Interim Report on the Chair-Initiated Public Complaint regarding the Shooting Death of Valeri George in Buick Creek, B.C.

Introduction

[1] On September 26, 2009, the Fort St. John RCMP in British Columbia was contacted by a member of the public with respect to an incident involving Valeri George and his family. It was reported that Mr. George stopped a vehicle containing his spouse and children, who were on their way to attend a wedding in another town, and shot out two of the tires with a rifle. The driver of the vehicle was able to proceed to a nearby residence, but Mr. George followed them and shot out the remaining two tires. Mr. George eventually returned to his residence following several failed attempts to speak with his family and to get them to return home. His family travelled on to the wedding and remained out of town until the matter could be resolved, on the advice of the RCMP. Attempts were made by members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment to speak with Mr. George, but he was not cooperative and insisted that his family be returned to him.

[2] The RCMP North District Emergency Response Team (NDERT) was ultimately activated, and on September 30, 2009, they were deployed to the area of Mr. George's residence to effect a warrant for his arrest. After numerous attempts by the RCMP to make contact with Mr. George to negotiate his surrender, Mr. George drove down his driveway, while carrying a firearm and at a high rate of speed. The NDERT had blocked Mr. George's exit from his property and it appeared that Mr. George was about to ram the barricade, placing at least one NDERT member at risk of serious harm or death. NDERT members fired on the vehicle and Mr. George, who died at the scene.

Chair-Initiated Complaint

[3] On October 6, 2009, the then Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (now the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,^{Footnote 1} hereafter referred to as the "Commission") initiated a complaint (Appendix A) into the conduct of all RCMP members or other persons appointed or employed under the authority of the RCMP Act involved in this incident, as well as matters of general practice applicable to situations of this nature and, more specifically, those in which RCMP Emergency Response Teams are deployed. Specifically:

whether the RCMP members or other persons appointed or employed under the authority of the RCMP Act involved in the events of September 26 to September 30, 2009, from the moment of initial contact through to the subsequent death of Mr. George complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force; and
whether the RCMP's national-, divisional- and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to such an incident and to situations in which RCMP Emergency Response Teams are deployed are adequate.

[4] As provided by the RCMP Act, the complaint was investigated by the RCMP, who provided the Commission with a Final Report dated June 11, 2012, attached as Appendix B. In summary, the RCMP found that the NDERT members acted appropriately and that the use of lethal force was necessary and reasonable, and that the policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to this incident were adequate.

[5] Pursuant to paragraph 45.71(3)(a) of the RCMP Act, the Commission is required to prepare a written report setting out its findings and recommendations with respect to its review of the complaint. This report constitutes the Commission's investigation into the issues raised in the complaint, and the associated findings and recommendations. A summary of the Commission's findings and recommendations can be found in Appendix C.

Commission's Review of the Facts Surrounding the Events

[6] It is important to note that the Commission is an agency of the federal government, distinct and independent from the RCMP. When reviewing a Chair‑initiated complaint, the Commission does not act as an advocate either for the complainant or for RCMP members. The Chair's role is to reach conclusions after an objective examination of the evidence and, where judged appropriate, to make recommendations that focus on steps that the RCMP can take to improve or correct conduct by RCMP members.

[7] It should also be noted that the findings and recommendations made by the Commission are not criminal in nature, nor are they intended to convey any aspect of criminal culpability. A public complaint involving the use of force is part of the quasi-judicial process, which weighs evidence on a balance of probabilities. Although some terms used in this report may concurrently be used in the criminal context, such language is not intended to include any of the requirements of the criminal law with respect to guilt, innocence or the standard of proof.

[8] The circumstances related to the death of Mr. George were also reviewed as part of an Independent Officer Review (IOR), which was conducted by RCMP Inspector Jeffrey Hunter. He issued a Final Report dated September 2, 2011. An IOR is an internal administrative review. The primary purpose of the IOR is a fact-finding enquiry to ensure, among other things, that a proper investigation was conducted; that officer training, skills, procedures, tactics and policy are appropriate and were followed; that member conduct was in accordance with the RCMP Act, and that any issues which brought about or contributed to the incident are identified and responded to.^{Footnote 2} In its report to the Commission, the RCMP stated that it relied in large part upon the findings of the IOR. The findings and recommendations of the IOR will be referenced throughout this report, where applicable to the issues being examined by the Commission.

[9] My findings, as detailed below, are based on a thorough examination of the following documents: the investigative report prepared by the RCMP's "E" Division Major Crime Section and supporting documentation, including statements, notes, reports and photographic and video evidence; relevant documentary materials as disclosed by the "E" Division; the IOR report; the RCMP's Final Report to the Commission; and other relevant documentation.

[10] The following account of events flows from witness statements provided during the police investigation. The Commission puts these facts forward, as they are either undisputed or because, on the preponderance of evidence, the Commission accepts them as a reliable version of what transpired. It is noted that there were only minor discrepancies between witness statements, which include those received from many of Mr. George's family members and friends, as well as those of the involved RCMP members. In addition, the witness statements are generally consistent with the physical evidence. A list of the primary RCMP members involved in the incident can be found at Appendix D. Overall, the Commission finds that there is little dispute over what transpired over the course of the four days leading up to and including the shooting death of Mr. George.

Background

[11] Valeri George was a German- and Russian-speaking immigrant from Kazakhstan. He lived with his wife, Irina George, and eleven children on a secluded farm in the area of Buick Creek, near Fort St. John, British Columbia. Another child was married and lived away from home. According to Mrs. George, the family had been in Canada for four years. Mr. George had difficulty with English, which made working difficult. He spoke of going back to Germany, but Mrs. George told him that she liked it better in Canada. Mrs. George indicated that they had a good relationship and that Mr. George was good to their children.

[12] On September 26, 2009, Jack Thiessen reported the following events to the RCMP: Mr. George's family were on their way to Dawson Creek when he chased after them in a separate vehicle. Mr. George allegedly used his vehicle to force the vehicle his family was in to stop. Mr. George subsequently used a rifle to shoot out two of the tires and demanded that his family return home. The driver of the vehicle (a family friend) was able to drive away while the tires were deflating and pulled into a neighbour's residence, which was also the home of Mr. George's cousin, Jakob George. Mr. George followed them, shot out the other two tires of the vehicle and again demanded that his family return home. Mr. George left and returned to the property several times before going home. The family proceeded to Dawson Creek in a different vehicle and Mr. Thiessen, who arrived at Jakob George's property during the incident, called the RCMP to report the matter.

[13] The following details of those events are as recounted by those present, which included Mrs. George and several of the George children, members of the Simon family (who were driving the George family to Dawson Creek), Rudi, Jakob and Paul George (who lived at the home where the George family sought refuge after the van tires were disabled), and Jack Thiessen, the neighbour who made the report to the RCMP.

[14] According to all involved, Mr. George did not want to go to the wedding in Dawson Creek but gave permission for Mrs. George and the children to go and to be driven by the Simon family. Multiple witnesses confirmed that Mr. George had given his permission. The Simon family reported that on September 26, 2009, at approximately 9 a.m. they drove up the driveway to the George residence and left the gate open as they picked up the George family. When they went to leave the property with Mrs. George and the children, they discovered that the gate had been shut, presumably by Mr. George. One of the George children got out of the vehicle and opened the gate, and they went on their way to the wedding.

[15] Not long after leaving the George property, Mr. George drove up behind them in his own vehicle, passed them and cut them off, forcing them to stop their vehicle. Mr. George got out of his vehicle carrying a rifle and spoke with the driver of the van—Johan Simon. Mr. George asked him where he was going with his family. Mr. Simon told him that they were going to the wedding. Mr. George asked him for the keys to the vehicle, and Mr. Simon asked him, "What, what do you want?" Mr. George proceeded to shoot two of the tires on the vehicle, apparently in an attempt to keep the family from going, but the tires were only slowly deflating and they were able to make it to Jakob George's property, which was two or three kilometres away. According to Mrs. George, it appeared at first that Mr. George was heading home. She stated that Mr. George thought they were not going to keep driving, but the tires were not completely flat yet and they drove on. Mr. George then turned around and followed them to Jakob George's property.

[16] After stopping at the neighbouring property, Mr. George got out and shot out the remaining two tires on the vehicle being driven by Mr. Simon. Mr. Simon approached Mr. George, who asked him if he wanted to fight. Mr. Simon replied that he did not and asked Mr. George to calm down. Mr. Simon noted that he had never seen Mr. George like this before. Several persons who were present reported that Mrs. George and the children were shaken up and wanted to come inside the house, which they did. Mr. George was clearly upset and agitated. He came and went from Jakob George's property a number of times and it was reported that at one point while Mr. George was arguing about the return of his family, he held a butter knife in his hand.

[17] Mr. Thiessen, who knew Mr. George but had difficulty communicating with him due to language issues, stopped at Jakob George's at some point after the first time Mr. George had left the property. Mr. Thiessen observed that the four tires were flat on a large van (the vehicle that had been carrying the Simon and George families) when he approached the house. Jakob George told him that Mr. George had shot out the tires. During this conversation, Mr. George returned and was very agitated. Through an interpreter (Jakob George's sons), Mr. George told him that a family had come and stolen his family and that he had to go and save them. Mr. Thiessen told Mr. George that he understood being upset if someone came and stole his family, but shooting the tires out a vehicle was not the way to go about getting his family back. Mr. Thiessen also told him that unless he settled down and changed his way, he would be calling the RCMP. Mr. George immediately responded that if he called the RCMP, he would be joining the enemy and that Mr. Thiessen and his whole family would go to hell. Mr. George then got in his vehicle and drove away.

[18] Mr. Thiessen further stated that Mr. George returned five minutes later. While Mr. George was speaking with Jakob George, Mr. Thiessen did a quick search of Mr. George's vehicle for the firearm, but did not find it. When Mr. George saw what he was doing, Mr. George got angry and brought his fist up to Mr. Thiessen, who pushed it away. They exchanged some words before Mr. George left again.

[19] Mr. Thiessen went inside the house with the George family. While they were inside, Mr. George returned and attempted to get inside, but the door was locked. According to Mr. Thiessen, Mr. George was seen looking in all the windows and the children attempted to move out of his line of sight. Mr. Thiessen stated that all of the women in the house were clearly very upset. Jakob George went to the door and Mr. George came inside as the family went upstairs. Mr. Thiessen remained on the stairs and prevented Mr. George from going up. Mr. George was clearly agitated, yelling and swearing in a loud voice. Mr. George spoke with Mr. Simon and reportedly told him that he had stolen his family, that they needed to come home immediately and had not asked to go to the wedding. He subsequently left again.

[20] In the meantime, another friend had arrived with an alternate vehicle for the Simon and George families to take to the wedding, and they left in it. Mr. Thiessen drove behind them as far as Buick to ensure that they were okay before telephoning the RCMP to report the incident.

[21] Mr. Thiessen later reported that he was told by those translating for him (members of Jakob George's family who were present at the time) that Mr. George said that there would be consequences to pay for his family having just run off. He read the situation as very tense and possibly dangerous, so he decided to call the RCMP. When Mrs. George left with the children, he cautioned her not to come back until the situation had been sorted out.

Initial involvement of the RCMP

[22] Mr. Thiessen reported the following information in his initial call to the RCMP: He wanted to speak with someone about a family issue involving a neighbour. The wife and children wanted to go to a wedding but the husband did not feel like taking them. Another family picked them up to take them, but the husband "got very violent and, and he took his .22 out and he was shooting." The incident had happened about two hours previously, and Mr. Thiessen did not witness the shooting but saw bullet holes in the tires and a few bullets that Mr. George had dropped on the ground, which he picked up. Mr. Thiessen stated to the dispatcher: "[H]e kept coming to the house there and he got very violent and he was going to beat me up. Because I went through his vehicle, I was gonna confiscate that rifle if I could find it . . . ." They finally got the family out of there and to where Mr. George would not locate them. Mr. Thiessen reported that Mr. George did not speak English, so the RCMP would need an interpreter.

[23] Records indicate that that information was relayed to Constable Krystal Moren of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment within minutes of Mr. Thiessen's call. Constable Moren spoke with Mr. Thiessen by telephone and noted some of the following:

He had called to report a domestic dispute involving Mr. George and his wife, during which time Mr. George shot out the tires to a vehicle when she was trying to leave.
Mrs. George and her children were currently safe and in Dawson Creek.
A friend had picked up Mrs. George and her children to drive them to a wedding and Mr. George became upset and followed them, eventually shooting out all four tires of the vehicle they had been travelling in.
Mrs. George and the children sought refuge in a neighbour's house, where Mr. Thiessen became involved and spoke with Mr. George.
Mrs. George and the children were able to leave in another vehicle.
The George children were scared and crying.
Mrs. George did not want him to call the police and was worried that Mr. George may go to jail.
Mr. George did not speak English.
Mr. Thiessen was scared of what may happen to Mrs. George when he returned home.
Mr. Thiessen indicated that there are reports of domestic violence between Mr. George and his wife but that the community will not say anything to the police.
Mr. Thiessen checked Mr. George's vehicle for the firearm but could not locate it.
Mr. Thiessen agreed to meet Constable Moren and Constable Josh Martyn at Jakob George's house.

[24] Constable Moren and Constable Martyn arrived at Jakob George's house mid-afternoon on September 26, 2009, and learned the following (with the assistance of a family friend, Jakob Dick, translating when necessary):

At approximately 9 a.m. that morning he was awoken by the arrival of Johan Simon pulling into his driveway with Mrs. George and her children.
Mr. George had shot out the tires of the vehicle that was driven by Mr. Simon and he could hear the air leaking from the tires.
Mr. George was upset that his wife was leaving when he told her not to.
Mr. George was waving the gun around but he did not threaten anyone or point the firearm at anyone.
Mr. George left his house, and Mrs. George and the children were able to leave.
Mr. George sometimes acts strange, but he has never seen him behave this way.
Mr. George will not listen to anyone.

[25] During that time, Mr. Thiessen provided the members with several bullets he had picked up on the ground, purportedly dropped by Mr. George. After speaking, Mr. Thiessen and Mr. Dick agreed to help the members in getting Mr. George to agree to speak with them. The approach taken by the members was to tell him that he would not be arrested at this time, but they wanted to speak with him and retrieve the firearm. Constable Moren noted in her report that it was not known whether Mr. George would shoot at members upon seeing them, as he may think he was about to be arrested.

[26] When the members attended Mr. George's address, they discovered that the metal gates were locked from the inside. Telephone calls to the residence went unanswered. Mr. Thiessen and Mr. Dick were not concerned that Mr. George would harm himself at that time, and Mr. Thiessen indicated that the gate is never locked and took it to mean that he did not wish to speak with anyone. They all returned to Jakob George's residence, where Mr. Dick was able to speak with Mrs. George by telephone. Mrs. George stated that they would stay in Dawson Creek and would speak to the local RCMP at her daughter's house about the incident. She stated that she suspected that Mr. George was home and had locked the gate.

[27] Later that evening, Constable Moren spoke to Mr. Thiessen, who told her that Mr. George returned to Jakob George's residence after the members had left. He seemed to have calmed down but was still upset that his wife had left for the wedding against his wishes. Mr. Thiessen told her that he thought Mr. George would "deal" with his wife when she returned home, and that Mr. Thiessen had urged her not to return home. Mr. Thiessen relayed his belief that this was not Mr. George's first act of violence towards his wife.

[28] That same evening, members of the Dawson Creek RCMP Detachment obtained statements from Mrs. George and the Georges' eldest daughter. A decision was made that Mr. George could be dealt with the next day, as the rest of the George family was safe for the night. The situation would be reassessed the following day.

[29] On September 27, 2009, members confirmed that the George family remained in a safe location, but the members were busy for much of the day on other calls. That evening, members obtained further information from the family by telephone, and from members of the community. They learned that the previous evening, the neighbour who had originally given Mr. George the firearm had heard about the incident and attempted to get it back from Mr. George. However, Mr. George told him that the rifle was now in Wonowon. That was believed to be a lie, as the person Mr. George claimed he had given the rifle to was in Dawson Creek at the wedding being attended by the George family. No one saw Mr. George on this day. A recorded statement was taken from Mr. Thiessen and the owner of the rifle.

[30] In the early morning hours of September 28, 2009, a pass-on request was prepared with the following instructions:

Locate a German translator that will be able to speak with Mr. George by telephone. Mr. George needs to know that he will be arrested for the shooting of the tires incident and that he needs to cooperate and not be nervous.
Locate and arrest Mr. George for careless use of a firearm and mischief. If Mr. George is cooperative, obtain the firearm.
(Note: a caution was added outlining some information about Mr. George, including that he believes that police are extremely corrupt and may feel that they are a strong threat against him. He may be dealing with an undiagnosed mental illness and his behaviour may escalate, as his wife had not returned home. It was unknown whether he would fire at or run from police. He may also barricade himself inside his house to avoid arrest, as he may believe he is going to jail for a long time. Mr. George is in possession of a .22 single shot rifle.)
Update Mrs. George on the situation (through a family member) and ensure that she does not return home.

[31] A German-speaking member at the Castlegar RCMP Detachment—Constable Dirk Finkensiep—was identified and engaged to speak with Mr. George by telephone. Constable Finkensiep spoke with Mr. George, after first speaking with Mrs. George that evening. Earlier that afternoon, members began surveillance of the George property to keep track of Mr. George's whereabouts, as well as to be in a position to receive him should Constable Finkensiep be able to convince Mr. George to surrender to police. Unfortunately, Mr. George refused to engage with Constable Finkensiep and would not answer his subsequent calls. Constable Finkensiep also engaged the assistance of a church elder and friend of Mr. George's, but without success. Members remained at the property, but were instructed to observe only and to not attempt to stop the vehicle or confront Mr. George if he was to leave.

[32] On September 29, 2009, Constable Finkensiep continued to work with the church elder and friend to facilitate communications with Mr. George. Mr. George continued to refuse to speak with police and wanted his family returned to him. It was reported by the friend that Mr. George knew that what he did was wrong and was afraid of what would happen to him. Constable Finkensiep attempted to contact Mr. George again, but his calls went unanswered.

[33] In the later afternoon of September 29, 2009, members observed a white van approach the end of Mr. George's driveway (coming from the residence, which was not in sight of their location). Once the driver of the van saw the marked police vehicle, the driver retreated. At this point, the NDERT had been activated and were on their way to Fort St. John.

Mr. George's state of mind

[34] It became evident in the hours and days following the initial incident that Mr. George's behaviour was out of character for him, although not the first time he displayed strange behaviour over the previous months. Almost every person who spoke with the RCMP about Mr. George expressed some concern about his mental state. On the day of the incident, one witness reported that Mr. George told him that the President of Russia had come to his house. Mr. George spoke to a number of people by telephone, expressing concern about the whereabouts of his family, seemingly convinced that the police had taken them.

[35] Mrs. George stated that she had wanted to return home, but the police had told her to stay away and not to call her husband. Her family members also did not want her to go back. She stated that her family thought that the police would talk to Mr. George and that he would see a doctor. Mrs. George reported that her husband was always afraid of the police and doctors.

The George family property

[36] After September 26, 2009, Mr. George remained at his family property, pictured below. As noted above, the house is accessed by way of a gated driveway and is some distance from the road. The remoteness of the location presented a number of challenges for members in terms of negotiating with Mr. George as well as being able to approach him in order to facilitate his arrest.

Photo 1: Showing the George residence, outbuilding and farm area.

Photo 2: Showing a larger portion of the George property, including the residence, outbuildings, farm area and lagoon.

Photo 3: Aerial photograph of the George property, including all buildings and the driveway leading out to the main road.

North District Emergency Response Team activation and deployment

[37] Since efforts to persuade Mr. George to cooperate with the police were unsuccessful and he remained armed and emotionally unpredictable, the NDERT was activated on September 29, 2009. The following NDERT team members were ultimately deployed:

Inspector Patrick Egan – Incident Commander^{Footnote 3}
Corporal Richard Brown – NDERT Team Leader^{Footnote 4}
Corporal Ryan Arnold – NDERT second in command
Constable Colin Warwick – NDERT Member and Police Dog Service
Constable Matthew Shaw – NDERT Member
Constable Martin Degen – NDERT Member
Constable Brian Merriman – NDERT Member
Constable Colin Atkinson – NDERT Member
Constable Nathan Poyzer – Spare^{Footnote 5}

[38] They were supported by the following members:

Sergeant Mike Stevenson – Negotiator
Corporal Claudette Garcia – Negotiator
Ryan Schaefer – Radio technician
Civilian Member Shirley Hogan – Scribe^{Footnote 6}
Civilian Member Don McKelvie – Dispatcher
Civilian Member Nicholas Chapman – Dispatcher trainee
Civilian Member Greg Melson – Radio technician

[39] Upon arrival of the team, a member covertly entered the George family property on foot and to a position where he could observe the residence and monitor the movements of Mr. George and anyone else on the property. The member relayed that information to the Incident Commander and other team members by radio. Throughout the morning, Mr. George was seen entering and exiting his residence with the rifle, and later entering a white van with the rifle and driving it up the driveway at a high rate of speed, with music blaring. He returned the vehicle to the residence and he went back inside, still holding the rifle. He later returned to his vehicle and drove it erratically and at a high rate of speed about the property. Mr. George was also observed walking around with the rifle, aiming it randomly at different points in the bush.

[40] Each time Mr. George was reported to be inside his residence, members of the Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) attempted to make contact by telephone. One call was answered but immediately disconnected; the rest went unanswered. (Investigators later discovered that Mr. George had apparently unplugged the telephone from the wall.)

[41] NDERT members contained the end of the driveway in an attempt to prevent Mr. George from leaving the property. At one point, Mr. George was observed loading the rifle and walking up the driveway with his four dogs. Members were instructed by Inspector Egan to verbally challenge Mr. George. Mr. George was given commands in German to halt, but he ignored the commands and continued walking back and forth with the dogs, yelling. He then walked back in the direction of his residence.

[42] Following this encounter, members moved their position and the barricade to the area of the gate, which was some distance from the road. The NDERT positioned another vehicle outside the gate to help fortify their blockade. Mr. George was observed fuelling his white van; he then retrieved his rifle from the van and went back into his residence.

[43] Mr. George was subsequently observed exiting his residence carrying the rifle. He started an all-terrain vehicle (ATV), but it stalled. He then entered the white van, still carrying the rifle, and drove it down the driveway at a high rate of speed toward NDERT members. As he neared the gate, members fired at the van. The van came to a stop and Mr. George exited it, carrying the rifle. More shots were fired by NDERT members and Mr. George collapsed on the driveway. Members approached and began providing first aid. An ambulance attended and efforts continued; however, Mr. George was ultimately pronounced dead at the scene. Mr. George received four gunshot wounds, two of which penetrated the chest and lead to massive internal bleeding, causing his death.

Analysis of the RCMP's Involvement with Mr. George from September 26 to 30, 2009

As noted above, the issues to be examined by the Chair-initiated complaint are:

whether the RCMP members or other persons appointed or employed under the authority of the RCMP Act involved in the events of September 26 to September 30, 2009, from the moment of initial contact through to the subsequent death of Valeri George complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force; and
whether the RCMP's national-, divisional- and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to such an incident and to situations in which RCMP Emergency Response Teams are deployed are adequate.

In its response to the Chair-initiated complaint, the RCMP indicated that it was satisfied with the conduct of its members, and that the applicable policies, procedures and guidelines were adequate. The RCMP's response to recommendations made as a result of the B.C. Coroner's inquest and the RCMP's IOR are referenced where applicable to the Commission's examination of the issue.

Conduct of RCMP members prior to the activation of the NDERT

a) Initial response and investigation

[44] The police (including the RCMP) have a duty to investigate a complaint of criminal activity when there is a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Paragraph 18(a) of the RCMP Act states that it is the duty of members:

18(a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody.

[45] In addition, RCMP policy dictates that all complaints of violence in relationships must be investigated and documented.^{Footnote 7} Members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment were duty-bound to investigate the call received from Mr. Thiessen regarding the actions of Mr. George against his family members.

[46] Members spoke with Mr. Thiessen and others present during the incident and determined that Mrs. George and her children were safe and out of town. Members used family members or friends where needed as interpreters. Mr. Thiessen and the others agreed to assist with making attempts to speak with Mr. George, although their calls to his residence went unanswered. Members spoke with Mrs. George by telephone, who stated that she would remain out of town until the matter was resolved. Arrangements were made for Mrs. George and one of her older daughters to give statements to a member of the Dawson Creek RCMP Detachment.

[47] When members initially met with Mr. Thiessen, he turned over two unfired bullets that Mr. George had apparently dropped in the yard during the incident. The members attended Mr. George's residence, but the metal gates were locked from the inside. No one was concerned that Mr. George would harm himself at that time. Mr. Thiessen told the members that the gate is never locked and that he took it to mean that Mr. George did not wish to speak to anyone.

[48] In the days that followed, and as detailed earlier in this report, members made concerted efforts to gather additional information about Mr. George, his history and his habits, and made numerous attempts to speak directly with him to resolve the situation and facilitate a peaceful arrest. They also took steps to gather additional physical evidence to support the charges and an application for a warrant, when it was determined that that may be necessary.

[49] Inspector Egan, in his capacity as the Officer in Charge of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment, stated that he spoke with Inspector Ray Fast, the Operations Officer from the North District, late on September 28, 2009, regarding his assessment of the situation. They decided that as long as they could place Mr. George at his home and make telephone contact with him (which had been done throughout that day), they would hold off on deploying an ERT. While Mr. George's actions had been troubling, Inspector Egan felt that the situation could be resolved through dialogue, and that it was sufficiently mitigated by the placement of members at the property and the fact that Mrs. George and the children were safe and out of town. He noted that while the situation had the potential to escalate, for the time being Mr. George's family was safe.

[50] In the Commission's view, the members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment who were involved in the initial response and investigation took reasonable steps to investigate the matter and ensure the safety of the George family. It was reasonable for members to determine that, for the time being, Mr. George was not an immediate danger to others as they continued to gather information and physical evidence, as well as monitor the movements of Mr. George. That assessment changed as time passed, and will be discussed later in this report.

Finding: RCMP members were duty-bound to investigate the reported actions of Mr. George.

Finding: RCMP members took reasonable steps to investigate the incident.

Finding: RCMP members took appropriate steps to ensure the safety of Mr. George's family pending an arrest.

b) Grounds to arrest Mr. George

[51] It became evident early on in the investigation of this matter that Mr. George would be arrested due to the seriousness of his reported actions. When evaluating a member's decision to make an arrest and pursue charges,^{Footnote 8} it is important to keep in mind that his or her role is not to determine a suspect's guilt or innocence—they do not act as judge and jury. The goal of an investigation is to determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed.

[52] The initial charges that were contemplated by members were for careless use of a firearm and mischief, as confirmed by Constable Moren's pass-on request detailed earlier in this report. Those offences are defined as follows in the Criminal Code of Canada:

86. (1) Every person commits an offence who, without lawful excuse, uses, carries, handles, ships, transports or stores a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any ammunition or prohibited ammunition in a careless manner or without reasonable precautions for the safety of other persons.

430. (1) Every one commits mischief who wilfully
(a) destroys or damages property;
(b) renders property dangerous, useless, inoperative or ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use, enjoyment or operation of property; or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use, enjoyment or operation of property.

430. (2) Every one who commits mischief that causes actual danger to life is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

[53] In the Commission's view, there was overwhelming evidence supporting the above-noted charges against Mr. George in relation to the shooting incident. There were numerous witnesses to Mr. George's actions and they made consistent statements to investigators that were supported by physical evidence. In addition, there were no denials on the part of Mr. George when he discussed the incident with family and friends. In the Commission's view, it is clear that members had reasonable grounds to believe that multiple offences had been committed by Mr. George.

[54] However, even in situations where police have reasonable grounds to believe that an individual has committed an offence, an arrest does not automatically follow. The decision to make an arrest without a warrant involves consideration of the requirements listed under section 495 of the Criminal Code and the exercise of discretion.

[55] When a person is believed to have committed an indictable offence, such as that set out in subsection 430(2) of the Criminal Code (mentioned above), he or she may be arrested without a warrant. There are no additional requirements set out in the Criminal Code. When a person has committed what is known as a hybrid offence—i.e. where the prosecution may elect to proceed by indictment or summary conviction, and as provided for in section 86 of the Criminal Code—a police officer may arrest that person without a warrant to:

(i) establish the identity of the person;
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to the offence; or
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the offence or the commission of another offence.^{Footnote 9}

[56] Members were clearly concerned about a repetition of the offence or the commission of another offence against Mrs. George or other members of the George family. According to Mrs. George, both RCMP members and members of her family did not want her to return to her residence until the matter was resolved. Friends of the George family expressed concern to members about what could happen when Mrs. George returned. In the Commission's view, members reasonably believed it was necessary to arrest Mr. George for the safety of his family and satisfied the requirement set out under section 495 of the Criminal Code.

[57] That being said, section 495 of the Criminal Code is permissive. It does not require the police to make an arrest simply on the basis that someone is believed to have committed an offence. The power of arrest is a discretionary one. It is the nature of discretion that different people will exercise their discretion differently in similar circumstances. It allows a police officer to make decisions based on an assessment of the circumstances at the time that they occur and within a range of acceptable outcomes. Accordingly, decisions involving the exercise of discretion are entitled to some level of deference.

[58] Those decisions are made based on the individual circumstances of each case. However, there are also policy considerations, particularly in cases involving domestic violence. RCMP policy stresses the importance of victim safety and that police intervention and action should address that.^{Footnote 10} It also refers to the B.C. Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General's policy on violence against women in relationships and its emphasis on a proactive arrest and charges where grounds exist.^{Footnote 11} Mrs. George and her family remained away from their home due to the perceived danger. Victim safety is of the utmost importance when considering whether or not to exercise discretion to arrest or not to arrest. In all the circumstances, the Commission is satisfied that the decision to arrest Mr. George without a warrant was reasonable.

Finding: RCMP members had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. George had committed multiple Criminal Code offences.

Finding: RCMP members had grounds to arrest Mr. George without a warrant following the incident with his family.

Finding: RCMP members' decision to pursue Mr. George's arrest without a warrant was a reasonable exercise of discretion.

c) Application for a warrant

[59] As the days passed without an arrest, members decided that a warrant to arrest Mr. George in his home (known as a Feeney warrant) may be necessary. On September 29, 2009, members sought and obtained a Feeney warrant for the following Criminal Code offences:

mischief endangering life (subsection 430(2));
use of a firearm while committing an offence (paragraph 85(1)(a));
dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (subsection 249(1)); possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose (section 88);
possession of a firearm without a licence (subsection 92(1)); and
intimidation through the use of violence (subsection 423(1)).

[60] The warrant was issued by a Judicial Justice of the Peace for the Province of British Columbia on September 30, 2009, at 12:50 a.m. It authorized police to enter Mr. George's residence for the purpose of arresting him, without prior announcement. The time period given for executing the warrant was from 7 a.m. on September 30, 2009, until 23:59 p.m. on October 2, 2009.

[61] The role of the Commission is not to assess the validity of the warrant, as it was issued by the court, which determined that the application for the warrant set out reasonable grounds to believe that the above-noted offences had been committed. The decisions of the court are not subject to review by the Commission. However, the Commission may assess the actions of RCMP members in relation to the frankness and accuracy of the warrant application in relation to the investigative record as well as the reasonableness of the discretion exercised in deciding to effect the arrest at the time members chose to do so.

[62] The warrant application was completed and submitted to the court by Constable Jessica Veysey. Prior to the warrant application, members had not sought to arrest Mr. George in his home, but rather sought to have Mr. George come to them voluntarily. While that continued to be the goal even after the NDERT was activated and deployed, it was evident that Mr. George may not be cooperative and members may be required to enter his home to effect his arrest. In the Commission's view, it was both reasonable and necessary at that stage of the investigation to seek a Feeney warrant. Having reviewed the contents of the warrant application and the Fort St. John investigation file, the Commission finds that the application contained a reasonably thorough and accurate representation of the evidence up to that point in time.

Finding: It was both reasonable and necessary for members to seek a warrant to arrest Mr. George in his home in the event that negotiations failed.

Finding: The warrant application contained a reasonably thorough and accurate representation of the evidence.

d) Communications

[63] As noted earlier in this report, members did not attempt to approach Mr. George on his property on the basis that a) he had closed and locked the gate (indicating that he would not be receptive to visitors), b) they were told that Mr. George would not react well to the intervention of police, and c) Mr. George had a firearm that he had already used in the commission of a criminal offence. From September 26 to September 28, 2009, members had relied on family and friends to communicate with Mr. George and to attempt to facilitate a surrender to police.

[64] Communications were complicated by the fact that Mr. George did not speak or understand English. Members attempted to retain the services of a translator to assist in communicating with Mr. George; however, they were unsuccessful in doing so. On September 28, 2009, Constable Finkensiep of the Castlegar RCMP Detachment was identified as German-speaking and was asked to assist.

[65] Constable Finkensiep first spoke by telephone with Mrs. George to ensure that he was able to communicate with her and would be able to communicate with Mr. George, and to gather more information about Mr. George. He was provided with a two-page questionnaire by members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment, which he used when speaking with Mrs. George. That conversation was audio-recorded and formed part of the investigative record.

[66] At approximately 6:30 p.m. on September 28, 2009, Constable Finkensiep subsequently called the George residence and spoke to a male who identified himself as Mr. George. Constable Finkensiep attempted to speak to Mr. George about what had transpired and about surrendering to the police, but Mr. George said that he did not want to talk to the police and hung up the telephone. Mr. George did not answer subsequent calls from Constable Finkensiep. That conversation was also audio-recorded. At the time of the call, members were positioned at the end of Mr. George's driveway in order to receive him should he be willing to surrender.

[67] Members enlisted the assistance of Jakob Remple Sr., a friend of Mr. George and a respected church elder in their community. Mr. Remple Sr. had been in contact with Mr. George in the days following the incident. When reached by telephone by Mr. Remple on September 29, 2009, Mr. George told him that he would not speak to the police, would not present himself to the police, and demanded that his family be returned. Mr. George admitted to damaging the tires and said that he would pay for them, but he was scared of what would happen with the police.

[68] In the morning of September 29, 2009, Constable Finkensiep again enlisted the assistance of Mr. Remple Sr. Mr. Rempel Sr. was asked to call Mr. George. Constable Finkensiep asked him to tell Mr. George to talk to the police, as they wanted the situation resolved, and that it would not just go away. Mr. Remple Sr. stated that he spoke to Mr. George twice that day. Mr. George continued to refuse to speak with the police and said that he would not speak with the police until his family was returned. When Mr. George told him that the Simons took his wife and children without his permission, Mr. Remple Sr. reminded him that he was a witness to the conversation in which Mr. George agreed that his family could go to the wedding. Mr. Rempel Sr. stated that he told Mr. George that the police were being cautious because he had a gun and that the police wanted him to come out and talk to them. Mr. Remple Sr. tried to convince Mr. George to give himself up to the police and that everything was going to work out peacefully. But Mr. George was convinced that the police were going to harm his family.

[69] Constable Finkensiep made two more attempts to reach Mr. George by telephone, but no answer was received. No further contact was made until after the activation and deployment of the NDERT.

[70] Extensive efforts were made to communicate with Mr. George in a language that he understood. Mr. George's inability to communicate in English presented a challenge, but members took steps to retain the services of an interpreter and used family and friends until they were able to find a German‑speaking member to make that contact. I note that a recommendation was made following the Coroner's inquest that every RCMP detachment determine the predominant second language in their communities and have a local officer fluent in that language. The RCMP stated in its response to the Chair-initiated complaint that that recommendation was not feasible but that other strategies are in place, including the ability to deploy translator/language capability police officers when required, as well as the use of translation services. However, "E" Division Headquarters was considering the creation of a database of members that speak a language other than English.

[71] In addition to the language issues, Mr. George was part of a small community that reportedly preferred to deal with issues internally, and it became evident that Mr. George did not trust the police for cultural reasons. To that end, members used family and friends to facilitate communications, and guidance was provided to those individuals to help facilitate a surrender by Mr. George to police. Matters were further complicated by Mr. George's apparent mental state.

[72] RCMP policy states that members are not qualified to make a diagnosis of mental illness, but should be able to recognize behaviour that indicates signs of one.^{Footnote 12} It recognizes that clear communication can be effective in de-escalating a situation involving a person who may have a mental illness and suggests that members may seek the assistance of a close friend, family member, religious or spiritual leader, or a mental health professional in appropriate circumstances, and after a careful risk assessment.^{Footnote 13}

[73] Over the course of September 26 to 28, friends and family reported on their conversations with Mr. George, although generally those conversations were not prompted by the RCMP. When it became clear that Mr. George was not receptive to speaking with the RCMP, members attempted contact through a friend and respected church elder. Mr. Remple Sr. had spoken to Mr. George regularly in the days that followed the incident, contact that was first initiated by Mr. George, who was looking for his family. Mr. Remple's son was married to Mr. George's eldest daughter, and Mr. George's family was staying at their home in Dawson Creek. In the Commission's view, it was reasonable for members to seek such assistance from Mr. Remple Sr., and appropriate direction was given with respect to the messages to be conveyed to Mr. George.

[74] According to Inspector Egan's statement, they considered using Mrs. George to make contact with Mr. George. However, that idea was rejected for three reasons: there could be a potential for retribution against Mrs. George for assisting in the arrest should they reconcile; if the approach was unsuccessful, it may cause Mr. George to become more volatile; and it would place Mrs. George in the position of being re-victimized. Inspector Egan stated that at that point it was clear that speaking with Mr. George was going to be difficult and further failed attempts may agitate Mr. George and force a confrontation. Consequently, he decided to consult with Inspector Fast about deploying an ERT. In the Commission's view, Inspector Egan's decision not to approach Mrs. George to make direct contact with her husband was reasonable.

[75] There were early indications that it may be difficult to communicate with Mr. George. His apparent mental state – which included indications of paranoia and delusions - may have contributed to those difficulties. There is much discussion amongst policing agencies regarding the role of mental health professionals and when and how to engage them during incidents of a criminal nature. In the current case, there is no indication that members considered seeking assistance from a mental health professional. While Mr. George had not been diagnosed with a mental illness, it was clear by all accounts that he may be suffering from one and that it had some impact on his current behaviour. The Commission encourages RCMP members to consider the use of mental health professionals early on in an incident and in accordance with the above-noted RCMP policy. Had Mr. George been willing to speak with police, a mental health professional could have offered insight into his behaviour and techniques to assist with negotiating his surrender.

Finding: RCMP members made reasonable attempts to communicate with Mr. George in order to negotiate a peaceful surrender.

Finding: RCMP members took reasonable steps to ensure that they could communicate with Mr. George in a language that he understood.

Finding: RCMP members' decision to seek assistance from Mr. Remple Sr. to communicate with Mr. George after he refused to speak with members was reasonable.

Finding: Inspector Egan reasonably decided that using Mrs. George to contact her husband was inappropriate in the circumstances.

Activation of the NDERT

[76] The lack of progress through ongoing communication attempts with Mr. George led Inspector Egan to consult with Inspector Fast about activating the NDERT. According to RCMP policy, any decision to deploy the ERT is generally the purview of a trained Critical Incident Commander. RCMP policy provides that the Criminal Operations Officer or delegate may activate an ERT under the direction of an Incident Commander.^{Footnote 14} According to Inspector Egan's notes, at 11:55 a.m. on September 29, 2009, Inspector Fast authorized the use of an ERT and appointed him as the Incident Commander.

[77] At the time of this incident, national RCMP policy^{Footnote 15} stated that an ERT may be activated to provide tactical armed support to:

apprehend or neutralize armed/barricaded persons with or without hostages;
assist in the arrest of suspects or mentally deranged persons; and
assist with high-risk vehicle take-downs or arrests.

[78] A more recent version of the same policy also includes the conduct of rural surveillance where compromise could result in violence towards police, or when specialized equipment and training are required due to environmental conditions.^{Footnote 16} ERT members are used in such situations because they have specialized training and equipment. Keeping regular detachment members involved in what are essentially prolonged stand-offs can also put a strain on local police resources.

[79] Inspector Egan stated that after receiving an update in the morning of September 29, 2009, it was clear to him that talking to Mr. George was going to prove difficult and that further failed attempts would agitate him and force a confrontation. It was on that basis that he consulted with Inspector Fast about deploying the ERT, and the decision was made. Despite best efforts, members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment were having no success in gaining cooperation from Mr. George, and a confrontation was likely if communications continued to be unsuccessful. In the Commission's view, the decision to activate the NDERT to assist in the arrest of Mr. George was reasonable and consistent with RCMP policy. At the time, Mr. George remained at his residence but continued to pose a threat to his family, and his apprehension was necessary to ensure their safety.

Finding: The decision made on September 29, 2009, to activate and deploy the NDERT to facilitate the arrest of Mr. George was reasonably based and consistent with RCMP policy.

NDERT personnel

[80] The NDERT is a part-time ERT, which means that members of the team have full-time positions within the RCMP separate and apart from their participation with the ERT. As of the date of this incident, all positions on the team were on a voluntary, part-time basis. Part-time team members are subject to the same qualification and training requirements as full-time team members, and RCMP policy provides that an ERT activation supersedes their other duties.^{Footnote 17} In September 2009, the position of Team Leader was a part-time position occupied by Corporal Richard Brown of the Fort St. James RCMP Detachment. In 2014, the position of Team Leader was made full-time and was occupied by Corporal Ryan Arnold, who was the second in command during this incident.

[81] NDERT members are posted to detachments throughout the North District with equipment stored in Prince George, which is approximately six hours away from Fort St. John. The Fort St. John RCMP Detachment responds to calls from Buick Creek, which is an additional 70 kilometres north.

[82] According to the RCMP's response to the Commission's complaint, all members of the NDERT who were deployed during this incident were found to be current with respect to their ERT training and annual firearms qualifications. As noted above, Constable Poyzer was a spare and was not used in an operational capacity as part of the NDERT, as he had not yet received the required training. Constable Colin Warwick, who was an NDERT member as well as a Police Dog Services member, was also current with respect to his Police Dog Services training.

[83] The members of the Crisis Negotiation Team were also current with respect to their training, except that Corporal Garcia had not completed a refresher course, which was required, pursuant to RCMP policy, in five-year intervals. No reason was provided by the RCMP as to why a refresher course had not been completed at the time. It was noted that Corporal Garcia had considerable experience as a crisis negotiator and had attended numerous related seminars and workshops, particularly with respect to issues related to mental health.

[84] Inspector Egan had completed the Incident Commander's Course previously offered through the Canadian Police College, which had since been replaced by another course that he had not taken at the time of the incident. However, the RCMP noted that Inspector Egan and all Critical Incident Commanders within the North District are now trained to the current standard. Inspector Egan had participated in an ERT training scenario in the preceding six months, in compliance with the Incident Commander policy.

[85] The RCMP acknowledged that the scribe used during this incident was not formally trained as a scribe, but pointed out that there was no formal course required prior to September 2009. Inspector Egan noted during the criminal investigation that, following the incident, he raised concerns about the deficiencies of the notes, only then learning that the member in question had not attended a scribe training course. It is noted, however, that the policy requiring scribes to have completed formal scribe training did not come into effect until several months after this incident. Current policy now requires that scribes be accredited, which includes successfully completing one of three course options that are specific to scribes.^{Footnote 18}

Finding: The NDERT members who were deployed during this incident were current with respect to their training.

Finding: Corporal Garcia had not participated in a negotiators refresher course, as required by RCMP directives.

Recommendation: That the RCMP take steps to ensure that all members who are engaged in critical incidents in any capacity are up‑to‑date with their ongoing training requirements.

Finding: While not required at the time, Inspector Egan had not been trained on the current course standard for Incident Commanders.

Recommendation: That the RCMP ensure that all NDERT members, Incident Commanders, and other supporting personnel receive training on new standards in a timely manner.

Finding: The scribe assigned to the Incident Commander had not taken a scribe's course, although none had been required at the time. Current policy now mandates such training.

NDERT briefing

[86] Prior to the activation of the NDERT, but in anticipation of an activation, Team Leader Corporal Brown spoke with Constable Camil Coutney of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment. Constable Coutney provided some details of the situation and asked what the NDERT would expect from the detachment members should they be activated. Corporal Brown indicated that they "would require a photograph of the suspect, information about his criminal convictions and current charges, maps of the area such a[s] Google Earth, blue prints of the suspect residence, and information about dogs and other animals on the scene."

[87] Following the NDERT's activation on September 29, 2009, and prior to departing Prince George with the rest of the team, Corporal Brown again spoke with Constable Coutney, who indicated that they had gathered maps, pictures and video of the area. Corporal Brown requested that blueprints be obtained. Corporal Brown's notes indicate that he asked Constable Coutney about the presence of dogs, vehicles, and trails leading off the property.

[88] The NDERT left Prince George at approximately 2:45 p.m. on September 29, 2009, and arrived in Fort St. John at approximately 8 p.m. A briefing was conducted shortly thereafter and lasted just under one hour. It was conducted by members of the Fort St. John General Investigation Section who had been investigating the incident. During the briefing, ERT members were provided a photograph of Mr. George, a written summary of events up to that point, a map of the property, and a printout of the forecasted weather conditions. In addition, Constable Coutney provided photographs and video of the property.

[89] According to the statements and notes of the NDERT members, the briefing included information about the alleged offences committed by Mr. George and Mr. George's mental state (including the belief that he had experienced hallucinations, such as seeing the Russian President as well as wolves and black panthers in his backyard), as well as information that Mr. George had been taking his child's medication because he did not trust the doctors; that friends had attempted to facilitate a surrender; that contact with Mr. George by a German-speaking member was unsuccessful; and that he refused to speak with police and demanded the return of his family. Neighbours reportedly said that Mr. George would either flee or battle with police. A member conducting scene security reportedly observed Mr. George's van travel toward him on the driveway, stop at the sight of the police vehicle and turn back in the direction of the residence. Members also spoke about the dogs on the property, previous military experience, religious beliefs, Mr. George's distrust of the police, and his language skills. They also discussed the type of firearm believed to be in Mr. George's possession, which was a .22 calibre lever action rifle.

[90] Having fully considered the results of the Fort St. John members' investigation and all records relating to the briefing, the Commission finds that the briefing was reasonably thorough and accurate. Efforts were made well in advance by members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment to ensure that NDERT members were well-informed and up-to-date on the initial incident involving Mr. George, the events that followed, and additional intelligence that investigators had gathered with respect to Mr. George, his habits and his behaviours.

Finding: The NDERT briefing prepared and given by members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment was reasonably thorough and accurate.

NDERT deployment

[91] RCMP policy provides that only an Incident Commander can deploy an ERT and authorize use of force.^{Footnote 19} The onus and responsibilities placed on an Incident Commander at a critical incident are onerous and wide-reaching. To meet these demands, the RCMP selects, trains and mentors Incident Commanders in order to provide them with the knowledge, skills and expertise necessary. At the time of this incident, Inspector Egan was the Officer in Charge of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment. He had been involved in a number of successfully resolved ERT call outs, including one a year prior involving a chronic alcoholic and schizophrenic who was in possession of a rifle and had fired shots at detachment personnel.

[92] While the NDERT was activated on September 29, 2009, it was not deployed to Mr. George's location until the following morning. When considering whether to deploy the team in the evening of September 29, 2009, or starting in the morning of September 30, 2009, Inspector Egan decided on the latter for the following reasons:

He felt that it would be safer to deploy during daylight, given that the members were unfamiliar with the local environment.
He expected that they would be there for a long period of time, and the NDERT and support staff had driven for six hours in bad weather to get to Fort St. John. He felt that it would be better if they were well rested.
He and NDERT Team Leader, Corporal Brown, agreed that the plan would be one of containment and negotiation, which had been a successful approach in another intervention earlier that year and involving many of the same personnel.

[93] There was no indication that Mr. George would leave his residence during the night, and members were placed at the perimeter in case he did. Inspector Egan reasonably believed, at the time, that negotiations would be prolonged and that NDERT members may be there for a long period of time once deployed to the George property. Consequently, having considered the risks involved, and in all the circumstances, the decision to wait until the morning to deploy the NDERT to the George property was reasonable.

Finding: Inspector Egan's decision to delay deploying NDERT to the George property until the early morning of September 30, 2009, was reasonable in the circumstances.

Operational plan

[94] The RCMP's Tactical Operations Manual provides that unless exigent circumstances exist, the ERT Team Leader is responsible for ensuring that written operational plans are completed as soon as possible at a deployment and are approved and initialed by the Incident Commander before being carried out.^{Footnote 20}

[95] Corporal Brown's statement indicates that following the briefing, he discussed preparation of the operational plan with the Incident Commander, Inspector Egan, and told him that his proposed plan would be to take the situation slowly and rely on negotiation to safely resolve it. Inspector Egan agreed and told him that they could wait out the situation "for quite a while." Corporal Brown spent time with the other NDERT members discussing tactics and logistics, and watching the video of the scene.

[96] Later that night, Corporal Brown wrote out the operational plan. It provided for basic containment, including an ERT member (Constable Shaw) entering the property covertly to gather information on the property and Mr. George's activities (so that they could react accordingly), with a PDS/NDERT member (Constable Warwick) providing cover on the back of the house. Using a family friend as an interpreter, the plan was to focus on negotiation.

[97] Records confirm that the operational plans were completed by Corporal Brown and signed by Inspector Egan, as required by RCMP policy. The "objective" of the plan was to "peacefully resolve the situation through negotiation prior to any deliberate action." The surrender plan included having negotiators, through a family friend/interpreter, instruct Mr. George by telephone on what to do and a German-speaking NDERT member (Constable Degen) giving commands onsite so that NDERT members could safely arrest him. If Mr. George escaped by foot, members would confront him, instruct him to stop, and use appropriate intervention options (as per their training).

[98] In anticipation of an escape by vehicle, the plan was to block the driveway. The quad trail would be covered but not physically blocked. Additional plans were made in the event that Mr. George became aware of members on his property and if he barricaded himself in his residence. All plans were presented to the ERT members on the morning of September 30, 2009, after being provided with a copy of a signed Feeney warrant for Mr. George's residence.

[99] The Commission notes that while the escape option plan provided for a barricade at the driveway should Mr. George escape by vehicle, no additional plan was made in the event that Mr. George breached the barricade. Prior to establishing the barricade, which eventually changed locations on the driveway and is discussed later in this report, it was likely anticipated that Mr. George would not be able to breach it. In the Commission's view, that was a reasonable assessment based on what was known at the time of planning. It was not known that Mr. George would in fact repeatedly attempt to leave the property despite the police presence, given his previous retreat upon seeing a police vehicle, and would do so with his firearm. (Following Mr. George's shooting and in their statements to investigators, NDERT members provided different opinions with respect to whether or not they thought the barricade, as it existed at the time of the shooting, could be easily breached. The sufficiency of the barricade will be addressed in a later section.)

Finding: The operational plans were prepared and signed by the Team Leader and Incident Commander prior to the NDERT's deployment at the George property, in accordance with RCMP policy.

Finding: The operation plans were reasonably thorough and appropriate in the circumstances known to members at the time they were developed.

Observation of Mr. George

[100] At approximately 9 a.m. on September 30, 2009, Constable Shaw and Corporal Arnold entered the property on foot in order to set up in an observation position near the George residence, which took approximately one hour. Constable Shaw indicated in his written statement to investigators that he set up in a position approximately 70 metres from the north side of the George residence and was able to observe a number of vehicles, the residence and the outbuildings. He was not able to observe the main entrance in and out of the residence but could see onto the deck off of the main entrance and into the residence through a large picture window on the north side. From this position, Constable Shaw provided commentary about the property and buildings to the ERT, and Corporal Arnold returned to the command post.

[101] At approximately 10:38 a.m., through the use of a spotting scope, Constable Shaw confirmed that Mr. George was in the residence. There was no indication that anyone was at the property other than Mr. George and his four dogs. Constable Shaw was able to observe Mr. George without being seen. He continued to make observations of Mr. George for approximately two-and-a-half hours, relaying them to the command post and to his team members by radio. During that time, he observed Mr. George enter and exit his home a number of times, generally carrying a rifle. He observed Mr. George walk in circles in the yard or go to one of the vehicles parked in the yard, typically the white Pontiac Montana van. To Constable Shaw, his actions were "very erratic and unpredictable."

[102] As per the operational plan, an attempt was also made by Constable Warwick, with his police service dog, and Constable Atkinson to move into place near the residence. However, they discovered that the area was covered by thick brush and underbrush and had approximately 1.5 kilometres still to travel to get to the residence when Mr. George was first sighted by Constable Shaw having entered his vehicle with a rifle. Consequently, the members were instructed to reposition themselves at Mr. George's driveway so that they would be in a position to assist if a confrontation occurred.

[103] Constable Shaw observed Mr. George driving erratically about the property, up and down the driveway at high speeds with music blaring. On numerous occasions, Mr. George reportedly took short drives about the property in this manner, returned to the residence and locked the vehicle, entered the residence, came outside and completed a similar routine a minute later. Constable Shaw's communications to his team members over the radio reporting such actions by Mr. George were recorded and formed part of the investigation record.

[104] At one point, Mr. George exited his residence with the rifle and began pointing it at different spots of the bush line, then put it back down. He repeated that action a number of times, and pointed the rifle in Constable Shaw's direction at one point, although Constable Shaw indicated that he was confident that he could not be seen by Mr. George.

[105] At another point, Mr. George walked up the driveway with the rifle in his hands and with his four dogs. As he walked past, and within 25 metres from, Constable Shaw, Constable Shaw observed Mr. George load his rifle. Mr. George left Constable Shaw's sight and shortly thereafter Constable Shaw could clearly hear other members yelling "Polizie, Halt." Minutes later, Mr. George returned to the residence on foot with his dogs and the rifle in his hands.

[106] Approximately two hours into his observations, Constable Shaw saw Mr. George park his vehicle in front of the residence and go inside the house and remove his jacket. Mr. George walked about his residence, gesturing with his hands and speaking as though he was having a heated conversation with someone. However, no one else appeared to be present with Mr. George. Mr. George subsequently exited the residence and added what appeared to be gasoline to the fuel tank of his white van. Mr. George did not have the rifle in his hands at this point, but he was only approximately 12 metres from the front deck of the residence, which was the last location that Constable Shaw had seen him with the rifle.

[107] According to Constable Shaw, this information was relayed to Corporal Brown, and they discussed whether or not Constable Shaw should possibly rush him because both of Mr. George's hands were occupied with the gas can. The problem was that Constable Shaw was there on his own and assistance was too far away. He was also concerned that the dogs would give him away if he got any closer. It was possible that if that happened, Mr. George would have time to get his firearm.

[108] Mr. George was subsequently observed returning to the residence and then exiting with the rifle. He attempted to start an ATV but abandoned, it as it stalled after a short distance. Mr. George reportedly returned to the white van and accelerated up the driveway at a high rate of speed, which Constable Shaw estimated to be 70 to 80 kilometres per hour, and out of Constable Shaw's view. Moments later, Constable Shaw reported that he heard what sounded like gunshots. Constable Shaw remained in his position until other members of the team made their way to the residence on foot.

Finding: Constable Shaw stalked to a position near the George residence and reported his observations over the radio in a continual and detailed manner.

Actions of the NDERT Crisis Negotiation Team

[109] RCMP policy states that deployment of a Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) must be considered for an ERT deployment.^{Footnote 21} In this case, a decision was made to deploy such a team with the NDERT. The objective of a CNT in such an incident is to negotiate the safe surrender of a subject without death or injury to anyone.^{Footnote 22} Negotiation tactics and strategies are approved by the Incident Commander.^{Footnote 23} The team consisted of Corporal Stevenson as the primary negotiator and Corporal Garcia as the secondary negotiator.

[110] According to RCMP policy, a full team consists of four positions: a team leader, a primary negotiator, a secondary negotiator, and a scribe. Policy also provides that under exigent circumstances a negotiator may commence negotiation without a complete team. Considerations include the availability of crisis negotiators, response time, anticipated length of incident and type of incident. In its response to the Commission's complaint, the RCMP stated that at the time it was a common practice within the North District to have only two negotiators respond to most calls and arrange for additional resources where required. That practice was attributed to the remoteness and availability of sufficient negotiators to cover what is an extensive area. Corporal Garcia stated to investigators that they cannot always find four negotiators, but they never go with less than two.

[111] In response to a recommendation made by the IOR, the RCMP stated that every effort should be made by the Incident Commander to have a complete team and that the full team should respond unless there are exigent circumstances. The RCMP noted that the North District's current practice is to deploy three negotiators when feasible and practical, and a fourth if necessary. In the Commission's view, that practice is in line with the policy and the considerations set out within that policy for having less than a complete team.

[112] The negotiation team attended the NDERT briefing held the night prior. The following morning, they set up their equipment at the command post to try to initiate contact with Mr. George by telephone once the NDERT was in position. As noted above, Mr. George's actions, as observed by Constable Shaw, were reported to the command post via radio. That information allowed Inspector Egan to decide when contact could best be attempted by the CNT. Inspector Egan stated that every time he heard that Mr. George was in the house, a call to the house was made. However, Mr. George hung up immediately in response to one call and otherwise did not answer the telephone. That is supported by the investigation records. Records confirm that nearly forty calls were attempted between 11:41 a.m. and 12:58 p.m. on September 30, 2009.

[113] Corporal Garcia stated that during the briefing, they learned that Mr. George was possibly suffering from an undiagnosed mental illness, as he was seeing things like panthers and wolves; that he did not trust the police due to the environment he grew up in in Russia; and that he would probably only talk to a male figure. She concluded that they would need to calm him down and let him know that the police in Canada were not bad, that they were there to help, that his family was safe but not with the police, and that he should come and talk to the police so that they could bring his family back together.

[114] As identified earlier in this report, the CNT was faced with the same language issues that the original investigating members had faced. None of the negotiators were able to speak German or Russian, and Mr. Rempel Sr. was not available on September 29, 2009. After some hiccups in obtaining assistance, they were able to obtain the assistance of Jakob Dick, who was able to speak fluently in English, German and Russian. They provided him with handwritten questions to ask if contact was successful. The script provided to Mr. Dick included the following:

They are there to help him and to make sure that everybody was safe; himself included.
He has not done anything serious and that his kids and wife are safe and not with the police.
He is in Canada and that we do things differently in Canada.
Nobody wants to see anybody get hurt.
They were there to help bring him out and to a safe conclusion.

[115] Mr. Dick stated to investigators following this incident that he was not sure if Mr. George would listen to him because of the age difference and where they come from, explaining that, in Russia, being arrested generally meant life imprisonment, regardless of whether you are innocent or not.

[116] Mr. Dick stated that he spoke with the negotiators about their role and was provided with a list of things to say if Mr. George answered the telephone. His instructions were to reassure Mr. George that he has not done something serious (i.e. not something where he has to spend his life in prison); that his family and kids are safe and not with the police (Mr. Dick understood that Mr. George thought they were in the hands of the police); he does not need to be afraid, he needs to leave the gun and come to the police; the police do not want anybody to get hurt, including the police and Mr. George, himself; the police are trying to do everything safely, to ensure that everyone is safe; the police want to bring the family together and help; and the family needs their father.

[117] Unfortunately, because Mr. George did not pick up his phone and he had a firearm, members could not get close and the negotiators could not execute their plans. However, while the CNT did not ultimately have the opportunity to communicate with Mr. George, the Commission has identified several issues with the communication and negotiation process as planned.

[118] First, it is not clear whether CNT members were made aware of, or considered if they had been made aware of, Mr. Dick's concern that Mr. George may not have listened to him because of their age difference and the cultural factors. While there was difficulty in obtaining assistance from someone who could communicate with Mr. George, it is not clear that attempts were made to fully assess the appropriateness of using Mr. Dick or whether someone more suitable may have been available. This issue was not specifically canvassed by the RCMP's investigation, and the CNT members' notes and statements do not provide such details. CNT members should ensure that the details of any such conversations with third parties who are being used to negotiate with a subject are well documented.

[119] In addition, it is not clear whether consideration was given by CNT members to continuing with assistance from Constable Finkensiep. If at any point Mr. George was prepared to speak with the police, Constable Finkensiep could have provided a contact option that was more controlled, as directed by his training and experience as a police officer (and of course with assistance and direction from the CNT). Inspector Egan stated that he told Corporal Garcia, when there was still no interpreter available, to contact Constable Finkensiep and to have him assist with the negotiations. However, it appears that once Mr. Dick was identified, obtaining further assistance from Constable Finkensiep may not have been considered.

Finding: CNT members deployed without a full team; however, it was reasonable in the circumstances.

Finding: CNT members made efforts to locate persons who could communicate with Mr. George on their behalf in the face of a language barrier.

Finding: It is not clear from the record whether CNT members fully assessed the limits and capabilities of a third party who they intended to use to communicate with Mr. George, or whether other options were available.

Recommendation: The RCMP should take steps to ensure that CNT members make detailed notes regarding the assessment and involvement of any third parties in their negotiation process.

Finding: It is not clear from the record whether CNT members considered obtaining assistance from Constable Finkensiep to communicate with Mr. George during the NDERT deployment.

Recommendation: That the RCMP take steps to ensure that all members involved in ERT deployments consider the use of general duty members where a particular skill or expertise (such as the ability to speak a foreign language) is required.

Initial confrontation between the NDERT and Mr. George

[120] The Commission must evaluate the members' conduct based on what they reasonably believed at the time the events were occurring, with the information that was available to them and given all of the circumstances they were faced with in the light of the applicable policy and training in place at the time of the incident. As noted above, Constable Shaw was observing Mr. George in and around the residence and reporting his actions to the team and command post. NDERT members were receiving those reports, as well as making their own observations as Mr. George approached the portion of the driveway closer to the road.

[121] Shortly after Constable Shaw and Corporal Arnold reached a position near Mr. George's residence, Corporal Arnold returned to the command post. Corporal Brown intended to deploy Constable Degen into position with Constable Shaw, due to his knowledge of the German language. The hope was that Constable Degen could facilitate dialogue with Mr. George when necessary. As noted by Corporal Arnold in his statement, the ability to communicate with him "would aid in his compliance and increase his safety." However, before that could happen, Constable Shaw reported that Mr. George had exited his residence with a rifle and was getting into his vehicle, as detailed earlier in this report and further below.

[122] According to the radio recordings, Constable Shaw reported that Mr. George was blaring music in the vehicle and drove at a high rate of speed away from the residence and down the driveway toward the road. A general duty member who had been blocking the end of the driveway with a marked police truck and a spike belt reported that it sounded like the vehicle stopped and turned around. Constable Shaw subsequently reported that Mr. George returned to the area of the residence and was driving all over the place. He eventually exited the vehicle and began walking aimlessly around the yard. Constable Shaw repeatedly stated over the radio that Mr. George was acting erratically and was walking back and forth.

[123] Mr. George subsequently got back in his vehicle and again drove, according to Constable Shaw and as reported by him over the radio, at a high rate of speed. Constable Shaw lost visual contact as Mr. George drove away from the residence. A general duty member who had been placed at the end of the driveway could hear the vehicle getting closer, but did not make visual contact. Constable Shaw reported that Mr. George returned to the area of the residence, squealed the brakes, drove all over and across the lawn, and kept revving the engine before heading back towards the driveway. Mr. George reportedly did donuts in the clearing before returning to the front of the residence.

[124] Radio recordings indicate that Mr. George exited the vehicle with the firearm and began walking about, randomly shouldering his rifle and aiming it at different points in the bush. Corporal Brown stated over the radio that containment at the end of the driveway would be replaced by NDERT members in case Mr. George attempted to make a break down the driveway. To that end, Corporal Brown, Corporal Arnold, Constable Merriman, Constable Degen and Constable Poyzer headed to the end of Mr. George's driveway. The general duty member was relocated, away from the scene, by Constable Poyzer. The others took up positions at the end of the driveway. Corporal Brown advised Constable Warwick and Constable Atkinson to hold their positions and wait for further direction.

[125] At that point, Constable Shaw reported that Mr. George was walking up the driveway with his four dogs and had loaded the rifle. Radio records confirm that Corporal Brown reported to the command post that the members were stationed on foot at the end of the driveway and wanted instructions on whether to move or confront Mr. George there. Dispatch confirmed instructions to confront Mr. George there. Corporal Brown subsequently instructed Constable Warwick and Constable Atkinson to come to his location at the end of the driveway. Before that could happen, the members already present at the driveway encountered Mr. George, who was approaching on foot from a distance of between approximately 200 and 300 metres. Constable Degen recounted it as follows:

As I looked down the driveway I was able to see a male figure approaching us on foot. He was walking and he was on my right side. With the male were three dogs. In his right hand was a long barreled weapon. I began yelling, "Halt Polizei!" which is a German command for "Stop Police!". I yelled this command as loudly and as clearly as I possibly could. Cpl. BROWN was yelling, "Stop Police!". Shortly thereafter I heard Cpl. ARNOLD yelling, "Halt Polizei!". All of us yelled on several occasions, "Halt Polizei!". In addition, I repeatedly instructed the male to "Hande Hoch!" which is a German command instructing GEORGE to put his hands in the air. At one point I noted that GEORGE paused and looked in our direction. When he did this he made no indication that he was going to put down his weapon, and he was quite casual in his movements.

GEORGE eventually turned and walked back down the driveway and his dogs followed. I was quite unsettled by GEORGE's reaction. It [h]as been my experience that anyone confronted by armed police officers who are yelling loudly would likely follow officer's commands or at least display some surprise.

Eventually GEORGE disappeared from my line of sight. . . .

[126] It is evident from all accounts that Mr. George was walking in the direction of the road with a firearm and that there was reasonable concern that Mr. George might attempt to leave the property, with his firearm in hand. Mr. George had approached by vehicle on numerous occasions, both that morning and the previous day, but had turned around. From his attempt the day prior, it appears that he was aware of the police presence at the end of his driveway. It was also clear that Mr. George was not interested in communicating with members by telephone, as he previously stated to police and family friends that he did not wish to speak with them, and would not answer ongoing calls from the CNT. In the Commission's view, it was reasonable for members of the ERT to confront Mr. George at that time and issue commands for him to stop and put his hands up in an attempt to facilitate a safe surrender.

[127] The Commission is satisfied from the investigation record that Mr. George saw members during this encounter and that he likely heard their commands for him to stop, which were primarily issued in German. However, it is clear from the members' statements that multiple members were making similar statements and issuing instructions to Mr. George at the same time. It is advisable in any communications with a subject, particularly where there may be mental health issues involved, that commands be clear and understandable. While we will never know what Mr. George heard or understood from those communications, commands being yelled by various members simultaneously or overlapping from multiple directions may be confusing or even lost. I recognize that the situation was dynamic and unfolded quickly. However, it would have been preferable to have had a coordinated approach between NDERT members with respect to communications with Mr. George so that his ability to hear and comprehend the instructions was optimized.

Finding: It was reasonable for members to confront Mr. George when he approached the end of his driveway on foot and in possession of a rifle, particularly given that the members would have already been visible to him.

Finding: Members issued their commands to Mr. George in a language that he was known to understand.

Tactical repositioning following initial confrontation between the NDERT and Mr. George

[128] Tactical repositioning refers to a situation in which police refrain from confronting the suspect pending a greater tactical advantage. At the time of the initial confrontation, NDERT members had positioned themselves at the end of Mr. George's driveway, which was estimated to be 150 metres from the locked gate on the property. Following that confrontation, Corporal Arnold suggested to Corporal Brown that they move the team up near the gate and place their vehicles across the road in that location.

[129] Corporal Arnold's rationale was that the position at the end of the driveway was dangerous to the public, given that public access to the road had not been blocked and, if shots were fired, there was a greater risk to the public who might be in the area at that time. In addition, the curve of the driveway began at the gate, and moving their positions up to the gate would allow NDERT members to see Mr. George coming from a greater distance, which would give them more time to react.

[130] Constable Degen stated that the marked police truck was not large enough to block Mr. George if he attempted to flee in his own vehicle and that their positioning at the end of the driveway did not give members sufficient cover if Mr. George opened fired. A marked police truck and the NDERT vehicle were subsequently parked across the driveway near the gate, along with a spike belt. Another vehicle was later added to provide better coverage of the driveway. Corporal Brown stated that he had originally requested a piece of heavy machinery to bolster the roadblock, but no such machinery was available.

[131] Corporals Brown and Arnold were asked by investigators about the positioning of the roadblock and the possibility of there being two, namely the Georges' gate as the first roadblock and the vehicles and spike belts further back as a second roadblock. Corporal Brown stated that he did not believe it would have contained Mr. George on his property or allowed for more time and attempts by police to negotiate with him. Consideration was given to repositioning the spike belt further into the property, past the metal gate. However, Inspector Egan and Corporal Brown stated that it would expose the team to gunfire and that the open area made it tactically unsound.

[132] Another issue identified during the RCMP's complaint investigation with respect to the barricade as it was constructed was that despite there being emergency lighting on each of the three police vehicles present, and that there was a very real potential for harm to be inflicted on members should it be breached by Mr. George, it was not used to signal Mr. George to stop his vehicle. As no NDERT member was specifically tasked with attempting to signal Mr. George to stop his vehicle, presumably due to the fact that providing their exact location to someone who is appearing to ram a barricade and who is in possession of a rifle is fraught with danger, any available signals to stop should have been utilized.

Finding: The decision to move the police barricade to the area of the gate and to fortify it was reasonable.

Finding: The decision not to move the spike belt further into the property, given the risk to members in doing so, was reasonable.

Finding: Emergency lighting should have been utilized at the police barricade as an additional means to signal Mr. George to stop.

Finding: Consideration should have been given to blocking off the roads surrounding the George property should Mr. George breach the police barricade at the driveway.

Recommendation: That the RCMP take steps to ensure that sufficient resources are made available to block public roads where there is a risk to the public during a critical incident.

Positioning of Corporal Arnold

[133] Corporals Arnold and Brown took up positions near the gate and blockade, while the rest of the team took positions in the bush line, forming an extended line along the driveway, with Constable Warwick farthest into the property. Corporal Arnold was near a power pole several feet from the gate, a position that provided him with "long cover" (i.e. he could see much farther down the driveway). Prior to that point, Corporal Arnold was positioned in the tree line. From that location, when Mr. George drove within several hundred meters of the gate, Corporal Arnold could hear the music from his vehicle but could not see him or what he was doing. Mr. George was also out of Constable Shaw's sight at that time.

[134] Mr. George's erratic behaviour continued, with him fueling his vehicle, going in and out of the house, changing clothes, and apparently talking to himself. It was at that point that the third vehicle was added to cover the driveway. Corporals Arnold and Brown then discussed tactics, during which time Corporal Arnold asked whether he should move his position to a safer location and away from the driveway. The concern was that if Mr. George rammed the barricade, Corporal Arnold was at risk of physical harm.

[135] Corporal Arnold believed that the gate post was possibly rotten and that it would take minimal force to break it. Corporal Arnold stated that he also believed that there was enough room between the vehicle closest to him and the power pole he was lying beside for Mr. George's vehicle to fit through, i.e. leaving a gap. He considered standing so that he would be in a better position to quickly reposition himself; however, he determined that he risked being seen and would not be able to shoot as accurately from that position. The spike belt was moved to cover the area between the power pole and the closest vehicle to address the gap, but that did not address his risk of bodily harm or death if struck by Mr. George's vehicle or the debris. Accordingly, he discussed the issue with Corporal Brown. He advised Corporal Brown that if Mr. George was closing in on the gate without any sign of stopping or slowing, he would fire at Mr. George when he got within 100 metres to protect himself.

[136] Corporal Arnold wrote in his statement:

It was my risk assessment at the time that if the van was traveling on the gravel portion of the driveway as it approached the gate his intent would be to crash his way through the road block.

If the suspect crashed the gate I believed that I would be struck by his vehicle and debris such that I would suffer grievous bodily harm or death. Accordingly, I felt I would have to shoot the operator of the van in an attempt to stop the van solely for the purposes of protecting myself. (p.10, Arnold Stmt.)

...

I advised Cpl. BROWN that it was my risk assessment that if the suspect was traveling down the road in his van with his rifle, that his intent was likely not to surrender and we would likely be engaged in a fire fight after his collision with the gate

I also expressed my fear that if the suspect was able to break containment, many other people would be in jeopardy of grievous bodily harm or death (p.11)

[137] According to Corporal Brown, the team needed someone to maintain a long view of the driveway to be able to observe if Mr. George approached quietly on foot and flanked the team. If Corporal Arnold moved across the driveway, it would create the potential for crossfire if Mr. George approached the gate. If he moved farther back from his location, other team members may be in his arc of fire and it would not provide adequate cover or concealment. Corporal Brown stated that he believed their configuration was the safest and most effective in the circumstances. Following their discussion, Corporals Arnold and Brown concluded that Corporal Arnold's position was the best tactical position available.

[138] The RCMP's IOR examined the decision by Corporal Arnold to seek cover next to the gate. It found that given the actions of Mr. George, "allowing the subject to leave the property was simply not an option" and that it was a tactically sound position. The vehicles were well placed to slow down any attempt by Mr. George to evade the police and Corporal Arnold was in "the best possible location given that it afforded the best . . . line of sight and avoid a cross-fire situation with the other team members." The IOR concluded that "[i]t was a necessary risk to remain there and I believe it was given due consideration by those on scene."

[139] While it is important to note that the members were positioned covertly on the George property, it is equally important to note that Mr. George appeared to be aware of their presence generally. Mr. George was confronted by NDERT members approximately 90 minutes prior to his fatal shooting. In addition, there were marked police vehicles visible at the gate of his driveway, and he had sighted a marked police vehicle at the end of his driveway as early as the previous evening and retreated because of it. The Commission is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Mr. George was aware of the members' presence, if not their precise location at the time of the shooting.

[140] It is also relevant that the warrant that was obtained by the RCMP provided for entry without prior announcement, having satisfied the court that to do otherwise would expose members to imminent bodily harm or death.^{Footnote 24} The risk involved with arresting Mr. George—who, at the point of the decision being made by Corporals Arnold and Brown, was not willing to deal with the police, carried a rifle with him, indicated an ability and willingness to use the firearm, had a mistrust for police, was acting erratically, and chose to ignore police despite their continued communication attempts and presence at the property—is of significant consideration.

[141] Police work is inherently dangerous. Officer safety concerns must be kept top of mind in any assessment of members' actions, especially when firearms are involved. The RCMP teaches members that officer safety is essential for public safety. Some of the actions members take to minimize risks to themselves may increase risks to a subject. What is reasonable will vary depending on the circumstances. For example, the intent of a "no-knock warrant" is to provide protection to members, but the element of surprise may itself provoke a violent reaction from the subject and have undesired outcomes. However, there are many situations where the law and the courts deem that protection necessary.

[142] Similarly, Corporal Arnold's tactical positioning provided members with much needed warning with respect to an approach by Mr. George but also presented a certain risk of harm to himself should Mr. George decide to ram the barricade. The Commission is satisfied that Corporals Arnold and Brown appropriately considered all of the risks involved and reasonably concluded that maintaining the tactical advantage was necessary.

Finding: Corporals Arnold and Brown appropriately considered all of the risks involved in holding Corporal Arnold's position near the gate, including the risk of bodily harm or death that could justify the use of lethal force against Mr. George, and reasonably concluded that maintaining the tactical advantage was necessary.

Communication of Corporal Arnold's positioning

[143] Corporal Brown stated in response to follow-up questions asked by investigators that he did not specifically inform the Incident Commander about the discussion and decision regarding Corporal Arnold's positioning. Inspector Egan was asked whether he should have been informed of the discussion with respect to the risks of Corporal Arnold's position and that lethal force was a possibility if he feared death or grievous bodily harm, and whether he would have authorized the use of lethal force. Inspector Egan responded as follows:

I am not able to answer this question given the fact that I do not know when this decision was made. I would need to have this particular decision provided to me with considerably more detail in order to be able to comment as to my perception of its soundness as a tactic. I would propose that this might include the transcripts with audio of the actual statements provided by the members. I would expect that the decision to employ this cover and concealment location was based on some tactical, or strategic consideration. I suspect that BROWN and ARNOLD felt that holding the suspect within the perimeter was crucial based on their observations at the scene coupled with the information provided at the briefing.

I base this on the fact that the suspect fueled up his vehicle giving the impression that he was going to be going for a long drive.

George was probably aware or the location of his wife and children in Dawson Creek.

George brought a firearm with him.

George had demanded the return of his wife and kids.

George drove in an increasingly erratic way which supported the idea that his intention was to ram through the containment.

Had George breached containment it is my view that he would have done so with the intention of killing his wife and possibly his children. He would have been at large driving in an erratic manner which would have put members of the public at grave risk. We never had control of his actions within the area of containment however we did have control over the impact of those actions on the public. . . .

. . .

. . . Corporal BROWN was in regular, effective, and thorough . . . communication with me in my capacity as incident commander. It is not my practice to interfere with the tactical immediacy of the situation. It would not be practical for any incident commander to do so. Where time permits communication, and updates are frequent. Tactical decisions relating to the selection of positions of cover and concealment and tactical advantage are made by the ERT Team leader. I have no impact on the moment a member chooses to exercise the option of lethal force. I am of the opinion that the decision of BROWN and ARNOLD would have been conveyed to me as many others were had the situation not taken such a dramatic and rapid turn for the worse.

[144] The RCMP's IOR considered this issue and found that although the decision made by Corporals Arnold and Brown was sound and justified, the final results of the discussion should have been communicated to the Incident Commander. The RCMP's formal response to the Commission's complaint did not address this issue.

[145] RCMP policy states that the Team Leader directs the tactics once the ERT is deployed.^{Footnote 25} That being said, the Incident Commander has overall responsibility for the critical incident^{Footnote 26} and is responsible for "evaluating all tactical options at a deployment."^{Footnote 27} While Inspector Egan was correct in stating that it is not practical for an Incident Commander to interfere with the tactical immediacy of a situation, he was clearly involved in ongoing discussions regarding tactics, such as the availability and use of a portable phone or loud hailer,^{Footnote 28} and whether or not to disable Mr. George's vehicle near the residence.

[146] According to NDERT radio transmissions, Corporal Arnold called Corporal Brown to his position at approximately 12:21 p.m. Corporal Brown stated that Corporal Arnold called him to his location to discuss tactics, at which time they discussed his positioning. There were continual communications between Corporal Brown and the command post between that time and the fatal encounter at 12:59 p.m., including confirmation of the team members' positions at approximately 12:46 p.m. In the Commission's view, there was sufficient timing for Corporal Brown to inform Inspector Egan regarding the risks of Corporal Arnold's positioning and their decision to maintain it in the circumstances, and he should have done so.

Finding: Corporal Brown should have informed Inspector Egan regarding his discussion with Corporal Arnold about the risks in his positioning and their decision to maintain it.

Recommendation: That the RCMP review this report with Corporal Brown to ensure that he is aware of the need to communicate tactical decisions and risks to ERT members to the Incident Commander where there is time to do so.

Final confrontation and use of lethal force

[147] A public complaint allegation of excessive force is part of the quasi-judicial process, which weighs evidence on a balance of probabilities. The Commission is empowered to make findings and recommendations with respect to allegations of excessive force. The Commission is not empowered to determine whether an RCMP member committed the Criminal Code offence of assault; that is a matter for the courts. The criminal investigation concluded that no criminal offence had been committed by the members in the use of lethal force against Mr. George. The Commission's role is to look at the use of force in the context of the law and applicable RCMP policy and training.

[148] In executing their duties, police officers are authorized by the Criminal Code to use as much force as necessary.^{Footnote 29} However, an officer must be acting on reasonable grounds. In determining whether the amount of force used by the officer was necessary, one must look at the circumstances as they existed at the time the force was used. The courts have been clear that the officer cannot be expected to measure the force used with exactitude.^{Footnote 30}

[149] The RCMP's Incident Management/Intervention Model (IM/IM),^{Footnote 31} which is used to train and guide members in the use of force, promotes risk assessment and depicts various levels of resistance behaviours and reasonable intervention options. The guide promotes the use of verbal interventions wherever possible, both to defuse potentially volatile situations and to promote professional, polite and respectful attitudes to all. These guidelines are based on situational factors when determining whether to use force and what amount of force is necessary in the circumstances. The underlying principles of the RCMP's IM/IM are:

The primary duty of a peace officer is to preserve and protect life.
The primary objective of any intervention is public safety.
Peace officer safety is essential to public safety.
The IM/IM is consistent with federal statutes and common law authorities and in no way replaces or augments the law.
The intervention must always be applied in the context of a careful assessment of risk, taking into account the likelihood and extent of loss of life, injury, and damage to property as a result of the intervention.
Risk assessment is a continuous process and risk management must evolve as situations change.

[150] It is incumbent upon the member to perform a risk assessment, first determining which of the five behaviour classifications (cooperative, non-cooperative, resistant, combative and potential to cause grievous bodily harm or death^{Footnote 32}) the subject's actions fall into. Consideration must also be given to the situational factors specific to each incident. These include weather conditions, subject size in relation to the member, presence of weapons, number of subjects and of police officers, the perceived abilities of the subject (which may include past knowledge of the subject), as well as other incident-specific considerations.

[151] The IM/IM sets out various response or intervention options specific to the member's determination of subject behaviour in conjunction with the assessment of the situational factors. Intervention options include member presence, verbal intervention, empty hand control (soft and hard), intermediate devices, impact weapons, lethal force and tactical repositioning. Members must continually assess the risk and potential for harm and respond at an appropriate level. Verbal interventions and tactical repositioning occur regardless of the level of risk to assist the member in maintaining control of the situation, de-escalating any confrontation and ensuring maximal safety for all concerned.

[152] A member must be able to explain the intervention methods he or she chooses to manage an incident, taking into account all of the circumstances, including perceptions, situational factors and subject behaviour. In considering the intervention options, the Commission must also consider the fact that to ensure public safety, police officers cannot be asked to intervene in dangerous situations, yet be denied the authority to take protective measures to their safety when reasonable, especially when there is a danger due to the presence of weapons and of a fluid and unpredictable threat.

The RCMP also trains its members that they must also satisfy in his/her mind that the subject possessed the ability, intent and means to carry out their threat or actions.

A. Does the suspect have, or reasonably appear to have the physical ability (capability) and mobility to cause injury or death to you or others?
I. Does the suspect's words and/or actions lead you to believe they had the intent to cause injury or death to your or others?
M. Does the suspect have the means medium or mechanism (weapon) to deliver the known or perceived threat?

[154] According to the Tactical Operations Manual, only an Incident Commander can deploy an ERT and authorize a use of force.^{Footnote 33} The operation plans, as prepared by Corporal Brown and approved by Inspector Egan, provided for execution of the arrest warrant granted by the court and for use of the appropriate intervention options. The justification for the use of lethal force must be based on the circumstances at the moment it was used and based on the position of each individual member. The following is an overview of the circumstances resulting in the use of force as recounted by the members present (as there were no other witnesses), their justification for the use of lethal force, and the Commission's assessment of each member's conduct.

[155] Section 25 of the Criminal Code authorizes a police officer who is acting in the administration or enforcement of the law to use as much force as is necessary for that purpose. It further states that a person is not justified in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm unless the person believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the self-preservation of the person or the preservation of anyone under that person's protection from death or grievous bodily harm.

[156] The RCMP's use of force guidelines reiterate the legal requirement that lethal force be used only "when preventing death, or the threat of death, or grievous bodily harm to peace officers and the public and when no lesser means is appropriate."^{Footnote 34}

[157] NDERT members Corporal Arnold, Corporal Brown, Constable Warwick, Constable Merriman, Constable Degen and Constable Atkinson were the only witnesses to the confrontation that led to Mr. George's death. Consequently, the Commission has relied heavily on their statements, which it finds to be consistent and reliable. Their statements were supplemented and supported by the recorded radio communications as well as expert reports analyzing the physical evidence at the scene.

[158] In all the circumstances and for the reasons set out below, the Commission is satisfied that NDERT members reasonably feared death or grievous bodily harm to themselves or their team members at the time they fired at Mr. George and that, as such, the use of lethal force was reasonably justified.

Corporal Arnold

[159] Corporal Arnold was the first to fire at Mr. George. In the minutes leading up to the fatal shooting, Constable Shaw reported that Mr. George had entered his vehicle with the rifle and was heading toward the police barricade, travelling at a high rate of speed. Corporal Arnold saw the vehicle coming down the driveway and radioed the rest of the team to let them know that Mr. George was heading in their direction and at a high rate of speed. According to Corporal Arnold, as the vehicle approached, he could hear the engine revving and could see that the vehicle was creating dust. He noted that Mr. George appeared to be driving more quickly than in previous times and he believed that Mr. George was planning to ram the barricade.

[160] Corporal Arnold stated that he used the power poles along the driveway to estimate Mr. George's position. Previously, Mr. George had not come closer than within three or four power poles from the gate. At this time, Mr. George was closing on the power pole closest to the gate, which was approximately 100 metres away. Corporal Arnold took aim at Mr. George through the scope on his M16. He recognized Mr. George as the driver from the photograph that had been provided to the team. The vehicle continued without slowing and Corporal Arnold believed that Mr. George would collide with the gate, likely resulting in death or grievous bodily harm to Corporal Arnold. Consequently, Corporal Arnold fired one round at Mr. George to protect himself from that harm. He observed a bullet hole in the windshield of the vehicle and saw Mr. George react to the shot. Mr. George sunk a few inches in his seat and the van began to slow, then stopped.

Photo 4: Corporal Arnold's view of the driveway from his position beside the power pole. (Also shows Mr. George's vehicle in its final stopped position.)

[161] Corporal Arnold watched Mr. George exit the driver's side door with the rifle. Corporal Arnold stated that he yelled "Gun Gun!" to his team members and fired several more shots at Mr. George through the door. He believed Mr. George was exiting with his rifle with the intent of shooting the police. The vehicle continued rolling toward the gate and he lost sight of Mr. George. He heard shots being fired by other members of his team and heard the shots strike the vehicle. He then observed Mr. George cross the road behind his vehicle and fall onto the shoulder of the driveway, with the rifle laying in the middle of the driveway beside him. The team approached Mr. George and began administering first aid, which was ultimately not successful.

[162] The findings set out in the bloodstain pattern analysis report are consistent with the events as recounted by Corporal Arnold. The key findings were:

The bloodstain patterns located inside the vehicle are consistent with Valerie [sic] GEORGE bleeding above the steering wheel and exiting the vehicle.
The spatter stains located on the driver's side rear wheel are consistent with being associated to the cast-off pattern located above the wheel well and the tire moving after these stains had been deposited onto the wheel.
The bloodstain patterns located on the gravel driveway are consistent with Valerie [sic] GEORGE exiting the vehicle and travelling eastward along the roadway and collapsing.

[163] Corporal Arnold's account is also consistent with the accounts of the other NDERT members, as detailed later in this report, as well as the radio communications between team members and with the command post.

[164] Corporal Arnold stated that based on Constable Shaw's reporting of Mr. George's movements, he believed that Mr. George was building the courage to confront the police near his gate. Corporal Arnold emphasized the following:

Mr. George walked around the outside of his residence shouldering his rifle and pointing it into the bush, suggesting that he was practicing and mentally preparing to shoot the police.
Mr. George entered his residence and paced around, waving his arms and screaming.
Mr. George changed his clothes and then gassed up his other van using gas cans on the property, suggesting that he was hoping to change his appearance and vehicle in the event he was able to defeat the police at his gate and escape his property.
The calls to Mr. George's residence went unanswered (apart from one hang-up) when he was known to be inside, suggesting that he knew that it was the police phoning and that he had no intention of negotiating or surrendering.

[165] When Mr. George was driving towards the police barricade, he always brought his rifle, which Corporal Arnold thought indicated an intent to harm police. Corporal Arnold maintains that he used lethal force in response to Mr. George's behaviour and that it was not a formulated plan. There was no time to both inform the Incident Commander and deal with the threat to himself.

[166] During the criminal investigation, a use of force review was conducted by a member of the Calgary Police Service. As noted in that report, a firearm is the only use of force option that has a high likelihood of stopping a deadly threat immediately. However, while the intent is not to cause grievous bodily harm or death but rather to stop the threatening behaviour, it often has lethal consequences. According to Corporal Arnold, he fired his weapon at Mr. George at a time when he believed Mr. George's actions were likely to cause him grievous bodily harm or death. He did so in order to protect himself and the other members near the barricade from that danger, which was imminent.

[167] A member may only discharge a firearm at a person to protect a person from death or grievous bodily harm, in accordance with the Criminal Code and the IM/IM.^{Footnote 35} The Commission accepts, based on his account of events, which is supported by the investigative record, that Corporal Arnold was satisfied that Mr. George had the ability, intent and means to cause him grievous bodily harm or death. That being said, shooting at a suspect in a moving vehicle presents its own unique risks. Corporal Arnold stated that he was not absolutely certain that shooting Mr. George would have stopped the vehicle from crashing into the gate or him, and that he considered the possibility of the vehicle rolling forward toward him or veering off toward other NDERT members. At the time this incident occurred, RCMP policy stated that:

A member may only discharge a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle if that person poses a threat of death or grievous bodily harm to a person, and no other intervention options are appropriate.^{Footnote 36}
A member must not discharge a firearm at any motor vehicle for the purpose of disabling that motor vehicle, unless authorized by an Incident Commander as part of a critical incident.^{Footnote 37}

[168] The Commission notes that that policy was revised to provide that a member may only discharge a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle being deliberately used as a weapon when there are reasonable grounds to believe it is necessary to protect any person from death or grievous bodily harm and there are no reasonable means of escape open to the person being imminently threatened.^{Footnote 38}

[169] The issue of Corporal Arnold's positioning near the gate was addressed earlier in this report. The Commission is satisfied that in the moments leading up to the shooting, Corporal Arnold reasonably believed that Mr. George was intent on ramming the barricade and that he was therefore at risk of grievous bodily harm or death. The Commission is also satisfied that no other intervention options were appropriate, as there were no other viable means to stop the vehicle or otherwise mitigate the imminent risk of harm. It had already been deemed too dangerous for members to place a spike belt further up the driveway in the open space (although even that could have been avoided by Mr. George by veering off the driveway), and RCMP policy states that discharging a firearm at a motor vehicle is an ineffective method of disabling it.^{Footnote 39} Corporal Arnold did not shoot for the purpose of disabling it and such action was not authorized by the Incident Commander. Consequently, the Commission finds that Corporal Arnold's actions of shooting at Mr. George in a moving motor vehicle were reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the RCMP policy in effect at the time.

[170] Ultimately, Mr. George was speeding toward the police barricade and members reasonably believed that his intention was to ram through it. NDERT members, including Corporal Arnold, were necessarily placed in the vicinity and out of sight to avoid being deliberate targets and at a tactical disadvantage. The result of Mr. George's actions was that grievous bodily harm or death were potential outcomes of a collision between his vehicle and the barricade, and that was the basis for Corporal Arnold's first shot. Subsequently, and while already wounded with what may have been a fatal shot, Mr. George exited his vehicle with his rifle in hand and with no indication that he was willing to surrender to police. The Commission is satisfied that at all times during this confrontation, Mr. George presented a real and imminent threat of grievous bodily harm or death to the NDERT members.

Finding: Corporal Arnold reasonably feared grievous bodily harm or death when he discharged his firearm at Mr. George.

Finding: It was reasonable for Corporal Arnold to discharge his firearm at Mr. George in his motor vehicle, as no other intervention methods were appropriate.

Corporal Brown

[171] Corporal Brown stated that when he heard that Mr. George was starting the ATV, he considered the fact that the rear escape route was covered with dense vegetation and it was unlikely Mr. George could make a quick escape using that route. Corporal Arnold considered sending members to the area where it was assumed he might appear, but Constable Shaw soon after reported that the ATV had stalled. Mr. George returned to his van with his rifle and was again driving toward the gate.

[172] According to Corporal Brown, he soon heard the vehicle and believed it was approaching at a higher rate of speed than previously, noting that the engine was revving at a louder pitch. No music was playing. He heard Corporal Arnold say, "Here he comes boys," and soon after a shot was fired. He heard the vehicle skid to a stop and saw the front end of it. He saw the driver's door open and movement out of the driver's seat. He heard Constable Merriman call out "Police! Stop!" and heard several more shots. Corporal Brown reported that he subsequently saw Mr. George with a rifle and so Corporal Brown fired toward the driver's seat, through the passenger side windshield of the vehicle.

Photo 5: Corporal Brown's view of the driveway and Mr. George's vehicle in its final stopped position. The remaining NDERT members positioned throughout the bush line had similar views, from varying distances.

[173] Corporal Brown stated that he believed Mr. George possessed his rifle with the intent of shooting an ERT member and that the only way to protect the team members from death or grievous bodily harm was to use lethal force. His shots were aimed to strike Mr. George, whom he believed was using the vehicle for cover as it rolled forward. He heard someone yell in an unknown language and could not tell if it was Mr. George or Constable Degen. According to Corporal Brown, he reassessed the situation and provided an update over the radio.

[174] Corporal Brown lost sight of Mr. George and looked back down the driveway, where he then saw Mr. George lying on the ground. Corporal Arnold confirmed over the radio that Mr. George was on the driveway, approximately 50 metres away from him, and was down. The team approached Mr. George and Corporal Brown observed a pile of unspent .22 shells on the ground near his body. The rifle was three or four feet from him. Immediate medical assistance was provided by NDERT members, and the ambulance, which was waiting nearby, was requested.

[175] Corporal Brown stated that he discharged his firearm because he believed that Mr. George had the ability, means and intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the members who were present, and for the purpose of protecting those members from such harm. In his testimony at the Coroner's inquest, Corporal Brown explained that hearing a member shoot is not a signal for the rest of the team to open fire. Each member has to make their own decision about why they are going to fire their rifle, based on the IM/IM principles and the situation before them.

[176] At the time Corporal Brown fired his weapon at Mr. George, he reasonably feared grievous bodily harm or death to the NDERT members who were present. Mr. George was in possession of his rifle and was showing no indications of stopping or surrendering to police. Corporal Brown's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

Finding:: Corporal Brown's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

Constable Warwick

[177] Constable Warwick was positioned in the bush line furthest from the road and closest to the George residence. Constable Warwick stated that from the information relayed by Constable Shaw, it was apparent to him that Mr. George took his rifle everywhere with him and was acting in a dangerous, unpredictable and erratic manner. Constable Shaw reported that Mr. George was fueling his vehicle, which lead Constable Warwick to believe that he was doing so to take some sort of action. He based this belief on Mr. George's knowledge that the police were present, failure to surrender, and continuous carrying of a firearm. In his view, Mr. George fuelling his vehicle did not reflect an intent to surrender to or speak with the police.

[178] Shortly after the latest report of Mr. George driving towards members with his firearm, Constable Warwick heard the vehicle approach. He could tell by the sound of the engine that it was rapidly accelerating. He saw the vehicle headed towards the blockade at a high rate of speed, with no indication that the driver would slow or steer away from the blockade. Constable Warwick believed that there was about to be a significant collision between Mr. George's vehicle and the police vehicles.

[179] Constable Warwick heard a gunshot, and the van immediately started to slow, then skid to a stop on the driveway in front of him and slightly to his left. He could see the passenger side and a front portion of the vehicle. The driver's door opened but he could not see into the vehicle due to glare off of the windshield. He suddenly heard a gunshot, which he believed came from Mr. George's vehicle. He then heard several more gunshots coming from his right.

[180] Constable Warwick saw that Mr. George had moved to the rear of his vehicle and believed that he was using it for cover and concealment while he adopted a shooting position. Mr. George was slightly bent over and moving towards the rear passenger corner of the van, holding his rifle in both hands. As he moved, he was looking through the rear window of the van, appearing to focus towards the gate and where other members were located. Constable Warwick stated that he believed Mr. George was doing so in preparation of shooting at their location. He stated that he believed Mr. George had the ability, intent and means to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the members. According to Constable Warwick, Mr. George could have shouldered the weapon and fired in less than a second. It also appeared that he was going to do so.

[181] According to Constable Warwick, he shouted, "Stop! Police!" in a loud and clear voice, but Mr. George did not react. Consequently, Constable Warwick aimed and fired at Mr. George several times. As he did so, the van began to roll forward down the driveway, leaving Mr. George without cover. Mr. George turned and attempted to move back along his driveway. Constable Warwick believed that Mr. George was attempting to find cover to take up a shooting position, given his previous actions and failure to surrender. As a result of the dense bush Constable Warwick was in, he lost sight of Mr. George, so he stepped forward. At that time he saw Mr. George lying on the ground on the left side of the driveway. The rifle was near the centre of the driveway. He maintained cover of Mr. George to ensure that he did not recover his rifle. As the other NDERT members moved up to his position, they moved forward toward Mr. George. Mr. George was rolled over, and first aid was immediately started and the ambulance requested.

[182] I note that Constable Warwick was one of two members who recalled hearing what sounded like a gunshot coming from the area of Mr. George and his vehicle, and of a calibre that was different from the firearms being used by NDERT members. A spent casing was located in the rifle that was carried by Mr. George.

[183] Constable Warwick stated that he discharged his firearm at Mr. George because he believed he was preparing to shoot at members, which was likely to cause them death or grievous bodily harm. He maintained that no other reasonable option was available, and he discharged his firearm for the sole purpose of protecting members. He stopped firing when it was clear that Mr. George was no longer a threat to them.

[184] Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Constable Warwick reasonably believed that Mr. George was preparing to shoot and that discharging his firearm was necessary to stop the threat of grievous bodily harm or death. In the Commission's view, Constable Warwick's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

Finding: Constable Warwick's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

Constable Degen

[185] Constable Degen's position was to the left of Constable Merriman, who was to the left of Constable Arnold, who was nearest the gate. Constable Degen was in the bush facing the driveway, but was not able to see down the driveway due to the thick bush on his left. He was positioned behind a ditch and berm, which he stated gave him some cover while still giving him a view of the roadway immediately in front of his position. He could see the police vehicles blocking the gate (to his right) and he could see approximately 30 metres down the driveway toward the residence.

[186] In Constable Degen's view, the action of Mr. George refueling his van was an indication that he did not intend to surrender. When Mr. George attempted to use an ATV, Constable Degen stated that it suggested he was looking for means to break through the containment, since the ATV was capable of travelling through the heavy terrain. Mr. George's behaviour was escalating and he feared that if Mr. George did not surrender and was able to break containment, he was likely to inflict death or grievous bodily harm on a member, members of his family, or on an individual that aided in his wife's escape. He was also concerned that the NDERT members represented an organization that Mr. George did not trust.

[187] The last report from Constable Shaw indicated that Mr. George was in his vehicle with the rifle and was headed up the driveway at a high rate of speed. Constable Degen could hear the engine of the vehicle revving as it approached, as well as the tires as they spit up gravel. He heard Corporal Arnold warn that the vehicle was rapidly closing in on their position and a shot coming from his right before the vehicle came into his view. The vehicle quickly slowed and halted directly in front of him. It appeared that the driver was fumbling with something before exiting the van. He lost sight of the driver, and as the vehicle began to roll forward he heard members shout "Police! Stop!", and then heard a "pop" from the area of the vehicle, which he believed was Mr. George firing his rifle.

[188] Constable Degen next saw Mr. George moving away from the vehicle, in the direction of the residence with the rifle in his right hand. He fired several shots at Mr. George since the latter remained mobile, was still in possession of his rifle, and had not displayed any indication of slowing or surrendering. He lost sight of Mr. George but heard a member indicate that he was down on the driveway. The members formed a line and approached Mr. George, who was not moving. First aid was administered and Constable Degen breached the locked gate to provide access for the ambulance that was called to the scene.

[189] It is important to recognize that this was a very dynamic event that occurred within a one‑minute time frame and required decisive action. Constable Degen heard Corporal Arnold's shot and what he believed to be a shot fired by Mr. George, which there is evidence to support. The Commission notes that the entry positions of the four shots that hit Mr. George, and particularly the shots to the chest that resulted in his death, indicate that Mr. George was either directly facing or to the side of the shooter and not with his back to them. At all relevant times, the evidence is consistent that Mr. George was on the move, did not show signs of surrendering to police, and was carrying the rifle. Constable Degen reasonably believed that Mr. George had the ability, intent and means to cause grievous bodily harm and death to NDERT members at the time he fired his weapon at Mr. George.

Finding:: Constable Degen's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

Constable Merriman

[190] Constable Merriman stated that he heard Constable Shaw report that Mr. George had entered his vehicle with the rifle and was driving toward the gate. He could hear the loud motor revving before seeing the vehicle, which was approximately 150 to 200 metres away from him. The vehicle was moving at a high rate of speed, leaving a cloud of dust behind it. It did not slow down and he believed it was either going to ram the gate or stop at the gate and ambush their position. He was four to five metres from the gate and he was concerned that the force of a collision would cause death or grievous bodily harm to members near the gate.

[191] When the van was within approximately 70 metres of the gate, he heard a gunshot and the van skidding to a halt approximately 50 metres from his position. He yelled "Police! Stop!", and the driver, whom he believed to be Mr. George, turned in the driver's seat and exited the vehicle. He again yelled "Stop! Police!" That command was repeated, but Mr. George did not reply. When Mr. George exited the vehicle, he lifted up his right hand as if he was handling a long object that needed to be cleared from the dashboard and steering wheel. Then he saw the rifle in Mr. George's hand. Mr. George pushed the door open and quickly turned to face Constable Merriman's position. Constable Merriman believed that Mr. George was using the door as cover so that he could shoot, having no reason to exit his vehicle while armed with a rifle.

[192] Mr. George appeared to be holding the rifle in a firing position and was pointing it in his general direction. Constable Merriman feared that he would be shot and believed that he had exhausted all efforts in trying to verbally control Mr. George. He fired at Mr. George. It looked like Mr. George ducked down as the driver's side window shattered. He continued to fire at Mr. George, who appeared to be bobbing up and down in an effort to locate police targets. The vehicle started rolling forward and Mr. George appeared to retreat to the rear of the vehicle, where he lost sight of him.

[193] Constable Merriman fired at the front passenger tire and front grill to bring the van to a stop. When it did, he saw Mr. George collapse on the left edge of the driveway and the rifle approximately one metre away from him. After the members approached, Constable Merriman picked up the rifle and opened the action (the mechanism that handles the ammunition) to make it safe for handling. As he did, a spent casing was ejected from the chamber, which he collected. (At the Coroner's inquest, Constable Merriman testified that he did not hear the gun discharge and was surprised when he opened it to see the spent casing.)

Finding:: Constable Merriman's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

Constable Atkinson

[194] Constable Atkinson could hear Mr. George approaching in his vehicle and it sounded like it was travelling at a high rate of speed. He heard Corporal Arnold indicate that he could see the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Constable Atkinson heard a single shot come from an NDERT member on his right, followed shortly thereafter by additional fire by NDERT members. At first he could not see the vehicle or the suspect, as his view was obstructed by brush. He later saw the van come into view as it continued to move, with the driver's door open.

[195] Constable Atkinson could not see Mr. George and started scanning the area, shouting that he had not seen him. Eventually another member stated that Mr. George was down on the left side of the driveway. Corporal Brown then called for the members to form a line, and so he moved from his position and then saw Mr. George lying near the left edge of the driveway with a rifle laying in the middle of the driveway. When they approached Mr. George, he only saw slight movement in one of his feet. He saw a pile of small-calibre ammunition that had blood on it laying on the driveway between Mr. George and the rifle. Members began to provide first aid to Mr. George.

Photo 6: Constable Atkinson's view of the driveway and Mr. George's vehicle in its final stopped position.

[196] The above photograph shows Constable Atkinson's obstructed view of the portion of the driveway where Mr. George was shot and killed by NDERT members. At no time during this incident did Constable Atkinson fire his weapon. He reportedly did not see Mr. George until after the shooting ceased and it was communicated that Mr. George was on the ground.

Finding: It was reasonable for Constable Atkinson not to have utilized a use of force option, as from his position he did not see Mr. George until he was on the ground and no longer presented a threat to members.

[197] The Commission notes that many members stated that when Mr. George exited his vehicle with the firearm, he was instructed by them to stop, indicating that they were the police. It appears that these commands were not issued in German, as they had been previously. I understand that these events unfolded very quickly and that members were operating under extremely stressful conditions; however, it was known to members that Mr. George did not speak English. Although the Commission is confident that Mr. George ought to have been aware that he was dealing with the police given the marked police vehicles forming the barricade and his awareness that the police were pursuing him for the shooting incident, it is unfortunate that these commands were communicated in a language that Mr. George could not understand. Given the dynamic nature of these events and NDERT members' previous efforts to issue commands in German, the Commission makes no findings or recommendations with respect to these actions.

Non-lethal force and other tactical options

[198] As discussed in the previous section, the Commission accepts that at the time that members used lethal force against Mr. George, there was no reasonable lesser means of dealing with the threat posed by his actions of speeding toward the barricade and being in the possession of a firearm. That being said, the Commission's mandate is remedial in nature, and the Commission must consider whether any additional actions could or should have been taken by members to prevent the final and fatal confrontation between NDERT members and Mr. George.

[199] A number of tactics and non-lethal force options were considered in the hours leading up to the final confrontation. One such option was having Constable Shaw, who was covertly positioned near the residence, disable Mr. George's vehicle while it was parked at the property. However, Inspector Egan felt that firing into the vehicle might escalate the situation and was not convinced there would be a beneficial result. At that time, the priority was to make contact with Mr. George by telephone. Corporal Brown stated that Mr. George had not shot at them yet and he feared it would be opening the door for him to shoot back and that Mr. George would likely feel that he was under siege. It would also give away the position of Constable Shaw. In the Commission's view, that tactic was reasonably considered and determined to be unsound.

[200] The use of Constable Warwick and his police service dog were also considered. As noted earlier in this report, Constable Warwick was unable to get in position near the residence before Mr. George started the first of several approaches at the end of the driveway with his firearm. Consequently, Constable Warwick was redirected to the end of the driveway, where the other NDERT members were positioned. At the Coroner's inquest, Constable Warwick stated that the police service dog would not have been a viable means of apprehending Mr. George at the house when he was without his firearm due to the presence of other dogs that may have gotten in the way and would have warned of their presence and compromised his capability to make the apprehension.

[201] In addition, there was considerable open space surrounding the residence and it would have taken time for the police service dog to cover that distance. In that time, Mr. George might have had time to get back into the residence. In addition, if the police service dog was deployed, the remainder of the team would have to act as well, which would have changed the way they were approaching and dealing with the situation. Constable Warwick believed that there would have been a low probability of success, and the situation would have required an immediate follow-up action by the rest of the team.

[202] Corporal Brown stated that he considered moving Constable Warwick and his police service dog closer to the residence so that he could initiate a running attack at Mr. George as he fueled the vehicle, but there was too much risk in doing so. Those risks included Mr. George's erratic behaviour, the use of his dogs as a warning system, and the wind direction (moving from the members' positions down the driveway and toward the residence would have alerted Mr. George's dogs of their presence), which would have made moving team members closer too risky.

[203] Once NDERT members were in a position to observe the behaviour of Mr. George (who was acting erratically, continuously on the move about the property, and appeared to be attempting to leave it), it became evident that more resources may be required. Less than an hour before the fatal shooting occurred, the NDERT Team Leader requested that consideration be given to deploying another ERT, as well as a helicopter. Inspector Egan spoke with Inspector Fast about these options and made an official request. Inspector Fast confirmed that he would make those arrangements. In a follow-up call Inspector Egan advised Inspector Fast that the second team was desired because the stand-off was likely to go on for a long time before Mr. George would surrender and that the helicopter was needed to monitor Mr. George, especially if he were to enter the woods on foot.

[204] Resourcing is a continuing issue with part-time ERTs working in remote areas. It is even more so difficult when an operation involves a large piece of property that is difficult to contain. There was ultimately not enough time to get those additional resources, i.e. a helicopter or additional ERT, to the incident location. These resources could have been considered and requested earlier on in the planning process. There is no indication in the investigation record that they were.

[205] The issue of resources and containment was the subject of a recommendation made by the IOR and commented on by the RCMP in its response to the Commission. The Commission notes that concerns were expressed by Corporal Arnold that there was a risk to the public since the road was not blocked off. He stated that if they had moved their positions and barricade closer to the road, they would have lost the tactical advantage of being able to see Mr. George coming and compromised their safety, and that of the public. He further stated that moving the police vehicles back toward the road and using them as cover (suggested in questions posed by investigators) would have also endangered the public, as the road was not blocked by police.

[206] While some containment efforts were made (Constable Poyzer was located in a vehicle on the road near the end of the driveway), it was clear that the property was not fully contained. As noted by the IOR:

Unfortunately, these [additional ERT] resources could not have arrived in time. This is the reality of working in remote areas of the country where specialized resources are often at a minimum. Securing adequate resources at the initial stages of the incident are generally very limited. I do believe that additional ERT members at the initial stages of the call-out would have been beneficial for providing a better containment. The lay‑out of the property was particularly hazardous for both officer and public safety, thus limiting the intervention options available to the members.

[207] The IOR recommended that "E" Division consider implementing containment teams to enhance the response capacity of the ERTs in the North District. Their role would not be to replace ERT roles and responsibilities, but to allow the ERTs to focus on their primary responsibilities while still maintaining a high level of security on the perimeter. It would allow for a more flexible response. The RCMP's response to the Commission indicates that "E" Division Headquarters and North District senior management is considering implementation of one or more such containment teams. Superintendent Rod Booth, the signatory to the RCMP's response and then Superintendent of the North District, indicated that he anticipated that such a team would be implemented.

[208] As discussed earlier in this report, consideration was also given to repositioning the spike belt further into the property and past the metal gate. However, Inspector Egan and Corporal Brown stated that it would expose the team to gunfire and that the open area of the driveway made it tactically unsound. In the Commission's view, that decision was reasonable given Mr. George's numerous approaches of that end of the driveway.

[209] Given the difficulties in establishing communications with Mr. George, the NDERT considered various alternate options. They included the use of a loud hailer and/or a portable phone. It is clear that a remote loud hailer was considered by Corporal Brown from the radio transmissions at least in the context of attempting to make contact with Mr. George from a distance in the area of his residence. However, there were logistical issues in terms of getting the equipment to the location, which was a difficult and long trek through the bush, as well as what distance it would cover. It is not clear from the investigation record whether or not it was considered when members encountered Mr. George at this time.

[210] Inspector Egan stated that he confirmed that both a portable phone and loud hailer were available if required. However, a risk assessment by the team revealed that the portable phone option would expose members to potential gunfire and leave them vulnerable for too long. Consequently, the idea was set aside.

[211] Communication difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that it was unsafe for members to approach Mr. George openly while he continued to possess, and continually carry with him, a firearm that he had already demonstrated an ability to use. A recommendation following the Coroner's inquest was that the RCMP consider stationing an armoured vehicle with the NDERT, which they did not have access to at the time of this incident. The North District has since received a tactical armour vehicle, which provides the ERT with the ability to safely approach armed subjects.

Finding: Non-lethal force and other tactical options were reasonably considered, including disabling Mr. George's vehicle at his residence, obtaining additional ERT resources, using the police service dog to apprehend Mr. George near the residence, as well as resorting to alternative means of communication.

Finding: Additional ERT resources should have been identified and requested earlier in the planning stages.

Finding: Additional resources could have allowed for a more secure perimeter.

Recommendation: That the RCMP establish one or more containment teams in the North District if not already in place.

Medical treatment following the shooting

[212] The RCMP owes a duty of care to those in its custody, and its policies provide direction to members with respect to obtaining medical treatment for persons in its custody. RCMP policy states that members must seek immediate medical assistance and provide the necessary first aid when a person appears to be unconscious or has an injury or illness for which medical attention should be sought.^{Footnote 40} This can often be difficult when faced with a subject who just seconds earlier members determined posed such a threat that lethal force was used; however, that duty applies equally in such situations.

[213] Inspector Egan requested that a BC Ambulance be on standby early into the ERT deployment. The ambulance arrived at the command post shortly after 10 a.m. Immediately following the shooting, at approximately 1 p.m., the paramedics were called to the scene, where they saw NDERT members performing CPR. The paramedics performed an assessment and contacted a physician, who instructed them to discontinue resuscitation.

[214] The Commission is satisfied that arrangements were made for the provision of emergency medical support during the NDERT operation. Members provided emergency first aid to Mr. George pending the arrival of ambulance personnel, who were on standby at the command post. NDERT members continued performing CPR while ambulance personnel assessed Mr. George, and stopped when instructed to do so. All reasonable efforts were made by members to provide immediate and necessary medical treatment to Mr. George following his shooting.

Finding: Arrangements were made for the provision of emergency medical support during the NDERT operation.

Finding:: All reasonable efforts were made by NDERT members to provide immediate and necessary medical treatment to Mr. George following his shooting.

RCMP involvement following the shooting

[215] Immediately following the shooting, the scene was managed by the Incident Commander, Inspector Egan, using the ERT and Fort St. John members until members of the North District Major Crime Unit were able to attend. Those members were later replaced by members of the "E" Division Major Crime Section, who travelled from Kelowna and Vancouver and who were assigned to investigate the in-custody death of Mr. George.

[216] This incident occurred in 2009 in British Columbia, prior to the creation of the Independent Investigation Office (IIO), a civilian-led body that was created in 2012 by the provincial government to conduct investigations into incidents where the actions of police officers result in death or serious harm. This incident also occurred prior to the implementation of the RCMP's current policy with respect to external investigation or review, which now provides that where there is no provincial or federal body established for such investigations, the RCMP will request an external law enforcement agency to conduct an investigation that the RCMP would otherwise conduct where an individual has been killed or seriously injured and the incident involves an RCMP member.^{Footnote 41}

[217] At the time of the incident, RCMP "E" Division policy required that all deaths of persons in RCMP custody be investigated by a Major Crime Unit. However, with the new policy soon coming into effect, efforts were made to obtain an investigative team outside of the RCMP, although those efforts were ultimately not successful. As noted above, members from the "E" Division Major Crime Section investigated Mr. George's death.

[218] Pursuant to RCMP policy, the investigative team followed the Major Case Management (MCM) model. The MCM model is "a methodology for managing major cases that provides accountability, clear goals and objectives, planning, allocation of resources and control over the direction, speed and flow of the investigation."^{Footnote 42} MCM is managed by the Major Case Management Team (MCMT) illustrated by the "command triangle," which includes the Team Commander, the Primary Investigator and the File Coordinator. The Team Commander has ultimate authority, responsibility and accountability for the MCMT, its resources (human and physical) and its mandate. The Primary Investigator controls the overall investigative process. The File Coordinator is responsible for the control, supervision, organization and disclosure of the file documentation.^{Footnote 43}

[219] The command triangle roles were assigned to members of the "E" Division Major Crime Unit. Staff Sergeant Maurice Tremblay assumed the role of Team Commander, Sergeant David Chauhan, the role of Primary Investigator, and Corporal Terry Faulkner, the role of File Coordinator. They were all trained and qualified members with experience in serious crime investigation. Inspector Thomas McCluskie of the Vancouver Police Department was assigned to provide independent investigative oversight for the investigation of this incident. In addition, a use of force review was conducted by a member of the Calgary Police Service.

[220] All members of the investigation team completed an impartiality questionnaire developed by the RCMP to ensure the highest possible level of objectivity by the members involved in such a case. This procedure calls for full disclosure of any relationship past or present investigators may have or have had with members involved in the incident under scrutiny. All questionnaires are reviewed by the Team Commander in order to decide if an investigator should be excluded from the team on the ground that there may be a perception of conflict of interest on his part.

[221] On October 1, 2009, the then Chair of the Commission requested that the Commission Independent Observer^{Footnote 44} be engaged to a) make an initial assessment as to the impartiality of the Major Crime Unit assigned to investigate this incident, and b) monitor progress so as to ensure that any future issues as they relate to the impartiality of the investigation are identified and addressed. The Commission Observer completed an assessment as to the impartiality of the investigative team and concluded that there were no identified issues as they relate to questions of impartiality.

[222] In addition to the steps taken to conduct the original investigation, the RCMP utilized an IOR to review the investigation, as referenced throughout this report.

Finding: The NDERT's use of lethal force against Mr. George was investigated by members of the RCMP, as the incident occurred prior to the establishment of the RCMP's external investigation policy and the creation of the Independent Investigation Office of British Columbia.

Finding: Reasonable efforts were made by the RCMP to ensure that the criminal investigation into the NDERT's use of lethal force was conducted in an impartial manner, which included oversight by an inspector from the Vancouver Police Department.

Member debriefing

[223] ERT policy provides that the ERT Team Leader, in conjunction with the Incident Commander, will debrief the team and other support units involved, ensuring that discussions cover all aspects of the information, including briefing, deployment, communications, tactics used, and the outcome. If an ERT member is involved in a shooting incident (in which a member fires his or her weapon at another person or object, or is fired upon), the Team Leader must immediately notify the Chief Psychologist at RCMP National Headquarters and ensure that trauma counselling is provided, in consultation with divisional health services.^{Footnote 45}

[224] In its response to the Chair-initiated complaint, the RCMP stated that timely critical incident counselling is a priority consideration. The IOR had recommended that the RCMP implement a review of policy to address member's health and welfare immediately following a critical incident. The RCMP's response indicated that current policy is sufficient and mandates a debriefing within 72 hours of a psychologically traumatic incident, which include shooting incidents.

[225] However, in the Commission's view, the RCMP's response does not adequately address two important concerns:

The issue raised by the IOR that three of the members responding to this incident had been involved in a fatal shooting within the preceding five days of this call-out, and there was no indication that an evaluation was conducted prior to them being re-deployed to this incident. (The Commission notes that the IOR did state that there was no indication that it adversely affected their decisions in relation to this incident, which the Commission agrees with.)
An indication by the IOR that "there is a general consensus from the members who responded to the critical incident that there is a dire need to improve the manner by which members are dealt with following a shooting. There is a necessity to balance the investigation and health and welfare of our members."

[226] With respect to debriefings, the IOR further stated:

The principle of affording tactical units an opportunity to conduct an immediate post-incident debriefing is a long-standing practice. It's [sic] intent is to identify short-comings and best-practices as soon as possible after the event, in a non-threatening environment. The practice of M.C.U. is to not allow witnesses to share their stories and possibly contaminate a pure-version accounting to an event. RCMP Policy enacted since this incident should address the need to provide a timely (within 10 days) accounting of the incident while affording the members an opportunity to debrief.

[227] The IOR recommended that a formal critical incident debriefing for all members that participated in this matter be conducted, as there "existed a perception of 'go talk but keep in mind it can be used against you.'" While the RCMP indicated that a critical incident debrief occurred one week after the incident, as well as a psychologist debriefing a month later and a formal team operational debrief one year following the incident, the Commission is concerned that the issues raised by the IOR have not be sufficiently addressed.

[228] The IOR identified one member involved in this incident who expressed frustration during the Coroner's inquest with what he perceived as a lack of support from the RCMP following the incident. In a statement to investigators, another member indicated that the initial debriefing was a waste of time since they were not able to talk about the details of the incident, and the operational debriefing held seven months after the incident was of little value due to the delay. The Commission recognizes that years have now passed since this incident; however, the Commission recommends that the RCMP review the process by which these briefings are conducted to ensure that they take place in a timelier manner and are conducted in a way that addresses the needs of the members.

Finding: NDERT debriefings did not occur in a comprehensive and timely manner.

Recommendation: That the RCMP review the process by which ERT briefings are conducted following a critical incident that is subject to a criminal investigation, to ensure that they are conducted in a comprehensive and timely manner.

Adequacy of Policy, Procedures and Guidelines

[229] The RCMP stated in its response to the Commission that the Force's national-, divisional- and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to this incident were adequate and are continually reviewed and assessed. The Commission's review revealed that many of the RCMPs policies have in fact been updated since the time of this incident. The Commission did not identify any issues with respect to policy, procedures and guidelines as they relate to the events leading to the shooting death of Mr. George that have not been addressed by subsequent revisions.

Conclusion

[230] Tragically, during the police efforts to ensure the safety of his family, Mr. George's life was lost on September 30, 2009. Tremendous efforts were made by numerous RCMP members to resolve the matter peacefully, and in the face of significant challenges, including apparent mental health, cultural, communication and resource issues. The Commission's review of the circumstances found that members generally conducted themselves professionally, responsibly, and in accordance with the law and their training. However, some of those challenges were not overcome.

[231] While communication and negotiation were believed to be the tools that would bring the situation to a peaceful end, Mr. George was not a willing participant. Despite the calm, deliberate and measured approach taken by RCMP members, Mr. George's actions unfortunately led to a confrontation that resulted in the use of lethal force. The Commission is hopeful that the recommendations set out in this report will be of some assistance to the RCMP in making improvements to the ways it deals with such incidents.

[232] Having considered the complaint, I hereby submit my Interim Report in accordance with paragraph 45.71(3)(a) of the RCMP Act.

Ian McPhail, Q.C.
Chair

Appendix A - Chair-Initiated Complaint: Shooting death of Mr. Valeri George at Buick Creek, in the Fort St. John area of British Columbia on September 30, 2009

October 6, 2009

File No.: PC-2009-2863

As Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, I am initiating a complaint into the conduct of those unidentified RCMP members present at the shooting death of Mr. Valeri George at Buick Creek, in the Fort St. John area of British Columbia on September 30, 2009.

The facts as presently known indicate that on September 26, 2009, the Fort St. John RCMP were contacted with respect to Mr. George. Mr. George allegedly shot at the tires of a vehicle containing his spouse and children and returned to his residence following a failed attempt to speak with them. The RCMP North District Emergency Response Team (ERT) were mobilized to the area, and on September 30, 2009, they were deployed on the scene. On that date, Mr. George left his residence in his vehicle at a high rate of speed. ERT members fired on the vehicle, and Mr. George was fatally struck.

I am initiating this complaint with the full appreciation that the RCMP has deployed its Major Crime Unit to investigate this incident and that the RCMP will be ordering an Independent Officer Review. It is not my intention to prejudice the RCMP investigations. However, I will be closely monitoring RCMP progress as it relates to the investigations underway so that I can ensure, at their completion, a timely response to this complaint.

I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to investigate the circumstances surrounding the shooting death of Mr. George. Accordingly, pursuant to subsection 45.37(1) of the RCMP Act, I am today initiating a complaint into the conduct of all RCMP members or other persons appointed or employed under the authority of the RCMP Act involved in this incident, as well as matters of general practice applicable to situations of this nature and, more specifically, those in which RCMP Emergency Response Teams are deployed. Specifically:

whether the RCMP members or other persons appointed or employed under the authority of the RCMP Act involved in the events of September 26 to September 30, 2009, from the moment of initial contact through to the subsequent death of Mr. Valeri George complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force; and
whether the RCMP's national-, divisional- and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to such an incident and to situations in which RCMP Emergency Response Teams are deployed are adequate.

Appendix B – RCMP Response to the Chair-Initiated Complaint

Nov 02, 2016

Mr. Ian McPhail, Q.C.
Chair
Civilian Review and Complaints
Commission for the RCMP
P.O. Box 1722, Station "B"
Ottawa, Ontario
KlP OB3

Dear Mr. McPhail:

I acknowledge receipt of the Commission's interim report on the Chair-Initiated Complaint regarding the shooting death of Mr. Valeri George in Buick Creek, British Columbia, your file number PC-2009-2863.

I have completed a review of this matter, including the findings and recommendations set out in the Commission's interim report.

I agree with Finding No. 1, that the RCMP members were duty-bound to investigate the reported actions of Mr. George.

I agree with Finding No. 2, that the RCMP members took reasonable steps to investigate the incident.

I agree with Finding No. 3, that the RCMP members took appropriate steps to ensure the safety of Mr. George's family pending an arrest.

I agree with Finding No. 4, that the RCMP members had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. George had committed multiple Criminal Code offences.

I agree with Finding No. 5, that the RCMP members had grounds to arrest Mr. George without a warrant following the incident with his family.

I agree with' Finding No. 6, that the RCMP members' decision to pursue Mr. George's arrest without a warrant was a reasonable exercise of discretion.

I agree with Finding No. 7, that it was both reasonable and necessary for members to seek a warrant to arrest Mr. George in his home in the event that negotiations failed.

I agree with Finding No. 8, that the warrant application contained a reasonably thorough and accurate representation of the evidence.

I agree with Finding No. 9, that the RCMP members made reasonable attempts to communicate with Mr. George in order to negotiate a peaceful surrender.

I agree with Finding No. 10, that the RCMP members took reasonable steps to ensure that they could communicate with Mr. George in a language that he understood.

I agree with Finding No. 11, that the RCMP members' decision to seek assistance from Mr. Jakob Remple Sr. to communicate with Mr. George after he refused to speak with members was reasonable.

I agree with Finding No. 12, that Inspector Patrick Egan reasonably decided that using Mrs. Irina George to contact her husband was inappropriate in the circumstances.

I agree with Finding No. 13, that the decision made on September 29, 2009, to activate and deploy the ND ERT to facilitate the arrest of Mr. George was reasonably based and consistent with RCMP policy.

I agree with Finding No. 14, that the NDERT members who were deployed during this incident were current with respect to their training.

I agree with Finding No. 15, that Corporal Claudette Garcia had not participated in a negotiators refresher course, as required by RCMP directives. However, I note that, although Corporal Garcia attempted to reach Mr. George, she never made contact with him. I also note that, as observed by the Commission in the Interim Report, Corporal Garcia "had considerable experience as a crisis negotiator and had attended numerous related seminars and workshops, particularly with respect to issues related to mental health." I find that this mitigates any risk possibly associated with the fact that Corporal Garcia had not · yet participated in a negotiators refresher course. I would also like to advise that Corporal Garcia has taken the refresher course since the incident.

I support Recommendation No. 1, that the RCMP take steps to ensure that all members who are engaged in critical incidents in any capacity are up to date with their ongoing training requirements; however, I find that such steps are already in place.

For crisis negotiators specifically, policy in the Tactical Operations Manual (TOM), chapter 3.2, "Selection, Training and Equipment", stipulates that the divisional negotiator coordinator will ensure that training requirements are met, including that the crisis negotiation refresher training is taken every five years. The refresher course is provided exclusively by the Canadian Police College on a limited basis, and several police agencies in Canada seek attendance for this course; these factors, coupled with operational pressures, can combine to create difficulties in having a crisis negotiator attend the refresher course in time.

As for the Critical Incident Program in general, there is policy in place to ensure that training requirements are met. For example, ERT Leaders are tasked in policy with ensuring that proficiency levels and training logs are maintained (TOM chapters 2.1 and 2.2).

I agree with Finding No. 16, that, while not required at the time, Inspector Egan had not been trained on the current course standard for incident commanders.

I support Recommendation No. 2, that the RCMP ensure that all NDERT members, incident commanders, and other supporting personnel receive training on new standards in a timely manner. I will ensure that this is communicated to the Division. I note, however, that Superintendent Rod Booth, in his Final Report to the Commission, indicated that all critical incident commanders within the North District are now trained to the new standard.

I agree with Finding No. 17, that the scribe assigned to the Incident Commander had not taken a scribe's course, although none had been required at the time, and that current policy now mandates such training.

I agree with Finding No. 18, that the NDERT briefing prepared and given by members of the Fort St. John RCMP Detachment was reasonably thorough and accurate.

I agree with Finding No. 19, that Inspector Egan's decision to delay deploying the NDERT to the George property until the early morning of September 30, 2009, was reasonable in the circumstances.

I agree with Finding No. 20, that the operational plans were prepared and signed by the Team Leader and Incident Commander prior to the NDERT's deployment at the George property, in accordance with RCMP policy.

I agree with Finding No. 21, that the operation plans were reasonably thorough and appropriate in the circumstances known to members at the time they were developed.

I agree with Finding No. 22, that Constable Matthew Shaw stalked to a position near the George residence and reported his observations over the radio in a continual and detailed manner.

I agree with Finding No. 23, that CNT members deployed without a full team; however, that it was reasonable in the circumstances.

I agree with Finding No. 24, that CNT members made efforts to locate persons who could communicate with Mr. George on their behalf in the face of a language barrier.

I do not agree with Finding No. 25, that it is not clear from the record whether CNT members fully assessed the limits and capabilities of a third party who they intended to use to communicate with Mr. George, or whether other options were available.

As for an assessment of the limits and capabilities of Mr. Jacob Dick, the person CNT members intended to use as translator, I find that there is evidence to show that a proper assessment was conducted by CNT members. In a post facto statement, Mr. Dick stated he had concerns about the age difference between him and Mr. George and the cultural background of the germano-russian community, which creates a fear of police [statement of Jacob Dick, page 4]. There is no evidence on file that shows that Mr. Dick conveyed the former to the CNT at the time, and as for the latter, it is quite clear from the evidence on file that the majority of members involved, if not all, were made aware of the cultural fear toward the police. As for the CNT members in particular, their notes indicate they were made aware of this cultural issue. I find it is apparent that the decision to use the services of Mr. Dick was not taken lightly; the CNT members actually sat down with him and discussed the matter, the process and their role at length, coming to the conclusion that he was an asset [notes of Corporal Mike Stevenson; statement of Corporal Garcia, pages 2-3; statement of Corporal Stevenson, pages 2, 11-12]. I therefore find that there is enough information on record to show that some form of discussion and assessment regarding the use of Mr. Dick's services was done and that no concerns were identified in relation to any limits or capabilities.

In a post facto statement, Mr. Waldemar Schaefer cites some vague and remote association between Mr. Dick and another individual who apparently had a disagreement with Mr. George, therefore making the use of Mr. Dick as an interpreter inappropriate. Mr. Schaefer stated that he had conveyed these concerns in a statement to Constable Jessica Veysey when Mr. George was barricaded.

The statement provided by Mr. Schaefer to Constable Veysey does not contain such information; therefore, I afford little to no probative value to Mr. Schaefer's assertion.

As for the availability of other options, statements on file show that a member of the Fort St. John Detachment informed Corporal Garcia that a potential translator, Mr. Vitaly Fendel, had been identified, but Mr. Fendel eventually desisted [statement of Corporal Milo MacDonald; statement of Corporal Garcia, page 2]. This is also confirmed in handwritten notes taken by CNT members [Negotiator's Log, pages 2 and 3]. Furthermore, CNT members' notes show entries such as "MEL willing to assist police will talk to him" when referring to Mr. Mel Woolfolk, a neighbour of Mr. George, as well as "Dirk: Russian member in Castlegar B.C." when referring to Constable Dirk Finkensiep, a member who had been used to communicate with Mr. George prior to CNT and ERT involvement [CNT members' notes, page 6]. Statements from CNT members also indicate that they had received information that Mr. George would not relate to a female person, and that consideration was given to that [statement of Corporal Garcia, page 2; statement of Corporal Stevenson, pages 5 and 6]. I therefore find that all this information shows that CNT members indeed documented the availability of other translators.

I support Recommendation No. 3, that the RCMP should take steps to ensure that CNT members make detailed notes regarding the assessment and involvement of any third parties in their negotiation process; however, I find that such steps are already in place. Although there is no specific requirement in policy directing that "detailed notes" be made regarding the assessment and involvement of third parties, there is policy in place directing that the use of a third party must be approved by the incident commander [TOM, chapter 3.3 "Crisis Negotiation Operations", section 1.5]. I find that it is reasonable to believe that this approval process, and what led to such approval, would be detailed by the members involved, as well as by the involved scribe. In the current instance, I find that CNT members did make notes regarding the use of a third party, and it is reasonable to conclude that they conducted an assessment and considered other individuals.

I do not agree with Finding No. 26, that it is not clear from the record whether CNT members considered obtaining assistance from Constable Finkensiep to communicate with Mr. George during the NDERT deployment.

First, as previously mentioned under Finding No. 25, the CNT members' notes contain an entry pertaining to Constable Finkensiep [CNT members' notes, page 6]. It is therefore apparent that they considered using the assistance of Constable Finkensiep. Second, Constable Finkensiep spoke on the phone with Mr. George prior to CNT and ERT involvement. This phone conversation was recorded, translated and transcribed, and it shows that Constable Finkensiep identified himself as being with the RCMP, and that Mr. George twice said that he did not want to talk to the police. Mr. George eventually hung up on Constable Finkensiep. It is therefore apparent that Mr. George did not want to speak with Constable Finkensiep in particular or with the police in general. Third, the file permeates with information pertaining to the cultural fear of police within the germano-russian community that Mr. George was part of. It is apparent from the statements that CNT members were made aware of this, and CNT members' notes contain specific entries to that effect.

I therefore find there is evidence that CNT members considered the assistance of Constable Finkensiep; in any event, in light of the information pertaining to the cultural fear of police, it was quite reasonable for CNT members not to have used Constable Finkensiep's services and to instead refer to an acquaintance of Mr. George.

I support Recommendation No. 4, that the RCMP take steps to ensure that all members involved in ERT deployments consider the use of general duty members where a particular skill or expertise (such as the ability to speak a foreign language) is required; however, I find that such steps are already in place.

If applied specifically to the CNT in the present case, I find that, as per my conclusions at Finding No. 26, CNT members did indeed consider the use of a general duty member (Constable Finkensiep) for a particular skill, but that a situational factor made that non-advisable. In a more general aspect, although there is nothing in RCMP policy that specifically deals with the use of non-ERT personnel during ERT deployment, it is reasonably expected that any valuable non-ERT resource will be considered, to the extent that safety is maintained. To illustrate this, a guide has been created and made available to all personnel in response to the MacNeil Report, Recommendation 7.12: "Emergency Response Teams (ERT) develop a quick reference guide for non-ERT trained members who may be called upon to offer assistance (e.g. aerial spotters and other observation posts)." This guide is intended to help non-ERT personnel in understanding specialized ERT vocabulary and radio protocols, should they be called to assist ERT teams during an incident. It is therefore clearly recognized that non-ERT personnel can be called upon to assist in ERT deployments.

I agree with Finding No. 27, that it was reasonable for members to confront Mr. George when he approached the end of his driveway on foot and in possession of a rifle, particularly given that the members would have already been visible to him.

I agree with Finding No. 28, that members issued their commands to Mr. George in a language that he was known to understand.

I agree with Finding No. 29, that the decision to move the police barricade to the area of the gate and to fortify it was reasonable.

I agree with Finding No. 30, that the decision not to move the spike belt further into the property, given the risk to members in doing so, was reasonable.

I do not agree with Finding No. 31, that emergency lighting should have been utilized at the police barricade as an additional means to signal Mr. George to stop.

I find it is evident that Mr. George was aware that police were standing at the barricade, and I find that the presence of three police vehicles at the gate in Mr. George's driveway and parked across the driveway were a clear indicator for Mr. George to stop. I find that leaving the police vehicles' emergency lighting on during that time would have likely quickly depleted the vehicles' batteries, rendering the vehicles inoperable. Furthermore, I find that, if the vehicles were left running in order to operate the emergency lighting, it could have depleted the vehicles' fuel tanks. I find that refuelling the police vehicles would have been problematic, as they would either have to be driven away, thereby weakening the barricade, or refuelled by way of a portable gas can, making this operation unsafe for the person conducting the refuelling while Mr. George moves about the property with a rifle. Finally, I find that the containment situation could have been lengthy, since priority was on negotiation and Mr. George was not a willing participant. Therefore, I find that leaving the police vehicles' emergency lighting on this whole time would not have provided a tactical advantage and could have resulted in unsafe situations.

I do not agree with Finding No. 32, that consideration should have been given to blocking off the roads surrounding the George property should Mr. George breach the police barricade at the driveway.

There was only one road to Mr. George's property, and the rest of the property was surrounded by thick bush. Information on file shows that general duty members had indeed blocked the road to Mr. George's property at some point during the ERT operation [statement of Constable Nathan Poyzer; notes and statement of Constable Jackelynn Passarell; notes and statement of Constable Camil Coutney; statement of Corporal MacDonald].

I do not support Recommendation No. 5, that the RCMP take steps to ensure that sufficient resources are made available to block public roads where there is a risk to the public during a critical incident. .

For this particular matter, as mentioned under Finding No. 32, I find that there is evidence on file that general duty members had indeed blocked the road to Mr. George's property. On a more general aspect, I believe that members of the RCMP are diligent in making the protection of the public a high priority in critical incidents. Although there is no policy specifically mentioning this, the common law duties of police officers include the preservation of the peace and the protection of life and property, and I believe that members of the RCMP abide by these duties diligently.

I agree with Finding No. 33, that Corporal Ryan Arnold and Corporal Richard Brown appropriately considered all of the risks involved in holding Corporal Arnold's position near the gate, including the risk of bodily harm or death that could justify the use of lethal force against Mr. George, and reasonably concluded that maintaining the tactical advantage was necessary.

I agree with Finding No. 34, that Corporal Brown should have informed Inspector Egan regarding his discussion with Corporal Arnold about the risk in his positioning and their decision to maintain it.

However, just as the Independent Officer Review concluded, I find that the decision made by Corporals Brown and Arnold was sound and justified, and that the failure to communicate it to the Incident Commander simply means that Inspector Egan was not privy to their decision, and does not imply any wrongdoing. I also note that the final position of all ERT members was communicated to Inspector Egan via radio communication with the dispatcher [transcript ofradio communications, page 38].

I generally support Recommendation No. 6, that the RCMP review this report with Corporal Brown to ensure that he is aware of the need to communicate tactical decisions and risks to ERT members to the Incident Commander where there is time to do so.

I will direct that a copy of the Commission's Interim Report and a copy of my response be provided to Corporal Brown for his review.

I agree with Finding No. 35, that Corporal Arnold reasonably feared grievous bodily harm or death when he discharged his firearm at Mr. George.

I agree with Finding No. 36, that it was reasonable for Corporal Arnold to discharge his firearm at Mr. George in his motor vehicle, as no other intervention methods were appropriate.

I agree with Finding No. 37, that Corporal Brown's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

I agree with Finding No. 38, that Constable Colin Warwick's use of lethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

I agree with Finding No. 39, that Constable Martin Degen's use oflethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

I agree with Finding No. 40, that Constable Brian Merriman's use oflethal force was reasonable and proportionate to the threat presented by Mr. George, and consistent with the law and RCMP training and policy.

I agree with Finding No. 41, that it was reasonable for Constable Colin Atkinson not to have utilized a use of force option, as, from his position, he did not see Mr. George until he was on the ground and no longer presented a threat to members.

I agree with Finding No. 42, that non-lethal force and other tactical options were reasonably considered, including disabling Mr. George's vehicle at his residence, obtaining additional ERT resources, using the police service dog to apprehend Mr. George near the residence, and resorting to alternative means of communication.

I agree with Finding No. 43, that additional ERT resources should have been identified and requested earlier in the planning stages.

Given the initial plan for "containment and negotiation," which inherently involves time, and given the remoteness of the location, I find that assistance from another ERT should have been considered from the get-go.

I generally agree with Finding No. 44, that additional resources could have allowed for a more secure perimeter.

In a general sense, I find it is clear that more resources will make for a more secure perimeter. In this particular instance, I find that the ERT Leader had requested the assistance of a Force helicopter to further secure the perimeter, along with his request for the assistance of a second ERT; however, these requests were never fulfilled, as the events came to a tragic end beforehand. Furthermore, I find that containment can be achieved without necessarily having several members deployed; containment can be achieved with as few as two well-placed members. In this particular instance, it was noted by members at the scene that the property was surrounded by thick bush, which would have made for difficult progress by Mr. George, had he chosen to escape the containment that way. Also, Corporal Arnold was covertly observing Mr. George's actions from his hidden location near the residence and relaying the information to the ERT; had Mr. George made an attempt at eluding the barricade, Corporal Arnold would have been in a position to intervene or track Mr. George.

I support Recommendation No. 7, that the RCMP establish one or more containment teams in the North District if not already in place.

Please be advised that containment teams have since been implemented in Terrace and Dawson Creek, in the North District.

I agree with Finding No. 45, that arrangements were made for the provision of emergency medical support during the NDERT operation.

I agree with Finding No. 46, that all reasonable efforts were made by NDERT members to provide immediate and necessary medical treatment to Mr. George following his shooting.

I agree with Finding No. 47, thatthe NDERT's use of lethal force against Mr. George was investigated by members of the RCMP, as the incident occurred prior to the establishment of the RCMP's external investigation policy and the creation of the Independent Investigation Office of British Columbia.

I agree with Finding No. 48, that reasonable efforts were made by the RCMP to ensure that the criminal investigation into the ND ERT' s use of lethal force was conducted in an impartial manner, which included oversight by an inspector from the Vancouver Police Department.

I agree with Finding No. 49, that NDERT debriefings did not occur in a comprehensive and timely manner; however, I find that some of the contributing factors to the delays can be justified.

RCMP policy stipulates that, in an instance of member-involved shooting, a psychological debrief is mandatory and must take place within 72 hours of the incident [Administration Manual Appendix 11-19-5, via TOM 2.3.2.1.4 and Health Services Manual 111.1.P.1.c)]. In this instance, I find thatthe psychological debrief did not take place within the prescribed 72 hours.

RCMP policy stipulates that the ERT leader will conduct a comprehensive operational debrief, but does not specify a timeframe [TOM 2.3.2]. In this instance, I find that a critical incident debrief involving NDERT took place a relatively short period time following the incident (one week); however, a comprehensive operational debrief only took place about one year after the incident. While policy does not stipulate a timeframe for such, I find it is important to bear in mind that every situation is different, and what is considered to be a reasonable delay for such a debrief will have to be assessed on its own merit. In this instance, there was an extensive criminal investigation taking place: the NDERT had a duty to account for their actions, yet at the same time, this needs to be balanced with their Charter Rights and the fact that any in-depth discussion of the incident amongst team members would be perceived negatively as collusion. I find that it took almost five months for all NDERT members to submit their account to the investigation team. The investigation team sent follow-up questions to NDERT members, and it took a year for all NDERT members to submit their responses to the follow-up questions. This illustrates that some of the delays in being able to conduct a comprehensive debrief stem from NDERT members' own delays in providing their account. Furthermore, there is apparently a delay in the NDERT Leader convening the comprehensive debrief after the submission of the initial accounts by the NDERT members.

I do not support Recommendation No. 8, that the RCMP review the process by which ERT briefings are conducted following a critical incident that is subject to criminal investigation, to ensure that they are conducted in a comprehensive and timely manner.

I find that current policy seems complete in covering the debrief aspect; despite the fact that only the psychological debrief has a strict timeline set, there is no identified need to set a timeline for the operational debrief, since every situation is dependent on its own set of facts. I find that the psychological debrief is perhaps the most important and pressing debrief to cover. Policy is clear, as explained at Finding No. 49, in stipulating that such a debrief must take place within 72 hours after a member-involved shooting. As for a comprehensive operational debrief, policy is also clear in stipulating that such a debrief must take place, and I find it is reasonable for this policy not to include a specific timeframe given that, as explained at Finding No. 49, there are several situational factors to consider before such a debrief can take place.

I look forward to receiving your final report on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

Bob Paulson
Commissioner

Appendix C – Summary of Findings and Recommendations