Interim Report on Chair-Initiated Public Complaint regarding the Shooting Death of Christopher Klim, Vernon, B.C.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act
Paragraph 45.42(3)(a)

File: PC 2008-0171

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IntroductionFootnote 1

On December 27, 2007, Mr. Christopher Klim, who suffered from a mental illness, was shot and killed by members of the RCMP in Vernon, British Columbia.  A mental health warrant had been issued to apprehend and return Mr. Klim to the hospital for psychiatric treatment.  Mistakenly believing that Mr. Klim was in the process of fatally harming himself, the RCMP members breached the door to Mr. Klim's apartment and entered with their guns drawn, planning to apprehend Mr. Klim at gunpoint.  Mr. Klim was not acting rationally and engaged the RCMP members with two knives in his hands.  A conducted energy weapon (CEW)Footnote 2 was applied to Mr. Klim, but one of its probes did not make contact.  Mr. Klim advanced towards the RCMP members and was shot.

Chair-Initiated Complaint

On January 21, 2008, the then Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (Commission, CPC) initiated a complaint into the conduct of the RCMP members involved in the shooting death of Mr. Klim (Appendix A) pursuant to subsection 45.37(1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (RCMP Act).  The purpose of the complaint is to assess the conduct of the members involved in the events of December 27, 2007, as well as matters of general practice applicable to situations in which RCMP members respond to individuals who are in a state of mental health crisis.  In particular, the purpose of the complaint is to assess:

  1. whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of initial deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health ActFootnote 3 and taken into custody;
  2. whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of initial deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force;
  3. whether the RCMP national, divisional and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis, and/or being apprehended under mental health legislation are adequate; and
  4. whether the RCMP officers involved in the criminal investigation of the members involved in the events of December 27, 2007, complied with the RCMP training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such an investigation, and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and, further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

This report will examine the events and actions of the RCMP members involved in the shooting death of Mr. Klim as well as the subsequent investigation by the "E" Division Southeast District Major Crime Unit (MCU).  A summary of my findings and recommendations can be found in Appendix B.

Commission's Review of the Facts Surrounding the Events

It is important to note that the Commission is an agency of the federal government, distinct and independent from the RCMP.  As Chair of the Commission, my role is to make findings after an objective examination of the information available to me and, where judged appropriate, to make recommendations that focus on steps that the RCMP can take to improve or correct conduct by RCMP members.  In addition, one of the primary objectives of the Commission is to ensure the impartiality and integrity of investigations involving RCMP members.

The Commission does not make findings of criminal or civil liability. Rather, the Commission makes its findings and recommendations on a balance of probabilities, a lower standard than the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although some terms used in this report may concurrently be used in the criminal context, such language is not intended to include any of the requirements of the criminal law with respect to guilt, innocence or the standard of proof.

My findings, as detailed below, are based on a careful examination of the following investigation documents: the MCU report and supporting documentation, including statements, notes, reports and photos; the Use of Force Report; relevant documentary materials as disclosed by "E" Division, including memoranda, e-mails and notes of RCMP members whose involvement was other than as provided in the MCU materials; an Independent Officer Review dated June 2, 2008, and performed by Staff Sergeant Jane Allemekinders; and relevant RCMP operational and administrative policies, as well as applicable legislation.

A coroner's inquest into the death of Mr. Klim was held in Vernon from November 12 to 14, 2008.  The purpose of an inquest is to ascertain how, when, where and by what means the deceased died. Although the mandate of an inquest is quite limited, I considered the evidence heard to be an important part of the fact-finding process related to Mr. Klim's death.  It is for this reason that the Commission carefully reviewed the inquest transcripts.

I would note that the RCMP's public complaint investigation into this matter resulted in a Final Report being issued on May 3, 2010 (Appendix C).  While some relevant material was immediately provided to the Commission by the RCMP, several requests for further relevant material were made to the RCMP.  The final materials were received by the Commission in late October 2010.

FIRST ISSUE: Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of initial deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody.

SECOND ISSUE: Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of initial deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force.

RCMP response to mental health warrant to apprehend Mr. Klim

Mr. Klim was 24 years of age on December 27, 2007.  He was not employed and he lived alone in an apartment in Vernon, British Columbia.  He had previously worked at a grocery store stocking shelves.  He maintained a relationship with his grandfather and grandmother, who also lived in Vernon.  Mr. Klim had grown up and previously lived with his grandparents.

Mr. Klim had a lengthy history of mental illness and suffered from schizophrenia.  Mr. Klim had been hospitalized in 2002 after a multiple substance overdose, and again after he attempted suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning.  Mr. Klim became involved with local Mental Health Services and was subsequently hospitalized again in 2003.  Since then Mr. Klim had been hospitalized several times and, at other times, had been released from the hospital on extended leaves.  Mr. Klim attempted suicide again in 2004, when he cut his wrists and his neck.

Mr. Klim did not accept the fact that he was mentally ill and was resistant to taking his medication.  This caused difficulty for Mr. Klim, who was required to take his psychiatric medication as a condition of his release from hospital under the extended leave provisions of the Mental Health Act.  Mr. Klim's failure to take medication resulted in his conditional release being revoked and a mental health warrant being issued for him in May 2007.  Mr. Klim was apprehended by two members of the RCMP, who utilized a CEW in the apprehension.Footnote 4  This incident is discussed in further detail in this report.

Mr. Klim was released again on an extended leave and he continued to resist taking his medication.  Another mental health warrant was issued for Mr. Klim's apprehension in July 2007.  Mr. Klim was apprehended at his residence the day after the warrant was issued.Footnote 5  There is no indication in the RCMP's documentation of this file that the members involved had any difficulty apprehending Mr. Klim on this occasion.

Mr. Klim thought that his medication was poisoning him.  To ensure that Mr. Klim took his medication, he was required to have it injected.  Mr. Klim started to miss injections in the fall of 2007, which reduced the effectiveness of the medication.  Mr. Klim's mental health worker persuaded him to attend the hospital on December 13, 2007, for an injection but Mr. Klim then had to be forced to take the injection.

Mr. Klim was warned that not taking his injections would result in a mental health warrant being issued.  Mr. Klim's mental health worker attempted to give Mr. Klim a letter from his psychiatrist, confirming that failure to comply with the conditions of leave would result in a recall to the psychiatric unit of the hospital.  Mr. Klim refused to accept the letter and made comments that caused his mental health worker concern, including that he would not be around when the RCMP came.  Mr. Klim's mental health worker believed that Mr. Klim was delusional, and he observed fresh cutting marks on Mr. Klim's hand, including what appeared to be a cut in the shape of a crucifix.

Mr. Klim's mental health worker spoke to Mr. Klim's psychiatrist on December 18, 2007, and a decision was made to issue a mental health warrant for his apprehension.  Mr. Klim's mental health worker called the Vernon/North Okanagan RCMP Detachment and informed the Watch Commander of the warrant, which he then faxed to the detachment.  Mr. Klim's mental health worker contacted the Detachment the following day, December 19, 2007, and was told that the warrant had not been received, so he faxed it again.

The warrant file was assigned to Constable Charles Burns, who attended Mr. Klim's residence later that same day on December 19, 2007.Footnote 6  Constable Colin Curtis also attended Mr. Klim's residence to assist Constable Burns.Footnote 7  Mr. Klim was not home and the members gained entrance to his apartment by using a key obtained from another tenant of the apartment building (who maintained a spare set of keys on behalf of the apartment manager who did not live at the apartment building).  They observed various steak knives in Mr. Klim's apartment, including one in his bathroom. 

Constable Curtis stated that when they were leaving they were approached by a female who identified herself as Mr. Klim's cousin.  According to Constable Curtis, she told him that she was there to help locate Mr. Klim and get him to the hospital.  According to Constable Curtis, she also told him that the last time the police had to deal with Mr. Klim it took six members to control him and a CEW was used.Footnote 8  Constable Curtis also said the cousin told him that Mr. Klim had ". . . lots of knives in his residence and usually carried as least one all the time."Footnote 9

Constable Burns returned the file to the Watch Commander, Corporal Linda Reil, who passed the file on to the next shift for follow-up.

Given that the warrant was immediately assigned to an RCMP member who attempted to apprehend Mr. Klim that same day, it is apparent that the RCMP initially responded to the mental health warrant for Mr. Klim's apprehension in an appropriate and timely manner.  It is less clear whether or not the follow-up action to apprehend Mr. Klim reached the same standard.

Corporal Reil added information to the file about Mr. Klim's prior involvement with the police and the location of knives in his apartment.  Corporal Reil noted that any RCMP members dealing with Mr. Klim should exercise "extreme caution."  On December 20, 2007 (as Watch Commander on the night shift), Corporal Reil determined that Mr. Klim had not yet been located so she assigned the file to Constable Andrew Forslund to monitor.  Constable Forslund had approximately two months of service at the time and was in recruit field training.Footnote 10

Constable Forslund testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death that he did not "have any chance to attend Mr. Klim's apartment" on December 20, 2007.  Constable Forslund explained that he met with two other RCMP members to discuss the warrant and to make plans to attend Mr. Klim's residence but they were called away on another matter.  Constable Forslund passed the file back to the Watch Commander and then went on days off, starting on December 21, 2007.  Corporal Reil reminded the members on night shift on December 21, 2007, of the existence of the warrant but it does not appear that the file was assigned to another member for follow-up.

The file appears to have then been passed on from shift to shift without any further specific action being taken to execute the mental health warrant.  It does not appear that any actual efforts were made to locate Mr. Klim after Constable Burns and Constable Curtis attended his residence on December 19, 2007.Footnote 11  Constable Forslund then returned to work on December 26, 2007, and was not certain if he was given the file again.Footnote 12  On December 27, 2007, Constable Forslund received a telephone call from Mr. Klim's mental health worker, who reported that he had just spoken with Mr. Klim's grandfather.

Mr. Klim's mental health worker told Constable Forslund that Mr. Klim's self-harm was escalating and that they were "pretty concerned" about Mr. Klim.  According to Constable Forslund, Mr. Klim's mental health worker told him that Mr. Klim was cutting his face and neck.  In explaining what he was told by Mr. Klim's mental health worker, Constable Forslund stated that if Mr. Klim was suicidal, he may be cutting his wrists.Footnote 13  Constable Forslund wrote the information down on a "post-it note" and put it on the file.  Constable Forslund then took the file to Constable Mike Anderson, the acting Watch Commander.

Constable Anderson requested that any available members return to the Detachment to discuss a plan to apprehend Mr. Klim.  Several RCMP members participated in the informal briefing to discuss Mr. Klim's apprehension.  Soon after, they attended Mr. Klim's residence to apprehend him, at which time Mr. Klim was fatally shot.  The circumstances of Mr. Klim's apprehension and death are discussed in detail below.

Police officers are often called upon to intervene in situations involving persons with mental health issues, including persons who are at risk of suicidal acts.  In this regard, the police play an important role in responding to the societal aim to ensure the safety of such persons at risk.  Although there is no express RCMP policy that dictates urgency, it is obvious that such instances should be a priority for the police.  This was demonstrated by the RCMP's initial response to the warrant to apprehend Mr. Klim and by the response to the information about Mr. Klim conveyed to the RCMP on December 27, 2007.

There were virtually no efforts to locate Mr. Klim between December 19 and 27, 2007.  Each day that passed increased the potential deterioration of Mr. Klim's mental illness in the face of his self-imposed withdrawal from medication to treat his mental illness.  There were several pieces of information known by the RCMP about Mr. Klim that should have objectively increased the importance of following up on the warrant file.

The fact that the warrant file was in part assigned to a new RCMP member still in recruit training is not by itself objectionable.  It does, however, bring into question the priority the file was given for follow-up—that follow-up amounting to one potential discussion regarding going to Mr. Klim's residence that was disrupted by another call for service.  I acknowledge, however, that police work is often a balancing act of differing priorities in resource-deprived circumstances.  While the failure to take any meaningful action to apprehend Mr. Klim between December 19 and 27, 2007, is a concern, given the lack of specific information about the resource demands during this time period and action or inaction related to the warrant file, I am unable to determine whether this failure was improper.

Finding No. 1: The RCMP initially responded to the warrant for Mr. Klim's apprehension in an appropriate and timely manner.

Finding No. 2: The RCMP did not take any meaningful action to apprehend Mr. Klim between December 19 and 27, 2007.

Finding No. 3: There is insufficient information to determine whether or not the failure to take any meaningful action to apprehend Mr. Klim between December 19 and 27, 2007, was improper.

RCMP risk assessment and plan to apprehend Mr. Klim

Constable Forslund stated that when he was first assigned the file between December 18 and 21, 2007, Constable Anderson told him that due to Mr. Klim's history and "propensity for violence," any ". . . interaction with [Mr. Klim] must be done with multiple members and treated as code 5 (subject to be ordered into the prone position on the ground with pistols drawn) . . . "  Constable Anderson, who was the acting Watch Commander on December 27, 2007, did not recall seeing the warrant file before December 27, 2007.Footnote 14  As noted above, Corporal Reil stated that she gave the file to Constable Forslund.

Constable Anderson explained in his statement to investigators that he became aware of the warrant file on the day the telephone call was received from Mr. Klim's mental health worker (although he thought that the call came directly from Mr. Klim's grandparents).  According to Constable Anderson, the "pass on" file informed him that Mr. Klim was violent (and that it took multiple members to subdue him last time), he "likes knives" and he was "off his meds."

Constable Anderson asked for any available members to meet in the office for a briefing.  The following RCMP members attended the briefing: Constable Forslund, Constable Amanda Garner (Constable Forslund's trainer), Constable Curtis, Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Rick Drought and Constable Ken Simpson.  Constable Kathy Szoboticsanec was also working but was unable to attend because she was busy working on another file.  Although Constable Anderson had essentially called the briefing, he stated that he "didn't have much involvement" and he ". . . ended up walking sort of into the middle of it when they were at the . . . photocopier. . . .

Constable Curtis stated that he told Constable Anderson that they would need "lots of people" to apprehend Mr. Klim because he had fought with police last time.  He advised the other members that Mr. Klim's cousin had told him that Mr. Klim "carried knives."  According to Constable Curtis, they ". . . all knew that it was going to be a high risk take down if Klim was located."  Constable Curtis testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death that "in essence . . . he was trying to kill himself" and they had to "get there to stop him from killing himself."

Constable Drought stated to investigators that not only was he informed that Mr. Klim was known to have knives, Mr. Klim also "brandished knives at the police officers" as well as used knives on himself.Footnote 15  Constable Veller commented to the RCMP dispatcher "he's crazy, he's just nuts, he fights everytime, it took three guys to take him down last time."Footnote 16  Constable Simpson commented to the RCMP dispatcher that "[w]e've got everybody. He's a knife fighter . . . ."

Constable Forslund called the briefing a "loose briefing" and said that "everybody added information that they had."  Constable Drought called it an "informal briefing" and stated that they did not "sit down around a table to try and get everything."  Constable Curtis drew a sketch of Mr. Klim's apartment, based on having been inside the apartment on December 19, 2007.  Constable Curtis also obtained a CEW and a battering ram.  Constable Curtis subsequently gave the battering ram to Constable Simpson.  Constable Forslund stated that Constable Simpson is a "good size guy" so that is why he was going to use the "door knocker."

Constable Anderson informed Inspector Steve McVarnock, the Officer in Charge of the Vernon/North Okanagan RCMP Detachment, of his intention to send all available members to Mr. Klim's residence.  According to Inspector McVarnock, Constable Anderson told him that Mr. Klim's grandfather had reported that Mr. Klim was "very suicidal," Mr. Klim was "in the process of causing harm to himself at that moment," Mr. Klim was "very well known" by the GD (General Duty) members and he was "usually quite confrontational when dealing with the police."

Inspector McVarnock stopped to listen to the briefing as he was on his way out of the office for a run.  Inspector McVarnock offered one suggestion, to have someone from the Detachment call Mr. Klim when the RCMP members were in the hallway outside Mr. Klim's apartment.  According to Constable Curtis, Inspector McVarnock said this as they were walking out the back door.  Inspector McVarnock noted that Constable Simpson was "travelling by himself" so he went with Constable Simpson with the intention of going to the area and watching from a distance (as he was not in uniform).  Inspector McVarnock testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death that he had no intention of being directly involved.

The RCMP's Final Report stated that the purpose of the telephone call to Mr. Klim's apartment was to "talk [Mr. Klim] into exiting his apartment without incident . . . ."  This is not consistent with the available information but does reflect a "leading question" from the RCMP's investigator, who asked Constable Anderson if the plan was for him to hopefully talk Mr. Klim out of the apartment.Footnote 17  Constable Anderson replied that he "wasn't even sure," that they "just wanted to make sure he was still there" and that he " . . . wasn't sure [he] even wanted him out of the apartment simply because once he's out there . . . he becomes possibly a greater risk to everybody else. . . ."

Inspector McVarnock testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death about the purpose of the telephone call to Mr. Klim's apartment.  He testified that the call was not to communicate with Mr. Klim but to determine whether or not he was alive.  Inspector McVarnock testified as follows:

. . . the phone call sets the stage for the next steps.  If Mr. Klim had picked up the phone, right away that would have answered the burning question of the moment, was he still alive.  If that had happened, it would then allow myself to then look and say he is now alive, there's no need to breach that door.  We can look at what other options we need to do.  The primary concern was his health, was he alive.  Nobody can answer that question.  That phone call was designed to get us to that point.

Constable Anderson did not assign any roles to any of the members before they left the Detachment and, when asked by investigators about this, he replied: "[P]resumably they would have worked that all out."  According to Constable Anderson, ". . . they were just acting as a team."  When asked if there was "anyone in charge of the operation itself" inside the apartment building, Constable Curtis replied: "I guess kinda me" based on the fact that he had drawn up the plan and had been in the apartment before.

Constable Forslund stated that, in addition to Constable Curtis who had the CEW and Constable Simpson who had the battering ram, two members said they would "watch there" outside and he entered the building with another member.  Constable Veller was asked by investigators, "[w]hat kind of decisions were made about who was going to take what action . . ." and he replied that he "[didn't] remember any of that part of it."  He came up to the building and ". . . just saw people going inside so [he] followed them on the way in . . . ."  Constable Drought stated that as soon as he got there he said: "I'm around to the side."

When asked by investigators if it was decided beforehand who was going to go where, Constable Garner stated that she saw Constable Drought walking to the back of the apartment building so she wasn't going to "leave him there by himself so [she] went back with him."  She did not know if the other members discussed who was going to do what.  Constable Garner testified at the inquest that she did not ask Constable Forslund where he wanted to go.Footnote 18  Constable Simpson stated to investigators that Inspector McVarnock rode with him to Mr. Klim's apartment but that they had no discussion about "planning."

In the Commission's view and in simple terms, a "plan" in a policing environment designed to arrest or apprehend a person should involve a risk assessment and three additional essential elements: leadership, communication and identification of actions/roles for team members.  In addition, a plan should identify contingent actions for team members to take if things do not go according to the plan.  While this type of planning will require some time, it need not require extensive time.  It can be applied informally as the circumstances dictate.

The RCMP's plan to apprehend Mr. Klim can be summarized as follows:

Risk assessment: Mr. Klim was believed to suffer from a mental illness and be off his medication, to be violent towards police, to have access to knives and to have used them recently to cut his face, to have previously engaged in suicidal acts and to be in the act of harming himself, and to be in a confined apartment.

Leadership: Constable Curtis appears to have been, in fact, the leader based on having been in Mr. Klim's apartment before, but Constable Anderson provided some direction as did Inspector McVarnock.

Communication: All of the members involved were aware of the components of the plan to attend Mr. Klim's residence.

Action/roles:

  • Constable Curtis was assigned the role of carrying the CEW and Constable Simpson was assigned the role of using the battering ram.
  • Constable Curtis, Forslund, Veller and Simpson and Inspector McVarnock went into the apartment building while Constables Drought and Garner went outside Mr. Klim's apartment in case he tried to flee.
  • Constable Anderson was going to call Mr. Klim's apartment when the RCMP members were outside in the hallway.
  • If Mr. Klim did not answer the telephone, Mr. Klim's door would be breached with the battering ram.
  • Constable Curtis was going to enter the apartment first, followed by the remaining members, who would all have their pistols drawn.

Contingent actions: None identified.

The plan to apprehend Mr. Klim failed in many respects.  First and foremost, it proceeded on the premise that Mr. Klim posed a significant and high risk for the factors noted above and required immediate apprehension.  This risk assessment was the primary reason for the tactical approach utilized by the RCMP members involved in the effort to apprehend Mr. Klim.  It must be observed at the outset that this approach is clearly more in line with action to arrest a high-risk criminal suspect than it is to apprehend someone in need of psychiatric treatment under the Mental Health Act.

One of the key facts that founded the risk assessment was the belief that Mr. Klim had previously fought with police, multiple police officers were required to subdue him, and a CEW had to be used.  It does not appear that any of the RCMP members involved in Mr. Klim's apprehension on December 27, 2007, had any personal knowledge of the prior incident.  It is unclear exactly what the belief concerning the prior incident was based on, but it may have been what Constable Curtis stated he was told by Mr. Klim's cousin.  But, as noted above in regard to the prior incident, Constable Curtis also advised Mr. Klim's cousin that he highly doubted that Mr. Klim had been subject to eight CEW cycles.

The RCMP did not interview Mr. Klim's cousin but she did testify at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death.  Contrary to what Constable Curtis stated about his conversation with her, she denied knowing about the warrant for Mr. Klim until told by Constable Curtis.  She also denied saying that Mr. Klim had an "infatuation" with knives.  She was not asked about the prior incident where a CEW was used in respect of Mr. Klim.

The file that related to the prior incident was provided to the CPC upon request to more accurately understand the nature of the prior incident involving Mr. Klim.  For reasons that were not explained, the file was not reviewed by the RCMP in its investigation of Mr. Klim's death or as part of the RCMP's investigation into the Chair-initiated complaint.  Given the reliance that was placed on Mr. Klim's prior involvement with the police, this file should have been reviewed.  The circumstances of this prior incident should have been more carefully considered by the RCMP members involved in the apprehension of Mr. Klim on December 27, 2007.  Had they done so, they would have learned that the circumstances were not nearly as dramatic as made out to be.

It appears that the prior incident referred to is the occasion where Mr. Klim was apprehended in May 2007.Footnote 19  At that time, Mr. Klim was seated in a police car when he was asked to get out so he could be handcuffed.  Up to that point, he had been dealing with one RCMP memberFootnote 20 but another RCMP memberFootnote 21 attended to assist in handcuffing Mr. Klim.  Mr. Klim did not cooperate and struck one of the RCMP members on the ear.  A CEW was deployed in probe mode but the probes did not make contact with Mr. Klim because they were lodged in his shirt.Footnote 22  This significantly reduced the effectiveness of the CEW.Footnote 23

The CEW was used again in push-stun mode but, although tested by the member at the start of his shift, the batteries were "next to none" when he tried to use the CEW in push-stun mode.  The two members took Mr. Klim to the ground where he "turtled" and held his hands underneath him.  The two members used "empty hand tactics, namely pressure point application and knee strikes" to control and handcuff Mr. Klim.  There is no indication that the RCMP members had any further difficulty escorting Mr. Klim to the hospital.

Mr. Klim's prior involvement with the police was a critical component of the RCMP's risk assessment.  As noted above, Constable Anderson told Inspector McVarnock that Mr. Klim was "very well known" to the General Duty members and was "usually quite confrontational" when dealing with the police.  This is not clear from the incident outlined above.  Although there was one other police file from 2007 that involved Mr. Klim, there is no indication what this file involved and it has already been destroyed.

The RCMP's investigation into Mr. Klim's death did not include any kind of meaningful victim profile that detailed his prior police involvement.  Accordingly, I can only consider the information available for review, which does not support the RCMP's assessment of Mr. Klim insofar as it relates to his prior involvement with the police.  I do not suggest that there was no basis to be concerned about Mr. Klim's response.  There were several factors that objectively increased the risk associated with his apprehension.  It is clear, however, that the RCMP's risk assessment was based on inaccurate and exaggerated information in regard to the prior incident where Mr. Klim was subjected to the CEW.

Another critical component of the risk assessment relates to whether or not Mr. Klim was in the act of causing harm to himself, thus requiring an urgent response.  This was a fundamental basis for the approach taken by the RCMP as noted above, particularly by Constable Anderson and Inspector McVarnock.  While I agree that an urgent response was necessary in the circumstances, the issue is whether or not the RCMP's conclusion was objectively supported by the information that was known to them.  I acknowledge that a risk assessment is not necessarily based on one fact but the sum of all relevant facts.  Nonetheless, the individual factors must support the risk assessment.

The conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the actual act of causing harm to himself was based in part on his prior history but primarily on the information received on December 27, 2007, from his mental health worker.  According to the mental health worker, he informed Constable Forslund that:

  • Mr. Klim's grandmother observed Mr. Klim to have a "cross-cut" on the side of his face, which the mental health worker understood had actually been observed two days prior, on Christmas day.
  • It looked like Mr. Klim's self-harm behaviour was "escalating."
  • The mental health worker and Mr. Klim's grandparents were "pretty concerned" about Mr. Klim.

Mr. Klim's mental health worker was concerned about the media reports, after Mr. Klim's death, that the police had gone to Mr. Klim's residence because Mr. Klim was "suicidal."  When asked by the RCMP's investigator if there was anything he had not been asked that he thought was important and would like to add, the mental health worker stated:

. . . things that have been reported in the media describe the police as going to Kris' because he was told that he was suicidal.  I just wanna be clear that those words didn't come out of my mouth in my conversation with Constable FORLUND [sic].  So I don't know, I don't know what was reported to the media by RCMP.  I wanted to make quite clear to Constable FORLUND [sic] that we were worried about Kris and had good reason to.  But I really had no I mean I haven't even laid eyes on Kris.  I had no concrete hard evidence to say that he was suicidal or not.  Okay, and I just wanted to make sure that you knew that.

The information received from Mr. Klim's mental health worker on December 27, 2007, formed the primary factual basis that informed the RCMP about Mr. Klim's current mental state on December 27, 2007.  This information supplemented the other information already conveyed or known to the RCMP, including:

  • A warrant for Mr. Klim's apprehension had been issued.
  • Mr. Klim was off his medication.
  • Mr. Klim had previously attempted suicide.
  • Mr. Klim apparently had some fascination with knives, and there were knives in his apartment.
  • Mr. Klim had previously fought with the police, and a CEW had been used.

It should be noted that when referring to "harm," the context of the interpretation by the RCMP clearly contemplated that Mr. Klim was in the act of committing fatal or serious bodily harm to himself.  Although the circumstances warranted urgency, they do not objectively support that Mr. Klim was in the process of causing fatal or serious bodily harm to himself.  There was no evidence that this was the case.  Accordingly, the conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the act of seriously harming himself was not accurate.

The conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the act of harming himself was first reached by Constable Anderson and reinforced by Inspector McVarnock.  As the Watch Commander who first coordinated the RCMP's response, Constable Anderson bears the primary responsibility for this erroneous conclusion, but Inspector McVarnock should have also questioned whether or not the conclusion was accurate, given the information known.  The other RCMP members accepted this conclusion without questioning whether or not it was supportable.

Part of the plan was to call Mr. Klim's apartment when the police arrived outside his door.  It is apparent, based on the evidence regarding the telephone call, that there was a lack of understanding amongst the RCMP members involved about the purpose of the call.  Given that Constable Anderson did not know what he was to do if Mr. Klim answered the telephone and that Inspector McVarnock did not view it as a method of communication, it begs the question: What would have happened if Mr. Klim had answered the telephone?  Inspector McVarnock's explanation at the inquest, about using the telephone call as a means to determine if Mr. Klim was alive, failed to address the fact that there was no plan for what to do if Mr. Klim did answer the telephone.

The confusion surrounding the planned telephone call to Mr. Klim's apartment highlights the lack of direction in regard to the plan to apprehend Mr. Klim.  Put simply, there was no one who was in charge of the plan in any meaningful way.  More importantly, there was no one on scene in charge to provide specific direction about how to proceed.  Instead, the effort to apprehend Mr. Klim proceeded on an improvised basis with a lack of clear direction beyond entering Mr. Klim's apartment en force.  The failure to identify any contingent actions further evidences the lack of direction.  This lack of direction jeopardized the potential for a successful outcome. 

In addition, given the possibility of Mr. Klim's non-cooperation or of some form of stand-off, the RCMP should have considered calling someone with specialized crisis intervention training to attend Mr. Klim's residence.  They could have also considered requesting the presence of Mr. Klim's mental health worker or a member of his family.  The RCMP's national operational policy has been amended since this incident and provides that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, and after a careful risk assessment, members may seek the assistance of a close friend, family member, religious or spiritual leader, or a mental health professional" when dealing with a person who has a mental illness.Footnote 24

Another issue arises related to the plan to use a forced entry to apprehend Mr. Klim at gunpoint.  Despite the obvious risk factors involved, the RCMP did not call Emergency Health Services to attend Mr. Klim's apartment until after he was shot.  This is inconsistent with the RCMP's conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the act of killing himself.  If the RCMP members involved did, in fact, believe that Mr. Klim was in the act of killing himself, it is difficult to understand why they did not call Emergency Health Services to attend and stand by while they determined the status of Mr. Klim.

Regardless of the fact that the RCMP erroneously concluded that Mr. Klim was in the act of killing himself, there were several additional risk factors that should have prompted the RCMP to consider requesting the presence of Emergency Health Services.  These risk factors included the uncertain status of Mr. Klim, his likely irrational response to the police presence and the potential for some level of force being required to apprehend him.  Depending on the eventual outcome of the apprehension, Emergency Health Services could even have transported Mr. Klim to the hospital to be admitted.Footnote 25

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the circumstances involving Mr. Klim warranted a higher level of planning and direction than the improvised approach taken.  As the Watch Commander who initially coordinated the effort to apprehend Mr. Klim, Constable Anderson should have recognized that the plan improvised lacked appropriate clarity.  As a senior RCMP member with significant Emergency Response Team (ERT) experience, Inspector McVarnock should have also identified this failure and taken steps to remedy it by making sure that an adequate operational plan had been put in place.

In the Commissioner's recent response to the Commission's report into its Chair-initiated complaint and public interest investigation in respect of the shooting death of Mr. John Simon,Footnote 26 he stated as follows:

I support the recommendation that a guide/checklist be developed and installed in all the police vehicles' mobile workstations to ensure that all operational procedures for a critical incident are followed and completed.  The RCMP is currently developing a National Critical Incident Form that will be incorporated in the Operations Manual and will be used to assist members in determining appropriate responses to critical incidents.  Other important initiatives that are underway on a national level are the creation of an Emergency Response Team Governance Policy and an Investigators' Development Program.  Both of these initiatives will include the creation of checklists and flowcharts to assist members in responding to critical incidents.

While it may be posited that a mental health apprehension does not, on its face, constitute a critical incident, it bears mentioning that in this case, the risk assessment, though not reasonable in the circumstances, resulted in a conclusion that what amounted to a high-risk takedown—requiring a specialized and coordinated response—was warranted.  In my view, given both the members' determination that heightened measures were appropriate and the uncertainty inherent in mental health apprehensions, a critical incident existed.  In my view, the measures initiated by the RCMP Commissioner to deal with critical incidents represent a significant step forward and should be applied to incidents such as this.

Finding No. 4: The RCMP's risk assessment was based on inaccurate and exaggerated information regarding Mr. Klim's prior involvement with the police.

Finding No. 5: The conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the process of committing fatal or serious bodily harm to himself is not supported by the available information, and the risk assessment that relied on this conclusion was flawed.

Finding No. 6: The plan to apprehend Mr. Klim lacked appropriate clarity and direction.

Finding No. 7: Constable Anderson and Inspector McVarnock should have recognized that the plan to apprehend Mr. Klim lacked appropriate direction.

Recommendation No. 1: Constable Anderson and Inspector McVarnock should receive training in appropriate risk assessment and in critical planning and management.

Tactical entry into and search of Mr. Klim's apartment

The primary issue to be considered in examining the tactical entry into and search of Mr. Klim's residence is whether or not it was excessive in the circumstances.  To determine this, it is useful to consider what else could have been done in the circumstances and also how the tactical entry and search contributed to the circumstances.  In other words, was there another option available to the RCMP members who attended Mr. Klim's residence, and did the actions taken influence or contribute to the outcome?

Prior announcement

Constables Curtis, Veller, Forslund and Simpson, and Inspector McVarnock entered Mr. Klim's apartment building and went to his apartment at approximately 1:00 p.m.  Constable Curtis placed some gum over the peephole of Mr. Klim's apartment door when they approached it, so that Mr. Klim could not look out.  Constable Forslund radioed Constable Anderson to call Mr. Klim's apartment.  Constable Anderson called Mr. Klim's apartment and let the telephone ring 12–15 times but Mr. Klim did not answer.  Constable Simpson then looked to Inspector McVarnock for permission to breach the door with the battering ram.

It is unclear whether or not any attempt was made to knock on Mr. Klim's door before proceeding to use the battering ram.  The relevant information relating to this point is not determinative.

Inspector McVarnock did not recall any "knocking attempt" and stated that he would not have supported knocking because he did not want Mr. Klim to know that they were there.Footnote 27  Constable Forslund did not believe that they knocked on the door because they were concerned that Mr. Klim might try to flee and it was better to have an "element of surprise."  Constable Simpson was not asked by investigators whether or not they knocked on the door, but he later testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death that he did not recall anyone knocking.  Constable Veller stated that Constable Curtis knocked on the door a couple of times.  He later testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death that he was "a hundred percent" certain that "somebody knocked."

Constable Curtis did not initially state to investigators that he or anyone else knocked on the door.  The investigator who interviewed Constable Curtis later asked him: "Now, and you looked over, someone knocked on the door, as well you say?"  Constable Curtis replied: "Yeah, I believe we knocked on the door first, as well, yeah."  Constable Curtis did not state that he knocked on the door.  Constable Curtis testified at the inquest into Mr. Klim's death that Constable Simpson had knocked on the door.

To resolve this issue, I need only examine the other factors related to the plan to apprehend Mr. Klim, including:

  • The RCMP members involved appeared to be operating under the assumption that Mr. Klim was in the act of killing himself.
  • Mr. Klim's prior involvement with the police was exaggerated.
  • The plan to apprehend Mr. Klim included forcing entry, if required, with guns drawn and apprehending him at gunpoint.
  • Gum was placed over Mr. Klim's peephole, so he could not see out.
  • A telephone call was placed to Mr. Klim's apartment and there was no answer.
  • A battering ram was present to make entry.

Given these factors, combined with the inconsistent recollection of the members involved, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that no attempt was made to knock on the door after Mr. Klim did not answer the telephone.

Generally, in matters involving search and arrest at common law, there is a requirement for the police to make a prior announcement before making entry—only in exceptional circumstances is this practice not followed.  Prior announcement requires that peace officers give notice of their presence by knocking, that they identify themselves as peace officers and that they state a lawful reason for entry.Footnote 28  Before forced entry can be made, a peace officer must at least request entry and be denied.  These requirements are reflected in the RCMP's national operational policy.Footnote 29

The principles of prior announcement have also been codified in the Criminal Code, in the provisions relating to entry to a dwelling house.Footnote 30  Ordinarily, a warrant is required for the police to enter a dwelling house in matters involving the criminal law.Footnote 31 In certain exigent circumstances, including to prevent "imminent bodily harm or death to any person," a warrant is not required.Footnote 32  In addition, prior announcement may be omitted where there are reasonable grounds to believe that prior announcement would "expose the peace officer or any other person to imminent bodily harm or death."Footnote 33

I acknowledge that these circumstances did not invoke the statutory requirements found in the Criminal Code, and no warrant was required for the RCMP to enter Mr. Klim's apartment.  This is because the RCMP members were acting under the authority of the Mental Health Act to apprehend Mr. Klim, and were not purporting to arrest him.  The police are authorized in British Columbia to enter a private dwelling to apprehend a patient pursuant to an apprehension warrant.Footnote 34  Nonetheless, the RCMP policy related to entry to a dwelling is helpful by general application in that the default action is to make a prior announcement.

Entry into Mr. Klim's apartment

At the time that Mr. Klim's door was breached, the RCMP members did not know if Mr. Klim was in the apartment because he had not answered the telephone.  They did have information received earlier that day that Mr. Klim was likely at home but they had no actual knowledge that he was there.  As noted above, the members proceeded on the basis that Mr. Klim was in the act of attempting to kill himself but there was no compelling information to support this conclusion.  Put simply, there was an absence of any information about what Mr. Klim was doing at the time that the RCMP members were outside his apartment.

It is apparent, from what information was available, that there was clearly an element of speculation at play: based on what they knew or believed they knew, the members speculated that Mr. Klim may be about to commit suicide.  If Mr. Klim was about to inflict fatal or serious injury to himself, then a forced entry and apprehension could be warranted to attempt to prevent his death or serious injury.  Put simply, the risk of escalating the dynamic interaction between the police and Mr. Klim due to forceful intervention would outweigh the likelihood of harm if Mr. Klim were permitted to inflict fatal or serious injury to himself without the intervention.

Inspector McVarnock gave permission to breach the door with the battering ram and Constable Simpson hit the door three times.  The RCMP's policy regarding entry to a dwelling includes specific direction regarding using a battering ram to gain entry.  The policy provides that "[a]n RCMP-approved entry ram may be used in circumstances where lesser means of entry are unrealistic or inappropriate."Footnote 35 

It does not appear that lesser means of entry were considered in this instance. Constable Curtis had previously been to Mr. Klim's apartment on December 19, 2007, eight days prior.  At that time, he and Constable Burns obtained a key for Mr. Klim's apartment from a tenant in the apartment building (who obtained it from another tenant with a master key).  The tenant with the master key was home at the time the RCMP attended Mr. Klim's apartment.  In addition, the apartment manager lived close to the apartment building (and arrived at the apartment building soon after Mr. Klim was shot when he was telephoned by a tenant about the incident).  The RCMP members who attended Mr. Klim's apartment on December 27, 2007, did not make any attempt to obtain a key to Mr. Klim's apartment, nor does it appear that such action was considered.

It is of note that the RCMP members made no efforts to understand what mental illness Mr. Klim suffered from or how it would affect his response to the police.  This could have been easily accomplished when speaking with Mr. Klim's mental health worker.  Had they done so, the RCMP members would have learned that Mr. Klim was suffering from schizophrenia and subject to delusions.  This type of information would have been valuable when considering whether or not to make a forced entry into and search of Mr. Klim's apartment.

Regardless of whether or not Mr. Klim's specific mental illness was known, there was a clear indication to the RCMP members involved that there was a strong likelihood that Mr. Klim would not respond in a rational manner to the police presence.  The simple fact that Mr. Klim was subject to a warrant to apprehend under the Mental Health Act should have alerted the members present to this probability.  It is also notable that the "E" Division RCMP policy at the time advised that "[i]t is important to remember that such persons are generally not responsible for their behavior, even though they are potentially violent and dangerous."Footnote 36

Given the factors noted, I am satisfied that the tactical entry and search employed by the RCMP members in these circumstances unnecessarily escalated the situation and significantly decreased the possibility of achieving a peaceful outcome.  While it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that Mr. Klim's death could have been avoided, it is clear that the RCMP's approach not only contributed to but materially created the highly charged climate that led to Mr. Klim's death.  The tactical entry into Mr. Klim's apartment was excessive and unreasonable in the circumstances given that lesser means were available.

Finding No. 8: The tactical entry into Mr. Klim's apartment was excessive and inappropriate in the circumstances.

Finding No. 9: The RCMP should have considered calling Emergency Health Services to attend Mr. Klim's apartment to be on standby.

Initial interaction with Mr. Klim

Constable Curtis was the first RCMP member to enter Mr. Klim's apartment and he did so with the CEW drawn.  Constables Veller and Forslund followed behind Constable Curtis with their pistols drawn.  Constable Simpson was the fourth RCMP member into the apartment.  Constable Simpson left the battering ram in the hallway and also entered with his pistol drawn.  Constables Garner and Drought waited outside the apartment building near Mr. Klim's apartment balcony.

The RCMP members then started to search Mr. Klim's apartment room by room while Inspector McVarnock waited in the hallway at the door to Mr. Klim's apartment.  During the search, Constable Curtis continued to have the CEW drawn and ready for use and the other members continued to have their service pistols drawn and ready for use, if needed.  The search of Mr. Klim's apartment was conducted in a manner consistent with a tactical approach: from all accounts, in an assertive and forceful manner.

Constable Veller located Mr. Klim on the bed in the bedroom and observed that he was holding two knives in his hands.  Constable Veller yelled a warning to the other RCMP members and exited the bedroom.  Constable Curtis was in the dining room and made his way with the CEW to a position outside the bedroom.  Mr. Klim was yelling profanities at the RCMP members, telling them to get out of his apartment.  The RCMP members, located outside the bedroom in Mr. Klim's small apartment, were yelling at Mr. Klim to drop the knife.  Some efforts were made to tell Mr. Klim that they were there to help him.  Mr. Klim did not follow the commands to drop the knife and started to advance out of the bedroom.

At that point, the potential for injury to Mr. Klim or to one of the RCMP members increased dramatically.  The apartment was small and Mr. Klim was in close proximity to the RCMP members who had little room to manoeuvre.  Absent the RCMP members completely withdrawing from Mr. Klim's apartment, it was no longer a practical option to apprehend Mr. Klim in a peaceful manner and some use of force to control Mr. Klim became justified.

While the use of force may have been justified, there was equally a lack of any meaningful effort at de-escalation.  The RCMP Commissioner, in his recent response to the Commission's report into its Chair-initiated complaint and public interest investigation into the death of Mr. Robert DziekanskiFootnote 37, stated:

The RCMP also updated its Incident Management Intervention Model training to put an increased emphasis on de-escalation, reinforcing that the goal of any intervention is to resolve the incident through officer presence and communication whenever possible and if the situational factors require that force be used, that members must only use as much force as necessary to resolve the situation.

The Commission is encouraged by this development, and is of the hope that it, coupled with commensurate in-service and cadet training, will serve to emphasize the importance of the use of appropriate de-escalation techniques.

Finding No. 10: The RCMP members who entered Mr. Klim's apartment failed to employ any meaningful de-escalation techniques in the effort to apprehend Mr. Klim.

Shooting of Mr. Klim

Mr. Klim advanced towards the RCMP members, who backed into the hallway, kitchen and living room.  Constable Curtis discharged the CEW in probe mode at Mr. Klim and activated the weapon.  Constable Curtis saw one of the probes hit Mr. Klim but could not see the other probe (which it was later learned did not penetrate Mr. Klim's clothing).  Mr. Klim experienced some effect from the CEW by backing up and falling over a chair and onto his bed but he was disabled only momentarily.  Although Constable Curtis had initially entered the bedroom to subdue Mr. Klim, there was not sufficient time to do so before Mr. Klim got up off the bed.  Mr. Klim continued to hold the knives and continued to yell at the RCMP members to get out.

The RCMP's policy regarding the use of a CEW was amended on December 14, 2007, shortly before Mr. Klim's death, raising the threshold for its use to situations where a person is displaying active resistant behaviour and higher categories of behaviour, i.e. combative or death, grievous bodily harm.Footnote 38  Given that Mr. Klim was holding two knives and advancing towards the RCMP members, the use of the CEW was justified in the circumstances.  Accordingly, Constable Curtis properly deployed the CEW against Mr. Klim.

Constable Curtis exited the bedroom when it was clear that Mr. Klim was not disabled by the CEW.  Constable Curtis repositioned to the living room while Constables Simpson, Forslund and Veller repositioned to the kitchen.  Mr. Klim exited the bedroom and followed the members into the kitchen.  The members continued to yell at Mr. Klim to drop the knives.  Inspector McVarnock described that Mr. Klim appeared to be moving "robotically."

Inspector McVarnock was at the entrance to the apartment when Mr. Klim exited the bedroom, and he estimated that he was approximately four feet away from Mr. Klim when Mr. Klim turned to go into the kitchen.  Inspector McVarnock stated that he was prepared to step back into the hallway if Mr. Klim lunged at him.  Inspector McVarnock contemplated trying to ram Mr. Klim as he turned into the kitchen but he was concerned because he did not know the layout and he knew that the "members were gonna be right on him, with lethal force."

Inspector McVarnock was not in uniform and was dressed in running gear.  Accordingly, he was not easily identifiable as an RCMP member and, more importantly, he did not have access to any of the RCMP intervention tools.  In addition, Inspector McVarnock remained in close proximity to Mr. Klim, who still had knives in his hands.  Given the circumstances, Inspector McVarnock exposed himself to unnecessary risk and he should not have remained at the entrance to Mr. Klim's apartment.  By doing so, he jeopardized his own safety and impacted the ability of the other RCMP members to control the situation.

According to Constable Forslund, after turning into the kitchen, Mr. Klim made a slashing motion at him and Constable Forslund fell backwards.  The other RCMP members thought that Constable Forslund had been stabbed by Mr. Klim.  Constable Veller stated that he feared for Constable Forslund's safety as well as his own and he shot Mr. Klim two times.  Constable Forslund stated that he feared death or grievous bodily harm and he shot Mr. Klim one time.  Mr. Klim went backwards into the hallway and fell to the floor.

Section 25 of the Criminal Code, as supported by RCMP policy, authorizes police officers to use lethal force in situations where they objectively and reasonably believe that such force is necessary for their own protection or for that of another person. Notwithstanding the events leading to the members' confrontation with Mr. Klim, it is apparent that at the point at which Mr. Klim was shot, Mr. Klim had refused to drop the knives he was carrying and continued to approach the members.  Accordingly, I accept that Constables Veller and Forslund reasonably believed that their lives were in jeopardy, and find that the use of force was reasonable in the circumstances.

The members notified the RCMP dispatcher immediately that shots had been fired and requested that an ambulance be called.  Constable Drought came into the residence and checked on Mr. Klim, who was on the floor unresponsive but with a weak pulse.  Constable Drought started CPR on Mr. Klim and was assisted by Constable Curtis until Emergency Health Services arrived approximately 10 minutes later, at 1:21 p.m.  Emergency Health Services examined Mr. Klim and observed that his eyes did not open, he was not making any sounds and he was not moving.Footnote 39

Mr. Klim was transported to the hospital at approximately 1:38 p.m., where emergency room personnel continued to work on him.  Mr. Klim had been struck by two bullets in his chest.  The efforts to resuscitate Mr. Klim were not successful, and he was pronounced dead at 1:55 p.m.  An autopsy later determined that one of the bullets had gone through his heart, which caused his death.

Finding No. 11: Constable Curtis' use of the CEW was reasonable and consistent with RCMP policy.

Finding No. 12: Inspector McVarnock, who was not in uniform, unreasonably remained in close proximity to Mr. Klim as Mr. Klim advanced towards the RCMP members with knives in his hands.  This action jeopardized his safety and impacted the ability of the other RCMP members to control the situation.

Finding No. 13: Constables Veller and Forslund reasonably believed that their lives were in jeopardy, and accordingly, their use of lethal force was reasonable and consistent with the relevant law and RCMP policy.

THIRD ISSUE: Whether the RCMP national, divisional and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis, and/or being apprehended under mental health legislation are adequate.

At the time of Mr. Klim's death, the RCMP had national, divisional and detachment-level policies related to dealing with persons who are suffering from a mental illness.  The national and detachment-level policies direct that these persons are to be incarcerated separately from other prisonersFootnote 40 and also provide general guidance on apprehension.  The "E" Division policy reminds members that persons who are suffering from a mental illness ". . . are generally not responsible for their behavior, even though they are potentially violent and dangerous."Footnote 41

The British Columbia Ministry of Health has prepared a "Guide to the Mental Health Act, 2005 Edition" that provides information about the province's Mental Health Act.  The purpose of the Guide is to make the Mental Health Act more understandable and to promote ". . . consistency in interpreting the Act so people who need involuntary psychiatric treatment receive help in a responsible and lawful manner."  The Guide is referenced in the "E" Division policy, including where to obtain a copy of the Guide.

The Guide provides practical information concerning the Mental Health Act including relating to police intervention and apprehension.  The Guide does not, however, directly address the issue of crisis intervention and de-escalation when dealing with persons who have a mental illness.  Current RCMP national policy requires RCMP members to be "familiar with their provincial or territorial mental health legislation, and the criteria for apprehending a person for an involuntary assessment."Footnote 42

The RCMP's national operational policy was amended in September 2010.  It provides that members are not qualified to diagnose mental illnessFootnote 43 but should "be able to recognize when a person's behaviour shows signs of a mental illness, and the person is acting in a manner likely to endanger his/her safety or the safety of others."Footnote 44  It reminds members that they must act in accordance with the Incident Management/Intervention Model (IM/IM)Footnote 45 and that "[c]lear communication has proven to be effective in de-escalating a situation when dealing with persons who may have a mental illness."Footnote 46

RCMP national operational policy now allows a member dealing with a person who is mentally ill to ". . . seek the assistance of a close friend, family member, religious or spiritual leader, or a mental health professional" but only in appropriate circumstances and after a careful risk assessment.Footnote 47  The policy further provides that ". . . when situational factors permit, members should consult with mental health personnel before apprehending a person and transporting him/her to a facility for examination" and that this "may ensure the most appropriate resolution to the situation."Footnote 48  As discussed above, a more meaningful discussion with Mr. Klim's mental health worker would have assisted the RCMP members in this case.

The amended national operational policy also specifically provides that the RCMP Commander should ensure "regular liaison with the medical community to address issues of mutual concern."Footnote 49  The Vernon RCMP Detachment policy has been amended since Mr. Klim's death to reflect liaison with Vernon Mental Health on an "ongoing basis" and to appoint a member of the Detachment as the "primary mental health liaison."Footnote 50  The Vernon RCMP Detachment has also implemented specific measures to enhance members' awareness towards mental health issues, and developing solid working relationships, through the following means:Footnote 51

  1. All new Cadets will take part in a 1-day rotation with Mental Health as part of their Cadet Field Training.
  2. By promoting and facilitating joint-training opportunities, either through formal or informal developmental workshops and courses.
  3. Through the use of the Police Observer Program (formerly the Ride-Along program).Footnote 52

The CPC conducted a literature review related to persons with mental illness, and in January 2010, released a special report entitled Policing Persons with Mental Illness: Issues and Trajectories.Footnote 53  In its report, the CPC noted that "many police organizations have not established clear guidelines and protocols for dealing with [persons with mental illness]" and that "[b]ecause many police officers receive insufficient training on issues related to the mentally ill population, increased training is among the most commonly cited mechanism for improving contacts with [persons with mental illness]."Footnote 54

The Braidwood Commission's Phase I Report, Restoring Public Confidence, recommended that crisis intervention training be required for law enforcement agencies in British Columbia and that "officers of provincially regulated law enforcement agencies, when dealing with emotionally disturbed people, be required to use de-escalation and/or crisis intervention techniques before deploying a conducted energy weapon, unless they are satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that such techniques will not be effective in eliminating the risk of bodily harm."Footnote 55

The Province of British Columbia has committed to implementing the recommendations from the Braidwood Report relating to de-escalation and crisis intervention.  British Columbia is in the process of developing crisis intervention and de-escalation training that will be mandatory for all police officers in the province.  The training is being developed by the Police Services Division of the British Columbia Ministry of Public Safety & Solicitor General, with input from municipal police agencies and representatives from the RCMP's Pacific Regional Training Centre, located in Chilliwack, British Columbia.

While the RCMP has made positive steps, since Mr. Klim's death, to address the issue of persons with mental illness, it is clear that dealing with such persons invokes a number of important decision-making standards for RCMP members.  Not only must RCMP members be aware of their authority to deal with persons with mental illness, they must understand the interrelationship of the multitude of factors that arise when dealing with such persons and how their interaction can affect the outcome.

Some of the primary factors include: the role of police and other agencies when dealing with persons with mental illness and how the police may effectively use other agencies with regard to information or assistance; knowledge of the mental illness and how it may impact on the behaviour of the person with the mental illness; and the importance of employing meaningful crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques while respecting reasonable police discretion to take alternative action depending on the circumstances.

RCMP members receive training in a general sense regarding how to deal and interact with all manner of persons, including those with a mental illness.  As recent incidents discussed in this report have demonstrated, the generalized training falls short of equipping RCMP members with the necessary tools to interact with persons with mental illness at an acceptable level in today's society.  This diminishes the ability of RCMP members to effectively deal with persons with mental illness and impacts on public and officer safety.  Further efforts in regard to training are required to supplement the recent policy changes.

It is trite to observe that RCMP members come into contact with persons with mental illness on a regular basis, and that these interactions can have varying outcomes.  Given this fact, RCMP members should receive dedicated comprehensive training with respect to interacting with persons with mental illness.  In addition to initial training, there should be ongoing refresher training to ensure that members' skills are current and up to date with the latest developments in regard to interacting with persons with mental illness.

Finding No. 14: While the RCMP has made many positive steps recently to address the issue of interacting with persons with mental illness, current generalized RCMP training is not sufficient to equip RCMP members with the necessary tools to interact with persons with mental illness at an acceptable level in today's society.

Recommendation No. 2: The RCMP should develop comprehensive training in regard to interacting with persons with mental illness and this training should include ongoing refresher training.

FOURTH ISSUE: Whether the RCMP officers involved in the criminal investigation of the members involved in the events of December 27, 2007, complied with the RCMP training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such an investigation, and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and, further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

Initial investigative response

The death of Mr. Klim was investigated by members of the RCMP's "E" Division Southeast District MCU, i.e. members within the same RCMP division and district as the members who were involved in Mr. Klim's death.  Since then, the RCMP has implemented its External Investigation or Review policy, which would now require that the investigation be conducted by another law enforcement agency.Footnote 56  The investigation that was conducted highlights the concerns associated with the RCMP conducting its own investigations and underscores the need for independent external investigations.Footnote 57

Scene security

Constable Brian Evans with the Vernon RCMP General Investigation Section attended the scene at approximately 1:15 p.m., or approximately five minutes after Mr. Klim was shot.  He noted that Constables Veller and Simpson were just leaving the scene together and Constables Drought and Curtis were performing CPR on Mr. Klim.  Constable Szoboticsanec was already at the scene, as she had attended soon after the radio call of "shots fired."  Inspector McVarnock asked Constable Evans to remain at the scene with Constables Drought and Curtis to provide scene security until MCU arrived.  Inspector McVarnock left the scene and returned to the RCMP Detachment.

Constable Kevin Cyr attended the scene soon after the shooting but unfortunately did not have any notes pertaining to his involvement and no statement was taken from him.Footnote 58  There was mention in the investigative materials that he prepared a timeline of events for an initial briefing but there is no further information with respect to this or his involvement.  Failure to conduct any meaningful investigation of a member who attends the scene soon after a police-involved shooting is not a good investigative practice.

Both Constables Szoboticsanec and Cyr provided some assistance with scene security but left after approximately one half hour.  Constable Curtis remained at the scene and assisted Constable Evans with scene security until approximately 2:20 p.m., when Constable Curtis was asked to return to the RCMP Detachment by Constable Anderson, the acting Watch Commander.  Sergeant Dean Filipchuk with the Southeast District MCU attended the scene at approximately 3:40 p.m. and took over control of the scene.  A scene security log was not started until 4:13 p.m.

Constable Curtis was one of the members involved in the events that resulted in Mr. Klim's death.  Members involved in a major police incident may be required to secure the scene due to circumstances beyond their control, for example due to the unavailability of other non-involved members to take over scene security.  As soon as a non-involved member is available to take over scene security, the involved member should be removed from the scene. Footnote 59 In this case, additional members not involved in the death of Mr. Klim arrived soon after the shooting.  Nonetheless, Constable Curtis continued to provide scene security. Inspector McVarnock should have ensured that Constable Curtis was removed from the scene at the earliest opportunity.

Finding No. 15: It was improper for Constable Curtis to remain at the scene to provide scene security.

Finding No. 16: Inspector McVarnock should have removed Constable Curtis from the scene at the earliest opportunity, given that he was involved in the circumstances that resulted in Mr. Klim's death.

Discussion between RCMP members

 The RCMP members involved in the death of Mr. Klim had opportunities to discuss the events amongst themselves in the time period immediately following the shooting.  Constable Forslund sat in a police car with his trainer, Constable Garner, soon after the shooting.  According to Constable Garner, they then returned to the RCMP Detachment and waited in a briefing room for the Staff Relations Representative (SRR) to arrive.  Constable Veller obtained a ride back to the Detachment with Constable Simpson.  Constable Drought went to the hospital with Mr. Klim, while Constable Curtis remained at the scene for a period of time after Mr. Klim was transported to the hospital.

Inspector McVarnock stated that after it was learned that Mr. Klim had succumbed to his injuries, he met with the members who had been involved who he described as "quite distraught" and "offered [his] support over a period of an hour."  Inspector McVarnock was asked if he gave the members any direction regarding interviews or statements.  He stated that he did not but told them that about the Member/Employee Assistance Program, and that they could get assistance from a SRR.

One or more of the members did meet with a SRR before being interviewed by investigators.Footnote 60  All of the members who attended Mr. Klim's residence to apprehend him on December 27, 2007, except for Inspector McVarnock, refused to provide statements until after they had obtained legal advice.  Inspector McVarnock provided a statement to investigators on December 27, 2007.

In September 2010 the Deputy Commissioner, Contract and Aboriginal Policing, informed the CPC of the new RCMP Responsibility to Report policy.  This policy covers the responsibilities of RCMP members involved in major police incidents "where there is a serious injury or death of an individual involving an RCMP member, or where it appears that an RCMP member may have contravened a provision of the Criminal Code or other statute and the matter is of a serious or sensitive nature."Footnote 61

The policy addresses areas including: identification of an on-scene supervisor; identification of suspect members and subject/non-subject witness members; and a member's "Responsibility to Report" (formerly referred to as the duty to account) immediately with a preliminary report, with no allowance for meeting before such report with an SRR, and with a detailed report within 10 days.  While the impact of these policy changes remains to be seen, I am satisfied that no further recommendations in this regard are necessary at the present time.

Finding No. 17: It was improper for the RCMP members involved in the death of Mr. Klim to meet alone together before being interviewed by investigators.

Finding No. 18: It was improper for the RCMP members involved in the death of Mr. Klim to meet alone with the SRR before reporting on their actions.

Criminal investigation

The RCMP's investigation clearly involved significant effort and, at a casual glance, appears to have been reasonably thorough.  An Independent Officer Review concluded that the investigation was "thorough and exhaustive with appropriate oversight and guidance provided."  It further concluded that the investigation "has been conducted in a very thorough, professional and unbiased manner."  On closer examination, however, there are several deficiencies in the investigation that do not support such a conclusion. These deficiencies are outlined below.

Failure to determine the location of the knives

Mr. Klim was observed to have two knives in his hands as he advanced towards the RCMP members.  Constable Simpson stated that Mr. Klim dropped the knives after he was shot.  Constable Simpson then threw the knives away from Mr. Klim but he was unsure where they ended up.  Constables Curtis and Veller did not see the knives after Mr. Klim was shot, Constable Forslund did not see the knives after Mr. Klim came out of the bedroom with them in his hands, and Inspector McVarnock did not know what became of the knives Mr. Klim was holding but confirmed that nobody touched anything.

Constable Drought, who entered the apartment soon after Mr. Klim was shot and performed CPR on him, did not see any knives around Mr. Klim.  Constable Garner confirmed that she did not see any knives but clarified that she did not actually enter the apartment.  The RCMP investigators did not question the Emergency Health Services personnel who attended the apartment about the location of the knives.  When asked by Commission staff about the issue of the location of the knives, the RCMP confirmed that the scene would have been made safe before the Emergency Health Services personnel were allowed to enter the scene.

The forensic examination of Mr. Klim's apartment did not locate any knives in the hallway.  A steak knife was located on the coffee table in the living room and three knives were located on the counter in the kitchen: a steak knife, a serrated bread knife type and a butcher knife type.  There is a reference in the investigative briefing notes on December 29, 2007, that "[l]ocation of knives explained" but there is no further documentation about what the explanation was.  This issue was not further considered by the RCMP either as part of the investigation into Mr. Klim's death or as part of the RCMP's investigation into the Chair-initiated complaint.

The basis for shooting Mr. Klim was because he was advancing towards RCMP members with knives in his hands.  Accordingly, the location of the knives is a critical piece of evidence that should have been examined in detail.  While the evidence may not have been sufficient to determine how the knives ended up on the counter in the kitchen, the issue warranted some comment in the RCMP's investigation to confirm that the RCMP was aware of the issue and to outline its conclusion.

Post-it note not investigated

Constable Forslund received information from Mr. Klim's mental health worker on December 27, 2007, and recorded the information on a post-it note, which he provided with the warrant file to Constable Anderson.  This information formed a significant basis for the RCMP's conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the act of committing suicide.  Accordingly, it was critical information.  The RCMP did not investigate the post-it note in any capacity, either as part of the investigation into Mr. Klim's death or as part of the RCMP's investigation into the Chair-initiated complaint.  When asked by the CPC if any efforts were made to obtain the post-it note, the RCMP replied: "If the post-it note was of significant value an exhibit would have been made of it. If the note is not on the exhibit list, then it is unlikely a copy exists."

The post-it note is not an exhibit so it follows that the RCMP determined that it was not of significant value.  Given the post-it note contained critical information about Mr. Klim and was recorded contemporaneously with Constable Forslund's receipt of the information, I do not agree that the post-it note did not have significant value.  The RCMP investigator should have attempted to obtain the post-it note and, if it was not obtainable, should have explained why this was the case.

Failure to examine the prior incident where Mr. Klim was apprehended

Mr. Klim had previously been apprehended by the RCMP in an incident where a CEW was deployed.  As discussed above, this incident formed the basis for the various beliefs by RCMP members that Mr. Klim was prone to fighting with the police.  Given the heavy reliance that was placed on this incident, the RCMP's investigation should have reviewed this file as part of its investigation of Mr. Klim's death.  It is difficult to appreciate why this prior incident was not reviewed by the RCMP at any point, and failure to do so evinces a lack of thoroughness in the RCMP's investigation of Mr. Klim's death.

Editing of police file

The warrant to apprehend Mr. Klim was contained in Vernon RCMP file no. 2007-33863.  This is the file that contains Constable Burns' report about attending Mr. Klim's residence on December 19, 2007.  More than one version of the file was provided to the Commission as part of the relevant material for the Chair-initiated complaint.  The RCMP's file was updated on January 30, 2008 by the Rural Operations Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), since retired, who recorded: "Synopsis has been updated to reflect present status and as result previous information has been deleted." To understand what was deleted, the two versions were compared.

The original report prepared by Constable Burns reads as follows:

On 2007-12-19 at approximately 15:00 hrs Constable BURNS and Constable CURTIS attended Apt 102 a 3800 27th ave to execute a form 21 MHA Warrant. Members unable to locate KLIM. Members obtained master key to KLIM's residence from Apt 201, made entry and observed several knives in apt. Members advised family in town looking for KLIM to assist in getting him to hospital. KLIM has several PIRS entries for attempted suicide. KLIM suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and is known to be off of his meds at this time.

The edited version reads:

On 2007-12-19 Constable CURTIS and Constable BURNS responded to request to attend KLIM's residence for a MHA warrant. Due to the report that KLIM was suicidal police gained access to the room via key from the manager who was on scene at the time. Cst. CURTIS and BURNS searched the residence but did not locate KLIM. In that apartment it was noted by police that there were several knives laying around the apartment. As police were leaving they spoke with one of KLIM's family member who stated that KLIM had a knife fetish and had fought with police before where a taser had been used.

As can be seen, the information referring to Mr. Klim being suicidal, fighting with the police and having a knife "fetish" was not contained in the original report prepared by Constable Burns.Footnote 62  The edited version of file number 2007-33863 appears to "heighten" the information arising from the attendance to Mr. Klim's residence on December 19, 2007, information that was not originally conveyed by Constable Burns or Constable Curtis at the time. 

When asked about the rationale for the revisions and whether or not it was investigated, the RCMP replied that "[u]nder PRIME rules a synopsis is a "living" document. It is created in the first instance affording the purpose for the call for service then "updated" during the progression of the investigation."Footnote 63  While the need to include relevant updates is understandable, in my view, updating a record to reflect current status should not contemplate altering the record so that it becomes misleading.

In this instance, the alterations made had the effect of causing the information contained in the edited version of the report dated December 19, 2007, to appear misleading.  This edited version was the first given to the Commission as part of the RCMP's provision of all relevant material to accompany its Final Report.  The original unedited version, also dated December 19, 2007, was not provided to the CPC until much later, when the CPC requested the entire MCU file.  At that point, it became clear that the file had been edited and that the original version provided to the CPC was not an accurate record of Constable Burns' documentation.  Instead, it was an altered version prepared by the Rural Operations NCO with the benefit of information not received until well after December 19, 2007, the ostensible date of the record, and even after Mr. Klim's death.

Such alteration is a poor practice, fraught with risk, and should be avoided because it affects the integrity of the information that is recorded.  While the alterations in this case were relatively minor, and based in part on information that was reportedly known by the members involved but not recorded until after Mr. Klim had been shot, it is not difficult to foresee how editing original documentation in serious cases can raise concerns about the perception of bias.  To ensure that this does not occur, the RCMP should examine its documentation policy and amend it as necessary to ensure that original documentation in major cases is not subsequently altered. While it is appropriate to maintain a "current status" on file, the original information should also be retained in an unaltered state.

Recommendation No. 3: The RCMP should examine its documentation policy and amend it as necessary to ensure that original documentation in major cases is retained.

Use of force report

The RCMP obtained a use of force report from Mr. Kerry Solinski, a retired RCMP member from Southeast District, who was employed as a Public and Police Safety Instructor in Kelowna, British Columbia.  Mr. Solinski is employed by the City of Kelowna and is based out of the Kelowna RCMP Detachment.  It is of concern that the RCMP chose to employ a use of force expert with such close ties, real or perceived, to the Vernon RCMP, having worked in the same district for a good portion of his career and being situated only 50 kilometers away, in Kelowna.  There was no information concerning how the RCMP chose Mr. Solinksi to prepare the use of force report.

The CPC discussed the issue of the appointment of use of force experts in its report relating to the police-involved shooting of Kevin St. Arnaud.Footnote 64  The CPC found that "[t]he selection process for use of force experts gives rise to the possibility of real or perceived bias" and recommended its Interim Report dated October 29, 2008, that the RCMP "should streamline its appointment process for use of force experts and ensure transparency by establishing a set protocol for appointments."  The Commissioner of the RCMP agreed with the recommendation in March 2009, but to date I am not aware of any changes by the RCMP with respect to the appointment of use of force experts.

I reiterate the recommendation to establish a set protocol for the appointment of experts.

Finding No. 19: The RCMP appointed a use of force expert with close ties, real or perceived, to the Vernon RCMP Detachment.

Recommendation No. 4: I reiterate the recommendation from the CPC's report regarding the police-involved shooting death of Kevin St. Arnaud that "[t]he RCMP should streamline its appointment process for use of force experts and ensure transparency by establishing a set protocol for appointments."

An investigation that, intentionally or otherwise, fails to address key issues risks inadequacy.  There were numerous deficiencies in the RCMP's investigation into Mr. Klim's death that affected the adequacy of the investigation, although, in my view, had no impact on the determination of the lawfulness of the police use of force.  Despite the foregoing, the deficiencies noted are inconsistent with a thorough and effective investigation.  Major Case Management investigations are managed by the Major Case Management Team, consisting of the Team Commander, Primary Investigator and File Coordinator.  Accordingly, the responsibility for the deficiencies noted lies with the Major Case Management Team.  The Major Case Management Team should review the deficiencies noted with the "E" Division Criminal Operations Officer.

I would add that the Independent Officer Review, which was cursory, characterized the criminal investigation as "thorough and exhaustive."  Given the patent investigational deficiencies I have noted in the preceding sections, I cannot help but conclude that the poor criminal investigation was aggravated by an equally poor Independent Officer Review which lacked thoroughness.  The independent reviewing officer, Staff Sergeant Allemekinders, should also review the deficiencies noted with the "E" Division Criminal Operations Officer.

Finding No. 20: The RCMP's investigation into Mr. Klim's death was deficient in numerous respects but was adequate to conclude that the shooting of Mr. Klim was lawful in the circumstances.

Finding No. 21: The RCMP's Independent Officer Review, which failed to note any investigative deficiencies, was poor and lacked thoroughness.

Recommendation No. 5: The "E" Division Criminal Operations Officer should review with the Major Case Management Team as well as Staff Sergeant Allemekinders the investigational deficiencies noted.

Timeliness of the investigation

The RCMP's investigation commenced immediately after Mr. Klim's death and appears to have reached an early conclusion that Mr. Klim's death was primarily due to his own actions.  The RCMP's investigation pursued many investigative avenues that were appropriate given the circumstances and was conducted using Major Case Management principles.Footnote 65  The investigation generally consisted of the following:

  • Interviews of police witnesses, including the subject members and other members involved in apprehending Mr. Klim.
  • Interviews of non-police witnesses, including members of Mr. Klim's family, other tenants and the manager of Mr. Klim's building, mental health workers, Emergency Health Services, Mr. Klim's doctor and Mr. Klim's psychiatrist.
  • Examination of the training records for the subject members.
  • Seizure of exhibits, including the pistols used by Constable Forslund and Constable Veller to shoot Mr. Klim, the CEW used by Constable Curtis, RCMP radio and 911 communications, knives located in Mr. Klim's apartment and various other items from Mr. Klim's apartment and belonging to Mr. Klim.
  • Forensic examination of the scene and exhibits.
  • Expert reports, including a Use of Force Report.
  • Autopsy of Mr. Klim.

The RCMP's investigation proceeded in a timely manner.  Witness statements were obtained at the earliest opportunity (though delayed in the case of the actual members involved in the death of Mr. Klim due to their invoking their right to counsel), and forensic examinations and reports were conducted as soon as practicable.  The investigation was essentially complete by early March 2008. 

Finding No. 22: The RCMP's investigation of Mr. Klim's death was conducted in a timely manner.

Comment Regarding the RCMP's Review of Member Conduct

The investigation did not consider in any meaningful way whether or not the actions of the RCMP members involved contributed to Mr. Klim's death.  Although it may be unusual for such factors to be considered in a strictly criminal investigation, at some point, the RCMP should have given consideration to this issue.  Such consideration would normally be part of the Independent Officer Review and the Chair-initiated complaint investigation.  In both cases, the RCMP found no fault with the actions of the RCMP members involved in Mr. Klim's death.  As this report highlights, I do not agree with this assessment.

There is no indication that a Code of Conduct investigation was considered in regard to the members involved in the death of Mr. Klim.  The Independent Officer Review simply noted that no Code of Conduct investigation was ordered and, upon review of the complete investigation, the independent reviewing officer agreed with that decision.  Given the various shortcomings identified in this report, a Code of Conduct investigation could have been considered to assess whether or not the actions of the members involved in the death of Mr. Klim reached the threshold to initiate either formal or informal discipline.

The issue of considering if the threshold for initiating a Code of Conduct investigation has been met was discussed recently in the Commission's report in the Simon matter, cited above.  In that case, the RCMP only initiated a Code of Conduct investigation after the time limitation to do so had expired.  Although the RCMP has recently released a directive concerning Code of Conduct investigations, the Commission recommended in its report "[t]hat the RCMP consider adopting into RCMP policy a formalized process involving division Internal Services to ensure timely notifications and to ensure the proper documentation of decisions during the consultative process of Part IV in order to preserve the decision-making rationale involved."Footnote 66

The Commission noted in its report related to the death of Mr. Simon:

. . . it is not within the Commission's remit to impose discipline on members of the RCMP. That is an internal RCMP matter.  Moreover, the issue that I must consider is not whether the correct decision was made in not initiating Code of Conduct proceedings.  Rather, I must determine whether the question was adequately considered and decided on, and accordingly, whether the decision not to initiate Code of Conduct proceedings was reasonable in the circumstances.  It is at its core, therefore, a matter of assessing member conduct.Footnote 67

The Commission noted in the Simon case that the main difficulty in assessing the reasonableness of the decision not to initiate disciplinary proceedings is that the Commission was not provided with any information to assess the conduct of members involved in addressing conduct matters.  These comments are equally applicable to the circumstances involving Mr. Klim's death.

In his response to the Commission in respect of the Simon case, the RCMP Commissioner stated:

I support the recommendation that the RCMP consider adopting into policy a formalized process to ensure timely notifications and to ensure the proper documentation of decisions during the consultative process of matters under Part IV of the RCMP Act. . . . [T]he Senior Deputy Commissioner of the RCMP recently issued a directive to all Commanding Officers requiring that the Professional Integrity Officer be notified of Code of Conduct investigations and emphasizing the requirement to articulate decisions on whether or not to proceed with Code of Conduct investigations.  The RCMP will undertake a policy review to examine mechanisms that could further refine the formal decision-making process relating to discipline, in order to promote consistency and proper documentation.

In light of these developments, I see no need for further recommendations in this regard.  I look forward to being apprised of the results of the RCMP's policy review, and am of the opinion that the new directive will assist in ensuring that the appropriateness of initiating Code of Conduct investigations is duly considered and articulated.

Comment Regarding the RCMP's Public Complaint Investigation

Many of the issues raised in this report have been raised in previous reports by the CPC in other police-involved deaths of persons.  The CPC's report on Ian Bush was only released approximately one month prior to the death of Mr. Klim, while the CPC reports relating to Mr. Kevin St. Arnaud and Mr. Robert Dziekanski were released well after.  To some degree, it is understandable that many of the repeated issues had not really progressed in a positive manner at the time of Mr. Klim's death.

The same understanding cannot be extended to the RCMP's investigation of this Chair-initiated complaint.  The RCMP's Final Report was completed well after the CPC's reports in the Bush, St. Arnaud and Dziekanski cases were released.  Notwithstanding having the benefit of identification of various issues applicable to police-involved deaths, the RCMP's Final Report failed to identify many of the issues discussed in this report.

It should be noted that while the complaint was initiated in January 2008 by the then Chair of the Commission, it was investigated by the RCMP pursuant to the provisions of the RCMP Act.Footnote 68  Although the RCMP's "criminal" investigation was essentially completed in March 2008, the RCMP's Final Report relating to the Chair-initiated complaint was not completed until May 2010, over two years later.

The Chair-initiated complaint was initially assigned to an investigator in May 2008 but the member retired in January 2009 and the investigation had to be reassigned to another investigator in February 2009.  Despite assurances that the investigator anticipated completing the investigation in the near future, this did not occur and the CPC made regular requests to the RCMP for the investigation to be treated as a priority and completed.  Once completed, the RCMP's investigation of the Chair-initiated complaint totally misunderstood the clear wording of the fourth allegation.

The wording of the CPC's fourth allegation was as follows:

Whether the RCMP officers involved in the criminal investigation of the members involved in the events of December 27, 2007, complied with the RCMP training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such an investigation, and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and, further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

The RCMP's Final Report restated the fourth allegation as:

Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such investigation and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

As can be seen, the RCMP's Final Report replaced the CPC wording relating to "the RCMP officers involved in the criminal investigation of the members involved in the events of December 27, 2007" with "the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Klim's death . . . ."  This is a much different allegation.  Accordingly, the RCMP's investigation of the Chair-initiated complaint and ensuing Final Report failed to consider the issues associated with the investigation of Mr. Klim's death.

The death of any person that involves members of the RCMP is serious and should be treated as a priority by the RCMP.  The priority granted to these types of major incidents should not only apply to the RCMP's initial investigation but also to subsequent investigations related to the incident, including those that arise under the provisions of Part VII of the RCMP Act relating to public complaints.

Finding No. 23: The RCMP did not treat the Chair-initiated complaint investigation with an appropriate degree of priority.

Conclusion

Mr. Klim's death should not have occurred in the manner that it did. While it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the outcome could have been avoided, the approach taken by the RCMP members to apprehend Mr. Klim lacked coordination, foresight, and direction.  The members failed to adequately consider the existing situation or the relevant underlying facts, resulting in a highly aggressive initial approach.  Compounding the lack of appropriate coordination was the inherent uncertainty presented by Mr. Klim, who suffered from a mental health illness, and the members' failure to consider or seek any additional information in his respect.  While the consequence of the members' actions was certainly unintended, better informed and more coordinated planning may have gone some way in avoiding their tragic outcome. 

Having considered the complaint, I hereby submit my Interim Report in accordance with paragraph 45.42(3)(a) of the RCMP Act.

Ian McPhail, Q.C.
Interim Chair

Appendix A: Chair-Initiated Public Complaint: Shooting Death of Christopher Klim, Vernon, B.C., December 27, 2007

January 21, 2008

File: PC 2008-0171

As Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, I am initiating a complaint into the conduct of those RCMP members present at, and engaged in, the apprehension and shooting death of Mr. Christopher Klim in Vernon, B.C. on December 27, 2007.

The facts as presently known indicate that on December 27, 2007, RCMP members were executing a warrant issued pursuant to British Columbia's Mental Health Act. During the apprehension Mr. Klim is alleged to have produced at least one knife and threatened the officers. Officers responded with verbal commands and deployed a conducted energy weapon, with limited effect. As the event escalated, officers fearing for their safety responded with deadly force. Mr. Klim was shot and died as a result of his injuries.

I am initiating this complaint with the full appreciation that the RCMP has deployed its "E" Division South East District Major Crime Unit to investigate the incident, that it will be initiating an Independent Officer Review to assess the conduct of involved members, and that no decision has been taken in respect of the laying of criminal charges. It is not my intention to prejudice the RCMP investigations. However, I will be closely monitoring RCMP progress as it relates to the investigations under way so that I can ensure, at their completion, a timely response to this complaint.

It is of note that the CPC Independent Observer Program was engaged at the outset of the RCMP investigation to assess the impartiality of the RCMP members assigned to investigate this incident and will, as circumstances dictate, continue its monitoring activity to ensure that the required impartiality is maintained.

I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to investigate the circumstances surrounding the shooting death of Mr. Klim. Accordingly, pursuant to subsection 45.37(1) of the RCMP Act, I am initiating a complaint into the conduct of the RCMP officers involved in this incident, as well as matters of general practice applicable to situations in which RCMP members respond to individuals who are in a state of mental health crisis. Specifically:

  1. Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of initial deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody;
  2. Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of initial deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force;
  3. Whether the RCMP national, divisional and detachment-level policies, procedures and guidelines relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis, and/or being apprehended under mental health legislation are adequate; and
  4. Whether the RCMP officers involved in the criminal investigation of the members involved in the events of December 27, 2007 complied with the RCMP training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such an investigation and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and, further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

Appendix B: Summary of Commission Findings and Recommendations

Finding No. 1: The RCMP initially responded to the warrant for Mr. Klim's apprehension in an appropriate and timely manner.

Finding No. 2: The RCMP did not take any meaningful action to apprehend Mr. Klim between December 19 and 27, 2007.

Finding No. 3: There is insufficient information to determine whether or not the failure to take any meaningful action to apprehend Mr. Klim between December 19 and 27, 2007, was improper.

Finding No. 4: The RCMP's risk assessment was based on inaccurate and exaggerated information regarding Mr. Klim's prior involvement with the police.

Finding No. 5: The conclusion that Mr. Klim was in the process of committing fatal or serious bodily harm to himself is not supported by the available information, and the risk assessment that relied on this conclusion was flawed.

Finding No. 6: The plan to apprehend Mr. Klim lacked appropriate clarity and direction.

Finding No. 7: Constable Anderson and Inspector McVarnock should have recognized that the plan to apprehend Mr. Klim lacked appropriate direction.

Finding No. 8: The tactical entry into Mr. Klim's apartment was excessive and inappropriate in the circumstances.

Finding No. 9: The RCMP should have considered calling Emergency Health Services to attend Mr. Klim's apartment to be on standby.

Finding No. 11: Constable Curtis' use of the CEW was reasonable and consistent with RCMP policy.

Finding No. 12: Inspector McVarnock, who was not in uniform, unreasonably remained in close proximity to Mr. Klim as Mr. Klim advanced towards the RCMP members with knives in his hands. This action jeopardized his safety and impacted the ability of the other RCMP members to control the situation.

Finding No. 13: Constables Veller and Forslund reasonably believed that their lives were in jeopardy, and accordingly, their use of lethal force was reasonable and consistent with the relevant law and RCMP policy.

Finding No. 14: While the RCMP has made many positive steps recently to address the issue of interacting with persons with mental illness, current generalized RCMP training is not sufficient to equip RCMP members with the necessary tools to interact with persons with mental illness at an acceptable level in today's society.

Finding No. 15: It was improper for Constable Curtis to remain at the scene to provide scene security.

Finding No. 16: Inspector McVarnock should have removed Constable Curtis from the scene at the earliest opportunity, given that he was involved in the circumstances that resulted in Mr. Klim's death.

Finding No. 17: It was improper for the RCMP members involved in the death of Mr. Klim to meet alone together before being interviewed by investigators.

Finding No. 18: It was improper for the RCMP members involved in the death of Mr. Klim to meet alone with the SRR before reporting on their actions.

Finding No. 19: The RCMP appointed a use of force expert with close ties, real or perceived, to the Vernon RCMP Detachment.

Finding No. 20: The RCMP's investigation into Mr. Klim's death was deficient in numerous respects but was adequate to conclude that the shooting of Mr. Klim was lawful in the circumstances.

Finding No. 21: The RCMP's Independent Officer Review, which failed to note any investigative deficiencies, was poor and lacked thoroughness.

Finding No. 22: The RCMP's investigation of Mr. Klim's death was conducted in a timely manner.

Finding No. 23: The RCMP did not treat the Chair-initiated complaint investigation with an appropriate degree of priority.

Recommendation No. 1: Constable Anderson and Inspector McVarnock should receive training in appropriate risk assessment and in critical planning and management.

Recommendation No. 2: The RCMP should develop comprehensive training in regard to interacting with persons with mental illness and this training should include ongoing refresher training.

Recommendation No. 3: The RCMP should examine its documentation policy and amend it as necessary to ensure that original documentation in major cases is retained.

Recommendation No. 4: I reiterate the recommendation from the CPC's report regarding the police-involved shooting death of Kevin St. Arnaud that "[t]he RCMP should streamline its appointment process for use of force experts and ensure transparency by establishing a set protocol for appointments."

Recommendation No. 5: The "E" Division Criminal Operations Officer should review with the Major Case Management Team as well as Staff Sergeant Allemekinders the investigational deficiencies noted.

Appendix C: RCMP Final Report

Original Report [PDF, 1.89MB]

Security

Inspector R. Flewelling
Operations Officer
Kelowna Detachment
350 Doyle Ave., Kelowna, B.C. V1Y 6V

Mr. Ian McPhail – Office of the Chair
Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP
Bag Service 1722, Station B
Ottawa, Ont.
K1P 0B3

Your File – Votre référence
PC-2008-0171

Our File – Notre référence
2009-5990

Date
May 3, 2010

Dear Mr. McPhail:

On January 21, 2008, the Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police lodged a complaint with the Commission regarding the conduct of the RCMP members of Vernon Detachment engaged in the apprehension and shooting death of Mr. Christopher Paul Klim on December 27, 2007. An investigation into the death of Mr. Christopher Klim was conducted by the South East District Major Crime Unit and lead by Sergeant Sam Ghadban.

This investigation had three overseers:

  1. Mr. Larry Smith of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
  2. Detective Chris Mathews of the Major Crime Unit, Calgary Police Service;
  3. Sergeant Peter Jadis of EDIV Investigative Standards Unit.

An Independent Officer Review was conducted by Inspector Dan Fudge (now retired).

I have had an opportunity to review, in its entirety, the investigation conducted by the investigators from the South East District Major Crime Unit and the evidence presented during the Coroner's Inquest. I am now able to comment on the concerns which you have raised.

Background Information

On December 18, 2007, Mr. Stephen Fitzpatrick, a mental health worker with the Vernon Mental Health Unit, had the Director issue a Mental Health Warrant (Form 21) for his client, Mr. Christopher Paul Klim. Mr. Stephen Fitzpatrick's grounds for the warrant were based on Mr. Christopher Klim's ongoing refusal to take his anti-psychotic medication, delusions, recent self-inflicted wounds and his history of attempted suicide. Mr. Stephen Fitzpatrick believed Mr. Christopher Klim was a danger to himself and others, specifically Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents, Mr. Harry Klim and Mrs. Shirley Davis-Klim of Vernon, BC.

On December 19, 2007 at 3:00 p.m., Constable Charlie Burns and Constable Colin Curtis, both members of the Vernon RCMP Detachment, attended Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment situated at 102-3800 27th Avenue, Vernon, to execute the warrant. The members were unable to locate Mr. Christopher Klim that day. They obtained a key from the property manager and entered the suite. They located some knives laying around inside the suite. This is believed to be the only attempt to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim prior to December 27, 2007.

On December 27, 2007, Mr. Richard Jameson, a community support worker with Mental Health, returned a call to Mr. Harry Klim and Mrs. Shirley Davis-Klim, Christopher Klim's grandparents. They inquired as to the status of the Mental Health Act warrant for their grandson. Mr. Richard Jameson explained the efforts made by persons from his office and the police to execute the warrant. Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents told Mr. Richard Jameson they had been to Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment on Christmas Day. They did not get out of their vehicle due to Mr. Christopher Klim's behaviour. Mrs. Shirley Davis-Klim observed cuts on his face in the shape of a cross. They gave Mr. Christopher Klim money for Christmas and then departed. Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents had just received a telephone call from Mr. Christopher Klim, made from his apartment. They knew Mr. Christopher Klim was due for another injection of his medication for schizophrenia. Mr. Christopher Klim asked for money and they refused. Mr. Christopher Klim became belligerent and verbally aggressive.

Mr. Richard Jameson called the Vernon Detachment and spoke to Constable Andrew Forslund. Mr. Richard Jameson learned that Mr. Christopher Klim remained at large. Mr. Richard Jameson told Constable Andrew Forslund that he had just spoken with Mr. Harry Klim and Mrs. Shirley Davis-Klim, Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents, and it appeared Mr. Christopher Klim's self-harming behaviour was escalating and they were concerned. Mr. Richard Jameson was aware that Mr. Christopher Klim had a history of self-harm (cutting) with recent injuries to his hands and neck. Mr. Richard Jameson told Constable Andrew Forslund that Mr. Christopher Klim was at his apartment.

Mr. Richard Jameson called the hospital and learned that Mr. Christopher Klim was a direct admit to psychiatry. Mr. Richard Jameson then called the Vernon Detachment and informed Constable Andrew Forslund that Mr. Christopher Klim was a direct admit. Constable Andrew Forslund informed Constable Mike Anderson, the acting Watch Commander, of the content of his conversation with Mr. Richard Jameson. Constable Mike Anderson gathered Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Amanda Garner and Constable Richard Drought, all of the Vernon Detachment, then held a short briefing and developed a strategy to apprehend and transport Mr. Christopher Klim to the hospital.

Inspector Steve McVarnock, the Officer in Charge of the Vernon Detachment, was in the detachment on his day off. He overheard the members planning the arrest and gave some strategic advice during the briefing. Constable Andrew Forslund provided a history of police intervention with Mr. Christopher Klim. Constable Colin Curtis provided a sketch of the interior of Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment, as he had been inside of the apartment on December 19, 2007.

Constable Colin Curtis secured a Conducted Energy Weapon from the equipment locker, as Mr. Christopher Klim was known to fight with police. Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Amanda Garner, Constable Richard Drought and Inspector Steve McVarnock departed for Mr. Christopher Klim's residence.

At approximately 1:00 p.m., the members arrived at Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock was the only member not dressed in a RCMP working uniform, but in civilian attire. Constable Mike Anderson, the acting Watch Commander, remained at the detachment.

Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and Inspector Steve McVarnock positioned themselves just outside the door to Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Amanda Garner and Constable Richard Drought were positioned outside the doors at the back of Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment maintaining visual of the patio door and bedroom window of the apartment.

Constable Mike Anderson was contacted and informed Constable Amanda Garner, Constable Richard Drought, Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and Inspector Steve McVarnock were in the designated positions. Constable Mike Anderson placed a telephone call to Mr. Christopher Klim's residence to talk Mr. Christopher Klim into exiting his apartment without incident, then to be transported to the Vernon Hospital. Constable Mike Anderson let the phone in Mr. Christopher Klim's residence ring but no one answered. The ringing of the telephone was heard by members at the apartment.

Since Mr. Christopher Klim did not answer the telephone Constable Colin Curtis knocked on the door. The concern was that Mr. Christopher Klim had harmed or was causing himself harm. At the direction of Inspector Steve McVarnock, Constable Kenneth Simpson used the purging tool to force open the apartment door. Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Andrew Forslund and Constable Kenneth Simpson entered the apartment. Constable Kurt Veller announced them as, "Police." Constable Colin Curtis had the Conducted Energy Weapon drawn. Inspector Steve McVarnock remained in the hallway near the apartment door. Constable Richard Drought and Constable Amanda Garner maintained the outside perimeter of the apartment.

The members commenced to "clear" the apartment. The term "clear" refers to the physical search of a given structure, dwelling or area for person(s). During this process members are not only looking for persons, but also for items which could place the members' safety at risk; in this instance, knives.

Constable Colin Curtis "cleared" the kitchen. Constable Colin Curtis proceeded from the kitchen to the dining room and called out to the others that the kitchen was "clear". He called out that the dining room was "clear", then proceeded to the living room. Constable Colin Curtis observed a knife lying on the coffee table in the living room. Constable Kenneth Simpson had joined up with him and the two of them noticed the telephone was ringing. Constable Colin Curtis and Constable Kenneth Simpson "cleared" the livingroom.

Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund had "cleared" a large hallway closet and the bathroom. As he peered into the bedroom Constable Kurt Veller noticed Mr. Christopher Klim's feet on the bed. Constable Kurt Veller called out that Mr. Christopher Klim was in the bedroom. Mr. Christopher Klim sat up, at which time Constable Kurt Veller noticed a knife in Mr. Christopher Klim's hand. Mr. Christopher Klim stood up, which brought the second knife in his other hand into view. Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund yelled out, "Show me your hands; drop the knife," and, ". . . knife, knife, knife."

The repeated calling out of the knife is in accordance with their officer safety training to alert the other officers in the area that there is a threat to their personal safety.

Constable Colin Curtis noticed Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund were in the bedroom. Constable Colin Curtis raised the Conducted Energy Weapon. Constable Colin Curtis was not able to get past Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund so he repositioned. Constable Colin Curtis took up a position behind the kitchen counter, then aimed the Conducted Energy Weapon at Mr. Christopher Klim. Mr. Christopher Klim was standing just inside the bedroom door but in view of Constable Colin Curtis. Constable Colin Curtis noted Mr. Christopher Klim had a large knife in his left hand and a second one in his right hand. Mr. Christopher Klim went into a bladed stance, also referred to as a 'fighting' stance, then moved toward the hallway.

The term "fighting stance", also known as "bladed stance", occurs when a person has their feet shoulder width apart with one foot positioned to the front and the other foot to the rear, with their hands either open handed or closed fist. One hand or fist would be slightly extended out front between chest and chin height. The person's dominant hand or fist would be in a lower position closer to their body. This stance affords stability and faster ability to attack or defend.

Constable Kurt Veller repositioned to the livingroom hallway where he had a clear view of the bedroom door. Constable Andrew Forslund repositioned and took up a position behind the wall at the kitchen entrance then moved to position himself beside Constable Colin Curtis.

Constable Colin Curtis yelled at Mr. Christopher Klim to drop the knife, that they were there to help. Mr. Christopher Klim told the officer to, "Fuck off", he did not want their help and would not go back to the hospital. Constable Colin Curtis was being covered by Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund, who had their service pistols drawn and who maintained 'lethal overwatch' on Constable Colin Curtis.

"Lethal overwatch" is a term given to a second person who is providing backup to the primary person. In situations where the threat level is high and lethal force may have to be used, this second person is prepared to use lethal force because the first person is not in a position to exercise lethal force.

Constable Colin Curtis focussed the Conducted Energy Weapon's laser sight on Mr. Christopher Klim's 'centre of mass', a term used in reference to a person's chest and upper abdomen area.

Despite the orders to drop the knives, Mr. Christopher Klim refused and appeared to be proceeding toward Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and Inspector Steve McVarnock. Constable Colin Curtis discharged the Conducted Energy Weapon. Constable Colin Curtis saw one probe hit Mr. Christopher Klim in the upper chest area, but he did not see where the other probe hit. The Conducted Energy Weapon was "cycled" (activated). Mr. Christopher Klim retreated back to his bedroom, where he fell on a chair and then onto his bed.

The Conducted Energy Weapon did not have the desired effect on Mr. Christopher Klim, in that it did not disable Mr. Christopher Klim for a sufficient period that the police officers could enter the bedroom and apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim. It was noticed later that the lower probe got hung up in Mr. Christopher Klim's clothing.

Mr. Christopher Klim emerged from the bedroom with a knife still in each hand. Constable Colin Curtis was within eight (8) feet so he cycled the Conducted Energy Weapon a second time. Mr. Christopher Klim appeared angry and agitated, and yelled at the members to get out of his house. Mr. Christopher Klim grabbed at the Conducted Energy Weapon prong in his chest. The members continued to yell for Mr. Christopher Klim to drop the knife. Constable Colin Curtis repositioned in the livingroom to discharge the spent cartridge from the Conducted Energy Weapon and insert a new cartridge. Mr. Christopher Klim pursued Constable Andrew Forslund and Constable Kurt Veller, who retreated and tactically repositioned in the kitchen. Mr. Christopher Klim was making a slashing motion with the knife at Constable Andrew Forslund. In his effort to retreat, Constable Andrew Forslund stumbled and fell to the kitchen floor.

Fearing for the safety of Constable Andrew Forslund and himself, Constable Kurt Veller fired one shot from his service pistol at Mr. Christopher Klim. Almost at the exact moment, Constable Andrew Forslund, also fearing grievous bodily harm or death to himself, fired one shot from his service pistol at Mr. Christopher Klim. The two shots hit Mr. Christopher Klim and lodged in his chest. A third shot was heard moments after the second shot. It was later identified as a second shot fired by Constable Kurt Veller, and was recovered from the kitchen wall.

Mr. Christopher Klim stumbled out of the kitchen and fell to the floor in the hallway. Constable Andrew Forslund immediately broadcast over the police radio that shots were fired and a man was down. Members requested Emergency Health Services ("EHS") to be dispatched immediately and Constable Richard Drought and Constable Colin Curtis began to give Mr. Christopher Klim first aid and CPR.

EHS attendants Samara Den-Breeden and Kathleen Elliman arrived on scene at 1:21 p.m. and transported Mr. Christopher Klim to the Vernon Jubilee Hospital. Advanced lifesaving measures were initiated but Mr. Christopher Klim died. Mr. Christopher Klim was pronounced dead by Doctor J. Croft on December 27, 2007, at 1:55 p.m. The Coroner subsequently changed the time of death to 1:10 p.m., which coincided with the time EHS received the call for assistance.

Corporal Mark Taylor of the Vernon Detachment attended the scene and seized the firearms from Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund. Members from Vernon General Investigation Section attended and secured the scene for Major Crime Unit investigators.

The police officers involved in the incident were taken to the Vernon Detachment where they consulted with a Member Employee Assistance Program representative, the DSSR (Division Representative) and legal counsel.

On December 27, 2007, investigators from the Southeast District Major Crime Unit were dispatched to the shooting and assumed responsibility for the investigation, as per policy. Members from the Office of Investigative Standards and Practices, Mr. Larry Smith from the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP ("CPC"), and Detective Chris Mathews from the Calgary Police Service were involved at the outset to monitor the impartiality and integrity of the investigation.

Summary of Complaints

On January 18, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Garry Bass received correspondence from the Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The correspondence stated the complaint was initiated by the Office of the Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

In the correspondence dated January 21, 2008, the Chair of the Commission noted that the Commission for Public Complaints Independent Observer Program was engaged at the onset of the investigation to assess the impartiality of the RCMP members assigned to investigate this incident and would continue to monitor their activities.

Allegation #1) Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody;

Allegation #2) Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force;

Allegation #3) Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis, and/or being apprehended under mental health legislation are adequate; and

Allegation #4) Whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such investigation and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

Findings of the Investigation

A complete and thorough investigation into the death of Mr. Christopher Klim was completed by the South East District Major Crime Unit with impartial observers from the Office of Investigative Standards and Practices; the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP and the Calgary Police Service. The circumstances of what took place when Vernon Detachment members last dealt with Mr. Christopher Klim were taken from notes, statements and reports contained in the investigation completed by members of the Vernon Detachment and South East District Major Crime Unit. All of these materials and the transcripts of the evidence presented during the Inquest held by the Coroner Service of British Columbia were reviewed during this investigation.

After deliberations on November 14, 2008, at Vernon, B.C., the Coroner's Jury delivered their verdict in the death of Mr. Christopher Klim; categorizing his death as a homicide.

The jury made six recommendations to the Minister of Health and Provincial Health Regions. The jury submitted the following recommendation to the Minister of the Solicitor General:

"That a minimum standard operational and case management policy be developed for all city, municipal and RCMP officers in the province of British Columbia regarding the apprehension of patients and/or clients with mental illness history relative to the following:

  • i) Execution of Mental Health Warrants,
  • ii) Requests for apprehension or assistance to locate missing patients and/or
    clients with mental illness history from hospital settings or otherwise,
  • iii)  More knowledge or training for managing mental health patients."

No direct recommendations were made to the Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in British Columbia, or to the Officer in Charge of the Vernon Detachment or to any of the officers of the Vernon Detachment.

At the termination of the aforementioned processes no criminal liability was identified.

Investigation and Conclusion

There is an overlap as to the information sought and research of the four allegations made by the Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In such cases, I have identified that the information has been provided earlier in this letter. Due to the volume of material to accompany this letter, those materials have been saved onto a compact disc, attached. These materials include, but are not limited to: statements provided by police officers; diagrams made by the officers; photographs of Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment; training summaries for each of the officers who attended the residence of Mr. Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007; copies of relevant policy; copies of relevant statutes, and the verdict at the Coroner's Inquest. I am satisfied that the need to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim was lawful and justified.

Allegation #1:

From the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Christopher Klim's death, the members of the Vernon Detachment of the RCMP complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody. The response to the allegation is broken down into specific areas; training, policy, statutes, and supporting information.

In the Province of British Columbia, first response where violence is known or anticipated is left to the police. Other responding agencies such as paramedics, fire department, home care nurses and mental health workers will not enter residences or areas in these situations until the police have the person(s) under control and the threat to the other responders is believed to be eliminated.

Allegation one directs determination as to whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Christopher Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody.

I am satisfied that the need to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim was lawful and justified.

TRAINING

In order to address training, several aspects had to be examined. The first aspect is the date when the individual attended the National Training Center referred to as Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan. The training curriculum and programs are modified or changed to adhere to changes in legislation, technology, best practices and risk assessment. The training provided to members in Regina is basic training and augmented by a six-month field training program. The six-month field training program had been implemented prior to 1978. All of the members who attended Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment on December 27, 2007, had commenced their basic training in Regina after 1978.

Inspector Steve McVarnock

Inspector Steve McVarnock was the senior member both in rank and service to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock completed his basic training in December of 1981. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Inspector McVarnock had completed are:

  • Emergency Response Team 1989
  • Public and Police Safety Instructor 2002
  • Conducted Energy Weapon User 2004
  • National Incident Commanders 2005
  • Baton / Carotid Control / Oleoresin Capsicum Spray 2005
  • Conducted Energy Weapon Re-Certification 2006

Emergency Response Team training, Public and Police Safety Instructor Training, and National Incident Commanders courses provide training on dealing with situations where public and officer safety are at risk. The training places the emphasis on non-violent apprehension of the subject.

The Conducted Energy Weapon User and re-certification training provides the officer with training on dealing with persons suffering from excited delirium.

The Baton / Carotid Control / Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training provides training of the effects of oleoresin capsicum spray, its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons, including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

Public and Police Safety Officer Instructor is for officers who are trained to instruct the Incident Management Intervention Model. This provides response training based on the subject(s) behaviour, situational factors, officer perception and tactical considerations. The objective of this training is to preserve and protect life, preserve public safety, and officer safety.

Constable Richard Drought

Constable Richard Drought was senior in service of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Richard Drought completed his basic training in May of 1997. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Richard Drought had completed are:

  • Baton / Carotid Control / Oleoresin Capsicum Spray 2005
  • Operational Skills Training 2007
  • Datamaster Certification 2002
  • Alcometer S-L2 Operator 1998

The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training provides training of the effects of oleoresin capsicum spray, its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons, including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

Operational Skills Training is held every three years and is re-certification in firearms; baton / carotid control / Oleoresin capsicum spray; and the Incident Management Intervention Model.

Datamaster Certification training provides training on the effects of intoxicants, more specifically alcohol. As the operation of the instrument requires participation of a test subject who is suspected of being impaired, the training includes verbal articulation to the suspected impaired person.

Alcometer S-L2 Operator training provides training on the effects of alcohol. As the operation of the instrument requires participation of a test subject who is suspected of having consumed alcohol. The training includes verbal articulation.

Constable Mike Anderson

Constable Mike Anderson was the Watch Commander on duty but did not attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Mike Anderson lead the debriefing held at the Vernon Detachment prior to the members attending Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment on December 27, 2007. Constable Mike Anderson completed his basic training in April of 2001. A course relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Mike Anderson had completed was:

  • Conducted Energy Weapon User 2003

The Conducted Energy Weapon User training provides the officer with training on dealing with persons suffering from excited delirium.

Constable Kurt Veller

Constable Kurt Veller was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Kurt Veller completed his basic training in June of 2003. Constable Kurt Veller attended Depot Division in 2003, had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of his graduation requirement.

The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training addresses its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

The Incident Management Intervention Model training provides training to response based on subject's behaviour, situational factors, officer perception and tactical considerations. The objective of this training is to preserve and protect life, preserve public safety, and officer safety. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Kurt Veller had completed are:

  • Conducted Energy Weapon User 2003
  • Datamaster Certification 2006
  • Operational Skills Training 2007

The Conducted Energy Weapon User training provides the officer with training for dealing with persons suffering from excited delirium.

Datamaster Certification training provides training on the effects of intoxicants, more specifically alcohol. As the operation of the instrument requires participation of a test subject who is suspected of being impaired, the training includes verbal articulation to the suspected impaired person.

Operational Skills Training is held every three years and is re-certification in firearms; baton / carotid control / oleoresin capsicum spray; and the Incident Management Intervention Model.

Constable Kenneth Simpson

Constable Kenneth Simpson was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Kenneth Simpson completed his basic training in August of 2005. Constable Kenneth Simpson attended Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2005, and had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of his graduation requirement.

The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training addresses its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons, including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

The Incident Management Intervention Model training provides training to response based on subject's behaviour, situational factors, officer perception and tactical considerations. The objective of this training is to preserve and protect life, preserve public safety, and officer safety.

Constable Amanda Garner

Constable Amanda Garner was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Amanda Garner completed her basic training in August of 2003. While attending Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2003, Constable Amanda Garner had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of her graduation requirement.

The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training addresses its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons, including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

The Incident Management Intervention Model training provides training on response based on subject's behaviour, situational factors, officer perception and tactical considerations. The objective of this training is to preserve and protect life, preserve public safety, and officer safety. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Amanda Garner had completed are:

  • Conducted Energy Weapon User 2004
  • Standardized Field Sobriety 2004
  • Operational Skills Training 2007

The Conducted Energy Weapon User training provides the officer with training on dealing with persons suffering from excited delirium.

Standard Field Sobriety training provides the officer with training on detection through observation of intoxication based on physical skill testing.

Operational Skills Training is held every three years and is re-certification in firearms; baton / carotid control / Oleoresin capsicum spray; and the Incident Management Intervention Model.

Constable Colin Curtis

Constable Colin Curtis was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Colin Curtis completed his basic training in February of 2006. While attending Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2006, Constable Colin Curtis had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of his graduation requirement.

The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training addressed its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

The Incident Management Intervention Model training provides training to response based on subject's behaviour, situational factors, officer perception and tactical considerations. The objective of this training is to preserve and protect life, preserve public safety, and officer safety. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Colin Curtis had completed was:

  • Conducted Energy Weapon User  2007

The Conducted Energy Weapon User training provides the officer with training on dealing with persons suffering from excited delirium.

Constable Andrew Forslund

Constable Andrew Forslund was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Andrew Forslund completed his basic training in October of 2007. While attending Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2007, Constable Andrew Forslund had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of his graduation requirement.

The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training addresses its ineffectiveness on goal-oriented persons including those under the influence of an intoxicant or suffering from a mental disorder. The Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training identifies locations and situations where the use of oleoresin capsicum spray could contaminate the responding member(s).

The Incident Management Intervention Model training provides training on response based on subject's behaviour, situational factors, officer perception and tactical considerations. The objective of this training is to preserve and protect life, preserve public safety, and officer safety.

Each member who attended Mr. Christopher Klim's residence on December 27, 2007, used the training afforded them with the Incident Management Intervention Model. As reported in their statements and evidence to the Coroner Jury, a briefing was held prior to attending Mr. Christopher Klim's residence. Tactical considerations were reviewed during the briefing. Constable Colin Curtis had been in the apartment within the previous two weeks and drew a floor plan so that each member had an understanding of the physical environment they were entering. Specific duties were identified; Constable Colin Curtis was to have the taser and Constable Kenneth Simpson was to have the purging tool. Constable Mike Anderson, who ran the briefing, ensured all personnel who were attending Mr. Christopher Klim's residence were aware of the warrant issued in accordance with the Mental Health Act; the content of the telephone call from Mr. Christopher Klim's mental health case worker, and of Mr. Christopher Klim's history of self-harm and violence toward police.

The initial response was to call the residence and talk to Mr. Christopher Klim to have him walk out of the apartment to minimize risk to all persons. The call was made when the officers were in place outside of Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment, but Mr. Christopher Klim chose not to answer. An officer then knocked on the door but Mr. Christopher Klim did not respond.

The concern came for Mr. Christopher Klim's personal wellness based on the telephone conversation with the mental health worker.

The door lock was purged and Constable Colin Curtis lead the way into the apartment. Constable Kurt Veller located Mr. Christopher Klim in the bedroom with a knife in each hand. Constable Kurt Veller immediately utilized his training in two facets; he immediately alerted his colleagues to the fact that Mr. Christopher Klim was armed by calling out 'knife' repeatedly, and he immediately repositioned, creating distance between himself and Mr. Christopher Klim. He located a position of cover in accordance with his training.

When alerted to the threat by Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Andrew Forslund and Constable Kenneth Simpson repositioned and took cover. Based on his training at this point Constable Colin Curtis used the lowest level of force available when dealing with an armed person, and deployed the taser. The taser was cycled but had minimal effect on Mr. Christopher Klim, who then charged out of the bedroom.

Constable Colin Curtis repositioned to create space and provide cover. He was in the process of loading a second cartridge onto the taser. Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Kenneth Simpson had repositioned. Constable Andrew Forslund was in the process of repositioning to increase the distance between himself and Mr. Christopher Klim, when he fell backwards to the floor.

When Constable Kurt Veller observed Mr. Christopher Klim bring the knives in a downward motion toward Constable Andrew Forslund, he formed the opinion that Mr. Christopher Klim was going to cause death or grievous bodily harm to Constable Andrew Forslund. Constable Kurt Veller used his training and discharged his service pistol at Mr. Christopher Klim. Constable Andrew Forslund, who was on his back and feared grievous bodily harm or death by Mr.Christopher Klim, also discharged his service pistol.

POLICY

Within the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy is written. The allegations have sought procedures and guidelines within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Administration Manual provides insight as to term reference and response.

Procedure is commonly referred to within the RCMP environment as the action outlined in policy. Guidelines can be a reference to policy or verbal-based on best practices and/or risk assessment. Risk assessment means an evaluation of the effectiveness of existing or proposed security measures that is based on the likelihood of a threatening incident (natural or man-made) taking place.

The primary objective in any intervention is public safety, which includes the subject person or persons of the intervention. The safety of the public depends on police officer safety. The apprehension of Mr. Christopher Klim required the attending police officers to be prepared to use force, as Mr. Christopher Klim was known to have weapons throughout his residence and on December 27, 2007, reported to have weapons in his possession.

Operations Manual

On December 27, 2007, within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Part 3 Chapter 7 of the Operations Manual provides guidance to the member on Mentally Ill Persons and Prisoners. This particular portion of then Part 3 of the Operations Manual has since been moved to Part 19. Two areas in policy require examination in situations such as Mr. Christopher Klim:

  • involuntary admission where a warrant had been issued; and
  • emergency admission the observations of self-harming.

Involuntary Admissions are addressed in Chapter 7 in two separate categories; those not in custody (Section 4.1) and those in custody (Section 4.2).

In Section 4.1, Involuntary Admissions can be arranged through the following methods:

  1. A "Medical Certificate" provides authority for anyone to apprehend and transport the person named to a designated facility.
  2. Emergency Police Intervention under Section 28(1) MHA; and
  3. Warrant generated by a Justice under Section 28(3) MHA authorizing police to apprehend a person.

In this particular incident, a Director's Warrant was in existence.

This chapter tells investigators that criminal "Feeney Warrants" are not required for provincial Mental Health Act warrant executions and apprehensions. On December 27, 2007, the members of the Vernon Detachment were executing a warrant issued under the Mental Health Act for the apprehension of Mr. Christopher Klim.

In Section 4.2, a police officer may apprehend and immediately take a person to a physician for examination if satisfied from personal observations, or information received, that the person:

  1. Is acting in a manner likely to endanger that person's safety or others; and
  2. Is apparently a person with a mental disorder.

In this incident information had been received from mental health worker Mr. Richard Jameson that Mr. Christopher Klim was acting in a manner likely to endanger himself.

Section 7 of the policy directs the Commander to liaise regularly with the BC Ambulance Service, B.C. Sheriff Services and the medical community to address issues of mutual concern and prepare Unit Supplements reflecting and establishing protocols. This would include but not
be limited to:

  • Hospital admission policy;
  • Requests for police assistance at the hospital to keep the peace, versus requests for police assistance in restraining patients refusing to take their prescribed medication;
  • Escort, transport and monitoring of mentally disturbed persons; including young persons; and
  • Use the Guide to the Mental Health Act as a reference for Unit Supplements, as required.
  • Ensure that either a hard copy or electronic copy of the Guide to the Mental Health Act is available to members under your command.

Vernon Detachment Unit Level Supplements

Unit Level Supplements are policies drafted by the Detachment Commander to address local dynamics.

Part A of the Vernon Detachment Unit Level Supplement states, "This chapter deals with the handling of prisoners and mental patients."

Part B of the Vernon Detachment Unit Level Supplement references:

  1. OPS Manual 111.3 – Prisoners and Mentally Disturbed Persons
  2. OPS Manual 111.2 – Arrest
  3. Criminal Code – Part XVI

Part G Section 1 of the Vernon Detachment Unit Level Supplements specifically addresses Prisoners and Mentally Disturbed Persons.

  • a) OPS Manual 111.3.E.2 applies
  • b) Mental patients are to be kept separate from other prisoners in a monitored cell. If separate accommodation does not exist because of prisoner volume, consult with the Watch Commander before selecting shared cell arrangements.
  • c) Primary consideration must be to protect the patient from harming themselves or other persons. Violent or suicidal patients should be held in the security tank if possible. In extreme cases, the shower room.
  • d) Persons apprehended under the provisions of the Mental Health Act are to be transported to an established psychiatric facility at the earliest possible opportunity. Mental Health Form will be completed and delivered to the attending physician at the time of escort.
  • e) If restraint is necessary, use a straightjacket or restraining belt.
  • f) If the person is extremely violent, strap him/her to a stretcher.
  • g) If necessary, have a physician sedate the person.
  • h) When assisting hospital staff, "1st" first floor (a psychiatric ward) to restrain a violent patient, unload your firearm prior to attending as per OPS Manual 111.3.E.2.B, unless the circumstances are exceptional.

On December 27, 2007, the members of the Vernon Detachment of the RCMP complied with all appropriate policies and procedures relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody. All the members followed the policies of the day as they pertained to involuntary apprehension under the Mental Health Act of British Columbia.

They identified at the briefing that the sole purpose of their attendance to Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment was to apprehend him under the provisions of the Mental Health Act and transport him directly to Jubilee Hospital in Vernon. The officers confirmed that immediate admission provisions were in effect for when Mr. Christopher Klim was to arrive at the hospital.

STATUTE

Mental Health Act

Under Section 39 (3) of the Mental Health Act the Director of a designated facility who recalls a patient under subsection (2), or to which a patient is recalled under subsection (2) as a result of a transfer under Section 35, may issue a warrant in the prescribed form for the patient's apprehension and transportation to the designated facility to which the patient is recalled.

In this instance the Director of the facility, Russ Ballance, issued a Form 21 Mental Health Act Director's Warrant for "Chris Klim" on December 17, 2007.

Section 28 (1) of the Mental Health Act states a police officer or constable may apprehend and immediately take a person to a physician of examination if satisfied from personal observations, or information received, that the person;

  • is acting in a manner likely to endanger that person's own safety or the safety of others,
  • and is apparently a person with a mental disorder.

Criminal Code

Under Section 25 (1) of the Criminal Code a peace officer acting on reasonable grounds is authorized to use as much force as is necessary in the enforcement of the law or when authorized by law.

Under Section 25 (3) a police officer can use force that is intended to or likely to cause death or bodily harm when the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for their self-preservation or the preservation of anyone under their protection.

Under Section 25 (4) a peace officer is justified in using force intended to or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a person to be arrested; if proceeding lawfully to arrest the person with or without a warrant; for an offence for which a person can be arrested without a warrant; and a person to be arrested avoids arrest.

Under Section 26 everyone who is authorized by law to use force is criminally responsible for any excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes the excess.

Under Section 27 everyone is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of an offence for which the person can be arrested without warrant; and would likely cause immediate and serious injury to a person or property of anyone; or to prevent such act from being committed.

Evidence and Statements

Constable Andrew Forslund, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that he was the person who answered the phone when Richard Jameson, a mental health worker called to confirm the Vernon Detachment held a Mental Health Warrant for Mr. Christopher Klim. Mr. Richard Jameson told Constable Andrew Forslund that he just spoke with Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents, who told him that Mr. Christopher Klim was at his apartment. Mr. Richard Jameson expressed his and the concerns of Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents that his self-harm or violence was escalating. The reason for this concern was Mr. Christopher Klim had been cutting his face and neck and was suicidal. Constable Andrew Forslund went to the Watch Commander, Constable Mike Anderson. A group of available members were assembled for a briefing. Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Amanda Garner, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Richard Drought and Constable Mike Anderson held a briefing. Since Constable Colin Curtis had been in the apartment on December 19, 2007, he provided a diagram of the layout of the apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock happened upon the briefing. He confirmed that all use of force options were available and that Constable Colin Curtis had a Conducted Energy Weapon with him. Constable Mike Anderson ensured everyone knew Mr. Christopher Klim's intervention history with the police. At the apartment Constable Richard Drought and Constable Amanda Garner stayed outside. As the others approached the front door of the apartment an older couple let them in. The man said he had not seen Mr. Christopher Klim in a while. Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Inspector Steve McVarnock, Constable Colin Curtis and Constable Andrew Forslund entered the apartment building. Constable Andrew Forslund could hear the phone ringing but no one answered. They agreed Constable Colin Curtis would go in first, followed by Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and then Constable Kenneth Simpson. Constable Andrew Forslund confirmed with Inspector Steve McVarnock that Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents said they had just spoken to him and he was in the apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock gave a nod, then Constable Kenneth Simpson smashed the door in. Constable Andrew Forslund "cleared" the closet to make sure there was no one in there. Constable Andrew Forslund heard someone say he was in the bedroom and had knives. Constable Andrew Forslund backed up to the kitchen entrance and used the wall from the kitchen entrance for cover, as he saw Mr. Christopher Klim in the bedroom with two knives in his hands. Constable Forslund described Mr. Christopher Klim as angry and his body "bladed". They yelled at him to put the knives down and get down on the ground. Mr. Christopher Klim walked behind a wall. Constable Forslund stated he was scared, that he thought Mr. Christopher Klim was going to "grab a gun or something." Constable Forslund was very uncomfortable, as he could not see Mr. Christopher Klim. He observed Mr. Christopher Klim back away from the bedroom doorway a little bit with the knives in his hands. Constable Colin Curtis went into the hallway with the taser up and the red dot (an assisted aiming function) on Mr. Christopher Klim's chest. Constable Andrew Forslund had his gun pointed at Mr. Christopher Klim. He was Constable Colin Curtis' over watch, as this was the way they were taught in training; if one person has the taser then the other person has their pistol out in case the taser fails. They were telling Mr. Christopher Klim to calm down and to drop the knives. Constable Andrew Forslund could see and hear Inspector McVarnock telling Mr. Christopher Klim, "Calm down, we're here to help you." Constable Colin Curtis deployed the taser. Constable Andrew Forslund explained you want to subdue a person while they are being tasered. They started to move forward and observed Mr. Christopher Klim bring the knives up to about shoulder height, then charged out of the bedroom. Constable Andrew Forslund backed up as fast as he could into the kitchen. When Mr. Christopher Klim entered the kitchen Constable Andrew Forslund fell onto his back. He heard one gunshot and saw Mr. Christopher Klim still moving toward him so he fired one shot. Constable Andrew Forslund saw Mr. Christopher Klim turn and exited the kitchen. Constable Andrew Forslund went out from the kitchen into the hallway, where he saw Mr. Christopher Klim lying on the floor. Constable Richard Drought came in and rendered first aid.

Constable Colin Curtis, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that he entered Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment with Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Andrew Forslund and Constable Kenneth Simpson, and then Inspector Steve McVarnock. Mr. Christopher Klim was standing in the bedroom with two big knives. They yelled, "Drop the knives, we're here to help you." Mr. Christopher Klim told them to, "Fuck off, go away, I don't wanna go to the hospital. I'm not going with you guys." Constable Colin Curtis yelled, "Christopher, we're here to help you, take you to the hospital, calm down." Mr. Christopher Klim dropped his right foot back, which made Constable Colin Curtis think he was going to charge or make a stand. Constable Kenneth Simpson called out that Mr. Christopher Klim had three knives. Constable Colin Curtis deployed the taser and saw the top prong hit Mr. Christopher Klim but did not see where the bottom one went. Mr. Christopher Klim went back into the bedroom. Constable Colin Curtis then went charging into the bedroom and observed Mr. Christopher Klim back on his feet with two knives in his hands. The taser didn't work and Mr. Christopher Klim was angry. Constable Colin Curtis felt someone grab his jacket and belt and pull him out from the bedroom. Constable Colin Curtis removed his gun from his holster and backed into the livingroom. Constable Colin Curtis was getting a second cartridge ready for the taser when Mr. Christopher Klim came out of the bedroom and ran right in front of him. Constable Colin Curtis holstered his pistol and then switched taser cartridges. Constable Colin Curtis heard yelling and screaming coming from the kitchen. Constable Colin Curtis heard 'bang, bang'. Someone yelled, "Andrew has he been stabbed, check Andrew, check Andrew." Constable Kenneth Simpson, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that they entered the building; Inspector Steve McVarnock, Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and himself. He heard the phone ringing. He looked over to Inspector Steve McVarnock then hit the door three (3) times and forced it open. They announced, "Police, police, police." Constable Kurt Veller said, "He's in the bedroom and he's got knives." Constable Kenneth Simpson backed up behind the half wall in the kitchen for "cover" and drew his pistol. Constable Kenneth Simpson saw that Mr. Christopher Klim had two (2) knives and was moving toward the bedroom door. Constable Colin Curtis had the taser out so Constable Kenneth Simpson assumed the role of lethal "cover" if necessary. Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Andrew Forslund and Inspector Steve McVarnock all told Mr. Christopher Klim to, "Drop the knife, come with us, it's gonna be okay sir." Mr. Christopher Klim yelled, "Leave me alone, I'm not going with you, get out of here." Mr. Christopher Klim still had two (2) knives. Constable Colin Curtis fired the taser and hit Mr. Christopher Klim. They moved forward to quickly take control of the situation, when Constable Kenneth Simpson observed Mr. Christopher Klim coming out of his bedroom with two (2) knives in his hands. The taser clearly didn't have any effect on him. Constable Kenneth Simpson ran back toward the front door. Mr. Christopher Klim ran down the hallway at them with the two (2) knives in his hands. Constable Kenneth Simpson moved back further into the kitchen. Constable Andrew Forslund moved back into the kitchen. In Constable Kenneth Simpson's statement he commented that, "I will never forget the look in Mr. Christopher Klim's face. He would not drop the knives." They told him to drop the knives. Mr. Christopher Klim appeared angry and moved forward with a knife held up over his head. Constable Andrew Forslund fell while backing up into the kitchen. At the same time Mr. Christopher Klim made a lunging motion with the knife. Constable Kenneth Simpson thought Mr. Christopher Klim was going to stab Constable Andrew Forslund so he shot his firearm. Constable Kenneth Simpson also heard a shot fired from his left and another shot fired from his right. Constable Andrew Forslund was still on the floor. Constable Kenneth Simpson looked down at Mr. Christopher Klim and saw that he still had the knives in his hands. Constable Kenneth Simpson grabbed the knives from beside Mr. Christopher Klim and threw them behind him. Constable Kenneth Simpson announced, "Shots fired, roll an ambulance code three (3)," on his police radio.

Constable Kurt Veller, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that they all went to the apartment building. He was on the one side and Constable Kenneth Simpson was on the other side with the purging tool. They heard the phone ringing inside the apartment but no one answered. Constable Colin Curtis knocked on the door a couple of times but no one answered. Constable Kenneth Simpson engaged the door with the purging tool and the door opened. Constable Colin Curtis or Constable Kenneth Simpson yell out, "Kitchen ‘clear,’ livingroom ‘clear,’ dining room ‘clear,’ areas ‘clear.’" Constable Kurt Veller looked in the bedroom and saw feet on the bed. Constable Kurt Veller yelled out, "He's in the bedroom." Constable Kurt Veller saw Mr. Christopher Klim get up holding two (2) knives. Constable Kurt Veller called out, "He's in the bedroom, he's got a knife." Constable Kurt Veller backed out into the dining room. He heard Inspector Steve McVarnock and Constable Colin Curtis yell out, "Drop the knife, drop the knife." Constable Colin Curtis fired the taser at Mr. Christopher Klim after which he moved back into the bedroom. Constable Kurt Veller provided lethal overwatch for Constable Colin Curtis because he did not have a gun out. Constable Kurt Veller noticed the taser had little to no effect, as Mr. Christopher Klim was still standing holding two (2) knives. He noticed Mr. Christopher Klim was angry and yelling loud. They backed up. Constable Kurt Veller saw Mr. Christopher Klim run by with a knife in one hand. Constable Andrew Forslund was in the kitchen and Constable Kurt Veller turned into the kitchen and viewed Mr. Christopher Klim slashing at Constable Andrew Forslund. Constable Kurt Veller saw Constable Andrew Forslund fall back. Constable Kurt Veller fired one (1) round. He heard a second round, and then a third round fired.

Inspector Steve McVarnock, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that when he arrived on scene, a couple members were assigned to perimeter duty outside. At least four members went inside the apartment lobby. A call was placed by Constable Mike Anderson, as planned, to the apartment. The phone rang but nobody answered. The door was breached and the members entered and identified themselves, "Police." Mr. Christopher Klim showed up brandishing a butcher knife and the members utilized verbal intervention. There was a member with a taser on site and lethal over watch. Mr. Christopher Klim was very agitated. The members backed off their position at which time Inspector Steve McVarnock said, "We're just here to help you, we're not going to hurt you." Mr. Christopher Klim said, "Bullshit, get the fuck out of here", and went on a tirade of profanities. Constable Colin Curtis brought the taser to the ready position. The light from the taser was right on the center mass of Mr. Christopher Klim who was getting more and more agitated. Inspector Steve McVarnock could see it in Mr. Christopher Klim's face, his eyes were very large, very tense and he walked closer to the doorway. Constable Colin Curtis deployed the taser. Mr. Christopher Klim stumbled back in the bedroom. Inspector Steve McVarnock instructed for somebody to move in and restrain him. No sooner did he say that; Mr. Christopher Klim was up off the bed and came toward them with a large butcher knife. The knife posed a risk of death and grievous bodily harm to the members. Mr. Christopher Klim was very agitated and moved almost robotic. He walked right toward the members and the members backed right off. Everyone told him to, "Drop the knife, drop the knife." Mr. Christopher Klim would not, and he had a crazed look on his face. He stepped toward the members and Inspector Steve McVarnock heard two shots. Mr. Christopher Klim dropped immediately. Inspector Steve McVarnock knelt down but could not detect a pulse. One of the members called out on his portable radio there were, ". . . shots fired, get an ambulance here."

On December 27, 2007, Constable Colin Curtis of the Vernon Detachment was aware that a Director's Warrant had been issued by Mr. Russ Ballance on December 17, 2007, as Constable Colin Curtis had endeavoured to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim on December 19, 2007 under the authority of that warrant. Constable Andrew Forslund received a telephone call from Mr. Richard Jameson, a mental health worker in Vernon, B.C., who worked with Mr. Christopher Klim. Mr. Richard Jameson contacted the Vernon Detachment and informed Constable Andrew Forslund of the information provided by Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents, that they believed Mr. Christopher Klim was going to cause serious harm to himself as he had fresh cuts on his face.

Based on the report made by Mr. Richard Jameson the police formulated the opinion that there was an immediate need to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim. The police were also aware of the outstanding Mental Health warrant. Therefore, the statutory requirements of the Mental Health Act were met.

Based on the fact that Mr. Christopher Klim had two knives in his hands and charged toward Constable Andrew Forslund posed a real threat of grievous bodily harm. When Constable Andrew Forslund fell onto his back and Mr. Christopher Klim made a downward motion with the knife, that escalated the threat to fear of grievous bodily harm and/or death.

Based on the belief that Mr. Christopher Klim was going to cause death or grievous bodily harm, the five members of the RCMP who entered the apartment met the statutory requirements of the Criminal Code.

The members who attended the apartment of Christopher Klimon December 27, 2007, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody.

Allegation #2:

Allegation two directs determination as to whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Christopher Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to use of force.

I am satisfied that the appropriate options and use of force were exercised in the attempt to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim.

STATUTE

The statute authority for the use of force is provided on page eight (8) in this letter. The Mental Health Act provided the police officers who attended Mr. Christopher Klim's residence on December 27, 2007, the legal authority to act based on the existence of a warrant issued under that statute. In addition to the warrant, the Mental Health Act provides authority for police officers to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim based on the report that Mr. Christopher Klim was believed to be causing himself harm in concert with his history of self-harm. A copy of the Warrant to Apprehend, documents and statements addressing self-harm by Mr. Christopher Klim form part of the report.

Section 25 (1) of the Criminal Code provided the officers with the statute authority to use as
much force as was necessary to apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim.

When Mr. Christopher Klim charged the officers with two knives in his hands, Section 25(3) of the Criminal Code afforded the statute authority to use as much force as was necessary to prevent bodily harm or death.

Mr. Christopher Klim charged out of the bedroom with a knife in each hand raised above his shoulder. Constable Andrew Forslund was repositioning when he fell to the floor and onto his back. Mr. Christopher Klim brought the two knives downward in the direction of Constable Andrew Forslund. Section 25(3) of the Criminal Code gave the authority for the officers to use as much force as was necessary to prevent bodily harm or death. The officers discharged the pistols they were issued by the RCMP to prevent Constable Andrew Forslund from being killed or seriously injured.

Constable Andrew Forslund, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that he was the person who answered the phone when Richard Jameson, a mental health worker, called to confirm the Vernon Detachment held a Mental Health Warrant for Mr. Christopher Klim. Mr. Richard Jameson told Constable Andrew Forslund that he just spoke with Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents, who told him that Mr. Christopher Klim was at his apartment. Mr. Richard Jameson expressed his and the concerns of Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents that his self-harm or violence was escalating. The reason for this concern was Mr. Christopher Klim had been cutting his face and neck and was suicidal. Constable Andrew Forslund went to the Watch Commander, Constable Mike Anderson. A group of available members were assembled for a briefing. Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Amanda Garner, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Richard Drought and Constable Mike Anderson held a briefing. Since Constable Colin Curtis had been in the apartment on December 19, 2007, he provided a diagram of the layout of the apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock happened upon the briefing. He confirmed that all use of force options were available and that Constable Colin Curtis had a Conducted Energy Weapon with him. Constable Mike Anderson ensured everyone knew Mr. Christopher Klim's intervention history with the police. Constable Richard Drought and Constable Amanda Garner stayed outside the apartment. As the others approached the front door of the apartment an older couple let them. The man said he had not seen Mr. Christopher Klim in a while. Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Kenneth Simpson, Inspector Steve McVarnock, Constable Colin Curtis and Constable Andrew Forslund entered the apartment building. Constable Andrew Forslund could hear the phone ringing but no one answered. They agreed Constable Colin Curtis would go in first, followed by Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and then Constable Kenneth Simpson. Constable Andrew Forslund confirmed with Inspector Steve McVarnock that Mr. Christopher Klim's grandparents said they had just spoken to him and he was in the apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock gave a nod, then Constable Kenneth Simpson smashed the door in. Constable Andrew Forslund "cleared" the closet to make sure there was no one in there. Constable Andrew Forslund heard someone say he was in the bedroom and had knives. Constable Andrew Forslund backed up to the kitchen entrance and used the wall from the kitchen entrance for cover, as he saw Mr. Christopher Klim in the bedroom with two knives in his hands. Constable Forslund described Mr. Christopher Klim as angry and his body bladed. They yelled at him to put the knives down and get down on the ground. Mr. Christopher Klim walked behind a wall. Constable Forslund stated he was scared, that he thought Mr. Christopher Klim was going to "grab a gun or something." Constable Forslund was very uncomfortable, as he could not see Mr. Christopher Klim. He observed Mr. Christopher Klim back away from the bedroom doorway a little bit with the knives in his hands. Constable Colin Curtis went into the hallway with the taser up and the red dot on Mr. Christopher Klim's chest. Constable Andrew Forslund had his gun pointed at Mr. Christopher Klim. He was Constable Colin Curtis' over watch, as this was the way they were taught in training; if one person has the taser then the other person has their pistol out in case the taser fails. They were telling Mr. Christopher Klim to calm down and to drop the knives. Constable Andrew Forslund could see and hear Inspector McVarnock telling Mr. Christopher Klim, "Calm down, we're here to help you." Constable Colin Curtis deployed the taser. Constable Andrew Forslund explained that you want to subdue a person while they are being tasered. They started to move forward and observed Mr. Christopher Klim bring the knives up to about shoulder height then charged out of the bedroom. Constable Andrew Forslund backed up as fast as he could into the kitchen. When Mr. Christopher Klim entered the kitchen Constable Andrew Forslund fell onto his back. He heard one gunshot and saw Mr. Christopher Klim still moving toward him so he fired one shot. Constable Andrew Forslund saw Mr. Christopher Klim turn and exited the kitchen. Constable Andrew Forslund went out from the kitchen into the hallway, where he saw Mr. Christopher Klim lying on the floor. Constable Richard Drought came in and rendered first aid.

Constable Colin Curtis, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that he entered Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment with Constable Kurt Veller, Constable Andrew Forslund and Constable Kenneth Simpson and then Inspector Steve McVarnock. Mr. Christopher Klim was standing in the bedroom with two big knives. They yelled, "Drop the knives, we're here to help you." Mr. Christopher Klim told them to, "Fuck off, go away, I don't wanna go to the hospital. I'm not going with you guys." Constable Colin Curtis yelled, "Christopher, we're here to help you, take you to the hospital, calm down." Mr. Christopher Klim dropped his right foot back which made Constable Colin Curtis think Mr. Christopher Klim was going to charge or make a stand. Constable Kenneth Simpson called out that Mr. Christopher Klim had three knives. Constable Colin Curtis deployed the taser and saw the top prong hit Mr. Christopher Klim, but did not see where the bottom one went. Mr. Christopher Klim went back into the bedroom. Constable Colin Curtis went charging into the bedroom and observed Mr. Christopher Klim back on his feet with two knives in his hands. The taser didn't work and Mr. Christopher Klim was angry. Constable Colin Curtis felt someone grab his jacket and belt and pull him out from the bedroom. Constable Colin Curtis removed his gun from his holster and backed into the livingroom. Constable Colin Curtis was getting a second cartridge ready for the taser when Mr. Christopher Klim came out of the bedroom and ran right in front of him. Constable Colin Curtis put his gun back in his holster and switched taser cartridges. Constable Colin Curtis heard yelling and screaming coming from the kitchen. Constable Colin Curtis heard; 'bang, bang'. Someone yelled, "Andrew, has he been stabbed, check Andrew, check Andrew."

Constable Kenneth Simpson, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that they entered the building; Inspector Steve McVarnock, Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Andrew Forslund, Constable Kurt Veller and himself. He heard the phone ringing. He looked over to Inspector Steve McVarnock, then hit the door three (3) times and forced it open. They announced, "Police, police, police." Constable Kurt Veller said, "He's in the bedroom and he's got knives." Constable Kenneth Simpson backed up behind the half wall in the kitchen for "cover" and drew his pistol. Constable Kenneth Simpson saw that Mr. Christopher Klim had two (2) knives and was moving toward the bedroom door. Constable Colin Curtis had the taser out so Constable Kenneth Simpson was lethal "cover" if necessary. Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Andrew Forslund and Inspector Steve McVarnock all told Mr. Christopher Klim to, "Drop the knife, come with us, it's gonna be okay sir." Mr. Christopher Klim yelled, "Leave me alone, I'm not going with you, get out of here." Mr. Christopher Klim still had two (2) knives. Constable Colin Curtis fired the taser and hit Mr. Christopher Klim. They moved forward at which time Constable Kenneth Simpson saw Mr. Christopher Klim coming out of his bedroom with the two (2) knives in his hands. The taser clearly didn't have any effect on him. Constable Kenneth Simpson ran back toward the front door. Mr. Christopher Klim ran down the hallway at them with the two (2) knives in his hands. Constable Kenneth Simpson moved back further into the kitchen. Constable Andrew Forslund
moved back into the kitchen. Constable Kenneth Simpson will never forget the look in Mr. Christopher Klim's face. He would not drop the knives. They told him to drop the knives. Mr. Christopher Klim appeared angry and moved forward with a knife held up over his head. Constable Andrew Forslund fell while backing up into the kitchen. At the same time Mr. Christopher Klim made a lunging motion with the knife. Constable Kenneth Simpson thought Mr. Christopher Klim was going to stab Constable Andrew Forslund so he shot his firearm. Constable Kenneth Simpson also heard a shot fired from his left and another shot fired from his right. Constable Andrew Forslund was still on the floor. Constable Kenneth Simpson looked down at Mr. Christopher Klim and saw that he still had the knives in his hands. Constable Kenneth Simpson grabbed the knives and threw them behind him. Constable Kenneth Simpson announced, ". . . shots fired, roll an ambulance code three (3)."

Constable Kurt Veller, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that they all went to the apartment building. He was on the one side and Constable Kenneth Simpson was on the other side with the ram. They heard the phone ringing inside the apartment but no one answered. Constable Colin Curtis knocked on the door a couple of times but no one answered. Constable Kenneth Simpson rammed the door and the door opened. Constable Colin Curtis or Constable Kenneth Simpson yelled out, "Kitchen ‘clear,’ livingroom ‘clear,’ dining room ‘clear,’ areas ‘clear.’" Constable Kurt Veller looked in the bedroom and saw feet on the bed. Constable Kurt Veller yelled out, "He's in the bedroom." Constable Kurt Veller saw Mr. Christopher Klim get up holding two (2) knives. Constable Kurt Veller called out, "He's in the bedroom, he's got a knife." Constable Kurt Veller backed out into the dining room. He heard Inspector Steve McVarnock and Constable Colin Curtis yell out, "Drop the knife, drop the knife." Constable Colin Curtis tasered Mr. Christopher Klim but he moved forward. Constable Kurt Veller covered Constable Colin Curtis off because he did not have a gun out. Constable Kurt Veller noticed the taser had little to no effect as Mr. Christopher Klim was still standing holding two (2) knives. He noticed Mr. Christopher Klim was angry and yelling loud. They backed up. Constable Kurt Veller saw Mr. Christopher Klim run by with a knife in one hand. Constable Andrew Forslund was in the kitchen and Constable Kurt Veller turned into the kitchen and viewed Mr. Christopher Klim slashing at Constable Andrew Forslund. Constable Kurt Veller saw Constable Andrew Forslund fall back. Constable Kurt Veller fired one (1) round. He heard a second round and then a third round fired.

Inspector Steve McVarnock, in his statement and in his sworn evidence given during the Coroner's Inquest, in part, disclosed that when he arrived on scene, a couple members were assigned to perimeter duty outside. At least four members went inside the apartment lobby. A call was placed by Constable Mike Anderson, as planned, to the apartment. The phone rang but nobody answered. The door was breached and the members entered identifying themselves, "Police." Mr. Christopher Klim showed up brandishing a butcher knife and the members utilized verbal intervention. There was a member with a taser on site and lethal over watch. Mr. Christopher Klim was very agitated. The members backed off their position at which time Inspector Steve McVarnock said, "We're just here to help you, we're not going to hurt you." Mr. Christopher Klim said, "Bullshit, get the fuck out of here", and went on a tirade of profanities. Constable Colin Curtis brought the taser to the ready position. The light from the taser was right on the center mass of Mr. Christopher Klim, who was getting more and more agitated. Inspector Steve McVarnock could see it in Mr. Christopher Klim's face; his eyes were very large, very tense and he walked closer to the doorway. Constable Colin Curtis deployed the taser. Mr. Christopher Klim stumbled back into the bedroom. Inspector Steve McVarnock instructed for somebody to move in and restrain him. No sooner did he say that; Mr. Christopher Klim was up off the bed and came toward them with a large butcher knife. The knife posed a risk of death and grievous bodily harm to the members. Mr. Christopher Klim was very agitated and moved almost robotic. He walked right toward the members and the members backed off. Everyone told him to, "Drop the knife, drop the knife." Mr. Christopher Klim would not, he had a crazed look on his face. He stepped toward the members and Inspector Steve McVarnock heard two shots. Mr. Christopher Klim dropped immediately. Inspector Steve McVarnock knelt down but could not detect a pulse. One of the members called out on his portable radio there were, ". . . shots fired, get an ambulance here."

POLICY

Operational Manual 17 addresses the use of force by members of the Royal Canadian Mounted police. The primary objective of the use of force within the RCMP is:

"The main objective of any occurrence response and intervention is the safety of peace officers, other law-enforcement officers and the public. Many occurrences can be resolved through dialogue, but occasionally, intervention by means of force may be necessary."

Within policy Section 25(1) is sited as the authority to use as much force as is necessary to enforce and administer the law. That the officer must demonstrate the level of intervention was appropriate for the situation.

Within policy Section 25(4) is sited as the authority to use lethal force to prevent death or grievous bodily harm where lesser means are not appropriate.

The Incident Management Intervention Model is not policy or law. In policy the Incident Management Intervention Model is commonly referred to as the IMIM.

TRAINING

In this area the use of force is addressed through the Incident Management Intervention Model. The Incident Management Intervention Model was adopted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on or about 1996 and was incorporated into the curriculum at Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan at that time.

Confirmation of this aspect has not been provided by the National Learning Center in Headquarters, Ottawa. Once this information is received it will be forwarded under a separate cover.

The Incident Management Intervention Model is a training aid that assists police officers envision an event and explain why they chose the intervention method they did; in other words, explain their actions. The IMIM is also a teaching aid in training peace officers.

The training information for each of the members who were inside the apartment of Mr. Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007, as it pertains to the use of force is captured previously in this letter.

As set out in the statements of the five members who were in the apartment of Mr. Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007, they utilized all aspects of the Incident Management Intervention Model which were available based on the situational factors, officer perception, and tactical considerations.

The first aspect they used was their presence, which was completely ineffective with Mr. Christopher Klim, who immediately resorted to assaultive aggressive behaviour having the knives in his hands.

All the members in the apartment used their training and repositioned during the contact with Mr. Christopher Klim as his behaviour changed. Three of the members, Constable Colin Curtis, Constable Andrew Forslund and Inspector Steve McVarnock, used verbal intervention as the next means of intervention. Mr. Christopher Klim refused to drop the knives. Mr. Christopher Klim stated he would not go to the hospital and told the members to get out of his residence.

When Mr. Christopher Klim raised the knives above his shoulders with the knives in his hands he demonstrated the ability, means and intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and/or death. Constable Forslund and the other Constables were in their full duty attire, which included bulletproof vests. The bulletproof vest does not provide protection against Mr. Christopher Klim's weapon choice; butcher knives.

Oleoresin capsicum spray, also known as "pepper spray", was not an option based on the location and situation. It was known that Mr. Christopher Klim suffered a mental illness. The ineffectiveness of the Conducted Energy Weapon, also known as the taser, demonstrated Mr. Christopher Klim was goal-oriented. The location was a factor removing the oleoresin capsicum spray as an intervention option. The apartment provided a small confined closed space, increasing the probability of officer contamination which could have rendered one or all of the responding officers unable to respond to the changing environment. Based on the location and behavioural factors exhibited by Mr. Christopher Klim, the members used their training and recognized that OC spray was an ineffective option.

Another intervention option available was the defensive baton. The defensive baton becomes ineffective in confined space and in configurations such as this apartment, where the ability to extend and maneuver the baton are compromised. The fact that Mr. Christopher Klim had two knives removed the defensive baton as a viable intervention option, as knives can be lethal when the aggressor is within thirty feet.

The next intervention option utilized was the Conducted Energy Weapon. The Conducted Energy Weapon was ineffective. The members followed their training and when the Conducted Energy Weapon was deployed they closed the distance to restrain Mr. Christopher Klim. The Conducted Energy Weapon did cause Mr. Christopher Klim to retreat but when the members arrived to restrain Mr. Christopher Klim he was in a bladed (fighting) stance with a knife in each hand. The distance the members had to run was short and therefore the time was minimal.

The members' tactical considerations were to reposition with cover. The cover provides extra protection. In the process of repositioning, Constable Andrew Forslund fell to the floor onto his back. Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Kenneth Simpson both observed Mr. Christopher Klim approaching Constable Andrew Forslund quickly and the knives going in a downward motion toward Constable Andrew Forslund. The belief of these two members was that Constable Andrew Forslund was going to suffer grievous bodily harm or death.

Based on their training and statute authority, Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Andrew Forslund used the only viable intervention which was to discharge their service pistols, lethal force.

I therefore find that the members who attended the apartment of Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to the use of force.

Allegation #3:

Allegation three directs determination whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Christopher Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis, and/or being apprehended under mental health legislation are adequate.

The information sought in this allegation is the same as the information provided in response to allegation one; requirements relating to persons being apprehended under the Mental Health Act and taken into custody.

The members who attended the apartment of Mr. Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007, did comply with appropriate training, policies, procedures and guidelines relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis and/or being apprehended under the mental health legislation which were adequate.

Statutes, policies, procedures and guidelines can only address a particular situation. In the fact that there was a warrant for Mr. Christopher Klim's apprehension under the Mental Health Act, he told the police officers he would not go back to the hospital. He resorted to weapons, having a large knife in each hand. Just the possession of the knives in this circumstance was a violation of Section 88(1) of the Criminal Code, in that he was in possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

When Mr. Christopher Klim went toward Constable Andrew Forslund with the knives going from above his shoulders downward toward Constable Andrew Forslund, he was in violation of Section 267(a) of the Criminal Code – Assault With a Weapon.

The policies previously noted in this letter direct the use of force in conjunction with the legal authorities in the Criminal Code which are set out previously in this letter.

As detailed in the response to allegation #2, the members used the appropriate intervention options in conjunction with repositioning throughout the intervention.

The Vernon Detachment has revised their unit supplements since December 27, 2007. The Vernon Detachment unit supplements now direct a designated member to maintain ongoing communication with Vernon Mental Health on matters or persons of mutual interest. The member will attend regular meetings with the Outreach Team and the Mentally Disordered Offender Group. The detachment will enhance members' awareness in that Cadets will take part in a one day rotation with Mental Health; will promote and facilitate training through formal or informal workshops or courses and the Police Observer Program.

I find that the members who attended the apartment of Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements relating to persons in a state of mental health crisis, and/or being apprehended under mental health legislation are adequate.

Allegation #4:

Allegation four directs whether the RCMP officers involved in the events of December 27, 2007, from the moment of individual deployment until Mr. Christopher Klim's death, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such investigation and whether such policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate, and further, whether such investigation was carried out in an adequate and timely fashion.

TRAINING

To effectively address training as it pertains to conducting an investigation in a timely and adequate fashion, the foundation begins at Depot Division, also commonly referred to as the Training Academy.

The RCMP training curriculum at Depot Division keeps up with new developments in technology, legislation and best practices on a continuing basis. The foundation provided to each graduate of the Training Academy is then reinforced and augmented in what is referred to as the Cadet Field Training Program.

Part of the program is the mentoring and monitoring of the cadet in conducting investigations. These are "real life" situations investigated by the cadet under the direct supervision of their field coach and supervisors. This learning is augmented through the use of scenarios. The scenarios presented to a cadet during their Cadet Field Training Program affords their field coach, supervisors and detachment management with a means of ensuring the cadet understands their legal authorities, legal obligations and ability to manage incidents in an appropriate and professional manner.

Training is further developed throughout their career through mentoring, training and experience.

Inspector Steve McVarnock

Inspector Steve McVarnock was the senior member both in rank and service to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Inspector Steve McVarnock completed his basic training in December of 1981. During his tenure at the training academy, members were presented with scenarios which they had to investigate. These scenarios included attending scenes, dealing with persons, obtaining statements and completion of required documentation. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, in which Inspector McVarnock had completed are:

  • MCM Team Commander 2005
  • Incident Commanders Course 2005
  • Major Case Management 2005
  • Drug Investigation Techniques 1994
  • Arson Investigation 1989
  • Investigators 1987

The MCM Team Commander and the Major Case Management Course provide training in the investigation of serious incidents. Part of that training includes presentations on offender behaviour. The Incident Commanders Course is an intensive course developed and recognized nationally for the development of Critical Incident Commanders, who are trained in the management of major incidents involving weapons related situations, public order and natural disasters; i.e. barricaded persons, hostage taking and forest fires.

The Drug Investigation Techniques, Arson Investigator and Investigators Courses all provide training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, and investigation procedures, which includes interviewing.

Constable Richard Drought

Constable Richard Drought was senior in service of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Richard Drought completed his basic training in May of 1997. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Richard Drought had completed are:

  • Violence in Relationships 2002

Violence in relationship courses provide training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, investigation procedures, and dealing with persons who are emotional, from distraught to angered.

Constable Kurt Veller

Constable Kurt Veller was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Kurt Veller completed his basic training in June of 2003. Constable Kurt Veller graduated Depot Division in 2003. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Kurt Veller had completed are:

  • Sex Crimes Investigators 2005

The Sex Crimes Investigators course provides training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, investigation procedures, dealing with and interviewing persons who are distraught and offenders with specific offending behaviors.

Constable Kenneth Simpson

Constable Kenneth Simpson was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Kenneth Simpson completed his basic training in August of 2005. While attending Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2005, Constable Colin Curtis had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of his graduation requirement. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Simpson had completed are:

  • Investigators Course 2007
  • Investigative Interviewing 2006
  • Violence in Relationship   2005

The Investigators Course provides training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, and investigation procedures, which includes interviewing.

Violence in Relationship courses provide training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, investigation procedures, and dealing with persons who are emotional, from distraught to angered.

The Investigative Interviewing course provides training on preparation for an interview and interviewing persons from those who are distraught to offenders with specific offending behaviors. This training enhances the officer's abilities to communicate effectively with a variety of persons subject to different influences; physical, psychological and environmental.

Constable Amanda Garner

Constable Amanda Garner was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Amanda Garner completed her basic training in August of 2003. While attending Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2003, Constable Amanda Garner had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of her graduation requirement. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Amanda Garner had completed are:

  • Investigators Course   2007
  • Investigative Interviewing 2006

The Investigators Course provides training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, investigation procedures which includes interviewing.

The Investigative Interviewing course provides training on preparation for an interview and interviewing persons from those who are distraught to offenders with specific offending behaviors. This training enhances the officer's abilities to communicate effectively with a variety of persons subject to different influences, physical, psychological and environmental.

Constable Colin Curtis

Constable Colin Curtis was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Colin Curtis completed his basic training in February of 2006. While attending Depot Division in Regina, Saskatchewan, in 2006, Constable Colin Curtis had Oleoresin Capsicum Spray training and the Incident Management Intervention Model training as part of his graduation requirement. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Colin Curtis had completed are:

  • Investigative Interviewing 2007
  • Violence in Relationship 2006

The Investigative Interviewing course provides training on preparation for an interview and interviewing persons, from those who are distraught to offenders with specific offending behaviors. This training enhances the officer's abilities to communicate effectively with a variety of persons subject to different influences, physical, psychological and environmental.

Violence in Relationship courses provide training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, investigation procedures, and dealing with persons who are emotional, from distraught to angered.

Constable Andrew Forslund
Constable Andrew Forslund was one of the Constables to attend Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment. Constable Andrew Forslund completed his basic training in October of 2007. Courses relative to the events of December 27, 2007, which Constable Andrew Forslund had completed are:

  • Violence in Relationship

Violence in Relationship courses provide training on scene attendance, preservation of evidence, scene control, investigation procedures, and dealing with persons who are emotional, from distraught to angered.

POLICY

This fourth allegation pertains to the time from first police attendance up to the death of Mr. Christopher Klim, therefore, policy pertaining to death investigations is not applicable and has not been incorporated into this letter.

The National Policy which is most applicable to this particular investigation is Operational Manual II, Criminal Code Offences. This policy is the most relevant, as Mr. Christopher Klim held a knife in each hand, with knives pointed at them, then charged at the attending officer(s). The policy in Part 2 Chapter 7 addresses Acts / Threat of Violence. The policy was amended on May 3, 2007, and does not cover threats made in a moment of stress against a peace officer.

In National Policy 2.7.1.5.1., it states that where the threat is against a member of the general public the RCMP will ensure an investigation will be conducted and, if required, notify the subject of the threat in writing.

"E" Division Policy for Threats does not apply to this situation and directs the member back to National Policy.

Part 100.1 of "E" Division Policy addressed Provincial Statute investigations first in general terms. In areas of a province where a city or municipal department does not have jurisdiction, the RCMP is the law enforcement agency and will enforce the Provincial Statutes.

Under Part 100.1, Mentally Ill Persons / Prisoners directs the member to Part 19.7.1., which has been reported in depth in allegation #1 of this letter.

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

The provisions of Section 28 (1) of the Mental Health Act were met in that the members could apprehend Mr. Christopher Klim and immediately him take to a physician for examination, as they were satisfied a warrant had been issued under the Mental Health Act and information received that Mr. Christopher Klim was acting in a manner likely to endanger his own safety and that he had a mental disorder.

The provisions set out in Section 25 (1) of the Criminal Code were met in that the members were acting on reasonable grounds and thus authorized to use as much force as necessary as they were authorized by law. Furthermore, under Section 25 (3) of the Criminal Code, based on reasonable grounds, they used the force that was necessary for their self-preservation or the preservation of anyone under their protection.

The provisions outlined in Section 27 of the Criminal Code were met when Mr. Christopher Klim advanced towards Constable Andrew Forslund, moving two knives he had in his hands downward in the direction of Constable Andrew Forslund, who was on his back on the floor. Constable Kurt Veller and Constable Kenneth Simpson who witnessed this were justified in using as much force as was reasonably necessary to prevent Constable Andrew Forslund from being stabbed, which would likely cause immediate and serious injury or his death.

INVESTIGATION ADEQUATE AND TIMELY

Constable Andrew Forslund received a telephone call from Mr. Richard Jameson, the mental health case worker for Mr. Christopher Klim. Mr. Richard Jameson confirmed through Constable Andrew Forslund that the Vernon Detachment had in their possession a warrant issued under the Mental Health Act of British Columbia for Mr. Christopher Klim. Mr. Richard Jameson provided the details of a conversation he had just had with Mr. Harry Klim and his wife, Shirley Davis-Klim, the grandparents of Christopher Klim. In brief, the grandparents had spoken to Mr. Christopher Klim before they contacted Mr. Richard Jameson. Based on the content of the conversation and their visual observations on December 25, 2007, of Christopher Klim's self-inflicted injuries, they feared his acts of self-harm and violence were escalating. Mr. Richard Jameson provided a history of Mr. Christopher Klim harming himself.

On receiving that information, Constable Andrew Forslund immediately notified his acting Watch Commander, Constable Mike Anderson. Constable Mike Anderson directed Constable Andrew Forslund to assemble available resources in the general duty area of the Vernon Detachment for a briefing. Constable Mike Anderson chaired the briefing. He confirmed the existence of the Mental Health Act warrant for Mr. Christopher Klim. He provided current and historical information on the behaviours of Mr. Christopher Klim, those that endangered his life and his aggressive tendencies toward police. He instructed Constable Colin Curtis, who had been inside of Mr. Christopher Klim's apartment only eight days earlier, to provide a sketch of the layout of the apartment for the members who were attending. He assigned the members duties, including the need for an outer perimeter in the event Mr. Christopher Klim exited the apartment via the patio doors or a window.

Inspector Steve McVarnock reminded the members of safety protocol. He instructed that a telephone call be placed into the residence in an effort to have Mr. Christopher Klim exit his apartment once the members were in position.

The members drove direct from the detachment to the apartment. The telephone call was placed without success. Knocking on the door was not successful. After confirming the information received from Mr. Richard Jameson, Inspector Steve McVarnock authorized the use of the purging tool to open the door. Five members entered the apartment building while two remained outside maintaining the outer perimeter.

After three strikes with the purging tool the door opened and the four uniformed members entered the apartment. Within minutes the members encountered Mr. Christopher Klim. The investigation conducted by the members who attended Mr. Christopher Klim's residence on December 27, 2007, was conducted in a timely manner. Mr. Richard Jameson arrived at work at 12:30 p.m. on December 27, 2007. After returning a telephone call to Mrs. Shirley Davis-Klim, he placed a call to the hospital confirming direct admission for Mr. Christopher Klim to the psychiatric ward. Mr. Richard Jameson then contacted Constable Andrew Forslund by phone. It was as a result of the conversation with Constable Forslund that the members of the Vernon Detachment had reason to believe that Mr. Christopher Klim was at his apartment.

Inspector Steve McVarnock documented in his report that he had prepared to go for a jog at 12:40 hours (12:40 p.m.), and walked through the general duty area when he came upon the briefing. Inspector Steve McVarnock documented at 13:10 hours (1:10 p.m.) that he exited the apartment building and contacted his supervisor, Chief Superintendent Don Harrison.

Constable Kenneth Simpson and Constable Kurt Veller both had documented in their respective notebooks that they arrived at the apartment of Mr. Christopher Klim at 13:03 hours (1:03 p.m.).

The analysis of the Conducted Energy Weapon revealed that it was activated three times at 1:04 p.m. (13:04:18; 13:04:31 and 13:04:37 hours). The investigation conducted by the members upon learning that Mr. Christopher Klim was at his apartment to the time of his death was conducted in approximately thirty (30) minutes.

Corporal Mark Taylor of the Vernon Detachment Professional Standards Unit documented in his notes that he was told at 13:11 hours (1:11 p.m.), by Sergeant Neil Duncan, that there had been a shooting involving Constable Andrew Forslund.

Mr. Richard Jameson had three telephone conversations within thirty (30) minutes of starting his shift at 12:30 p.m. His final conversation was with Constable Forslund, who immediately informed his Watch Commander, Constable Mike Anderson. Constable Mike Anderson held a briefing with the members who attended the apartment. Based on the aforementioned notes the briefing had commenced at 12:40 p.m.

The members then drove from the detachment to the apartment. According to the aforementioned notes the members arrived at the apartment building at 1:03 p.m.

The members required time to enter the building and get into position. Time was required to place the telephone call, knock on the door and then purge the door. Time was also required to "clear" the apartment prior to the contact with Mr. Christopher Klim.

According to members' notes, Mr. Christopher Klim had been shot by 1:10 p.m. The time of arrival to the time Inspector Steve McVarnock placed a call to Chief Superintendent Don Harrison to advise of the incident was approximately seven (7) minutes. The period of time to investigate the incident from receipt of the information to the death of Mr. Christopher Klim was under thirty minutes, thus in my opinion was conducted in a timely manner.

I therefore find that the members who attended the apartment of Christopher Klim on December 27, 2007, complied with all appropriate training, policies, procedures, guidelines and statutory requirements for the conduct of such investigation. That the policies, procedures and guidelines are adequate for such an investigation and that the investigation was conducted in an adequate and timely fashion.

Due to the exigent circumstances in dealing with individuals under the provisions of the Mental Health Act who are believed to be causing harm to themselves or to others, a warrant under Section 529.1 of the Criminal Code is not required.

Due to the size of the attachments, I have included all attachments on a CD. The CD containing the attachments is enclosed in the package to "E" Division Professional Standards Unit.

Yours truly,

R. Flewelling, Inspector
Operations Officer
Kelowna Detachment

cc: "E" Division Professional Standards Unit

Appendix D: What is a Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW)

Excerpt from the Commission’s report titled RCMP Use of the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW), Interim Report, including Recommendations for Immediate Implementation

CEWs encompass a variety of electrical weapons which generally pulse high voltage and low power into a subject in order to override his/her motor and sensory nervous system. In short, it provides an electrical shock. The effects are instantaneous and range from a localized sensation of pain to muscular incapacitation which often results in the subject being unable to maintain motor control and falling to the ground.

CEWs were originally introduced to law enforcement in the 1990s in the United States as an option in cases where lethal force would otherwise have been an option; however, their use has expanded to include subduing resistant subjects who do not pose a threat of grievous bodily harm or death and on whom the use of lethal force would not be an option. Prior to authorizing CEW use, the RCMP initiated a study on its merits. The study, entitled The Conducted Energy Weapon Evaluation Project, concluded:

While not 100 percent effective, it does provide the officer with a tool that is not matched by any of the officer's current intervention options. The ability to control a combative subject, from a distance, in a manner that is typically less injurious than conventional control techniques can only benefit the police officer and the community they serve" [emphasis added].

The underlying rationale for this expanded use is the belief that CEWs reduce the risk of injury or death to both the subject and officer when use of force is required. This belief is supported by a variety of studies and reviews drawn from both clinical and in-field data.

Appendix E: Incident Management / Intervention Model

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