Commission's Final Report: Chairperson-Initiated Complaint and Public Interest Investigation Into the RCMP's Investigation of the Death of Colten Boushie and the Events that Followed

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act
Section 45.76(3)

Introduction

[1] On August 9, 2016, Colten Boushie ("Mr. Boushie"), a 22-year-old resident of the Red Pheasant First Nation Reserve, was shot and killed on a rural farm property near Biggar, Saskatchewan, by Gerald Stanley ("Mr. Stanley"), the property owner. Following a criminal investigation by the RCMP, Mr. Stanley was charged with murdering Mr. Boushie. From the outset, significant concerns were raised about the case and the actions of the RCMP. Mr. Stanley was eventually acquitted of the murder charge after a trial by jury.

[2] The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP ("the Commission") conducted a Public Interest Investigation (PII) to inquire into the conduct of the RCMP investigation and into the RCMP's interactions with Mr. Boushie's family. Following its investigation, the Commission made 47 findings and 17 recommendations in an Interim PII Report it provided to the RCMP.

[3] The Commission found that the investigation conducted by the RCMP was generally professional and reasonable. This included findings that the RCMP's initial response to the incident was reasonable and timely; that appropriate action was taken to ensure that all available resources were deployed; that the arrests made were lawful and reasonable; that the interview with Mr. Stanley was conducted in a reasonable manner; and that the investigative team was adequately staffed.

[4] However, the Commission also identified a number of issues with the investigation, such as deficiencies in the RCMP's interactions with some of the witnesses. Some issues were of significant concern, like the failure to protect the vehicle Mr. Boushie was sitting in when he was shot. This, in conjunction with an unreasonable delay in obtaining a search warrant for the property, led to the loss of blood spatter evidence as a result of inclement weather. It is not known, and will never be known, what difference this evidence, as well as any other evidence lost as a result of the failure to protect the vehicle, could have had on the outcome of the case.

[5] The Commission found that the RCMP members who notified Mr. Boushie's mother, Debbie Baptiste, of his death treated her with such insensitivity that her treatment amounted to a prima facie^{Footnote 1} case of discrimination. The RCMP members' actions included questioning Ms. Baptiste about her sobriety, smelling her breath, and looking inside her microwave to verify her statement that she had put her now-deceased son's dinner there.

[6] The Commission found that the attendance of RCMP members at the funeral hall where Mr. Boushie's wake was being held contributed to a further deterioration of the RCMP's relationship with the family. Although the RCMP members' intention was only to provide an update about the investigation, the Commission found that their attendance at the wake for this purpose was unreasonable.

[7] The Commission made a number of recommendations to address the deficiencies identified in the investigation and interactions with the family.

[8] A little over 10 months after the Commission issued its Interim PII Report, the RCMP Commissioner provided her response. The response accepted without debate almost all of the Commission's findings, and every one of its recommendations. The only exceptions related to more technical and less central findings.

[9] Of note, the RCMP Commissioner accepted the finding relating to the discriminatory treatment of Ms. Baptiste, noting that her treatment was insensitive.

[10] In response to the Commission's recommendation for increased mandatory cultural awareness training, the RCMP Commissioner provided a long list of programs that the RCMP has implemented, and is still implementing, in addition to other initiatives already mentioned in the RCMP's response to another of the Commission's reports.

[11] Surprisingly, despite generally accepting almost all findings and recommendations, the RCMP's response said very little about the issues at the heart of this case, while devoting much attention to more minor and technical points about the few findings the RCMP disagreed with. These points often related to resources and logistical issues that were discussed at length, while the more important issues were often addressed with few words. In that sense, the response could be viewed as a missed opportunity for the RCMP to take responsibility for the manner in which Mr. Boushie's family and friends were treated.

[12] Nevertheless, the RCMP's response to the Commission's Interim PII Report shows a willingness to implement the Commission's recommendations and to accept its findings. The RCMP's commitment to providing enhanced cultural awareness and Indigenous-related training is expressed in clear terms.

[13] Achieving the deeper change to the RCMP's organizational culture that will prevent the type of discrimination found in this case from reoccurring will require more than cultural awareness training. However, the Commission notes the positive steps the RCMP is taking, and hopes that this case and the present report can be part of the catalyst for the RCMP to further engage in a necessary process of change.

Overview of the Commission's Investigation

[14] The Commission is an agency of the federal government, distinct and independent from the RCMP.

[15] The Commission received a complaint on December 16, 2016, from Mr. Boushie's uncle, Alvin Baptiste, brother of Ms. Baptiste. The complaint mostly focused on the conduct of RCMP members who attended Ms. Baptiste's home on the evening of her son's death. This complaint will be referred to as the "family's complaint."

[16] The RCMP initially investigated the family's complaint pursuant to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act ("the RCMP Act"). On October 19, 2017, the RCMP issued a report to the family responding to their complaint. The family was not satisfied with the RCMP's report and requested that the Commission conduct a review. The Commission eventually decided to conduct a further investigation into the family's complaint.

[17] In the meantime, the Acting Commissioner of the RCMP wrote to the Commission's then-Interim Chairperson on February 16, 2018, to request that the Interim Chairperson consider initiating a complaint and investigation into this matter, in light of the concerns raised by the family and others about their interactions with RCMP members and about various aspects of the RCMP's criminal investigation.

[18] In response to this and to the Commission's own concerns, the Interim Chairperson initiated a broad separate complaint and PII on March 6, 2018. This complaint will be referred to as the "Commission Chairperson's complaint." The focus of this complaint was to examine:

Whether the RCMP members involved in this matter conducted a reasonable investigation into the death of Mr. Boushie;
Whether the actions taken by the RCMP in response to this matter were taken in accordance with all applicable RCMP training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements;
Whether the relevant RCMP national, divisional and detachment-level training, policies, procedures and guidelines are reasonable; and
Whether the conduct of RCMP members involved in this matter amounted to discrimination on the basis of race or perceived race.

[19] In the course of its investigation, the Commission reviewed thousands of pages of police records, documentary evidence, and other relevant information. Commission investigators conducted ten civilian interviews, primarily with members of Mr. Boushie's family and their legal counsel. Commission investigators also conducted interviews with over 30 RCMP members.

[20] The Commission was initially provided with the original materials from the RCMP's investigation of the family's complaint. However, several other requests for additional relevant materials were necessary. Relevant materials were provided in several instalments and some of the Commission's requests remained pending for a number of months. The Commission continued to receive additional materials from the RCMP until November 2019. While the RCMP provided materials in response to many of these requests, some materials were no longer available.

[21] When the Commission requested various recordings and transcripts of telephone calls and radio communications, the RCMP indicated that these records had been deemed to have no evidentiary value to the criminal investigation, and had been destroyed upon the two-year anniversary of their creation pursuant to RCMP document retention policies. In correspondence sent to the RCMP on February 13, 2019, the Commission noted its disappointment with the RCMP's failure to retain these records. The Commission pointed out that both the family's complaint and the Commission Chairperson's complaint had been initiated before the end of the two-year retention period, and that the materials were relevant to these complaints.

[22] On November 4, 2019, the Commission issued an Interim Report related to the family's complaint. This report reviewed the RCMP's decision about the complaint, and made findings and recommendations to address the specific issues raised by the family.

[23] On January 21, 2020, the Commission completed a 107-page Interim PII Report regarding the Commission Chairperson's complaint. In this Interim PII Report, the Commission made 47 findings and 17 recommendations.

[24] The Commission's review of the RCMP's criminal investigation of the death of Mr. Boushie involved an examination of the evidence in order to make findings about the actions of the RCMP members involved. When faced with conflicting versions or evidence, the Commission sought to determine what was more likely than not to have happened. This well-known legal standard is referred to as the "balance of probabilities" standard. This was the test applied by the Commission to reach all of its conclusions in this case.

[25] The Commission's role was not to relitigate the criminal matter against Mr. Stanley. Rather, its role was to reach conclusions regarding the conduct of RCMP members after a review of the evidence and, where appropriate, to make recommendations focused on measures that can help remedy the deficiencies identified.

[26] In accordance with the RCMP Act, the Commission sent the Interim PII Report to the RCMP Commissioner. On December 4, 2020, the Commission received a response from RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki, in accordance with section 45.76(2) of the RCMP Act. As of January 7, 2021, the Commission is still awaiting a response to its Interim Report on the family's complaint.

[27] In her response to the Interim PII Report, the RCMP Commissioner agreed with all but three of the Commission's findings. She supported all of the Commission's recommendations.

[28] After considering the RCMP Commissioner's response, the Commission has prepared this Final Report, pursuant to section 45.76(3) of the RCMP Act.

Background Facts

[29] At approximately 1 p.m. on August 9, 2016, Mr. Boushie stopped at his home on the Red Pheasant First Nation Reserve accompanied by K. W.^{Footnote 2} He told his mother, Ms. Baptiste, that he was going swimming with some companions and he planned to be home between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. for dinner. That was the last time Ms. Baptiste saw her son alive.

[30] Mr. Boushie and four companions spent the afternoon swimming and drinking. His companions were two young men, E. M. and C. C., and two young women, K. W. and B. J. As they were returning to the Red Pheasant First Nation Reserve, the Ford Escape that they were driving developed a flat tire. Sometime after 5 p.m. they turned into a driveway leading to the farm where Mr. Stanley lived with his wife, L. S. The Stanleys' adult son, S. S., was also present at the time.

[31] It is not clear whether the five occupants of the Ford Escape shared a common intention when they turned into the Stanley driveway. All had consumed alcohol and some of them were asleep. It does not appear that Mr. Boushie left the vehicle at any point or interacted with any of the Stanleys' property.

[32] The Ford Escape stopped in the Stanleys' yard. E. M. and C. C. got out of the vehicle and appeared to interact with a truck parked on the property. One of the pair then jumped onto an all-terrain vehicle that was also in the yard. After seeing this happen, Mr. Stanley and S. S. ran into the yard and yelled for the strangers to stop what they were doing, as they believed that the group was attempting to steal their property.

[33] E. M. and C. C. returned to the vehicle and attempted to drive away. In the process, the Ford Escape collided with another vehicle that was parked in the yard and subsequently became stuck as the exposed rim of the wheel with the flat tire dug into the gravel. At the same time, S. S. chased after the Ford Escape and hit the front windshield with a hammer. Mr. Stanley went to a shed, returning armed with a handgun. After the vehicle became stuck, E. M. and C. C. (who was the driver) left the vehicle and fled down the laneway on foot.

[34] Mr. Boushie then moved from the back seat to the driver's seat in an apparent attempt to drive away. Mr. Stanley approached the vehicle's driver-side door with the gun in hand. Although there are disputed facts regarding what happened next and why, it is undisputed that the gun in Mr. Stanley's hand fired, discharging a bullet that struck Mr. Boushie in the back of the head, killing him. K. W. got out of the Ford Escape, opened the driver-side door, and moved Mr. Boushie onto the ground next to the vehicle, where emergency responders later found him.

[35] K. W. and B. J. were both very distraught. K. W. knelt to hold Mr. Boushie in her arms. L. S. approached both B. J. and K. W. and attempted to calm them down. She later reported that K. W. and B. J. punched her (the two were charged with assaulting L. S. but the charges were ultimately withdrawn). K. W. and B. J. then departed on foot, proceeding down the lane to the roadway outside the Stanley farm.

[36] E. M.'s rifle was in the Ford Escape. He had brought it with him, as he intended to go hunting. The rifle's wooden stock was later found next to a vehicle at another property (belonging to M. F. and G. F.), approximately 15 kilometres from the Stanley farm. The barrel section of the same firearm was found next to Mr. Boushie's body. There remains no clear explanation as to how it came to be there.

[37] At 5:27 p.m., S. S. called 911. After hearing a brief description of the nature of the emergency, the 911 call taker transferred the call to the RCMP's Operational Communications Centre (OCC).

[38] S. S. provided the following information to the OCC call taker:

Three men and two women had come onto their property and tried to steal vehicles from the yard, had almost run someone over, and one of the three men had been shot;
The remaining two men had fled the scene on foot to the west and were armed with a gun;
The two women remained at the scene and his mother, L. S., was speaking to them;
His father was the shooter; and
The man who had been shot may be dead.

[39] The call taker obtained descriptions of the involved persons and asked for specific directions to the Stanley farm.

[40] The Stanley farm is located in the rural municipality of Glenside, between two RCMP detachments: Battlefords (located in North Battleford), which is a driving distance of approximately 68 kilometres to the north, and Biggar, which is 44 kilometres to the south. During S. S.'s call, the call taker determined that the incident fell within the Biggar Detachment's jurisdiction. Due to the nature of the incident, police officers were initially dispatched from both the Biggar and Battlefords detachments.

Figure 1: Approximate Driving Distances

Stanley Farm	to	Biggar RCMP	44 km	Biggar RCMP	to	Battlefords RCMP	94 km
Stanley Farm	to	Battlefords RCMP	68 km	Biggar RCMP	to	Saskatoon RCMP	98 km
Stanley Farm	to	Saskatoon RCMP	142 km	Biggar RCMP	to	Yorkton RCMP	465 km
Battlefords RCMP	to	Saskatoon RCMP	144 km

[41] At approximately 5:25 p.m.^{Footnote 3} on August 9, 2016, Constable Arvind Parmar^{Footnote 4} of the Biggar Detachment received a call from the OCC informing him of the incident at the Stanley Farm.

[42] Constable Parmar immediately contacted Constable Andrew Park, who was on‑call, for assistance. At approximately 5:30 p.m., emergency medical services (EMS) personnel were dispatched to attend the scene and the Emergency Air Ambulance Service was also called in to assist. At 5:45 p.m., Sergeant Colin Sawrenko, the Biggar RCMP Detachment Commander, received a call from Constable Parmar regarding the shooting. Sergeant Sawrenko, who was off‑duty at the time, directed Constable Parmar to contact all Biggar Detachment resources and those from surrounding jurisdictions, including the Battlefords Detachment.

[43] Sergeant Sawrenko initially assigned Corporal Jason Olney of the Battlefords Detachment as the supervising RCMP member. He explicitly directed Corporal Olney to remain off the property until sufficient resources were in place.

[44] Meanwhile, en route to the scene, Corporal Melvin Sansome and other RCMP members of the Battlefords Detachment came across E. M., B. J., and K. W. All three were arrested for mischief and were subsequently transported to the Battlefords Detachment where they were lodged in cells overnight.

[45] Attempts were made to re-establish communication with S. S. to obtain additional information. It was soon found out that S. S. was on the line with the OCC call taker, who transferred him to Constable Park's cell phone at approximately 5:52 p.m. S. S. told Constable Park, who was heading to the scene, that there had been no exchange of gun fire, and that only Mr. Stanley had fired a gun.

[46] RCMP members arrived at the scene between 6:10 p.m. and 6:35 p.m. In preparation for clearing and securing the scene, they lined their police vehicles along the road in front of the Stanley property. Following a briefing held by Corporal Olney with the RCMP members on scene, Mr. Stanley, his wife, L. S., and their son, S. S., were directed to exit their residence one by one with their hands up. All three were arrested without incident.

[47] By approximately 6:52 p.m., RCMP members successfully cleared the residence and outbuildings on the property. EMS personnel entered the scene. They examined Mr. Boushie and declared him deceased.

[48] In the meantime, a neighbour of the Stanleys, A. D., approached the RCMP roadblock outside the Stanley farm and informed police that he had just given someone a ride to the Red Pheasant First Nation Reserve. RCMP members determined that the neighbour's description of the person matched that of C. C.

[49] RCMP members from the Battlefords Detachment were sent from the scene of the Stanley farm to the Red Pheasant First Nation Reserve to search for C. C. There, they attended Ms. Baptiste's home to search for C. C. while also informing her of the death of her son. The actions of RCMP members while at Ms. Baptiste's home were part of the family's complaint.

[50] The RCMP was unable to locate C. C. on the Red Pheasant First Nation Reserve on the evening of August 9, 2016. The next day, his whereabouts were still unknown to police until he voluntarily attended the Battlefords Detachment just after 5 p.m.

Overview of the Commission's Findings and Recommendations

[51] Mr. Boushie's death is profoundly tragic. The pain and loss felt by his family, friends, and community was evident in their interviews and throughout the Commission's investigation. It was also clear that this incident affected RCMP members, some of whom expressed deep sadness in their interviews. Several of the RCMP members involved self-identify as members of Indigenous communities.

[52] With this in mind, the Commission carefully reviewed the conduct of the RCMP members that were involved in the investigation of Mr. Boushie's death, in keeping with its mandate to review RCMP members' conduct and to make recommendations aimed at improving policing and correcting any deficiencies identified.

[53] The issues examined by the Commission included the following:

first response;
arrests;
interviews;
detention in custody;
separation of witnesses;
investigative time management;
crime scene management;
collection and processing of physical evidence;
major case management;
communications;
discrimination; and
cultural awareness.

[54] In the following pages, the Commission provides an overview of its main findings and recommendations relating to the investigation conducted by the RCMP, communications with Mr. Boushie's family, and discrimination. It should be noted that this is not meant as an exhaustive review or summary of all of the Commission's findings and recommendations. For a complete review of all the issues examined by the Commission, the Interim PII Report needs to be reviewed in its entirety.

[55] The RCMP's response to the Commission's findings and recommendations is also briefly discussed in the following pages, particularly where commentary or information was provided in addition to agreeing with the findings and recommendations. The few cases where the RCMP disagreed with the Commission's findings are discussed separately. A table of the Commission's final findings and recommendations is included at the end of this report.

The RCMP's Investigation

[56] The Commission found that, when considered as a whole, the RCMP's investigation of Mr. Boushie's death was conducted in a professional manner by adequately trained and experienced criminal investigators employing the Major Case Management methodology as outlined in the RCMP's national policy on major case management.

[57] Findings were made about the reasonableness of specific aspects of the investigation. This included a finding that the RCMP's initial response to the incident was reasonable and timely, and that appropriate action was taken to ensure that all available resources were deployed to respond to the incident. The Commission also found that the investigative team was adequately staffed to conduct the investigation.

[58] In addition, the Commission found that the arrests made during the investigation were reasonable, and complied with the requirements of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter"). The Commission found that the RCMP's interview with Mr. Stanley was conducted in a reasonable manner, and that the approach taken and the tactics employed were in line with RCMP policy and training. The Commission also found that the RCMP members assigned to conduct the initial collection and processing of the physical evidence were adequately trained and qualified to perform these forensic identification tasks.

[59] Notwithstanding these positive findings, the Commission also identified a number of deficiencies in the investigation, which caused some concern and which resulted in interim findings and recommendations. The Commission noted that many of these deficiencies, as well as some of the deficiencies identified in the next-of-kin notification of Mr. Boushie's mother, were the result of internal communication failures involving instances where RCMP members did not adequately convey important information to other RCMP members.

Investigative time management – Information to Obtain a Search warrant

[60] Obtaining and securing all available evidence during the early stages of a major case is critical, and key to this is efficient time management. In this case, several circumstances were present that increased the need to move the case forward in the most timely manner possible.

[61] Investigators knew at the outset that Mr. Stanley had been arrested for murder and was in custody. They had 24 hours to lay a charge and bring him before a justice. They also knew that the crime scene was perishable, as it was for the most part outdoors and inclement weather was expected. The crime scene was on the private property of Mr. Stanley and a Criminal Code search warrant would be required to process the scene and collect evidence. Geographical challenges existed, given that the Major Crime Unit (MCU) home office was situated in Saskatoon, the detachment with jurisdiction was located in Biggar (where the Stanleys were awaiting interview), three other key witnesses were in custody at the Battlefords Detachment, and the crime scene was situated somewhat central to these three locations. Generally speaking, there was a drive of an hour or more from any one location to another.

[62] The Commission identified a number of issues in the early stages of the investigation that appear to have resulted in some inefficiency, one of which was a delay in the writing of the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (ITO).

[63] Sergeant Olberg began calling in MCU members to form the investigative team as soon as he was notified of the homicide around 6 p.m. on August 9. He called Corporal Doug Nordick, who stated that he was not immediately available. The two agreed that Corporal Nordick would start drafting the ITO the next morning. Corporal Nordick attended the MCU office at approximately 6 a.m. on the morning of August 10. The warrant was signed and completed at approximately 8 p.m. that evening, and the search commenced the following morning (August 11).

[64] Sergeant Olberg noted in his interview with Commission investigators that Corporal Nordick was one of his team leaders and was an experienced affiant.^{Footnote 5} Sergeant Olberg also indicated that any of his team members could have drafted the ITO given their training and experience. However, there was no indication in the information before the Commission that Sergeant Olberg considered other options in an effort to expedite the process. Corporal Fee and Constable Teniuk were called out to the Battlefords Detachment to interview E. M., B. J., and K. W., who were then deemed not to be in suitable condition to be interviewed. Their notes did not reflect that they were tasked with any other investigative actions until they retired for the night and attended the team meeting the next morning. Nothing appeared to prevent either one of them from starting to write the ITO.

[65] The overriding concern requiring the prompt attendance of an affiant was the perishable crime scene and deteriorating weather conditions in the forecast. The Commission found that these circumstances required that an affiant begin writing the ITO in a more timely fashion, while recognizing that not all MCU members can be available on a 24/7 basis.

[66] If an affiant had been working contemporaneously with the investigative team from the outset, a warrant could have been sought, and likely obtained, in the morning of August 10.

[67] The delay in writing the ITO ultimately deferred the attendance of Forensic Identification Services (FIS) until the morning of August 11. FIS member Constable Heroux stated that he was up all night on August 9 and waited all day on August 10 for the search warrant. He cited fatigue to explain why he could not have commenced the search late on August 10. This precluded the option of seeking authorization within the warrant to commence a night-time execution on August 10.

Commission's Interim Finding #21: Sergeant Olberg failed to ensure that the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant was drafted in a timely manner.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #6: That the RCMP provide Sergeant Olberg with guidance, mentoring and/or training regarding the timely drafting of an Information to Obtain a Search Warrant.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[68] The RCMP Commissioner agreed with Interim Finding 21 and generally supported Recommendation 6. The RCMP Commissioner stated that it is clear from Sergeant Olberg's curriculum vitae that he is a subject matter expert with respect to the preparation of judicial authorizations. For this reason, the RCMP Commissioner stated that she saw little use in providing mentoring or training to him on the need to ensure timely drafting of ITOs. Instead, the RCMP Commissioner indicated that she will direct that Sergeant Olberg be provided operational guidance about the circumstances that led to the delay in this case, since she expressed the view that the delay was due to extenuating circumstances and not because of a deficiency in Sergeant Olberg's training.

[69] While the Commission would not necessarily describe the circumstances that caused the delay in this case as "extenuating," the Commission does agree that the delay was caused by Sergeant Olberg's response to the particular circumstances of the case, rather than any deficiency in his training. As such, the Commission is satisfied that the action the RCMP Commissioner intends to take is consistent with the purpose and intent of its recommendation.

Crime scene management – protection of evidence (Ford Escape)

[70] The correct handling and collection of physical evidence within a crime scene is a critical aspect of any investigation. Police officers must know their duties relating to evidence, including the means to protect short-lived evidence at the earliest opportunity, to prevent its loss or destruction.

[71] There was no doubt in this case about the relevance of the Ford Escape. This vehicle was a key piece of physical evidence.

[72] During the initial examination of the crime scene in the early hours of the morning on August 10, 2016, Constable Heroux of the Saskatoon FIS took some general photographs of the Ford Escape. He did not make detailed notes or take forensic photographs of the bloodstain evidence at that time because a search warrant was required to process the scene and collect evidence. As mentioned above, the delay incurred in the writing of the ITO ultimately deferred the attendance of FIS until the morning of August 11. In the meantime, the vehicle was exposed to inclement weather and as a result, evidence was altered and bloodstain patterns in the vehicle were lost. Nothing was done to protect the vehicle.

[73] The Commission considers that the failure to protect the Ford Escape at the crime scene was a significant error in the investigation into Mr. Boushie's death. A review of the materials before the Commission revealed an apparent lack of appreciation or concern for the integrity of this evidence.

[74] Many of the police officers involved in this case (first responders as well as FIS and MCU members) knew that weather conditions were forecasted to deteriorate in the short term and that RCMP policy requires that steps be taken to ensure that evidence is both protected and preserved. During their interviews with Commission investigators, RCMP members acknowledged this; however, there is no clear explanation as to how the failure to protect the Ford Escape occurred. The Commission found that this appeared to have been the result of a lack of communication.

[75] During their interviews with Commission investigators, FIS members Constable Heroux and Corporal Ryttersgaard indicated that they did not consider covering the vehicle. The weather was clear at the time of their departure and they expected to be returning to the scene shortly under the authority of a search warrant. Constable Heroux noted that tarps were available at the scene, but not tents or shelters.

[76] The Primary Investigator, Constable Boogaard, had direct communication with Sergeant Sawrenko about the incoming weather and possible loss of evidence. However, he did not recall passing on this information to Constable Heroux of the FIS. He explained that he assumed Constable Heroux was en route to the scene and would assess the weather upon arrival.

[77] Constable Heroux's notes indicate that he was aware of the incoming weather and planned to "try to capture the scene in case poor weather sets in." He told Commission investigators that it had not rained during his initial attendance at the scene, but it had rained prior to his arrival. During his examination at Mr. Stanley's trial, he stated that "[b]etween the 8th of August and the 11th of August when we had arrived, approximately 44 millimeters of rain had fallen, and it was very obvious it had washed away a lot of the red substance consistent with blood from the door panel and on the ground."

[78] It was apparent during the interviews conducted by Commission investigators that the RCMP members were aware that the failure to protect the vehicle was a mistake and that it should not have happened. While the MCU took responsibility for this error, the Commission emphasized in its Interim PII Report that the preservation of evidence in such circumstances is a duty every RCMP member should recognize and act upon regardless of whether they have been specifically told to do so.

[79] The Commission also found an issue with the processing of the Ford Escape, as the FIS member involved did not contact a bloodstain pattern analyst until approximately three days after the shooting. The Commission concluded that this delay was unreasonable.

[80] It is impossible to determine what other evidence may have been compromised, diminished or lost, in addition to the blood spatter. The reason why all evidence must be preserved and processed in the timeliest way possible is because the potential relevance of any piece of physical evidence may be unknown at the outset of an investigation. In this case, Mr. Boushie was sitting in the Ford Escape when he was shot, so the importance of preserving the vehicle was clear. The impact of the loss of the evidence contained in the Ford Escape on the outcome of the investigation can never be known, since there was never an opportunity to collect and use the evidence.

[81] In its Interim PII Report, the Commission acknowledged that the MCU team had already recognized and discussed this shortcoming, and had instituted new procedures to prevent a similar reoccurrence. Specifically, "F" Division created a Crime Scene Manager position as part of its Coordinated Investigative Team. The RCMP member fulfilling this role is primarily responsible for overseeing and managing evidence collection. In her response, the RCMP Commissioner accepted all of the Commission's findings and recommendations on this issue.

Commission's Interim Finding #25: RCMP policies and procedures relating to the preservation and protection of evidence were not reasonably followed and a key piece of evidence, the Ford Escape, was left vulnerable to contamination.

Commission's Interim Finding #26: The RCMP's failure to protect the Ford Escape resulted in the alteration and loss of trace and bloodstain evidence.

Commission's Interim Finding #37: Constable Heroux's decision to contact a bloodstain pattern analyst three days after the incident was unreasonable.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #9: That the involved members of the Major Crime Unit and Forensic Identification Services be directed to review the findings in the Commission's Interim PII Report with a senior member of the RCMP.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #10: That the involved members of the Major Crime Unit and Forensic Identification Services receive operational guidance with respect to RCMP policies and procedures related to the preservation and protection of evidence.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #14: That Constable Heroux be directed to review this report with a senior Forensic Identification Services member and discuss the significance of the involvement of a bloodstain analyst at a blood‑letting crime scene.

Crime scene management – non-attendance of Major Crime Unit

[82] Another issue of significant concern addressed in the Commission's Interim PII Report related to the lack of attendance of the MCU at the crime scene.

[83] The MCU assembled in Saskatoon for its initial briefing on the evening of August 9. Following the briefing, five RCMP members, including the members of the Command Triangle,^{Footnote 6} went to the Biggar Detachment to deal with Mr. Stanley, his wife, L. S., and their son, S. S. Two field investigators went to the Battlefords Detachment to deal with E. M., B. J., and K. W. The witness statements of L. S. and S. S. were completed in the early hours of the morning of August 10. The members then left Biggar and drove to North Battleford to lodge for the night.

[84] At that time, no member of the MCU had yet attended the crime scene. The first response police officers had taken several investigative steps, including the arrest and transport of Mr. Stanley and the arrest and transport of E. M., B. J., and K. W. Mr. Boushie's body had been removed and the scene was being held while awaiting judicial authorization to conduct a search. The two investigators assigned to conduct the interviews with E. M., B. J., and K. W. were unable to deal with them at the time due to their state of intoxication. Mr. Stanley's interview was pending for later on August 10.

[85] In its Interim PII Report, the Commission recognized the geographical issues facing the investigative team. However, when the team decided to lodge for the night in North Battleford, the RCMP members had to travel north, in the direction of the crime scene. As no other tasks were planned, it would have been an opportune time to visit the crime scene. A visit would have provided the team with a visual perspective of the scene, including its location and an understanding of how it had been secured. A visit to the crime scene would have facilitated direct discussion with on-scene RCMP members, thereby ensuring that adequate resources were in place and tasks were properly managed and conducted. Discussions could have been held with FIS members already on scene regarding their observations, scene preservation and timeline expectations for the search warrant. It would also have been useful for the RCMP member who was tasked with interviewing Mr. Stanley to at least get a sense of the scene before the interview.

[86] The Commission acknowledged that there may be exigent circumstances in some cases where attendance at the scene is not immediately possible. However, in the case at hand, the interviews of L. S. and S. S. were completed and the MCU team was travelling in the direction of the crime scene. There was an opportunity present for one or more MCU members to attend the scene.

[87] The Commission recognized that unnecessary attendance at crime scenes should be avoided, especially given the risk of cross-contamination. However, MCU members in this case could have attended the perimeter to collaborate with other members, observe the scene, and gain an appreciation of ongoing activities.

[88] The Commission found that the MCU's delayed attendance at the crime scene was a contributing factor in many of the issues raised in its report. The more serious oversights or omissions could have been mitigated or avoided had there been an on‑site MCU presence—most significantly the issues pertaining to protection of evidence (Ford Escape) and some of the issues arising out of the next-of-kin notification.

Commission's Interim Finding #30: It was unreasonable for one or more members of the Major Crime Unit not to attend the crime scene in a more timely fashion.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #12: That, in future cases, the Major Crime Unit Commander ensure that a member of the Unit attend the crime scene in a timely fashion.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[89] The RCMP Commissioner agreed with Interim Finding 30 and supported Interim Recommendation 12. The RCMP Commissioner stated that she is satisfied that the creation of a Crime Scene Manager position within the MCU structure in "F" Division is a positive step forward in ensuring that MCU members attend a crime scene within a reasonable time. Consequently, she stated that she will not direct any further actions with respect to this recommendation.

[90] The Commission had acknowledged in its Interim PII Report that the creation of a Crime Scene Manager position with responsibility, amongst other things, to liaise with support services, should facilitate communications and timely information sharing between the various policing units and should help prevent situations such as those that occurred in the present case. As such, the Commission is satisfied that its recommendation has been sufficiently addressed.

Interviews and continued detention of E. M., B. J. and K. W.

[91] The Commission had concerns around the manner in which RCMP members treated E. M., B. J., and K. W. while in custody. The Commission found that the manner in which their interviews regarding the homicide of Mr. Boushie were conducted was unreasonable. RCMP investigators were frustrated with what they felt was a lack of cooperation from the three witnesses. However, the interviewers made little effort to establish trust. Given the historic distrust of police by Indigenous communities, the trauma, shock, and chaos of the previous day's events, the lack of sleep, the lodging in cells, and the potentially severe hangovers the witnesses suffered, the Commission found that the RCMP interviewers did not reasonably foster a state of mind that was conducive to witness cooperation. The Commission further concluded that the lengthy explanations provided to the three witnesses regarding the jeopardy that they faced and the type of information police wanted from them were both confusing and contradictory.

[92] The Commission also found that the continued detention in custody of E. M., B. J., and K. W. following the provision of their statements was unreasonable and not justified under the Criminal Code.

Commission's Interim Finding #8: The manner in which Corporal Fee and Constable Teniuk conducted the interviews of K. W., B. J., and E. M. was unreasonable in the circumstances.

Commission's Interim Finding #10: The continued detention in custody of E. M., B. J., and K. W. following the statements they provided to the RCMP on August 10, 2016, was unreasonable and not justified under subsection 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #1: That Corporal Fee and Constable Teniuk be provided with operational guidance with respect to RCMP policy regarding the interviewing of witnesses.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #2: That Sergeant Olberg be directed to review the reasons for detention listed in subsection 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #3: That the RCMP review its policy OM 24.1. ("Interviews/Statements: Suspect/Accused/Witness") to address the treatment of in-custody witnesses interviewed in criminal investigations in which they are not suspects.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[93] The RCMP Commissioner agreed with Interim Findings 8 and 10, and supported Interim Recommendations 1, 2 and 3.

[94] With respect to Recommendation 3, the RCMP Commissioner stated specifically in her response that she believed the RCMP policy at issue did not provide sufficient guidance about the relevant topics. She indicated that she would direct that the policy be amended to provide RCMP members with available options when obtaining a statement from a person who is held in custody and who is both a witness and an accused to offences having a temporal connection. She added that the guidance would further direct that RCMP members consult with Crown counsel, where possible, prior to obtaining statements in these circumstances, and would address the need for RCMP members to ascertain the prisoner's state of mind and care received in police custody.

Failure to separate L. S. and S. S. and removal of vehicle from crime scene

[95] In reviewing the documentation, the Commission noted that L. S. and S. S. were released from custody following their arrest on August 9, 2016, and were permitted to travel on their own to the Biggar Detachment to provide voluntary witness statements. They drove together, using their personal vehicle, which was parked within the crime scene. Upon arrival at the detachment, they waited together in the lobby until the arrival of MCU investigators.

[96] The Commission found that it was unreasonable for the RCMP members in charge of the investigation to fail to request that L. S. and S. S. not discuss the incident with each other prior to providing their witness statements. The Commission further found that the decision to allow L. S. and S. S. to remove a vehicle from the crime scene to travel to the RCMP Biggar Detachment was unreasonable.

Commission's Interim Finding #13: It was unreasonable for the members of the Command Triangle (Sergeant Olberg and Constables Boogaard and Wudrick) to fail to consider providing direction that L. S. and S. S. not discuss the incident with each other prior to providing their witness statements to the police.

Commission's Interim Finding #14: It was unreasonable for Sergeant Sawrenko to fail to request that L. S. and S. S. not discuss the incident with each other prior to providing their witness statements.

Commission's Interim Finding #27: Sergeant Sawrenko's decision to allow L. S. and S. S. to remove a vehicle from the crime scene to travel to the RCMP Biggar Detachment was unreasonable.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #4: That the RCMP provide guidance, mentoring and/or training to the members of the Command Triangle (Sergeant Olberg and Constables Boogaard and Wudrick) and Sergeant Sawrenko with respect to witness handling.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #11: That a senior member of the RCMP provide operational guidance to Sergeant Sawrenko regarding the importance of protecting and preserving evidence at a crime scene.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[97] The RCMP Commissioner agreed with Interim Findings 13, 14 and 27, and supported Interim Recommendations 4 and 11. She stated in her response that, in addition to implementing the Commission's recommendation to provide mentoring or training to the RCMP members involved with respect to witness handling, the RCMP will amend the applicable policy to provide guidance about advising witnesses not to discuss the incident with other witnesses. The guidance will also instruct RCMP members to escort the witnesses to the detachment separately for the taking of statements, when possible.

Communications with the Family

[98] The importance of effective communication with families in the context of major case investigations cannot be overstated.

[99] The first contact between the police and the family can set the tone for an important relationship that will exist up until the completion of court proceedings and possibly beyond.

[100] In this case, the first contact between police and Mr. Boushie's family was on the night of August 9, 2016, when police informed Ms. Baptiste of her son's death. Several issues arose from this first contact, which are discussed below. Unfortunately, the manner in which the next-of-kin notification unfolded set a negative tone for many of the subsequent communications between the RCMP and the family.

[101] Early communications were further challenged by the fact that RCMP members went to the funeral hall where Mr. Boushie's wake was being held to update Ms. Baptiste on their investigation.

[102] The funeral arrangements were already difficult for the family due to the circumstances surrounding the criminal investigation, which prevented the family from having access to the body. This disrupted their ability to enact their cultural protocol in relation to the death, where four days are needed and each day has its own meaning and significance.

[103] The presence of the RCMP members at the funeral hall was not welcome by the family; it further upset Ms. Baptiste at a moment of acute emotional vulnerability. During interviews, family members indicated that the police presence at the funeral intruded upon their grief and added to the negative experience they had already had with police during the next-of-kin notification.

[104] The RCMP members' motivation—to update the family—did not temper the effect of their presence at the funeral, nor did their presence soften the tone of the communications that was set during the next-of-kin notification. In its Interim PII Report, the Commission noted that, at funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable. Allowing Mr. Boushie's family members to have a few final hours of peace before their loved one was laid to rest would not have undermined the need to ensure that they be updated about the investigation.

Commission's Interim Finding #41: It was unreasonable for Constables Boogaard and Teniuk to attend the wake to update the family on the progress of the criminal investigation.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #15: That Constables Boogaard and Teniuk be directed to review this finding with a senior member of the RCMP.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[105] The RCMP Commissioner agreed with Interim Finding 41 and supported Interim Recommendation 15. She also stated in her response that "F" Division has revised its Major Crime Unit Business Rules to clarify the Team Commander's role and responsibility in ensuring that the death notification is properly resourced and completed, and that all plans, communication strategies and tasks are documented in the investigational decision logs.

[106] The RCMP Commissioner also stated that "F" Division has developed the "Saskatchewan RCMP Family Guide" to provide to families of homicide victims or to families of missing persons where foul play is suspected. The RCMP Commissioner explained that this reference document can be used by family members to gain a better understanding of the investigation process and to assist in identifying resources available to them to obtain further support or information.

Discrimination and Cultural Awareness

[107] The Commission found a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to the treatment of Ms. Baptiste during the notification of her son's death by the RCMP.

[108] In its Interim Report related to the family's complaint, the Commission made findings about the conduct of the RCMP members who attended Ms. Baptiste's home on the evening of Mr. Boushie's death. The Interim PII Report related to the Commission Chairperson's complaint focused on the issue of discrimination.

[109] In making its finding of prima facie discrimination, the Commission took into account the full social, historical, and legal context of the allegations of discrimination. With respect to Indigenous peoples, this social context includes long-standing colonial assertions, stereotypes, and a troubled history of police and Indigenous peoples' relations.

[110] The Commission highlighted historic events in the Treaty Six and Battleford areas as emblematic of the impact of colonialism and its collective traumas that continue to reverberate across Indigenous communities, and continue to impact the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the RCMP today.

[111] In its Interim PII Report, the Commission found that there was a link between the insensitive manner in which the next-of-kin-notification was provided to Ms. Baptiste and the social context, specifically in relation to the police's conduct towards Ms. Baptiste with respect to her sobriety and her credibility.

[112] In particular, after the RCMP members had just announced to Ms. Baptiste that her son was deceased, one member questioned her about whether she had been drinking. As the RCMP members were searching Ms. Baptiste's home for reasons unknown to her, and Ms. Baptiste displayed distress at the news they had just given her, one member told her to "get it together." One or more RCMP members smelled her breath.

[113] The RCMP members provided Ms. Baptiste with little information about what had happened to her son, but proceeded to question her and look in places in her home where no person could be hiding. Not only did the RCMP members' actions show little regard or compassion for Ms. Baptiste's distress and pain, they compounded her suffering by treating her as if she was lying.

[114] In a particularly hurtful instance, an RCMP member looked into Ms. Baptiste's microwave where Mr. Boushie's uneaten dinner was waiting for him, after Ms. Baptiste told the RCMP that she had placed it there when her son had not returned in time for supper as he had promised earlier. After spending the evening fearing that something had happened to her son and just seeing her worst fears realized, Ms. Baptiste saw her home encircled by a large number of armed police officers and had to endure this treatment from the RCMP members who remained in her home for about 20 minutes. She was then left with a lasting and painful memory of her interactions with the RCMP, and few answers about what had happened to her son.

[115] Because the RCMP members who attended Ms. Baptiste's home to notify her of her son's death were also searching for C. C.—and some believed he had a weapon—the Commission found that there were explanations for the tactical approach to Ms. Baptiste's home and the number of RCMP members involved. As such, the Commission concluded that there was no prima facie case of discrimination in this respect.

[116] However, the comments about Ms. Baptiste's sobriety and credibility could not be similarly explained.

[117] The Commission also examined other areas of concern with respect to potential discrimination, including the treatment of the witnesses who were with Mr. Boushie on the day of his death, as well as the overall gaps identified in the criminal investigation.

[118] While deficiencies were identified in each of these areas, and the Commission made adverse findings as discussed above, the Commission found that there were non‑discriminatory explanations for those deficiencies. They were explained, for instance, by logistical or resourcing issues, the distances between various locations, and communication problems between RCMP members.

[119] Therefore, the Commission concluded that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established with respect to these other areas of concern.

[120] The Commission did note that the approach taken with some of the witnesses was unusual and could reasonably appear to be coercive and intimidating. Put together, the gaps identified in the RCMP's investigation could have reasonably caused a person to question whether discrimination played a role in the overall investigation. However, because of the facts and explanations uncovered during the PII, the Commission concluded that the evidence fell short of establishing that these specific deficiencies were based on discriminatory considerations.

[121] To address the instance where a prima facie case of discrimination was made out, the Commission inquired into the training available to RCMP members. During the investigation, one RCMP member informed the Commission that Indigenous‑related training is not mandatory for everyone, particularly if there are "no" Indigenous populations within the jurisdiction of a detachment. The Commission found this particularly noteworthy for the RCMP, as it is the national police force responsible for policing approximately 40% of the Indigenous population.

[122] Significantly, one of the two main RCMP detachments involved in this case, Biggar, was mentioned as one of the detachments where Indigenous-related training was not mandatory. This suggested that a discrepancy existed between the current reality in the field and the institutional objective to provide the necessary training to all.

[123] Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the RCMP provide cultural awareness training to all its employees.

[124] Because this is not a new recommendation in the context of policing, the Commission emphasized that this awareness training needs to be offered and planned in a manner that bears in mind the factors outlined in related recommendations made in recent major inquiries over the past 30 years.

[125] This includes ensuring that the training meets the following standards:

ongoing throughout a police officer's career;
trauma-informed;
skills-based in intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism;
"experiential training" that includes Elders and community members who can share their perspective and answer questions based on their own lived experiences in the community;
informed by content determined at the local level, and informed by all best practices;
Indigenous, Inuit, and Métis peace officers as course leaders;
interactive and allows for respectful dialogue involving all participants;
distinctions-based and reflective of the diversity within Indigenous, Inuit, and Métis communities, rather than focusing on one culture to the exclusion of others; and
knowledgeable about traditional restorative justice principles.

Commission's Interim Finding #44: A prima facie case of discrimination is not established with respect to the police's tactical approach and search of the Baptiste family home.

Commission's Interim Finding #45: A prima facie case of discrimination is established concerning the police's conduct towards Ms. Baptiste with respect to her sobriety and her credibility.

Commission's Interim Finding #46: There is no prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the treatment of E. M., B. J., K. W., and C. C. during their police interviews.

Commission's Interim Finding #47: There is no prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the gaps in the criminal investigation into Mr. Boushie's death, including issues relating to the securing of evidence.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #17: That cultural awareness training be provided for all RCMP employees bearing in mind the factors identified in recent inquiries.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[126] The RCMP Commissioner agreed with Interim Findings 44, 46 and 47, concluding that no prima facie case of discrimination had been made out.

[127] The RCMP Commissioner also agreed with Finding 45, concluding that a prima facie case of discrimination was established concerning the police's conduct toward Ms. Baptiste. In her response, the RCMP Commissioner indicated that she "generally agree[d]" with this finding. She then stated that "it is undisputed that the manner in which the next of kin notification was communicated to the family was insensitive and demonstrated poor judgment." She also acknowledged the existence of a link between the manner by which the service was provided in this case and the Indigenous historical context, as found by the Commission in its Interim PII Report. For these reasons, the RCMP Commissioner stated that she is "prepared to agree with the Commission's finding with respect to this specific allegation in this particular matter."

[128] Given the lack of non-discriminatory explanation for the police conduct by the RCMP, and the RCMP Commissioner's agreement with the Commission's interim finding of prima facie discrimination, the Commission concludes that Ms. Baptiste, an Indigenous person, was discriminated against on the basis of her race, or national or ethnic origin (or the perception thereof), which are prohibited grounds of discrimination. The Commission's Final Finding will therefore be reworded as follows:

Commission's Final Finding #45: The police's conduct towards Ms. Baptiste with respect to her sobriety and her credibility was discriminatory on the basis of her race, or national or ethnic origin.

[129] The RCMP Commissioner also supported Interim Recommendation 17.

[130] In her response, the RCMP Commissioner informed the Commission that the RCMP implemented a continuum of Indigenous cultural awareness learning opportunities for all categories of RCMP employees, and that cultural awareness training is mandatory for all employees.

[131] The RCMP Commissioner outlined recently added learning opportunities to strengthen cultural awareness for all RCMP employees, including:

the Aboriginal and First Nations Awareness course, which provides information about the history, geography, and contemporary issues pertaining to Aboriginal lands, cultures, and communities;
the Blanket Exercise, an interactive learning activity developed with Indigenous Elders, knowledge keepers, and educators;
Indigenous Perceptions/Awareness workshops, which are delivered in the RCMP divisions and are distinction-based and mandatory for members policing Indigenous communities;
a Trauma-Informed Approach online course aimed at assisting employees in recognizing the widespread impact of trauma;
the Cultural Awareness and Humility course—mandatory for all RCMP members—developed to enhance awareness of self and others, ensuring understanding of Canadian laws and RCMP policies, and to recognize and apply a culturally informed approach; and
updating the Canadian Police College's Human Trafficking course to include Indigenous awareness and human trafficking prevention elements.

[132] The RCMP Commissioner also informed the Commission that some relevant learning opportunities had already been implemented as a result of the guidance provided by the Commission in previous reports, in particular the report issued following the Commission's PII into the RCMP's response to anti-shale gas protests in Kent County, New Brunswick and other matters ("Kent County PII Report")

[133] In her response to the Kent County PII Report, provided to the Commission in June 2020, the RCMP Commissioner had indicated that the RCMP offered 29 learning programs that included Indigenous culture as part of their curriculum. Of those programs or courses, 24 had been created for and were presented directly to RCMP members with the intent of increasing Indigenous cultural knowledge, and 26 contained material on Indigenous culture with a focus on regional traditions or geographical differences.

[134] The RCMP Commissioner had also informed the Commission in the response to the Kent County PII Report that the RCMP was developing a new Indigenous Awareness Guide that would highlight the distinct and unique cultures, languages, and political and spiritual traditions of Canada's First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples. The RCMP Commissioner stated that this guide was intended to educate and increase the RCMP employees' cultural awareness and understanding of matters related to the delivery of Indigenous policing services and interactions with Indigenous peoples. She indicated that the guide would expand on the information provided to RCMP members with regard to Indigenous cultural issues, and that, once it was completed, she would direct that a national communiqué be sent to all employees requesting that they review both the current Native Spirituality Guide and the newly developed Indigenous Awareness Guide.

[135] In addition, the RCMP Commissioner stated in her response to the Interim PII Report in this case that the RCMP is collaborating with the Department of Justice's Indigenous Justice Programs on the creation of online training for RCMP employees to increase RCMP referrals to Restorative Justice. This training will encourage pre-charge police referrals to community-based Restorative Justice Programs, particularly those under Indigenous Justice Programs.

[136] The RCMP Commissioner also indicated that, in 2019, the "F" Division in Saskatchewan implemented a division-wide community familiarization program in each detachment. She explained that, through this program, each new member of a detachment is shown the local culture by a resident of the community they serve thus allowing members to become familiar with the people, customs, and structure of that community.

Commission Findings Not Accepted by the RCMP

Sufficiency of Compensated On-Call Resources

[137] In its Interim PII Report, the Commission noted that there appeared to be an underlying issue regarding RCMP members' compensation that directly affected Sergeant Olberg's ability to acquire certain resources in the early stages of the investigation. This was particularly apparent within FIS, as well as with the affiant, Corporal Nordick.

[138] The Commission acknowledged that the difficulties incurred by Sergeant Olberg in obtaining FIS resources at the outset of the investigation were beyond his control. The Coordinated Investigative Team^{Footnote 7} had to wait until the FIS members could attend. At the time, there was only one FIS member on call for the north of the province and one for the south. As a result, the FIS member on call was approximately five hours away. The Commission found that the practice at the time of not having a designated on-call RCMP member in each FIS Unit during off-duty hours created availability issues and a delayed response time. The Commission also found that the local work-around practice of the on-call FIS member—attempting to contact an FIS member in the area of the crime scene for assistance—was unreasonable. The members being contacted were not on call, and therefore the FIS response time depended entirely on the willingness of FIS members to pick up these calls while off-duty.

[139] The Commission noted Sergeant Olberg's comment to Commission investigators regarding the availability and compensation of FIS members in this case:

There were significant challenges posed by the FIS deployment beyond my control. There were, at the time, -- organizationally, there was a determination, and I mentioned before, about compensation for members to be available outside of working hours. (…) But at that time, and I think my notes will demonstrate, that efforts by the Cpl. Wittersguard (phonetic) from Yorkton to try to reach somebody closer, calls were unanswered. Now, if you ask me why I think that happened, I think it was probably a work to rule demonstration.

[140] As for Corporal Nordick's availability to respond to the call for assistance on August 9, 2016, Corporal Nordick explained:

However, the big issue is that we're not -- we weren't compensated for being on call which may have resulted, obviously in my situation, if I would have been compensated on call, I would have been able to respond immediately to it. And that, I know it's gotten better and we have made a lot of changes with regards to certain thing, but yeah, it was obviously availability of Members within the unit to respond to that.

Commission's Interim Finding #22: In this case, insufficient RCMP members were available on a compensated on-call basis to respond in a timely manner to major crime investigations.

Commission's Interim Finding #32: The practice at the time of not having a designated on-call RCMP member in each Forensic Identification Services Unit was unreasonable.

Commission's Interim Finding #33: A local work-around practice of the on-call Forensic Identification Services member attempting to contact a Forensic Identification Services member located in the area of the crime scene was unreasonable.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #7: That the RCMP ensure that adequate resources are available in a timely manner for the investigation of major crimes.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[141] The RCMP Commissioner disagreed with Interim Finding 22. She stated that Corporal Nordick's comment to Commission investigators that RCMP members are not compensated for being on call was incorrect. She noted that RCMP members who are designated as being on call either for Immediate Operational Readiness or Operational Availability pursuant to OM chapter 16.12. "Operational Response" are, and were at the time of this incident, eligible for compensation in amounts set out in the National Compensation Manual, chapter 2.7. "Extra Duty Pay." The RCMP Commissioner noted that Corporal Nordick's superiors did not designate him as being on call on August 9, 2016. As he was on time off, he was not eligible for the applicable compensation provided for being on call.

[142] The RCMP Commissioner further stated that Sergeant Olberg's decision to await Corporal Nordick's availability appeared to be a matter of preference, not one that was imposed by restrictions relating to compensated on-call policies.

[143] The RCMP Commissioner reviewed numerous statements from RCMP members regarding the adequacy of resources available to respond to this incident, and noted that many indicated that there were sufficient resources on hand to deal with the workload. Based on her review of the information, the RCMP Commissioner stated that she found that there were sufficient RCMP members available on a compensated on‑call basis to respond in a timely manner to major crime investigations.

[144] The RCMP Commissioner nonetheless supported Interim Recommendation 7, that the RCMP ensure that adequate resources are available in a timely manner for the investigation of major crimes. She noted that since 2016, "F" Division has increased the number of MCU and FIS members on call during off-duty hours and receiving operational availability compensation. The RCMP Commissioner further noted that five provincial General Investigative Sections, located in Yorkton, Regina, Saskatoon, North Battleford and Prince Albert, each have one on-call member during the week and two on weekends, who can supplement the MCU members if needed.

[145] With respect to FIS, the RCMP Commissioner stated that, due to an increase in caseload, there is now one FIS member on call during off-duty hours in each of the five FIS service areas in Saskatchewan. The RCMP Commissioner accepted Interim Findings 32 and 33 regarding FIS availability at the time of the events. In its Interim PII Report, the Commission had noted that this situation had already been addressed and that no recommendation was therefore necessary.

Commission's Analysis of the RCMP's Response

[146] As its Interim PII Report indicates, the Commission has found that the investigative team was adequately staffed to conduct the investigation in this case.

[147] However, the Commission also learned in its investigation that Sergeant Olberg had to rely on off-duty RCMP members to respond to calls for assistance and this affected his ability to acquire certain resources in the early stages of the investigation.

[148] Sergeant Olberg stated the following to Commission investigators regarding the availability of FIS members, "I can't make someone answer their phone. I mean, that's an organizational challenge that we face; right? . . . And they were under no obligation to answer their phone outside of working hours either; right?"

[149] Sergeant Olberg further stated that, at the time, the available or on-call FIS member could be quite a distance from a particular crime scene that they were required to attend. Therefore, it was not unusual to have to sometimes wait a considerable amount of time for their arrival. Indeed, this was the case here where Corporal Ryttersgaard, the only on-call FIS member in the south district of the province at the time of the incident, was located in Yorkton, Saskatchewan. His response time was reportedly approximately five hours. The information indicated that Corporal Ryttersgaard made attempts to contact several off-duty RCMP members from other FIS units to assist him but he could not get a hold of anyone. Eventually, Constable Heroux of the Saskatoon FIS returned Corporal Ryttersgaard's call and confirmed that he would attend, despite being off-duty.

[150] As mentioned above, Corporal Nordick was not immediately available and it was decided that he would start drafting the ITO the next morning, which ultimately delayed the attendance of FIS until the morning of August 11. Corporal Nordick's comments to Commission investigators indicate that he would have responded immediately to the call for assistance had he been compensated on an on-call basis.

[151] The Primary Investigator, Constable Boogaard, also touched on the issue of compensation in his interview with Commission investigators when he described receiving a call to assist with the investigation. He stated that on August 9, he had worked his regular shift from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. Although he was not on call, he still answered his phone. He stated, "You know, the unit kind of survives to rely on people to still answer their phone, regardless, and you kind of -- when you get in Major Crimes, you understand what you're getting into."

[152] While the Commission does not dispute the fact that there were sufficient resources to conduct the investigation in this case, the evidence revealed that this was because off-duty RCMP members willingly answered their phone and made themselves available to respond to the call for assistance. These RCMP members could have chosen not to answer their phone, which could potentially have significantly affected service delivery.

[153] By stating that there were sufficient resources on hand to deal with the workload, the RCMP Commissioner essentially acknowledged the fact that Sergeant Olberg had to rely on off-duty RCMP members who were not compensated to be on call. As the Commission noted in its Interim PII Report, off-duty members cannot be expected or relied upon to be available or to respond to calls for service outside of working hours. In the Commission's view, this practice does not guarantee that sufficient resources will be available to respond in a timely manner to major crime investigations.^{Footnote 8}

[154] For these reasons, the Commission reiterates Interim Finding 22.

Mobile Command Centre

[155] One of the first issues that the Commission noted in its Interim PII Report was the geographical and environmental challenges confronting the MCU. The Commission found that the use of a Mobile Command Centre could have proven useful in this case and could have potentially helped to avoid some of the shortcomings or omissions in the investigation.

[156] A Mobile Command Centre is essentially a self-contained field office and staging unit. It is equipped with all the necessary communication, computer linkages, and TV monitors. It is also climate‑controlled and contains eating and washroom facilities.

[157] Interviews conducted by Commission investigators with the MCU members revealed that MCU North does not have access to a Mobile Command Centre, or at the very least, a Mobile Command Centre that is specifically built for this type of incident. The Unit Commander, Staff Sergeant Rockel, and the Team Commander, Sergeant Olberg, both indicated to Commission investigators that they did not believe a Mobile Command Centre would suit their needs, as they prefer to base their investigations out of a detachment. The File Coordinator, Constable Wudrick, appeared to be aware of the benefits that a Mobile Command Centre could have provided in this case, especially with respect to improving crime scene management.

[158] The Commission noted that the use of a Mobile Command Centre could have facilitated the ability for investigators and first response police officers to communicate, collaborate, and plan investigative activities while protected from the elements.

[159] The Commission acknowledged that, since this incident, "F" Division has created a Crime Scene Manager position as part of its Coordinated Investigative Team. The Commission noted that it might also be beneficial to have a Mobile Command Centre available to facilitate the requirements of not only the Crime Scene Manager position, but many other aspects of investigations.

Commission's Interim Finding #24: The use of a Mobile Command Centre could have proven to be useful in this case and potentially resulted in avoiding some of the shortcomings or omissions that occurred.

Commission's Interim Recommendation #8: That RCMP senior management in "F" Division consider acquiring a Mobile Command Centre.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[160] The RCMP Commissioner partly agreed with Interim Finding 24. She stated that, while the presence of a Mobile Command Centre could have proven useful in this case, she did not find that its presence could have potentially avoided some of the shortcomings and omissions that occurred. The RCMP Commissioner expressed the view that the omissions, such as the failure to cover the Ford Escape, could have been prevented without a Mobile Command Centre.

[161] The RCMP Commissioner nonetheless supported Interim Recommendation 8, that senior management in "F" Division consider acquiring a Mobile Command Centre. She indicated that this recommendation was submitted to "F" Division senior management for consideration; it was determined that, while the Division does not have a Mobile Command Centre specifically built for this type of incident, they do have access to other types of vehicles that could be used as a Mobile Command Centre when the circumstances warrant it.

[162] The RCMP Commissioner noted that "F" Division finds that it is more effective and efficient to use regular vehicles in most instances due to the nature of their operating environment. For example, there can be difficulties in accessing certain communities by roads, as well as difficulties in navigating a large command post-style vehicle even when communities are accessible by road. Therefore, the RCMP Commissioner indicated that "F" Division senior management determined that acquiring a Mobile Command Centre is not a viable option for "F" Division.

Commission's Analysis of the RCMP's Response

[163] The Commission agrees with the view expressed by the RCMP Commissioner that the shortcomings and omissions in this case, such as the failure to cover the Ford Escape, could have been prevented without the presence of a Mobile Command Centre. However, the Commission also finds that, had a Mobile Command Centre been present at the crime scene, the RCMP members responsible for the preservation and protection of the evidence would likely have been on site when the rain started and could have reacted quickly to protect the vehicle.

[164] It is impossible to determine whether some of the shortcomings and omissions in this case would have in fact been prevented with the presence of a Mobile Command Centre. As the Commission noted in its Interim PII Report, the benefits that a Mobile Command Centre could have provided in this case include improved crime scene management, collaboration, and most importantly, communication between the MCU, first response RCMP members and specialty units such as FIS. Crime scene management and communications were of particular concern in this case.

[165] The Commission notes that there is no information in the file materials indicating that road accessibility would have prevented the use of a Mobile Command Centre or a similar type of vehicle in this particular case.

[166] For these reasons, the Commission reiterates Interim Finding 24.

[167] As for Interim Recommendation 8, the Commission acknowledges that the RCMP Commissioner submitted the Commission's recommendation to senior management in "F" Division for consideration and that it was determined, for the reasons noted above, that acquiring a Mobile Command Centre is not a viable option for "F" Division. In light of this information, the Commission is satisfied that its recommendation for "F" Division to consider the option of acquiring a Mobile Command Centre has been sufficiently addressed.

Processing of the Crime Scene

[168] The Commission found that it was unreasonable in this case for only one FIS member, who was not qualified as a Forensic Identification (FI) Specialist, to be present at the crime scene conducting the processing on his own for a period of three hours.

[169] Constable Heroux arrived at the crime scene at 12:36 a.m. on August 10. Corporal Ryttersgaard arrived at the Biggar Detachment at 1:45 a.m. and processed (for photographs and gunshot residue collection) Mr. Stanley between 2:13 a.m. and 2:32 a.m. Corporal Ryttersgaard arrived at the Stanley farmyard at 3:45 a.m. to assist Constable Heroux with the scene examination. In the meantime, a member of the Biggar RCMP Detachment had been assisting Constable Heroux with the processing of the crime scene.

[170] The Commission examined the RCMP's national policy on crime scene processing, which provides the following:

At least two FI members will be involved in processing the crime scene with one investigator qualified as a FI specialist. If these resources are unavailable, notify the Divisional Manager immediately.

[171] The Commission noted that there was no indication in the materials that Constable Heroux had any discussions with Corporal Ryttersgaard, who was qualified as a FI Specialist, about the processing of the crime scene prior to Corporal Ryttersgaard's arrival at 3:45 a.m. While the Commission acknowledged that Constable Heroux was an FI Technician with considerable training and exposure to FIS work, most of that experience was under the apprenticeship program and he had yet to complete more advanced FI training courses. The Commission noted Constable Heroux's comment to Commission investigators that "with the benefit of hindsight, it's certainly always ideal to have more than one Forensic Identification member at the scene . . . ."

[172] The Commission acknowledged that the situation within FIS across the province had since changed, as already explained. Therefore, the Commission found that it was not necessary to recommend remedial measures in this regard.

Commission's Interim Finding #34: It was unreasonable that only one Forensic Identification Services member, not qualified as a Forensic Identification Specialist, was present at the crime scene for nearly three hours to conduct the processing.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

[173] The RCMP Commissioner disagreed with Finding 34. She stated that she was satisfied that the actions taken by Constable Heroux and Corporal Ryttersgaard were in substantial compliance with the provisions of the RCMP's national policy on crime scene processing, which requires that two FIS members process a major crime scene, one of whom must be an FI Specialist.

[174] The RCMP Commissioner noted that the RCMP members decided that Constable Heroux would begin to process the crime scene and Corporal Ryttersgaard would deal with obtaining gunshot residue from Mr. Stanley. The RCMP Commissioner further noted that Corporal Ryttersgaard attended the crime scene to assist Constable Heroux, which he did for nearly two hours before Mr. Boushie's body was removed and they exited the scene to await the search warrant.

[175] Based on her review of the statements of Corporal Ryttersgaard and Constable Heroux to Commission investigators, the RCMP Commissioner was satisfied that Constable Heroux was in contact with the "F" Division FIS Manager while he was processing the crime scene as per policy requirements.

[176] The RCMP Commissioner indicated that she consulted the RCMP policy centre responsible for the interpretation of the relevant policy and they indicated that sending Constable Heroux to process the scene on his own complied with the policy. The RCMP Commissioner agreed with the policy centre's interpretation that the requirement that at least two FIS members process a major crime scene does not preclude the first member on scene from beginning the process while awaiting a second member, since this practice eliminates any unnecessary delays in examining the scene. She further stated that the realities of policing, particularly in rural communities, require a flexible approach.

[177] With respect to the communications between Constable Heroux and Corporal Ryttersgaard, the RCMP Commissioner concluded, based on her review of Corporal Ryttersgaard's statement to Commission investigators, that there was indeed communication between both FIS members while Constable Heroux was at the scene, although the evidence did not inform on the nature of the communications.

[178] The RCMP Commissioner stated that the Commission seemed to give minimal consideration to Constable Heroux's depth of experience and found that processing the crime scene in a thorough and professional manner without the presence of an FI Specialist was well within Constable Heroux's capabilities. The RCMP Commissioner expressed the view that Constable Heroux being in the apprenticeship program at the time was of little consequence.

Commission's Analysis of the RCMP's Response

[179] The RCMP Commissioner's response to this finding is essentially proposing a different interpretation and assessment of the evidence, without pointing to new facts or new evidence. As the Commission has stated in a previous case,^{Footnote 9} the RCMP's own views about the appropriateness of its members' actions should not be allowed to govern in a case where the independent review body, having examined all the evidence as it is mandated to do, has reached a different conclusion, and no new factual or evidential information is being offered by the RCMP.

[180] Having reviewed the evidence discussed in the RCMP Commissioner's response, the Commission reiterates its original assessment of the matter. There are no new facts or evidence that would cause the Commission to change its original finding.

[181] With respect to the RCMP Commissioner's comment that Constable Heroux was in contact with the FIS Division Manager while he was processing the crime scene, the Commission notes that, when asked by Commission investigators if he had any dialogue with the FIS Division Manager during the evening of August 9, Constable Heroux replied:

I updated him that -- when we were heading out there. I updated him again before we left the scene, then I'd spoken again the following day, like, that next day.

[182] When asked by Commission investigators if the FIS Division Manager was providing any direction to Constable Heroux while he was at the scene, Constable Heroux replied, "No, he wasn't providing direction no."

[183] Constable Heroux recorded in his notebook that he informed the FIS Division Manager at 9:13 p.m. on August 9 that he and Corporal Ryttersgaard would attend the crime scene. Constable Heroux also recorded that he updated the FIS Division Manager about the status of the investigation at 9:17 a.m. on August 10.

[184] With respect to communications between Constable Heroux and Corporal Ryttersgaard, their reports and handbook notes refer to an initial discussion about the roles undertaken by each of them. There is no record of any conversation between the two while Constable Heroux was examining the crime scene prior to Corporal Ryttersgaard's arrival. During his statement to Commission investigators, Constable Heroux indicated that he called Corporal Ryttersgaard before attending the crime scene to brief him on what he had learned about the incident from MCU. Constable Heroux described to Commission investigators how the events unfolded while he was at the crime scene and stated that he was in contact with the Primary Investigator, Constable Boogaard, and that he had updated the FIS Division Manager. Constable Heroux made no mention of any discussions with Corporal Ryttersgaard.

[185] During his interview with Commission investigators, Corporal Ryttersgaard indicated that he had spoken with Constable Heroux before heading out to the crime scene. He stated that Constable Heroux told him "it was a large area, and so he was covering off photography at that location . . . ."

[186] In the Commission's view, the evidence indicates that the communications between the FIS members were limited to an initial discussion about the roles that would be undertaken by each of them, as well as a brief update before Corporal Ryttersgaard headed out to the scene. There is no indication in the materials before the Commission that there was any guidance or advice sought or provided with respect to the processing of the crime scene.

[187] The Commission reiterates its view that the relevant RCMP policy did not provide that only one FIS member, not qualified as an FI Specialist, should be processing the crime scene alone for an extended period under the circumstances of this case. If, as suggested in the RCMP's response, the policy can be interpreted as allowing or encouraging this, it should not be.

[188] With respect to the RCMP Commissioner's comments about Constable Heroux's experience and capabilities, the Commission had recognized in its Interim PII Report that Constable Heroux had considerable training and exposure to FIS work at the time of the incident. The Commission's finding is not about Constable Heroux's personal qualifications. There are reasons to require the presence of a qualified FI Specialist among the members processing the crime scene, and this was the Commission's focus in making this finding.

[189] For instance, the Commission noted that the incident occurred approximately seven months after Constable Heroux's certification as an FI Technician. He had received only a half-day training introduction to bloodstain pattern analysis during his basic forensic training program and had yet to complete more advanced Forensic Identification training courses, one of which was the 40-hour Basic Bloodstain Recognition Course.

[190] Further, despite the training and experience Constable Heroux did have, the evidence revealed that he was involved in some of the errors and deficiencies in the investigation, including the failure to preserve the Ford Escape and blood spatter evidence. The Commission emphasizes that errors are human and inevitable, and that Constable Heroux was clearly not solely responsible for the errors and deficiencies in question. This only emphasizes the importance of having at least two FI members involved in the processing of a crime scene, with one investigator qualified as an FI Specialist, as provided for in the policy and as the Commission found would have been preferable in this case.

[191] The Commission found that the assignment of Constable Heroux as the lead FIS RCMP member, with Corporal Ryttersgaard being in an assisting role, was reasonable given their home detachment locations. It was expected that their roles would be fulfilled through collaboration and teamwork, as it is incumbent on the senior member to provide advice and guidance when needed for more junior members to gain knowledge and confidence. This would have required the presence of Corporal Ryttersgaard, or another FI Specialist, for a longer period while Constable Heroux was processing the scene.

[192] The Commission acknowledges that the realities of policing, particularly in rural communities, require a flexible approach and that there may sometimes be logistical challenges. However, it remains that, in the Commission's view, it was unreasonable in the circumstances of this case for only one FIS member, not qualified as an FI Specialist, to be present at the crime scene for nearly three hours to conduct the processing.

[193] For these reasons, the Commission reiterates Interim Finding 34.

Comment Regarding the RCMP's Administrative Review

[194] On February 20, 2020, the Commission received from the RCMP an Independent Administrative Review Report (IAR) dated January 13, 2020. The RCMP prepared this report following an internal administrative review of the investigation of the death of Mr. Boushie. This administrative review initiated by the RCMP in June 2018 was conducted by RCMP members and encompassed all aspects of the major crime investigation. The RCMP's 217-page IAR and its related relevant materials were disclosed to the Commission after the Commission had issued its interim reports pertaining to the family's complaint and the PII. The RCMP Commissioner's response to the Commission's PII Report makes no mention of the IAR.

[195] The Commission reviewed the RCMP's IAR in light of the Commission's conclusions in its interim report into the family's complaint, as well as its Interim PII Report. The Commission determined that the findings and recommendations relating to issues addressed by both the Commission and the RCMP essentially aligned. The Commission also found that the content of the RCMP's IAR revealed no new information that would cause the Commission to reconsider any of its findings and recommendations.

[196] The RCMP's IAR is estranged to the public complaint process and has no legal basis in Part VII of the RCMP Act. Despite the fact that the IAR does not call into question the Commission's process or its findings and recommendations, the Commission nevertheless has serious concerns about the RCMP's actions in this regard.

[197] The RCMP not only decided to conduct a review on substantively the same issues as the Commission in parallel to the Commission's PII, it also failed to send a formal notification of the existence of the IAR to the Commission in a timely manner. In addition, the RCMP failed to disclose in a timely fashion the relevant materials obtained in the course of the IAR, including the contents of the IAR interviews. These materials were undoubtedly relevant, as they directly related to the Commission's investigation and they were clearly covered by the Commission's ongoing requests for relevant materials.

[198] The Commission is especially concerned about the RCMP's decision to interview many of the same witnesses interviewed by the Commission, and the risks of interfering with the Commission's PII by conducting such interviews, without disclosing detailed plans to the Commission in advance to ensure that there was no interference with the Commission's work.

[199] While the RCMP described its administrative review as "independent," RCMP members led this review and only RCMP members provided subject matter expertise for the purpose of the review. In contrast to the Commission's investigation, the RCMP did not conduct interviews with members of Mr. Boushie's family as part of their review.

[200] For the reasons noted above, the Commission expects that the RCMP will inform the Commission in future cases where such internal reviews are initiated into matters that are being reviewed by the Commission.

Commission's Final Findings and Recommendations

Final Findings

The RCMP members dispatched to the Stanley property, including Sergeant Sawrenko, acted in accordance with the policy on first response investigations.
The initial actions taken by the involved RCMP members in response to the complaint were reasonable.
Sergeant Sawrenko acted reasonably in supervising the initial response to the scene.
The RCMP members dispatched to the Stanley property responded in a timely fashion.
It was reasonable to arrest E. M., B. J., and K. W. for the criminal offence of mischief without a warrant.
E. M. was arrested in a manner consistent with paragraphs 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.
B. J. and K. W. were arrested in a manner consistent with paragraphs 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.
The manner in which Corporal Fee and Constable Teniuk conducted the interviews of K. W., B. J., and E. M. was unreasonable in the circumstances.
The manner in which Constable Teniuk conducted the interview of C. C. was reasonable in the circumstances.
The continued detention in custody of E. M., B. J., and K. W. following the statements they provided to the RCMP on August 10, 2016, was unreasonable and not justified under subsection 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code.
The decision to reinterview B. J. was reasonable under the circumstances.
The manner in which Constable Boogaard conducted the reinterview of B. J. was reasonable in the circumstances.
It was unreasonable for the members of the Command Triangle (Sergeant Olberg and Constables Boogaard and Wudrick) to fail to consider providing direction that L. S. and S. S. not discuss the incident with each other prior to providing their witness statements to the police.
It was unreasonable for Sergeant Sawrenko to fail to request that L. S. and S. S. not discuss the incident with each other prior to providing their witness statements.
Corporal Olney's actions in relation to A. D. were reasonable in the circumstances.
Corporal Fee and Constables Wright and Teniuk should have attempted to persuade M. F. and G. F. to be interviewed separately.
Sergeant Olberg had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Stanley had committed the offence of murder and that he could be arrested without a warrant pursuant to section 495 of the Criminal Code.
Sergeant Olberg's direction to proceed with the arrest of Mr. Stanley for murder was reasonable.
Mr. Stanley was arrested in a manner consistent with paragraphs 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.
The manner in which Constable Gullacher conducted his interview of Mr. Stanley was reasonable in the circumstances.
Sergeant Olberg failed to ensure that the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant was drafted in a timely manner.
In this case, insufficient RCMP members were available on a compensated on-call basis to respond in a timely manner to major crime investigations.
The Major Crime Unit's decision to separate the involved persons in two RCMP detachments was reasonable given the inherent challenges of rural policing.
The use of a Mobile Command Centre could have proven to be useful in this case and potentially resulted in avoiding some of the shortcomings or omissions that occurred.
RCMP policies and procedures relating to the preservation and protection of evidence were not reasonably followed and a key piece of evidence, the Ford Escape, was left vulnerable to contamination.
The RCMP's failure to protect the Ford Escape resulted in the alteration and loss of trace and bloodstain evidence.
Sergeant Sawrenko's decision to allow L. S. and S. S. to remove a vehicle from the crime scene to travel to the RCMP Biggar Detachment was unreasonable.
Given the significance of the Ford Escape as a key piece of evidence in the investigation, it would have been prudent to consult with Crown counsel prior to proceeding to its release.
Constable Boogaard's decision to release the Ford Escape following the completion of the examination conducted by Forensic Identification Services fell within the reasonable range of options open to him and therefore constituted a reasonable exercise of his discretion.
It was unreasonable for one or more members of the Major Crime Unit not to attend the crime scene in a more timely fashion.
Constable Heroux and Corporal Ryttersgaard were adequately trained and qualified to perform the forensic identification tasks they were assigned in this case.
The practice at the time of not having a designated on-call RCMP member in each Forensic Identification Services Unit was unreasonable.
A local work-around practice of the on-call Forensic Identification Services member attempting to contact a Forensic Identification Services member located in the area of the crime scene was unreasonable.
It was unreasonable that only one Forensic Identification Services member, not qualified as a Forensic Identification Specialist, was present at the crime scene for nearly three hours to conduct the processing.
Constables Doucette and Park acted reasonably to collect and preserve evidence that was at risk of being lost.
Constables Doucette and Park did not adequately document their handling and transfer of the evidence they collected.
Constable Heroux's decision to contact a bloodstain pattern analyst three days after the incident was unreasonable.
The Major Crime Unit team applied the Major Case Management methodology and its nine essential principles, in adherence to the RCMP's national policy OM 25.3. ("Major Case Management").
The investigative team was adequately staffed to conduct the investigation into the death of Mr. Boushie in spite of their stated large caseload and other duties.
The Coordinated Investigative Team, including the Command Triangle, possessed the necessary training and experience to competently carry out the roles and responsibilities assigned to them in this investigation.
It was unreasonable for Constables Boogaard and Teniuk to attend the wake to update the family on the progress of the criminal investigation.
Internal communications were inadequate in some instances in the investigation.
The lack of communication between the various RCMP units involved in the investigation of the death of Mr. Boushie lead to some of the errors and inefficiencies.
A prima facie case of discrimination is not established with respect to the police's tactical approach and search of the Baptiste family home.
The police's conduct towards Ms. Baptiste with respect to her sobriety and her credibility was discriminatory on the basis of her race, or national or ethnic origin.
There is no prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the treatment of E. M., B. J., K. W., and C. C. during their police interviews.
There is no prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the gaps in the criminal investigation into Mr. Boushie's death, including issues relating to the securing of evidence.

Final Recommendations

That Corporal Fee and Constable Teniuk be provided with operational guidance with respect to RCMP policy regarding the interviewing of witnesses.
That Sergeant Olberg be directed to review the reasons for detention listed in subsection 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code.
That the RCMP review its policy OM 24.1. ("Interviews/Statements: Suspect/Accused/Witness") to address the treatment of in-custody witnesses interviewed in criminal investigations in which they are not suspects.
That the RCMP provide guidance, mentoring and/or training to the members of the Command Triangle (Sergeant Olberg and Constables Boogaard and Wudrick) and Sergeant Sawrenko with respect to witness handling.
That Corporal Fee and Constables Wright and Teniuk be directed to review the RCMP's national policy OM 24.1. ("Interviews/Statements: Suspect/Accused/Witness").
That the RCMP provide Sergeant Olberg with guidance, mentoring and/or training regarding the timely drafting of an Information to Obtain a Search Warrant.
That the RCMP ensure that adequate resources are available in a timely manner for the investigation of major crimes.
That RCMP senior management in "F" Division consider acquiring a Mobile Command Centre.
That the involved members of the Major Crime Unit and Forensic Identification Services be directed to review the findings in the Commission's Interim PII Report with a senior member of the RCMP.
That the involved members of the Major Crime Unit and Forensic Identification Services receive operational guidance with respect to RCMP policies and procedures related to the preservation and protection of evidence.
That a senior member of the RCMP provide operational guidance to Sergeant Sawrenko regarding the importance of protecting and preserving evidence at a crime scene.
That, in future cases, the Major Crime Unit Commander ensure that a member of the Unit attend the crime scene in a timely fashion.
That Constables Doucette and Park be directed to review the policy OM 25.2. ("Investigator's notes").
That Constable Heroux be directed to review the Commission's Interim PII Report with a senior Forensic Identification Services member and discuss the significance of the involvement of a bloodstain analyst at a blood letting crime scene.
That Constables Boogaard and Teniuk be directed to review finding No. 41 with a senior member of the RCMP.
That Corporal Olney as well as the members of the Command Triangle (Sergeant Olberg and Constables Boogaard and Wudrick) be directed to read the Commission's Interim PII Report with a senior member of the RCMP.
That cultural awareness training be provided for all RCMP employees bearing in mind the factors identified in recent inquiries.

Conclusion

[201] Pursuant to subsection 45.76(3) of the RCMP Act, the Commission respectfully submits its Final Report, and accordingly the Commission's mandate in this matter is ended.

Michelaine Lahaie
Chairperson

Footnotes

Footnote 1

This legal term is used to describe a fact presumed to be true at first view unless disproved.

Return to footnote 1 referrer

Footnote 2

The Commission has identified most third parties as well as young persons by initials to protect individual privacy.

Return to footnote 2 referrer

Footnote 3

This is the approximate time as recorded by Constable Parmar despite the OCC record of the 911 call being received at 5:27 p.m.

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Footnote 4

RCMP members' ranks indicated in this report are those held at the time of the RCMP's investigation.

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Footnote 5

The affiant police officer's role is to provide a factual foundation to justify the issuing of a search warrant.

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Footnote 6

The Command Triangle was composed of the Team Commander, Sergeant Olberg, the Primary Investigator, Constable Boogaard, and the File Coordinator, Constable Wudrick.

Return to footnote 6 referrer

Footnote 7

According to section 2.3. of the RCMP policy on Major Case Management, OM chap 25.3., the Coordinated Investigative Team is formed with the exclusive purpose of investigating a major case. It includes the members of the Command Triangle, investigators, some of whom may be seconded from their primary duties, support staff, and other employees.

Return to footnote 7 referrer

Footnote 8

As an example, in one of its previous files from another RCMP Division, the Commission commented on the timeliness of the support that was offered by the divisional MCU on the night of December 25, 2013. In that case, the file materials revealed that no MCU members had to remain available on call in the Division and consequently, all MCU members were outside the province during the holidays. The Unit Commander indicated that this was due to budgetary concerns. As a result, there were delays in providing MCU support and supervision by a senior Non-Commissioned Officer to RCMP members at the crime scene. In that case, the Commission noted in its report that although this issue warranted comment for any action deemed appropriate by the RCMP, there was no information that it had any impact on the outcome of the investigation into the incident.

Return to footnote 8 referrer

Footnote 9

See paragraph 26 of the Commission's Final Report Into the RCMP's Response to Anti-Shale Gas Protests in Kent County, New Brunswick, which can be found on the Commission's website at: https://www.crcc-ccetp.gc.ca/en/FACR-anti-shale-Gas-Protests-Kent-County.

Return to footnote 9 referrer

Date modified:: 2021-03-22

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Commission's Final Report: Chairperson-Initiated Complaint and Public Interest Investigation Into the RCMP's Investigation of the Death of Colten Boushie and the Events that Followed

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Overview of the Commission's Investigation

Background Facts

Overview of the Commission's Findings and Recommendations

The RCMP's Investigation

Investigative time management – Information to Obtain a Search warrant

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Crime scene management – protection of evidence (Ford Escape)

Crime scene management – non-attendance of Major Crime Unit

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Interviews and continued detention of E. M., B. J. and K. W.

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Failure to separate L. S. and S. S. and removal of vehicle from crime scene

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Communications with the Family

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Discrimination and Cultural Awareness

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Commission Findings Not Accepted by the RCMP

Sufficiency of Compensated On-Call Resources

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Commission's Analysis of the RCMP's Response

Mobile Command Centre

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Commission's Analysis of the RCMP's Response

Processing of the Crime Scene

RCMP Commissioner's Response

Commission's Analysis of the RCMP's Response

Comment Regarding the RCMP's Administrative Review

Commission's Final Findings and Recommendations

Final Findings

Final Recommendations

Conclusion