system are anticipated sometime in 2009.
• Bill 103, the Independent Police Review Act, received Royal Assent in May of 2007. The Bill establishes a new Independent Police Review Director that would operate under the ministry of the Attorney General. Upon proclamation of Bill 103, the Commission will lose oversight of public complaints against the police and its interlocutory powers of review. The Commission will, however, remain the final appellate authority with respect to public complaints and the remainder of its mandate will continue.
• In addition, Bill 103 renames the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

Jurisdiction

• All municipal police services and police services boards are under OCCPS's scope of review.
• Chiefs of police, members of police services and police services boards are accountable to the public through the OCCPS.
• OCCPS reports to the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

Legislative basis

• The mandate and duties of OCCPS are set out in Part II the Police Services Act.
• Section 25 of the Act mandates indicates that OCCPS has the authority to initiate, investigate, inquire into and report on "the conduct or the performance of duties of a police officer, a municipal chief of police, a special constable, a municipal law enforcement officer or a member of the police board," as well as the quality of service provision by the police services.
• Pursuant to Part V of the Act, OCCPS is the review body for public complaint decisions made by chiefs of police and the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police.

Handling of complaint process

• There are three types of complaints:
  • Complaints relating to police services;
  • Complaints about the policies of a police service;
  • Complaints in relation to conduct of a police officer.
• Each complaint must be made within six months of the alleged incident.
• Only the person "directly affected" by the alleged incident may file a complaint.
• The complaint may be filed at the police station named in the complaint or it may be taken directly to the OCCPS office.
• Upon the receipt of the complaint, the police chief/Commissioner classifies the complaint into one of the three types. Should the complainant disagree with the classification, he/she may request a review with the OCCPS within 30 days.
• The chief/Commissioner is obligated to conduct an investigation into every complaint regarding police conduct. It may be determined that there is misconduct of varying degrees of gravity, or that the complaint is unsubstantiated.
• Within 30 days of the receipt of the outcome of the investigation, the complainant may request the OCCPS to conduct a review of the chief/Commissioner's decision.
• The OCCPS Case Manager reviews the file and consults with the Commission Advisor, investigators or legal advisors if necessary.
• The decision reached by OCCPS is not subject to appeal. OCCPS may:
  • Uphold the decision of the chief/Commissioner;
  • Refer it back for investigation;
  • Assign the investigation to another police service;
  • Find evidence of misconduct;
  • Order a disciplinary hearing in the case of misconduct of a serious nature.
• Should a disciplinary hearing be conducted, the complainant has 30 days to appeal to the OCCPS the outcome of the hearing.
• The complaints can be also resolved through informal resolution. Such resolutions are dependent upon the consent on the part of the complainant and the officer, as well as approval on the part of the chief/Commissioner. Complaints resolved by informal resolution are less serious in nature.
• The complaint can be rejected when it is determined that:
  • It is filed six months after the alleged incident;
  • It is vexatious or made in bad faith;
  • The complainant was not directly affected by the incident.
• Should the chief/Commissioner reject the complaint, the complainant shall be notified in writing within 30 days.

Statistical analysis

• In 2007, OCCPS conducted two investigations under Section 25 out of ten requested.
• There were 2,623 complaints made against 23,383 police officers or police services.
• The following table depicts the number of public complaints filed against police officers in Ontario since 2003:

Review of public complaints against police officers in Ontario

• 2003: 2,845
• 2004: 3,100
• 2005: 2,868
• 2006: 2,613
• 2007: 2,623

Structure

• OCCPS is led by the Chair, Mr. Murray W. Chitra, who is appointed by Order-in-Council.
• In 2007 the OCCPS had 7 part-time members, staff composed of the Senior Advisor, two investigators, Registrar & general manager, and four Case Managers.
• The members are representative of Ontario's Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western regions.
• There are currently 13 employees at OCCPS.
• The Commission meets in Toronto monthly.In addition, the members are regular participants in review panels regarding local police decisions on the classification and investigation of public complaints against police officers.

Budget/financing

• In 2007/08, the total budget consisted of $1,684,200.

Investigator credentials/training

• There are two investigators: Senior Investigator and Complaints Investigator.

Policies and procedures

• OCCPS policies and procedures are set out in the Rules of Practice, which define various steps of the complaint process and the participants involved, as well as the powers of the OCCPS. In addition, the following rules are applied:
  • Procedures Before Hearing determine that the Notice of Appeal filed with the OCCPS must be done within 30 days of the chief/Commissioner's decision;
  • Conditions that allow the OCCPS to provide information are outlined in the Disclosure provision;
  • The proper format of the supporting documentation used in the appeal hearings is described in the Appeal Factums policy;
  • Service of Documents Upon Parties sets out the proper method of sending documents;
  • Motions policy emphasizes that the notice of motion must be delivered at least 14 days in advance of motion proceedings;
  • Rules 21 and 22 set out the conditions necessary for the proper conduct of hearings, which may be conducted in an electronic format;
  • Order of Presentation determines that the appellant shall be the first party to present its case;
  • In addition, templates samples are provided for Notice of Appeal, Notice of Motion and Summons to a Witness;
  • The Public Inquiries Act applies to all Commission-initiated investigations and hearings.

Additional observations

• OCCPS Chair, Mr. Murray Chitra, admits that there is value in independent police oversight. At the same time, though, this does not mean that civilian oversight removes all responsibility from the police to address criminal wrongdoing on their own.
• The difficulty, says Mr. Chitra, lies in "where you draw the line," how much authority should such external body have.
• In the end, Mr. Chitra believes that a hybrid model combining civilian independence and police expertise is the most effective for an adequate police oversight:

For any oversight agency to be effective, it requires a range of capacities and people with a range of skills. It's helpful to have both perspectives-you need a combination of individuals with practical police knowledge to bring both perspectives so that you can make balanced decisions.

Ontario: Special Investigations Unit (SIU)

Mandate

• SIU's mandate is to investigate the circumstances of serious injuries and deaths (and allegations of sexual assault) that may have resulted from criminal offences committed by police officers.
• SIU has full powers to investigate and charge officers with a criminal offence.

Background

• During hearings at the Task Force on Race Relations and Policing in 1988, many participants expressed their concern regarding the integrity of the process in which police conducted investigations involving other police officers, especially in regard to shootings of criminal suspects. As a result of the recommendations made by the Task Force, a new Police Services Act established the Special Investigations Unit in force as of August 8, 1990 as an independent arms-length investigative branch of the government.

Jurisdiction

• SIU has jurisdiction over all municipal, regional and provincial police officers across Ontario, which represents 65 police services and approx. 21,600 officers. This excludes RCMP and Aboriginal police working in Ontario.
• In 2005-2006, SIU received 118 non-jurisdictional complaints. Areas that fall outside SIU scope of review include a lack of a serious injury.
• The definition of "serious injury" was created by SIU's first Director, the Hon John Osler. It refers to
  • Those [injuries] that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. "Serious injury" shall initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault.

Legislative basis

• SIU was established by Part VII, Section 113 of the Police Services Act (PSA), which provides the legislative framework for policing in Ontario. The new PSA received Royal Assent on June 28, 1990 and SIU came into force on August 8, 1990. It is an independent civilian agency that has full powers and authority to investigate and to charge police officers with a criminal offence.
• The legislation was too broad in scope. It states that the SIU and the police would cooperate but failed to specify how.
• As a result, in 1998, Regulation 673 Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit, was introduced in order to alleviate lack of clarity.

Handling of complaint process

• The goal of SIU is to complete 65% of all cases within 30 days. Depending on a case, the thoroughness of the investigation takes precedence over the length of time.
• According to SIU, every investigation typically involves the following:
  • "examining the scene and securing all physical evidence, monitoring the medical condition of anyone who has been injured,
  • seeking out and securing the cooperation of witnesses, seizing police equipment for forensic examination,
  • consulting with the coroner if there has been a death,
  • notifying the next of kin and keeping the family of the deceased or injured parties informed,
  • and keeping the Investigative Supervisor, Executive Officer and Director fully informed of developments on the case.
• Once that all the facts are gathered, the Director decides whether there are reasonable grounds to charge an officer with a criminal offence. The Attorney General of Ontario, the Chief of the involved police service or the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, are informed of the Director's decision.
• The Lead Investigator plays a critical role in the process. The lead investigator manages investigative resources, coordinates the gathering of evidence, assesses the importance of evidence gathered, secures cooperation from involved parties, and prepares an investigative brief at the conclusion of the cases, on the basis of which the Director makes his decision.

Statistical analysis

• The following illustrates SIU investigations throughout the years. In 2006-07, there were 238 occurrences, the most the SIU has ever had. According to SIU, custody deaths and injuries are largely responsible for this increase.
• There were two cases in which charges were laid against two police officers.
• 68% of the Unit's cases were closed within 30 business days in 2006-07.
• Since 2000, there were 24 cases in which charges were laid.

Structure

• SIU is led by the Director and as of 2006-07 composed of approx. 60 employees. These include three (3) Investigative Supervisors and 31 Investigators. In addition, the Forensic Identification Section team is composed of two (2) full-time Forensic Identification Supervisors and nine (9) Forensic Identification Technicians on an as-needed basis. The staff is completed by an Executive Officer, Legal Counsel, Administrative Manager, Communications Manager, Affected Persons Coordinator, Training Coordinator, and administrative staff.

Budget/financing

• For the year that ended March 2007, the total amount of expenditures was $5,689,745.

Investigator credentials/training

• The average investigative experience among the SIU investigators is 31 years. The composition of the full-time investigative team is balanced between five former police officers and seven investigators with no prior police experience.
• The investigative staff also includes experts in traffic collision investigations and collision reconstruction. In addition, SIU has a Forensic Identification Section which assists in all aspects of forensic identification work.
• All new investigators receive a five-day orientation session organized by the internal staff and the external subject matter experts.
• In addition, all investigative and forensic employees receive in-house training on a quarterly basis. Topics covered in the past included "Shooting reconstruction," "Interviewing vs. Interrogation," "Firearms trajectory and collision analysis," and "Role of team leads and team communication."
• External subject matter experts are also invited on a quarterly basis to present on current topical issues. Training sessions in the past covered such themes as "A Survivor's Perspective on Prostitution," "DNA Primer," and "Gunshot Residue."
• Moreover, SIU employees receive training offered by external service providers such as the Ontario Police College and the Canadian Police College, as well as other institutes and associations, such as the Centre of Forensic Sciences and the Criminal Lawyers' Association.
• External courses seminars and conferences provide SIU members with the additional information on a particular subject matter. In the past, the employees attended such events as the "Aboriginal and Diversity Policing Forum," "Disaster Planning: Major Event," the "Annual International Sex Crimes Conference," the International Association of Blood Pattern Associates Annual Conference," and the "Kinesic Interview Technique" session.
• Finally, SIU staff receive Health and Wellness training and Cultural Diversity Training.
• In the year 2006-07, expenditure on training comprised 4.8% of SIU's total budget, or $273,422.

Policies and procedures

• The SIU employees are guided by the following principles:
  • They are led by Operations Order 002 – The Investigative Process, which describes the procedures to be undertaken by the investigative staff members in their response to reports of incidents.
  • In addition, these principles are directly applicable in cases of serious injury or death:
    • The Firearms Related Investigations policy dictates that investigators must respond as quickly as possible in the cases of police-involved shooting incidents.
    • The Custody Related Investigations policy provides guidelines for an appropriate response in the case of incidents involving a serious injury or death of a person in police custody. The policy differentiates between two types of custody related incidents: those in which serious injury or death occurred as a result of a direct application of force by a police officer, and those in which the force was applied by the deceased/injured party to him/herself.
    • The Motor Vehicle Accident Incident Investigations policy states that "when the police vehicle is physically involved in the collision [that results in serious injury or death], the SIU will be the lead investigative agency."
    • The Communication and Liaison with Victim – Complainant and/or Next of Kin policyemphasizes that in the case of death and certain cases of serious injury (such as when the victim is unable to communicate), the SIU investigators must ensure a timely notification of the victim's next of kin.
    • The Action Required when Charges Are Laid policy describes the procedures to be adopted when the SIU Director determines that charges shall be laid against a police officer.
    • The Preparation of the Prosecution Brief policy lays out the proper format and contents of a Prosecution Brief.
    • The Pre-trial Disclosure policy defines the process and the responsibilities of the Lead Investigator in the case when criminal charges have been laid.
    • The Firearms Discharge for Examination policy sets out the safety procedures for a discharge of firearms for the purpose of collection of bullet projectiles.
  • The SIU is further guided by the following procedures:
    • The Investigative Priority policy
    • The SIU Cooperation Under Section 11 of Ontario Regulation 873/98 policy
    • The Sexual Assault Investigations policy
    • The Security and Continuity of Physical Evidence policy
    • Search Warrants (Obtaining for Investigative Purpose)
    • Release of Materials Seized Without Warrant During SIU Investigations
    • Seizure of Police Equipment
    • Case Reviews with Police Services
    • Media Relations
    • Use of Official Memo Books
    • Investigative Response when Aboriginal People are Involved
    • Use of Occurrence and Follow-up Reports
    • Requesting Documentation Regarding Reported Incidents
    • Preparation of the Prosecution Brief
    • Notification of Director's Decision
    • SIU Investigations in Co-operation with Child Welfare Authorities
    • Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (VICLAS) Submissions
    • SIU Response to Search Warrants, Subpoenas, etc.
    • Recorded Interviews
    • Infectious Disease/Needle Disposal Policy and Program
    • Photographic Lineups
    • Calculating the Length of SIU Cases
    • Retention/Disposition of Identification of Criminals Act Records
    • Definition of "Participate"

Quebec: Police Ethics Commissioner (Commissaire à la déontologie policière) & Police Ethics Committee (Comité de déontologie policière)

Mandate

• The mandate of the Police Ethics Commissioner (Commissaire à la déontologie policière) is to receive and examine the complaints made against police officers, special constables and highway controllers in relation to the alleged violation of the Code of ethics of Quebec police officers.
• The Police Ethics Committee (Comité de déontologie policière) is a specialized administrative tribunal that offers the citizens an opportunity to assert their rights, and police officers, special constables and highway controllers a defense before an authority that is "accessible, independent, impartial and specialized in matters of police ethics."
• The Police Ethics Committee ensures that the Code of ethics of Quebec police officers is enforced and respected.

Background

• The evolution of the Quebec society into an increasingly multicultural entity has contributed to tensions between members of visible minority groups and police officers.
• The powers that police officers enjoy in order to fully exercise their duty necessitates a presence of a civilian oversight body.

Jurisdiction

• In accordance with the Code of ethics of Quebec police officers, the jurisdiction of the Police Ethics Commissioner extends over "every police officer, every special constable, every highway controller and every person having authority over highway controllers."
• The Commissioner is an independent institution whose staff is composed exclusively of civilians. In addition, should one of the investigators be a former police officer, that investigator cannot participate in a case involving his/her former police department.
• The Commissioner does not have the authority to submit a case on his own. The following factors are needed for the initiation of investigation:
  • A person files a complaint, or
  • The Minister of Public Security makes a request for investigation, or
  • A Canadian Court declares a police officer guilty of a criminal offence, which also constitutes a breach of the Code of ethics of Quebec police officers.
• The Commissioner does not have the authority to conduct criminal investigations. If the case involves an alleged criminal offence, the Commissioner refers it to the appropriate police force for a criminal investigation.

Legislative basis

• On June 16, 2000, the Police Act came into force incorporating all provisions in relation to police ethics.
• The Code of ethics of Quebec police officers is outlined in Division I, Section 127 of the Police Act. It establishes the duties and standards of conduct of police officers, special constables and highway controllers "in their relations with the public in the performance of their duties."

Handling of complaint process

• In order to be admissible, a complaint must be:
  • in writing,
  • filed no later than a year from when the alleged event took place,
  • aimed at a police officer, special constable or highway controller in the performance of their duties,
  • a breach of the Code of ethics of Quebec police officers.
• The Commissioner must acknowledge the receipt of the complaint within five days and send a copy of the complaint and relevant evidence to the complainant and the director of the police service involved.
• In order to properly process the complaint, the Commissioner undertakes a preliminary examination of the complaint. This phase lasts a maximum of 40 days.
• The Commissioner has several options. He may:
  • refer it to conciliation,
  • order an investigation,
  • dismiss the file, or
  • if a criminal offence may have been committed, submit the file to the police service involved for criminal investigation.
• Should the Commissioner dismiss the file, the complainant has a right of review, which must be submitted within 15 days of the Commissioner's decision.
• All complaints must be submitted for conciliation. In that case, the Commissioner appoints a conciliator who is in charge of the conciliation session, which occurs within 45 days of the Commissioner's decision.
• In exceptional circumstances, the file is not referred to conciliation when the Commissioner chooses to dismiss the file or he feels that an investigation is necessary for public interest. The latter usually involves:
  • death or serious injury,
  • criminal offence, or
  • repeated offence.
• The file is referred to investigation when the conciliation fails, when the Commissioner believes it is in the public interest, or upon the request of the Minister of Public Security.
• By law, everyone but the subject of the complaint must cooperate with the investigation.
• The investigator must submit his report within three months. Upon the receipt of the report, the Commissioner may dismiss the case, propose conciliation or cite the police officer to appear before the Police ethics committee.
• Should the Commissioner decide to dismiss the case, the complainant has 30 days to appeal for review to the Police Ethics committee.
• The Commissioner may dismiss the complaint under the following circumstances:
  • The complaint was not filed within the required time period,
  • The complainant failed to cooperate,
  • The complaint is frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith,
  • The examination of the evidence revealed that there is no reason to set the ethical process in motion.
• Should the Commissioner recommend a citation, the subject officer appears at a public hearing before the Police ethics committee. At the hearing, the Commissioner must prove the alleged misconduct based on the rule of preponderance.
• The Committee decides whether the conduct of the subject officer constitutes a breach of the code of ethics, forwards its decision to the complainant, the subject officer and his director. The decision is also released to the public.
• The Committee may, at the complainant's request, review a Commissioner's decision dismissing a complaint following investigation.
• The Committee's decision may involve one of the following options:
  • It may uphold the Commissioner's decision to dismiss the complaint, or
  • It may quash the Commissioner's decision and order that he continue the investigation, conduct a new investigation, or issue a citation.
• The Committee's decision is not subject to appeal by the complainant. Within 20 days of the receipt of the Committee's decision, however, the complainant can submit to the Commissioner a document outlining the reasons justifying the appeal of the decision.

Statistical analysis

• In 2006-2007, the Commissioner received 1,371 complaints, comparable to 1,381 in 2005-2006 and 1,296 in 2004-2005.
• 59 citations were filed, involving 88 police officers. That included 17 members of the Sûreté du Québec, 33 officers from Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM), 37 municipal police officers and one highway controller.
• 505 conciliations occurred in 2006-2007, in comparison to 429 in 2005-2006.
• 114 investigations were conducted, comparable to 174 in 2005-2006.

Structure

• The Commissioner, Me Claude Simard, and the Deputy Commissioner, Me Réjean Gauthier, are appointed by the government for a five-year term with the possibility of renewal.
• The Commissioner is supported by a staff of 35 regular (and one casual) employees located in two branches, one in Quebec (19 employees), the other in Montreal (16 employees).
• The Committee is composed of 18 employees. Full-time members must have been called to the bar at least 10 years prior to their appointment to the Committee. Part-time members must have been called to the bar at least five years prior to their appointment.
• The president of the Committee, Me Mario Bilodeau, and the vice-president, Me Jean-Pierre Bédard, are also appointed by the government.

Budget/financing

• For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2007, the total expenditure was $2,718,644.
• The cost of investigations and conciliations totaled $784,913. This is subject to refund by the police service involved.

Investigator credentials/training

• Members of the Police Ethics Committee have to possess extensive legal experience.
• Investigators who are former police officers cannot investigate cases that involve their former units.

Saskatchewan: Public Complaints Commission

Mandate

• Saskatchewan's Public Complaints Commission (commonly referred to as PCC) was established to "ensure that both the public and the police receive a fair and thorough investigation" of a complaint made against the municipal police in Saskatchewan.
• The PCC is also responsible for conducting criminal investigations which originate from public complaints.

Background

• The creation of PCC was the Saskatchewan government's response to the Stonechild Inquiry as well as the Commission on First Nations and Métis Peoples and Justice Reform.
• The Commission on First Nations and Métis Peoples and Justice Reform was established in November of 2002 with a mandate to examine the relationship between the Aboriginal population and Saskatchewan's justice system, including such areas as policing, prosecutions, access to legal counsel and community justice processes.
• In its report released in June 2004, the Commission determined that the negative relationship between the Aboriginal population and the justice system was unacceptable and recommended reforms in the areas of restorative justice, education and economic development.
• The Commission of Inquiry Into Matters Relating to the Death of Neil Stonechild was established in February 2003 to examine the circumstances that led to the 1990 death of a 17-year old young man of Aboriginal origin, as well as the nature of contact between the deceased and members of the Saskatoon Police Service. In addition, the Commission was asked to examine the quality of investigation conducted by the police following Stonechild's death.
• The Commission's report, released in October 2004, determined that the police investigation was "superficial at best" and lamented the existence of a wide gulf between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal population, including a long-standing distrust of non-Aboriginal institutions (such as the police service).
• The recommendations of the Stonechild Inquiry and the Commission on First Nations and Métis people led to the implementation of several amendments to Saskatchewan's justice system exemplified in the Police Amendment Act, 2005.
• PCC was created as a result of consultations of a joint steering committee comprised of the Police Services of Regina, Saskatoon and Prince Albert, the Saskatchewan Association of Chiefs of Police, the Saskatchewan Federation of Police Officers, Saskatchewan Justice, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, and Métis Family and Community Justice Services.
• On April 1, 2006, the Public Complaints Commission replaced the office of the Saskatchewan Police Complaints Investigator.

Jurisdiction

• PCC has jurisdiction over all municipal police officers in the province. Complaints can be filed to the PCC, to the police service, to the Board of Police Commissioners, to Saskatchewan Justice, to the Special Investigations Unit of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, to the board office of the affected police service, or to the detachment of the RCMP (Section 38 (2) of the Act).
• The PCC has no authority to investigate members of the RCMP. Members of the population may file complaints against municipal police officers with a given RCMP detachment, which shall refer them to the PCC. The geographical nature of the province dictates that some inhabitants live in remote locations. They may therefore file complaints against municipal police officers at the remote RCMP detachment locations.

Legislative basis

• PCC was created pursuant to Section 16 of the Police Act, 1990. The amendments adopted on April 1, 2006 increased the scope of review and the range of powers of PCC.
• Section 16 (3) demands that one of the members of the board shall be of Métis origin, one must be a person of the First Nations ancestry, and one must be a lawyer.
• The duties and powers of PCC are outlined in sections 38 and 39 of the Act and include recording and monitoring the handling of the complaint, requesting access to files and interviews of the affected police officers and complainants.
• Section 45 (6) specifies that PCC has the authority to assume responsibility of the police investigation at any point it feels necessary to do so and in that instance the police service in questions must desist its investigation and provide all required assistance to the members of the PCC.
• Section 91.1(1) dictates that in cases of serious injury or death, the RCMP providing policing services within a municipality must request that the Deputy Minister of Justice appoint an observer "from another police service or detachment of the RCMP" to oversee the investigation. This observer shall be given "full access" to the investigation and report on all aspects of the investigation.

Handling of complaint process

• Upon the receipt of the complaint, the PCC records the complaint, decides upon the form of investigation, and continues to keep the complainant(s) and the police officer(s) affected regularly informed.

• PCC decides who conducts the investigation. According to section 45 (3), it can be conducted:
  • by the PCC;
  • by the police service whose member is the subject of the complaint;
  • by the police service whose member is the subject of the complaint with the assistance of PCC observer who monitors the investigation; or
  • by a police service other than the one whose member is the subject of the complaint.
• Pending the resolution of the complaint, the PCC shall provide within 30 days a report to the Saskatchewan Police Commission regarding the resolution of the complaint.
• The complaint shall be made within 12 months of the incident. However, if the chairperson of PCC is under belief that it is in the public interest to do so, the time allotted to the complaint can be extended.
• PCC inspects annually all records, operations and systems of administration for the handling of complaints by police services.

Statistical analysis

• In the year 2007/08, PCC received 135 complaints. 23 of those are pending and 24 were concluded as "Other" and 5 were withdrawn.
• Out of 135 complaints in 2007/08, PCC determined that 10 complaints were substantiated (supported by evidence), six were unsubstantiated and 75 were unfounded (unsupported by evidence).

Structure

• PCC is composed of five civilians. Pursuant to the Police Amendment Act 2005, the members are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council for a three-year term with a possibility of one renewal. In addition, the legislation (Section 16 (3) of the Act) requires that at least one of the members be of Métis origin, at least one must be of First Nations ancestry, and at least one member must be a lawyer.
• PCC is led by the Chair, Robert W. Mitchell, Q.C. The Director, John A. Clarke, is responsible for the daily operation of the PCC.

Budget/financing

• In the fiscal year 2007/08, the allocated budget was $598,900.
• The Special Investigations Unit's budget consisted of $150,000.

Investigator credentials/training

• There are three investigators in the PCC team. PCC members meet bimonthly to review new complaints, brief each other on the ongoing investigations and reach consensus on the determination of completed investigations.

Policies and procedures

• The PCC members meet twice a month at a minimum.

Additional observations

• PCC Director, Mr. John Clarke, emphasizes that his agency enjoys a very positive working relationship with the police service: "level of cooperation with the policing community is quite high."
• One of the key achievements of the amended PCC was the level of involvement by the First Nations groups, which were "very vocal about the lack of trust in the police justice system," in its creation.
• As Clarke puts it, "spirit of cooperation is vital to good civilian oversight."
• Policing is a service; if you want a quality service you are willing to pay the price – Clarke makes an analogy to high-priced restaurants and the price customers are willing to pay for quality service.
• Speaking about the credentials of his investigators, Clarke states:
  • There is a point to be made that a good investigator has to have good knowledge [of] what he investigates.

United Kingdom: Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

Mandate

• United Kingdom's Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has been in operation since April 1, 2004. Its mandate is to deal with complaints and allegations of misconduct against the police in England and Wales.
• In addition, its role is to promote confidence in the police complaints system; to ensure that the police complaints system is accessible to all; to set, monitor, inspect and review standards for the operation of the police complaints system; and to promote policing excellence by drawing lessons learned.

Background

• In 1981, an arrest of a black man led to three days of rioting in Brixton in south London. An inquiry into the Brixton Disturbances headed by Lord Scarman brought to light the problematic state of police/community relations, led by a widespread belief that police targeted civilians based on racial prejudice.
• As a result of concerns brought about by Lord Scarman's report, and pressures from the Board and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, major changes were introduced. On April 29, 1985, the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) replaced the Police Complaints Board.
• The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 1999, which analysed the police investigation of a 1993 murder of a young black man, reignited the debate about racism and policing and called for the establishment of an independent oversight body.
• On April 1, 2004, the PCA was replaced by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was given wider powers, including the ability to undertake independent investigation of police misconduct. In addition, the IPCC is tasked with "recording of matters from which it appears that there may have been conduct by such persons which constitutes or involves the commission of a criminal offence or behaviour justifying disciplinary proceedings" (section 10 (2) b of the Police Reform Act).

Jurisdiction

• The IPCC has jurisdiction over the police in England and Wales. In addition, since April 2006, its authority extends to handle complaints against the staff of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC). As of February 2008, IPCC's jurisdiction extends further to investigate matters pertaining to officers and officials of the UK Border Agency (UKBA).
• In addition to complaints, certain types of incidents, such as serious injury following from direct or indirect contact with the staff of either the police, HMRC, SOCA or UKBA, must be reported to the IPCC.
• Serious allegations also include allegations of serious or organised corruption, allegations against senior police officers, allegations of racism, and allegations of perverting the course of justice.
• IPCC is fully independent of the police, government and interest groups.

Legislative basis

• IPCC was created by the Police Reform Act 2002, which sets out statutory powers and responsibilities of the Commission, Chief Police Officers and police authorities. The police forces, among others, have the statutory duty to refer to the IPCC any incident involving a death that has arisen from police contact.
• The legislative changes introduced by the 2002 Act introduced the complainant's ability to make direct complaints to the IPCC and widened the types of people who can make a complaint about the police and be the subject of a complaint. As such, anyone can make a complaint on behalf of someone else, "providing that the complainant gives written permission for the other person to act on their behalf."

Handling of complaint process

• There are three types of investigation:
  1. IPCC supervised investigation
     • investigation supervised by the IPCC but conducted under the direction and control of either the police, HMRC, SOCA or UKBA
  2. managed investigation
     • conducted by the police, HMRC, SOCA or UKBA but under the direction and supervision of IPCC
  3. independent investigation
     • conducted by IPCC.
• There is no right to appeal to the IPCC against the outcome of the two latter types of investigation.
• Once the IPCC is notified of the fatality (which includes road traffic fatalities, fatal shootings, deaths in or following police custody, and deaths during or following other police contact), it decides whether to manage or supervise a police investigation or whether to independently investigate the case. In 2007/08, the IPCC was involved (through independent investigations or through investigations that it managed or supervised) in 69% of all fatalities, and left 31% of cases to be dealt with by the local police force.
• IPCC's Statutory Guidance for police officers about the complaints system sets out the standards for the handling of complaints.
• In the case of other than serious complaints, the police, within 10 working days from its receipt, decide whether to record the complaint under the Police Reform Act 2002.
• The IPCC forwards the complaint received from a member of the public to the relevant police force within two (2) working days of its receipt.
• Police force is obliged to refer all serious complaints to the IPCC.
• The IPCC offers a 24 hour on-call service for serious incidents such as allegations of serious or organised corruption, allegations against senior officers, allegations of racism or allegations of perverting the course of justice. It acknowledges the referral of the complaint by the end of the next working day, as well as decides upon the form of investigation within two working days from reception of the referral.
• If the investigation is of local nature or IPCC-supervised, the complainant has 29 days to appeal its outcome. By the end of the next working day, IPCC must acknowledge the receipt of the appeal and notify the police force, as well as make the final decision and notify the complainant and the police within 28 days.
• In the case of independent or managed investigation, the IPCC communicates with the complainant or other interested parties, with the police officer(s) involved and with the police force.
• The IPCC has an obligation to keep both the complainant and the police force (including the police officers involved) informed and updated every 28 days regarding any eventual liaison arrangements.
• In the case of a local or supervised investigation, the police communicate with the complainant or other interested parties, and with the police officer(s) involved.
• The police must keep the complainant informed every 28 days regarding any specific arrangements made.
• The complainant has 28 days to appeal in the following cases:
  • the non-recording of a complaint;
  • the local resolution process;
  • the outcome of a local or supervised investigation.
• In the case of an appeal, the IPCC must acknowledge its receipt and communicate it to the force within the next working day, as well as make both the complainant and the police of its decision within 28 days.
• Decisions made in the case of a managed or independent investigation are not subject to appeal.

Investigator credentials/training

• The IPCC has a team of more than 100 investigators headed by Regional Directors in each of its regions, to assist with supervision and management of some police investigations. They also carry out independent investigations into serious incidents or allegations of misconduct by persons serving with the police.

Statistical analysis

• In the year 2007/08, the IPCC was involved in 69% of all cases investigating fatalities, leaving 31 of them to be handled by the local police.
• In incidents involving fatalities, the IPCC was involved in 37 independent investigations, 14 managed investigations, and supervised one investigation.
• Between 2004/05 and 2007/08, the number of incidents with facilities decreased by 14.
• In 2007/08, the IPCC carried out 100 independent investigations and completed 82.
• It completed 147 managed investigations.

Structure

• There are four regional offices: central and eastern England, London and the south east, the north of England, and Wales and the south west.
• IPCC is led by the Chair, Nick Hardwick and the team is directed by the Chief Executive, Jane Furniss. The Chair is appointed by the Crown for a period of five years with a possibility of renewal (Chairman Hardwick's appointment was renewed in March 2008), and the Chief Executive is appointed by the Commission with the approval of the Secretary of State, and is accountable to the Commissioners.
• IPCC Commissioners are appointed by the Home Secretary for a term not exceeding five years and are responsible for the governance of the IPCC, guardianship of the complaints system, and the final determination of individual cases. By law, none of the 15 Commissioners can have worked for the police service, HMRC or SOCA in any capacity.
• IPCC staff also includes five Functional Directors, who are responsible for corporate and strategic functions in support of IPCC's operations, and four Regional Directors, responsible for the operations of the Commission's regional offices. Reporting too the Commission are also the Audit Committee, the Diversity Committee and the Health and Safety Committee.
• In addition, there are more than 100 independent investigators plus casework managers and other specialists.

Budget/financing

• IPCC is sponsored by the Policing Powers and Protection Unit and funded by grant in aid from the Home Office.
• In 2007/08, the Home Office allocated £32,273,000 to the IPCC.
• In 2007/08, the IPCC also received funding of £1,920,000 from HMRC (and some additional funding for work to establish an infrastructure for investigating of complaints from UKBA). That year, the IPCC total expenditure totalled £34,278,000 compared to a budget of £34,193,000.

Policies and Procedures

• IPCC policies are currently in the course of "drastic revision."
• IPCC used to operate with three procedural manuals, one on investigation, one on casework, and one belonging to the commissioners. IPCC is currently restructuring those into one integrated manual. The final product is expected for spring 2009.

Additional observations

• With regard to the credentials of its investigators, IPCC Commissioner Nicholas Long admitted that the expertise required need not be obtained solely from experience as a police officer: "You do not need in itself to have a former police officer-what you have to be is qualified and experienced." The Commissioner acknowledges that some investigators have "exceptional" expertise with no prior experience in law enforcement. At the heart of the matter perceptions of investigator qualifications often overshadow the reality.
• The IPCC model is often perceived as the best suited for Canada, one that constitutes a good blend of civilian oversight, independence and investigator expertise. Commissioner Long admits that while it applies well to the United Kingdom, the realities have to be taken into consideration. Canada's federal system and the sheer size of its territory and scope of review dictate the need for a model that factors in Canada's particular characteristics:
  • I am very conscious our form is appropriate to England and Wales [but] we cannot export it anywhere else without appropriate adaptation.
  • Achieving a single system would be difficult indeed because of autonomy of each province.

South Australia: Police Complaints Authority (PCA)

Mandate

• The Police Complaints Authority (commonly referred to as the PCA) was created to receive complaints about the conduct of police officers; maintain a register of complaints filed with the PCA and with the police; oversee complaint investigations conducted by South Australia Police (SAPOL); assess the merits of complaints; resolve complaints by conciliation where possible; recommend disciplinary or other action, and report to Parliament on the handling of complaints about police.
• It can also investigate certain complaints itself in exceptional cases. PCA can conduct primary investigations of complaints related to:
  • the most senior police officers;
  • members of the Internal Investigations Branch;
  • public servants employed by SAPOL;
  • policies, practices or procedures of the police force;
  • other exceptional circumstances.

Background

• Unlike the circumstances surrounding the creation of police oversight body in other states, in South Australia it does not appear as though public pressure or discontent demanded for the creation of the office. The impetus came from a growing consensus that such oversight was desirable, first expressed in a report of the Australian Law Reform Commission, and in the measures taken in other states.
• The Police Complaints Authority was established by the Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act of South Australian Parliament on September 1, 1985, introducing a system of external monitoring of internal investigation.

Jurisdiction

• PCA is an independent statutory body which answers directly to Parliament. The 1985 Act follows a model of "External Monitoring of Internal Investigation," that delegates the primary investigation of complaints to SAPOL's Internal Investigation Branch. These investigations are subject to oversight by the PCA, although it can conduct primary investigations of complaints in exceptional cases defined above.
• Pursuant to Section 46 (1) b of the Australian Federal Police Act, members of the IIB cannot investigate the actions of an AFP appointee serving in the investigation division.
• Section 23 of South Australia's Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act gives the PCA authority to investigate the officers of the IIB.
• Excluded from PCA's jurisdiction are complaints relating to purely private conduct of off-duty police officers or events that occurred before September 1, 1985.
• With the passing of the 2007 Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act, the PCA has the authority to audit SAPOL's compliance with its requirements.

Legislative basis

• The 1985 Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act sets out the provisions for the Police Complaints Authority as well as the Internal Investigations Branch.
• There are four other pieces of legislation that apply to the PCA, which set out specific obligations and require the Authority to report the results to the Attorney-General: the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Telecommunications (Interception) Act, and the Listening and Surveillance Devices Act.
• The recently adopted Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act of May 2007 requires PCA to conduct annual compliance audit.
• In the Freedom of Information Act of 1991, PCA is responsible for carrying out External Reviews at the request of applicants who are dissatisfied with the results of their application to SAPOL.
• The 1988 Telecommunications (Interception) Act requires PCA to audit the records of SAPOL pertaining to telephone interceptions.
• Finally, the 1972 Listening and Surveillance Devices Act obliges PCA to audit the SAPOL records pertaining to operations under that Act.

Handling of complaint process

• Complaints can be resolved through conciliation or may require full investigation. The alleged conduct that would not ordinarily justify a criminal or disciplinary charge, such as shoving in a crowded situation, is suitable for conciliation. Conciliation provides a flexible and simple alternative to a formal and lengthy process of investigation. The process, moreover, provides the participants an opportunity to have their grievances heard.
• A report is forwarded to SAPOL's Internal Investigations Branch and to the Authority which review the matter and decide whether it has been successfully conciliated.
• The process begins when a complainant gives the details of the complaint to either a member of the police force or an officer of the Police Complaints Authority. The complainant is then contacted by a Resolving Officer to discuss the case. The police officer subject of the complaint is in turn contacted by either his/her supervisor or the Resolving Officer and asked to provide an explanation. The Resolving Officer returns to the complainant who at that time decides whether to accept that the matter is resolved or to continue with the complaint. The whole process ideally is completed within 14 days.
• Investigation is usually conducted by the Internal Investigation Branch, a team of experienced police officers, and involves communication with the complainant, police officers involved and any other person who could help with the investigation. PCA monitors the investigation through regular communication with IIB officers and inspection of any relevant documents and contact persons involved about the complaint. In exceptional cases, PCA may decide to investigate the complaint on its own.
• The Commissioner of Police sends a copy of the investigation report to the PCA and the latter may recommend that action be taken if the conduct of the police officer involved was: against the law or in breach of discipline; unreasonable, unjust or improperly discriminatory; based on unreasonable law or practice; based on an error in law; or based on a misuse of a discretionary power.
• PCA may then recommend to the Commissioner that: the police officer should be charged with an offence or in breach of discipline; a decision should be reconsidered or reasons should be given for a decision; a law, policy or procedure should be changed; or that no action should be taken.
• Should PCA recommend disciplinary charges against the officer, these are heard by a magistrate sitting as the Police Disciplinary Tribunal and the penalty is assessed by the Commissioner of Police or the Deputy.

Investigator credentials/training

• According to the PCA, "the investigation of complaints requires skilled investigators familiar with the subject matter and areas covered by the investigations." Investigations are conducted by experienced officers from an independent area.
• There is one full-time investigator who is a former police officer with 18 years of experience in General Duties and Major Crash Investigation and Road Traffic Enforcement.
• In principle, the investigator can investigate his former unit. The investigator cannot be involved in cases where the subject of the investigation or a key witness or witnesses are persons the investigator had worked closely with or maintained a personal relationship with. In such cases, to avoid giving rise to the appearance of bias, the PCA Chair investigates the case himself or delegates one of the lawyers in his staff to undertake the investigation.
• All lawyers on the PCA team have had some criminal law exposure either prosecuting or defending or both.

Statistical analysis

• In the year ending June 30 2007, PCA received 1,133 new complaints and finalized 1,181. 430 (37%) of complaints were resolved by conciliation.
• During that year, it also received 21 new requests for External Reviews of determinations made by SAPOL under the Freedom of Information Act; 20 of these were finalized and one returned to SAPOL to attempt conciliation.
• PCA Chair, Mr. Anthony Wainwright, estimates that about six primary investigations were finalized in the last financial year. These investigations were not necessarily criminal in nature and some revolved around police practices and procedures.
• Two of the primary investigations involved complaints about officers in the Ethical and Professional Standards Branch (EPSB) which is the Branch within which the Internal Investigations is situated.
• One primary investigation was initiated by the Chair (no complaint was made) and involved direct oversight of a police investigation into the use of sound and vision recording within police Anti-Corruption Branch.

Complaints received and finalized, 2004/05 to 2006/07

Structure

• The Police Complaints Authority is led by an individual who, in pursuance with the 1985 Act, must be enrolled as a barrister, solicitor or legal practitioner of the High Court or the Supreme Court, and is appointed by the Governor. The current Authority is Mr. Anthony D. Wainwright.
• Because PCA is entirely independent of SAPOL, none of the staff are police officers.
• There are currently 13 people working the equivalent of 11 full-time hours. 5.6 FTE comprise the PCA Chair and case officers all legally qualified, 0.8 FTE comprise a conciliation officer, 0.8 FTE an investigator, and 3.8 FTE clerical/administrative support.

Budget/financing

• According to the latest Annual Report, the PCA staff achieved their budget, "markedly smaller than that of comparable agencies."
• PCA budget is currently AU$1,130,000 per year.

Policies and Procedures

• PCA policies are generally not written. The only written policy is the minor misconduct agreement between the PCA Chair and the Commissioner of Police made under Section 3(3) of the Act.
• According to the PCA Chair, there are few written policies because the Act prescribes in minute detail the formal way in which PCA interacts with SAPOL.In the words of Mr. Wainwright, PCA and SAPOL "have tried to keep things as informal and flexible as possible in order to best achieve our common objective, the best possible police service for South Australia."
• PCA and the IIB meet fortnightly to review investigation work in progress and discuss any emerging issues.
• In addition, PCA meets monthly with the Commissioner's delegate to discuss points of disagreement and to confer, pursuant to Section 34 of the Act, on matters of disagreement with PCA assessments and recommendations.

Additional observations

• There are key advantages to an oversight body model like South Australia's. Anthony Wainwright points out that this model "creates a system in which the police are very much part of the solution to whatever problems they may have." Mr. Wainwright emphasizes:
  • If you want your jurisdiction to have a good police force, the force has to be a part of the solution.
  • I am perfectly happy to hold them [to their obligations as part of the model], to criticize them if they do not play their part actively and responsibly and to affirm them if they do live up to their responsibility.
• A second advantage lies in the fact that if the police force play a role in the complaint process, complaints and non-complaints are dealt with consistently. All investigations are conducted (for the most part) in the same fashion by a united entity.

25.3. Major Case Management

2. Team Roles/Functions

2. 1. Major Case Management Team

2. 1. 1. Major case management is managed by the Major Case Management Team (MCMT). The MCMT is illustrated by the command triangle. The key roles in this model are the Team Commander, Primary Investigator and the File Coordinator. Although each role has clear accountability paths they maintain a collaborative relationship while maintaining independence in their respective roles.

Text Version

The Major Case Management Team (MCMT) is illustrated by a command triangle. The key role in this model is the Team Commander followed by the Primary Investigator and the File Coordinator who both occupy a secondary role.

2. 2. Team Commander

• 2. 2. 1. The Team Commander (TC) is an accredited individual who has ultimate authority, responsibility/accountability for the MCMT, its resources (human and physical) and its mandate. Accreditation includes successful completion of the Canadian Police College sponsored Major Case Management course.
• 2. 2. 2. Divisions must maintain pools of accredited TCs with current CVs outlining their experience and training in major cases focussing on leadership/managerial accomplishments.
• 2. 2. 3. The TC will ensure qualified File Coordinators (FC) and Primary Investigators (PI) are selected. Although the TC assumes overall control, responsibility and accountability for the direction, speed and flow of the case, he/she may perform other roles subject to the risk and nature of the investigation.

2. 3. Primary Investigator

• 2. 3. 1. The Primary Investigator (PI) controls the direction, speed and flow of the overall investigative process.
• 2. 3. 2. A key role of the PI is to macro-manage, not perform, all aspects related to the investigation and the PI must be prepared to restrict personal participation to the extent necessary to command the overall operation.
• 2. 3. 3. The PI is accountable to the TC and must work in collaboration with the File Coordinator (FC).
• 2. 3. 4. The PI will be an experienced investigator with proven ability to coordinate, organize and control a complex, multi-faceted investigation.

2. 4. File Coordinator

• 2. 4. 1. The FC is responsible for the control, supervision, organization and disclosure of the file documentation. See sec. 8.1
• 2. 4. 2. The FC must identify human and physical resources required to fulfill the role of file coordination. The FC is accountable to the team commander and must work in collaboration with the PI.
• 2. 4. 3. The FC will be a capable, competent investigator with familiarity in the use of both electronically and manually coordinated, organized and controlled data.

2. 5. Major Case Investigative Team

• 2. 5. 1. The Major Case Investigative Team (MCIT) is formed with the exclusive purpose of investigating a major case.
• 2. 5. 2. The MCIT is comprised of investigators (who may be seconded from their primary duties), support staff, and other employees attached to but not part of the major case management team. The MCIT may be comprised of multi-agency personnel.

2. 6. Exhibit Custodian

• 2. 6. 1. The Exhibit Custodian will be selected by and report directly to the Primary Investigator.
• 2. 6. 2. The Exhibit Custodian must coordinate and track the movement of each piece of evidence as prescribed by law.

2. 7. Interviewer

• 2. 7. 1. The PI will select the interviewer or interview team based on the investigative and evidentiary requirements of the case and the individual to be interviewed. The interviewer or interview team reports directly to the PI.
• 2. 7. 2. An interviewer must have the necessary knowledge, skill and ability to perform the required interviewing functions.